

GL 335.4
MAR V.1 C.2



106600
LBSNAA

शास्त्री प्रशासन अकादमी
i Academy of Administration

मुसोरी
MUSOORIE

पुस्तकालय
LIBRARY

अवाप्ति संख्या
Accession No. _____

वर्ग संख्या
Class No. _____

पुस्तक संख्या
Book No. _____


WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

**KARL MARX
AND
FREDERICK ENGELS**

**SELECTED WORKS
IN TWO VOLUMES**

VOLUME I

**FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE
Moscow 1955**



Karl Marx



F. Engels

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

The present volume follows the Russian edition of Marx and Engels, *Selected Works, two-volume edition*, prepared by the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Vol. I (Госполитиздат, 1952). It is supplemented by Engels's Preface to the English 1888 edition of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*.

The texts of all works included herein have been rechecked with the original sources kept in the Institute.

C O N T E N T S

| | <i>Page</i> |
|---|-------------|
| <i>Preface to the Russian Edition</i> | 13 |
| MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. By <i>Karl Marx</i> and <i>Frederick Engels</i> | 21 |
| <i>Preface to the German Edition of 1872</i> | 21 |
| <i>Preface to the Russian Edition of 1882</i> | 22 |
| <i>Preface to the German Edition of 1883</i> | 24 |
| <i>Preface to the English Edition of 1888</i> | 25 |
| <i>From the Preface to the German Edition of 1890</i> | 30 |
| MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY | |
| I. Bourgeois and Proletarians | 34 |
| II. Proletarians and Communists | 46 |
| III. Socialist and Communist Literature | 54 |
| 1. Reactionary Socialism | 54 |
| a. Feudal Socialism | 54 |
| b. Petty-Bourgeois Socialism | 56 |
| c. German, or "True," Socialism | 57 |
| 2. Conservative, or Bourgeois, Socialism | 60 |
| 3. Critical-Utopian Socialism and Communism | 61 |
| IV. Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties | 64 |
| THE BOURGEOISIE AND THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION. By <i>Karl Marx</i> . Second Article | 66 |
| WAGE LABOUR AND CAPITAL. By <i>Karl Marx</i> | 70 |
| Introduction. By <i>Frederick Engels</i> | 70 |
| WAGE LABOUR AND CAPITAL | |
| I. | 79 |
| II. | 84 |
| III. | 89 |
| IV. | 93 |
| V. | 98 |

| | <i>Page</i> |
|--|-------------|
| ADDRESS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE COMMUNIST LEAGUE. By <i>Karl Marx</i> and <i>Frederick Engels</i> | 106 |
| THE CLASS STRUGGLES IN FRANCE, 1848 to 1850. By <i>Karl Marx</i> . Introduction. By <i>Frederick Engels</i> | 118 |
| THE CLASS STRUGGLES IN FRANCE, 1848 to 1850 | |
| I. The Defeat of June 1848 | 139 |
| II. June 13, 1849 | 164 |
| III. Consequences of June 13, 1849 | 195 |
| IV. The Abolition of Universal Suffrage in 1850 | 228 |
| THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE. By <i>Karl Marx</i> | 243 |
| Author's Preface to the Second Edition | 243 |
| F. Engels's Preface to the Third German Edition | 245 |
| THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE | |
| I. | 247 |
| II. | 256 |
| III. | 268 |
| IV. | 283 |
| V. | 293 |
| VI. | 311 |
| VII. | 330 |
| THE BRITISH RULE IN INDIA. By <i>Karl Marx</i> | 345 |
| THE FUTURE RESULTS OF BRITISH RULE IN INDIA. By <i>Karl Marx</i> | 352 |
| SPEECH AT THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE <i>PEOPLE'S PAPER</i> . By <i>Karl Marx</i> | 359 |
| PREFACE TO A <i>CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY</i> . By <i>Karl Marx</i> | 361 |
| KARL MARX, A <i>CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY</i> . By <i>Frederick Engels</i> | 366 |
| I. | 366 |
| II. | 370 |
| INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF THE WORKING MEN'S INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION. By <i>Karl Marx</i> | 377 |

| | <i>Page</i> |
|---|-------------|
| GENERAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION. By <i>Karl Marx</i> | 386 |
| ON PROUDHON. (Letter to J. B. Schweitzer.) By <i>Karl Marx</i> | 390 |
| WAGES, PRICE AND PROFIT. By <i>Karl Marx</i> | 398 |
| [Preliminary] | 398 |
| I. [Production and Wages]. | 399 |
| II. [Production, Wages, Profits]. | 401 |
| III. [Wages and Currency] | 409 |
| IV. [Supply and Demand]. | 412 |
| V. [Wages and Prices] | 414 |
| VI. [Value and Labour] | 416 |
| VII. Labouring Power | 424 |
| VIII. Production of Surplus Value | 426 |
| IX. Value of Labour | 428 |
| X. Profit Is Made by Selling a Commodity <i>at</i> Its Value | 430 |
| XI. The Different Parts into Which Surplus Value Is Decomposed. | 431 |
| XII. General Relation of Profits, Wages and Prices | 434 |
| XIII. Main Cases of Attempts at Raising Wages or Resisting Their Fall | 436 |
| XIV. The Struggle Between Capital and Labour and Its Results | 441 |
| PREFACE TO THE FIRST GERMAN EDITION OF THE FIRST VOLUME OF <i>CAPITAL</i> . By <i>Karl Marx</i> | 448 |
| FROM THE AFTERWORD TO THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION OF THE FIRST VOLUME OF <i>CAPITAL</i> . By <i>Karl Marx</i> | 453 |
| HISTORICAL TENDENCY OF CAPITALIST ACCUMULATION. By <i>Karl Marx</i> . Chapter XXXII of the First Volume of <i>Capital</i> | 458 |
| MARX'S <i>CAPITAL</i> . By <i>Frederick Engels</i> | 462 |
| I. | 462 |
| II. | 465 |
| FROM THE PREFACE TO THE SECOND VOLUME OF <i>CAPITAL</i> . By <i>Frederick Engels</i> | 470 |
| THE CIVIL WAR IN FRANCE. By <i>Karl Marx</i> | 473 |
| Introduction. By <i>Frederick Engels</i> | 473 |

| | <i>Page</i> |
|---|-------------|
| First Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association on the Franco-Prussian War | 486 |
| Second Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association on the Franco-Prussian War | 491 |
| Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association on the Civil War in France, 1871 | 499 |
| I. | 499 |
| II. | 509 |
| III. | 516 |
| IV. | 530 |
| Notes | 542 |
| THE HOUSING QUESTION. By <i>Frederick Engels</i> | 546 |
| Preface to the Second Edition | 546 |
| THE HOUSING QUESTION | |
| Part One. How Proudhon Solves the Housing Question | 557 |
| Part Two. How the Bourgeoisie Solves the Housing Question | 577 |
| I. | 577 |
| II. | 591 |
| III. | 606 |
| Part Three. Supplement on Proudhon and the Housing Question. | |
| I. | 610 |
| II. | 615 |
| III. | 624 |
| IV. | 629 |
| ON AUTHORITY. By <i>Frederick Engels</i> | 635 |
| PREFATORY NOTE TO <i>THE PEASANT WAR IN GERMANY.</i> By <i>Frederick Engels</i> | 639 |

INDEXES

| | |
|--------------------------------|-----|
| <i>NAME INDEX</i> | 657 |
| <i>SUBJECT INDEX</i> | 671 |

KARL MARX
AND
FREDERICK ENGELS
SELECTED WORKS
VOLUME I

PREFACE TO THE RUSSIAN EDITION

The present anthology includes the most important works of Marx and Engels, which elucidate all the three component parts of Marxism: philosophy, political economy and socialism. Marx and Engels critically remoulded all the finest achievements of human thought in the fields of philosophy, political economy and socialism, generalized the age-old experience of the struggle of the oppressed classes against their enslavers and created the doctrine of scientific socialism. This was a revolutionary upheaval; it ushered in a new era in the development of social thought.

Unlike all other philosophical and political systems Marxism expresses the fundamental interests of the working class and of all toiling humanity. Marxism is not a doctrine held by isolated individuals or by founders of sects but is a teaching addressed to the proletariat and destined to serve as its compass in its revolutionary struggle. Marxism is the banner, the creed, of the working class, to which it revealed its historic mission, the emancipation of mankind from all oppression and exploitation, and showed the way to the building of communist society. Herein lies the strength of Marxism; this renders it invincible.

Marxism hewed its way by dint of relentless struggle against reactionary idealist philosophy, against bourgeois political economy, against sectarian and petty-bourgeois socialism.

In the famous programme document, the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, with which the present two-volume edition begins, Marx and Engels gave a classical exposition of the basic ideas of scientific socialism. "With the clarity and brilliance of genius," Lenin noted, "this work outlines the new world conception, consistent materialism, which also embraces the realm

of social life, dialectics, as the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development, the theory of the class struggle and of the world-historic revolutionary role of the proletariat—the creator of the new, communist society.” The *Manifesto of the Communist Party* has supplied the millions of proletarians in all countries with the theoretical weapon needed to combat capitalist slavery. It has revealed to them the future and has mapped out for them a militant programme of action.

The *Selected Works* contain three books by Marx on nineteenth-century French history: *The Class Struggles in France*, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* and *The Civil War in France*—splendid illustrations of the application of the method of historical materialism to the analysis of concrete events of history. At the same time they are of great theoretical importance: they reflect the development of the Marxist doctrine of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. True leader of the proletarian movement that he was, Marx himself learned from the masses, these makers of history, and enriched revolutionary theory with the lessons derived from their struggle. The valuable experience of the revolution of 1848-49 lent impetus to the development and concretization of Marx's views on the state. Whereas in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* we are still given but a general formulation of the inevitability of the conquest of political power by the proletariat, in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* Marx, generalizing the experience of the struggle of classes in France in 1848-51, arrived at the conclusion that in order to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat one must first of all smash the old military-bureaucratic machine, the apparatus of the class rule of the bourgeoisie. Subsequently, the heroic exploit of the Paris Communards led Marx to take a new and extremely important step in the development of his doctrine. In analyzing, in his work, *The Civil War in France*, the attempt of the popular masses to set up in Paris their own, a workers' government, Marx drew the conclusion that precisely a political organization of the type of the Paris Commune, and not a parliamentary republic, was the most expedient form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Finally, in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, an outstanding document directed against the opportunists, who were endeavouring to distort the revolutionary spirit of Marxism, Marx pointed out the necessity and historic inevitability of a political transition period during which the state must neces-

sarily be the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. It is in this work of invaluable theoretical and practical importance that Marx for the first time formulated his well-known proposition that socialism and communism are two phases of development of the new, communist system of society.

There is an indestructible inner unity between proletarian socialism and dialectical materialism, the world outlook of the revolutionary proletariat. "Marxism," wrote Comrade Stalin, "is not only a theory of socialism; it is an integral world outlook, a philosophical system, from which Marx's proletarian socialism logically follows."

In the *Thesis on Feuerbach*, which Engels designated as "the first document in which is deposited the brilliant germ of the new world outlook," Marx proclaimed as early as 1845 that an inseverable bond united philosophy and social practice. Only dialectical materialism, the sole truly scientific world outlook, can be the philosophy of the proletariat, the revolutionary class destined to transform the world. In disclosing the class character of the struggle between idealism and materialism Marx and Engels upheld the principle of partisanship in philosophy. "Marx and Engels," wrote Lenin, "were partisans in philosophy from start to finish; they were able to detect the deviations from materialism and concessions to idealism and fideism in each and every 'new' tendency."

In his preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* Marx formulated in the words of a genius the essence of historical materialism, that is, the application of the propositions of dialectical materialism to social life.

Engels's *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* is numbered among the classics that expound Marxism as an integral world outlook. This work consists of three chapters from *Anti-Dühring*, which were rewritten by Engels for the express purpose of giving the workers a popular explanation of the Marxian teaching. Engels briefly described the three component parts of Marxism and showed that all the world's achievements in the field of culture were refashioned by the critical mind of Marx, and that Marx created a new world outlook which differed qualitatively from all previous social teachings.

Ludwig Feuerbach, also by Engels, is a militant defence and substantiation of the materialist world outlook. Here Engels classically formulated the basic question of philosophy—the relation

of thinking to being, of spirit to nature, the question which divides philosophers into two camps, idealists and materialists. In his *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* and *Ludwig Feuerbach* Engels laid special stress upon the opposition of the materialist dialectics of Marx to the idealist dialectics of Hegel and revealed the defects and limitations of the metaphysical materialism of Feuerbach.

Great theoretical importance attaches to the separate letters, contained in this edition, of Marx and Engels on questions of historical materialism. In his letters to Annenkov and Weydemeyer, Marx briefly formulated the new matter that he had contributed to the theory of social development and the class struggle. Engels in his letters of 1890-1891, included in the present collection, sharply criticizes the vulgarization of the materialist conception of history and the under-estimation of the ideological factor in the development of society and the struggle of classes.

Engels's *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* is an excellent example of the masterly application of the theory of historical materialism to the history of social development. Here the author discloses the sources of the origin of the family, the gens, private property, classes and the state, shows the regularity of their development and their dependence upon the material mode of production, and explains why certain social forms are inevitably superseded by others. Lenin ranked this book by Engels among the principal works of modern socialism.

Capital, Marx's immortal masterpiece, contains a classic analysis of the economic law of motion of capitalist society, an investigation of this society and of its rise, development and decline. Included in the present edition is Section 7 of the famous Chapter XXIV,¹ Volume I, with which section this chapter concludes. In this section Marx reveals the historical tendency of capitalist accumulation, the inevitable intensification of the contradictions between the working class and the bourgeoisie, the inevitability of the proletarian revolution and of the "expropriation of the expropriators." Engels's review of the first volume of *Capital* not only acquaints the reader at large with its contents, but also shows the world-historic significance of the struggle of the working class and expounds the doctrine of surplus value, "the corner-stone of Marx's economic theory." (*V. I. Lenin.*)

¹ This corresponds to Chapter XXXII of Volume I, Eng. ed., Moscow 1954, pp. 761-64.—*Ed.*

The present collection further contains two works which Marx intended for the mass of the workers. The first of these, *Wage Labour and Capital*, is based on lectures delivered by the author in 1847 at the German Workers' Society in Brussels. The second, *Wages, Price and Profit*, is an address delivered by Marx at two sittings of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association in 1865. In these works Marx makes a profound theoretical analysis, couched in popular language, of the economic relations upon which bourgeois class rule rests, explains the origin and substance of surplus value and helps the reader draw the revolutionary conclusion that the working class must fight for the abolition of wage slavery.

One of the principal works of scientific socialism is Engels's *The Housing Question*. It contains a criticism of the Proudhonist projects for the solution of this problem, and this criticism Engels converts into an indictment of the entire capitalist system. In contradistinction to the Proudhonist and other social reformers Engels emphatically denies that the housing question can find a solution under capitalism. He considers here the important theoretical question of abolishing the antithesis between town and country and points out that this will be possible only under the conditions of communist society.

The founders of scientific socialism were the first organizers and leaders of the international proletariat. From the very outset the elaboration of the theory of Marxism unflinchingly went hand in hand with the struggle waged by Marx and Engels to establish a proletarian party. As is known, the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* was written to serve as the programme of the Communist League founded by them, the first international communist organization of the proletariat. In "On the History of the Communist League," an article by Engels, the activities of this organization are briefly outlined. Marx's activities during the revolution of 1848-49 in Germany are illuminated in another article written by Engels, "Marx and the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*." The celebrated *Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League* sums up the revolutionary struggle of 1848-49 and formulates the theses of uninterrupted revolution, which Lenin in the epoch of imperialism developed into the theory of the growth of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution.

When a new upsurge of the working-class movement gave birth to the International Working Men's Association (1864-72),

Marx assumed the leadership of this organization and wrote for it the Inaugural Address and the Rules, wherein he proposed in the simplest terms, intelligible to all workers, the task of creating an independent proletarian party to carry on the struggle against capitalism.

Marx wrote most of the documents of the International Association, including the two *Addresses on the Franco-Prussian War* forming part of the present selection. His classic *The Civil War in France* was likewise an address of the International Working Men's Association. Marx's article "On Proudhon," Engels's articles "On Authority" and "Social Relations in Russia," and a number of other articles and letters contained in the two volumes strikingly reflect the consistent struggle of the founders of Marxism against all forms of utopian and petty-bourgeois socialism, and against sectarianism in the working-class movement.

During the next stage of the development of the working-class movement in Europe, which witnessed the rise of socialist workers' parties in various countries, Marx and Engels, now the recognized leaders of the international proletariat, fought for the consolidation of these parties and against open opportunism, conciliationism and leftist phrasemongering. This struggle found reflection in such works as the *Critique of the Gotha Programme* mentioned above, the Preface to the second edition of *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*, *The Peasant Question in France and Germany* and others that make up the present selection.

The works in this anthology contain an exposition of the foundations of revolutionary theory, which the founders of Marxism constantly developed and perfected for half a century. After the death of Marx and Engels the leaders of the Second International distorted the revolutionary teachings of Marx for the benefit of the bourgeoisie, sought to convert them into an assemblage of petrified dogmas. On the eve of decisive encounters with capitalism it was necessary to maintain the revolutionary spirit of Marxism, to banish petty politics, renegation and treason to the cause of the proletariat from the ranks of the working class. It is the great merit of Lenin that he accomplished the task of a "general overhauling and general cleansing of the Augean stables of the Second International." Marxian theory, as the science that treats of society, as the science of the proletarian revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the ways and means of building

communist society, cannot mark time; it must enrich itself with new experience and new knowledge. In the new historic conditions it was necessary to advance revolutionary theory, whose foundations had been laid by Marx and Engels. "It may be said without fear of exaggeration that since the death of Engels the master theoretician Lenin, and after Lenin, Stalin and the other disciples of Lenin, have been the only Marxists who have advanced the Marxist theory and who have enriched it with new experience in the new conditions of the class struggle of the proletariat. And just because Lenin and the Leninists have advanced the Marxist theory, Leninism is a further development of Marxism; it is Marxism in the new conditions of the class struggle of the proletariat, Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, Marxism of the epoch of the victory of socialism on one-sixth of the earth's surface." (*History of the C.P.S.U.[B.], Short Course.*)

By its contribution of new theoretical propositions to the Marxist-Leninist science, the Party of Lenin and Stalin advances this science and is constantly guided by it in its activities.

* * *

The translations of all works of Marx and Engels included in this edition have been checked and corrected.

Each of the two volumes is provided with a name and subject index. Authors' notes are given at the bottom of the page. Editorial notes, given at the bottom of the page, are distinctly indicated as such.

***Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute
under the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union***

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

PREFACE TO THE GERMAN EDITION OF 1872

The Communist League, an international association of workers, which could of course be only a secret one under the conditions obtaining at the time, commissioned the undersigned, at the Congress held in London in November 1847, to draw up for publication a detailed theoretical and practical programme of the Party. Such was the origin of the following Manifesto, the manuscript of which travelled to London, to be printed, a few weeks before the February Revolution.¹ First published in German, it has been republished in that language in at least twelve different editions in Germany, England and America. It was published in English for the first time in 1850 in the *Red Republican*, London, translated by Miss Helen Macfarlane, and in 1871 in at least three different translations in America. A French version first appeared in Paris shortly before the June insurrection of 1848 and recently in *Le Socialiste* of New York. A new translation is in the course of preparation. A Polish version appeared in London shortly after it was first published in German. A Russian translation was published in Geneva in the sixties. Into Danish, too, it was translated shortly after its first appearance.

However much the state of things may have altered during the last twenty-five years, the general principles laid down in this Manifesto are, on the whole, as correct today as ever. Here and there some detail might be improved. The practical application of the principles will depend, as the Manifesto itself states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing, and, for that reason, no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end of Section II. That

¹ The February Revolution in France, 1848.—*Ed.*

passage would, in many respects, be very differently worded today. In view of the gigantic strides of Modern Industry in the last twenty-five years, and of the accompanying improved and extended party organization of the working class, in view of the practical experience gained, first in the February Revolution, and then, still more, in the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months, this programme has in some details become antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, *viz.*, that "the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes." (See *The Civil War in France; Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association*, London, Truelove, 1871, p. 15, where this point is further developed.)¹ Further, it is self-evident that the criticism of socialist literature is deficient in relation to the present time, because it comes down only to 1847; also, that the remarks on the relation of the Communists to the various opposition parties (Section IV), although in principle still correct, yet in practice are antiquated, because the political situation has been entirely changed, and the progress of history has swept from off the earth the greater portion of the political parties there enumerated.

But, then, the Manifesto has become a historical document which we have no longer any right to alter. A subsequent edition may perhaps appear with an introduction bridging the gap from 1847 to the present day; this reprint was too unexpected to leave us time for that.

Karl Marx Frederick Engels

London, June 24, 1872

Written by Marx and Engels for the
German edition which appeared in
Leipzig in 1872

Printed according to the 1872
edition
Translated from the German

PREFACE TO THE RUSSIAN EDITION OF 1882

The first Russian edition of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, translated by Bakunin, was published early in the sixties² by the printing office of the *Kolokol*. Then the West could see in

¹ See p. 516 of this volume.—*Ed.*

² The date is not correctly indicated; the edition referred to appeared in 1869.—*Ed.*

it (the *Russian* edition of the Manifesto) only a literary curiosity. Such a view would be impossible today.

What a limited field the proletarian movement still occupied at that time (December 1847) is most clearly shown by the last section of the Manifesto: the position of the Communists in relation to the various opposition parties in the various countries. Precisely Russia and the United States are missing here. It was the time when Russia constituted the last great reserve of all European reaction, when the United States absorbed the surplus proletarian forces of Europe through immigration. Both countries provided Europe with raw materials and were at the same time markets for the sale of its industrial products. At that time both were, therefore, in one way or another, pillars of the existing European order.

How very different today! Precisely European immigration fitted North America for a gigantic agricultural production, whose competition is shaking the very foundations of European landed property—large and small. In addition it enabled the United States to exploit its tremendous industrial resources with an energy and on a scale that must shortly break the industrial monopoly of Western Europe, and especially of England, existing up to now. Both circumstances react in revolutionary manner upon America itself. Step by step the small and middle land ownership of the farmers, the basis of the whole political constitution, is succumbing to the competition of giant farms; simultaneously, a mass proletariat and a fabulous concentration of capitals are developing for the first time in the industrial regions.

And now Russia! During the Revolution of 1848-49 not only the European princes, but the European bourgeois as well, found their only salvation from the proletariat, just beginning to awaken, in Russian intervention. The tsar was proclaimed the chief of European reaction. Today he is a prisoner of war of the revolution, in Gatchina, and Russia forms the vanguard of revolutionary action in Europe.

The Communist Manifesto had as its object the proclamation of the inevitably impending dissolution of modern bourgeois property. But in Russia we find, face to face with the rapidly developing capitalist swindle and bourgeois landed property, just beginning to develop, more than half the land owned in common by the peasants. Now the question is: can the Russian *obshchina*,¹

¹ *Obshchina*: Village community.—Ed.

though greatly undermined, yet a form of the primeval common ownership of land, pass directly to the higher form of communist common ownership? Or, on the contrary, must it first pass through the same process of dissolution as constitutes the historical evolution of the West?

The only answer to that possible today is this: If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other, the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting-point for a communist development.

Karl Marx F. Engels

London, January 21, 1882

Written by Marx and Engels for
the second Russian edition, which
appeared in Geneva in 1882

Printed according to the ms.
Translated from the German

PREFACE TO THE GERMAN EDITION OF 1883

The preface to the present edition I must, alas, sign alone. Marx, the man to whom the whole working class of Europe and America owes more than to anyone else, rests at Highgate Cemetery and over his grave the first grass is already growing. Since his death, there can be even less thought of revising or supplementing the Manifesto. All the more do I consider it necessary again to state here the following expressly:

The basic thought running through the Manifesto—that economic production and the structure of society of every historical epoch necessarily arising therefrom constitute the foundation for the political and intellectual history of that epoch; that consequently (ever since the dissolution of the primeval communal ownership of land) all history has been a history of class struggles, of struggles between exploited and exploiting, between dominated and dominating classes at various stages of social development; that this struggle, however, has now reached a stage where the exploited and oppressed class (the proletariat) can no longer emancipate itself from the class which exploits and oppresses it (the bourgeoisie), without at the same time forever freeing

the whole of society from exploitation, oppression and class struggles—this basic thought belongs solely and exclusively to Marx.¹

I have already stated this many times; but precisely now it is necessary that it also stand in front of the Manifesto itself.

F. Engels

London, June 28, 1883

Written by Engels for the German edition which appeared in Göttingen-Zurich in 1883

Printed according to the 1883 edition
Translated from the German

PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION OF 1888

The "Manifesto" was published as the platform of the "Communist League," a working-men's association, first exclusively German, later on international, and, under the political conditions of the Continent before 1848, unavoidably a secret society. At a Congress of the League, held in London in November, 1847, Marx and Engels were commissioned to prepare for publication a complete theoretical and practical party-programme. Drawn up in German, in January, 1848, the manuscript was sent to the printer in London a few weeks before the French revolution of February 24th. A French translation was brought out in Paris, shortly before the insurrection of June, 1848. The first English translation, by Miss Helen Macfarlane, appeared in George Julian Harney's "Red Republican," London, 1850. A Danish and a Polish edition had also been published.

The defeat of the Parisian insurrection of June, 1848,—the first great battle between Proletariat and Bourgeoisie—drove again into the background, for a time, the social and political aspirations of the European working class. Thenceforth, the struggle for

¹ "This proposition," I wrote in the preface to the English translation, "which, in my opinion, is destined to do for history what Darwin's theory has done for biology, we, both of us, had been gradually approaching for some years before 1845. How far I had independently progressed towards it, is best shown by my 'Condition of the Working Class in England.' But when I again met Marx at Brussels, in spring, 1845, he had it ready worked out, and put it before me, in terms almost as clear as those in which I have stated it here." [*Note by Engels to the German edition of 1890.*]

supremacy was again, as it had been before the revolution of February, solely between different sections of the propertied class; the working class was reduced to a fight for political elbow-room, and to the position of extreme wing of the middle-class Radicals. Wherever independent proletarian movements continued to show signs of life, they were ruthlessly hunted down. Thus the Prussian police hunted out the Central Board of the Communist League, then located in Cologne. The members were arrested, and, after eighteen months' imprisonment, they were tried in October, 1852. This celebrated "Cologne Communist trial" lasted from October 4th till November 12th; seven of the prisoners were sentenced to terms of imprisonment in a fortress, varying from three to six years. Immediately after the sentence, the League was formally dissolved by the remaining members. As to the "Manifesto," it seemed thenceforth to be doomed to oblivion.

When the European working class had recovered sufficient strength for another attack on the ruling classes, the International Working Men's Association sprang up. But this association, formed with the express aim of welding into one body the whole militant proletariat of Europe and America, could not at once proclaim the principles laid down in the "Manifesto." The International was bound to have a programme broad enough to be acceptable to the English Trades' Unions, to the followers of Proudhon in France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain, and to the Lassalleans* in Germany. Marx, who drew up this programme to the satisfaction of all parties, entirely trusted to the intellectual development of the working class, which was sure to result from combined action and mutual discussion. The very events and vicissitudes of the struggle against Capital, the defeats even more than the victories, could not help bringing home to men's minds the insufficiency of their various favourite nostrums, and preparing the way for a more complete insight into the true conditions of working-class emancipation. And Marx was right. The International, on its breaking up in 1874, left the workers quite different men from what it had found them in 1864. Proudhonism in France, Lassalleanism in Germany were dying out, and even the Conservative English Trades' Unions, though most of them

* Lassalle personally, to us, always acknowledged himself to be a disciple of Marx, and, as such, stood on the ground of the "Manifesto." But in his public agitation, 1862-64, he did not go beyond demanding co-operative workshops supported by State credit. [*Note by Engels.*]

had long since severed their connexion with the International, were gradually advancing towards that point at which, last year at Swansea, their President could say in their name "Continental Socialism has lost its terrors for us." In fact: the principles of the "Manifesto" had made considerable headway among the working men of all countries.

The "Manifesto" itself thus came to the front again. The German text had been, since 1850, reprinted several times in Switzerland, England and America. In 1872, it was translated into English in New York, where the translation was published in "Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly." From this English version, a French one was made in "*Le Socialiste*" of New York. Since then at least two more English translations, more or less mutilated, have been brought out in America, and one of them has been reprinted in England. The first Russian translation, made by Bakounine, was published at Herzen's "Kolokol" office in Geneva, about 1863; a second one, by the heroic Vera Zasulich,¹ also in Geneva, 1882. A new Danish edition is to be found in "Socialdemokratisk Bibliothek," Copenhagen, 1885; a fresh French translation in "*Le Socialiste*," Paris, 1885. From this latter a Spanish version was prepared and published in Madrid, 1886. The German reprints are not to be counted, there have been twelve altogether at the least. An Armenian translation, which was to be published in Constantinople some months ago, did not see the light, I am told, because the publisher was afraid of bringing out a book with the name of Marx on it, while the translator declined to call it his own production. Of further translations into other languages I have heard, but have not seen them. Thus the history of the "Manifesto" reflects, to a great extent, the history of the modern working-class movement; at present it is undoubtedly the most wide-spread, the most international production of all Socialist literature, the common platform acknowledged by millions of working men from Siberia to California.

Yet, when it was written, we could not have called it a *Socialist* Manifesto. By Socialists, in 1847, were understood, on the one hand, the adherents of the various Utopian systems: Owenites in England, Fourierists in France, both of them already re-

¹ The translation was made by G. V. Plekhanov as Engels himself later pointed out in his postscript to the article "Social Relations in Russia."—*Ed.*

duced to the position of mere sects, and gradually dying out; on the other hand, the most multifarious social quacks, who, by all manners of tinkering, professed to redress, without any danger to capital and profit, all sorts of social grievances, in both cases men outside the working-class movement, and looking rather to the "educated" classes for support. Whatever portion of the working class had become convinced of the insufficiency of mere political revolutions, and had proclaimed the necessity of a total social change, that portion then called itself Communist. It was a crude, rough-hewn, purely instinctive sort of Communism; still, it touched the cardinal point and was powerful enough amongst the working class to produce the Utopian Communism, in France, of Cabet, and in Germany, of Weitling. Thus, Socialism was, in 1847, a middle-class movement, Communism a working-class movement. Socialism was, on the Continent at least, "respectable"; Communism was the very opposite. And as our notion, from the very beginning, was that "the emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself," there could be no doubt as to which of the two names we must take. Moreover, we have, ever since, been far from repudiating it.

The "Manifesto" being our joint production, I consider myself bound to state that the fundamental proposition, which forms its nucleus, belongs to Marx. That proposition is: that in every historical epoch, the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch; that consequently the whole history of mankind (since the dissolution of primitive tribal society, holding land in common ownership) has been a history of class struggles, contests between exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes; that the history of these class struggles forms a series of evolutions in which, now-a-days, a stage has been reached where the exploited and oppressed class—the proletariat—cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and ruling class—the bourgeoisie—without, at the same time, and once and for all, emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class distinctions and class struggles.

This proposition which, in my opinion, is destined to do for history what Darwin's theory has done for biology, we, both of us, had been gradually approaching for some years before 1845.

How far I had independently progressed towards it, is best shown by my "Condition of the Working Class in England."¹ But when I again met Marx at Brussels, in spring, 1845, he had it ready worked out, and put it before me, in terms almost as clear as those in which I have stated it here.

From our joint preface to the German edition of 1872, I quote the following:—

"However much the state of things may have altered during the last twenty-five years, the general principles laid down in this Manifesto are, on the whole, as correct today as ever. Here and there some detail might be improved. The practical application of the principles will depend, as the Manifesto itself states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing, and, for that reason, no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end of Section II. That passage would, in many respects, be very differently worded today. In view of the gigantic strides of Modern Industry since 1848, and of the accompanying improved and extended organization of the working class,² in view of the practical experience gained, first in the February Revolution, and then, still more, in the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months, this programme has in some details become antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, *viz.*, that 'the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made State machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.' (See "The Civil War in France; Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association," London, Truelove, 1871, p. 15, where this point is further developed.) Further, it is self-evident, that the criticism of socialist literature is deficient in relation to the present time, because it comes down only to 1847; also, that the remarks on the relation of the Communists to the various opposition parties (Section IV.), although in principle still correct, yet in practice are antiquated, because the political situation has been entirely changed, and the progress of history has swept from off the earth the greater portion of the political parties there enumerated.

¹ "The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844." By Frederick Engels. Translated by Florence K. Wischnewetzky, New York. Lovell—London. W. Reeves, 1888. [*Note by Engels.*]

² In the German original of 1872 this phrase is worded somewhat differently. See p. 22 of this volume.—*Ed.*

"But then, the Manifesto has become a historical document which we have no longer any right to alter."

The present translation is by Mr. Samuel Moore, the translator of the greater portion of Marx's "Capital." We have revised it in common, and I have added a few notes explanatory of historical allusions.

Frederick Engels

London, 30th January, 1888

Written by Engels in English for
the English edition which appeared
in London in 1888

Printed according to the 1888 edition

FROM THE PREFACE TO THE GERMAN EDITION OF 1890

The Manifesto has had a history of its own. Greeted with enthusiasm, at the time of its appearance, by the then still not at all numerous vanguard of scientific socialism (as is proved by the translations mentioned in the first preface), it was soon forced into the background by the reaction that began with the defeat of the Paris workers in June 1848, and was finally excommunicated "according to law" by the conviction of the Cologne Communists in November 1852. With the disappearance from the public scene of the workers' movement that had begun with the February Revolution, the Manifesto too passed into the background.

When the working class of Europe had again gathered sufficient strength for a new onslaught upon the power of the ruling classes, the International Working Men's Association came into being. Its aim was to weld together into *one* huge army the whole militant working class of Europe and America. Therefore it could not *set out* from the principles laid down in the Manifesto. It was bound to have a programme which would not shut the door on the English trade unions, the French, Belgian, Italian and Spanish Proudhonists and the German Lassalleans.¹ This pro-

¹ Lassalle personally, to us, always acknowledged himself to be a "disciple" of Marx, and, as such, stood, of course, on the ground of the Manifesto. Matters were quite different with regard to those of his followers who did not go beyond his demand for producers' co-operatives supported by state credits and who divided the whole working class into supporters of state assistance and supporters of self-assistance. [*Note by Engels.*]

gramme—the preamble to the Rules of the International¹—was drawn up by Marx with a master hand acknowledged even by Bakunin and the Anarchists. For the ultimate triumph of the ideas set forth in the Manifesto Marx relied solely and exclusively upon the intellectual development of the working class, as it necessarily had to ensue from united action and discussion. The events and vicissitudes in the struggle against capital, the defeats even more than the successes, could not but demonstrate to the fighters the inadequacy of their former universal panaceas and make their minds more receptive to a thorough understanding of the true conditions for the emancipation of the workers. And Marx was right. The working class of 1874, at the dissolution of the International, was altogether different from that of 1864, at its foundation. Proudhonism in the Latin countries and the specific Lassalleanism in Germany were dying out, and even the then arch-conservative English trade unions were gradually approaching the point where in 1887 the chairman of their Swansea Congress could say in their name: “Continental socialism has lost its terrors for us.” Yet by 1887 Continental socialism was almost exclusively the theory heralded in the Manifesto. Thus, to a certain extent, the history of the Manifesto reflects the history of the modern working-class movement since 1848. At present it is doubtless the most widely circulated, the most international product of all socialist literature, the common programme of many millions of workers of all countries, from Siberia to California.

Nevertheless, when it appeared we could not have called it a *Socialist Manifesto*. In 1847 two kinds of people were considered Socialists. On the one hand were the adherents of the various Utopian systems, notably the Owenites in England and the Fourierists in France, both of whom at that date had already dwindled to mere sects gradually dying out. On the other, the manifold types of social quacks who wanted to eliminate social abuses through their various universal panaceas and all kinds of patchwork, without hurting capital and profit in the least. In both cases, people who stood outside the labour movement and who looked for support rather to the “educated” classes. The section of the working class, however, which demanded a radical reconstruction of society, convinced that mere political revolutions were not enough, then called itself *Communist*. It was still a

¹ See pp. 386-87 of this volume.—*Ed.*

rough-hewn, only instinctive, and frequently somewhat crude communism. Yet it was powerful enough to bring into being two systems of Utopian Communism—in France the “Icarian” communism of Cabet, and in Germany that of Weitling. Socialism in 1847 signified a bourgeois movement, communism a working-class movement. Socialism was, on the Continent at least, quite respectable, whereas communism was the very opposite. And since we were very decidedly of the opinion as early as then that “the emancipation of the workers must be the act of the working class itself,” we could have no hesitations as to which of the two names we should choose. Nor has it ever occurred to us since to repudiate it.

“Working men of all countries, unite!” But few voices responded when we proclaimed these words to the world forty-two years ago, on the eve of the first Paris Revolution in which the proletariat came out with demands of its own. On September 28, 1864, however, the proletarians of most of the Western European countries united to form the International Working Men’s Association of glorious memory. True, the International itself lived only nine years. But that the eternal union of the proletarians of all countries created by it is still alive and lives stronger than ever, there is no better witness than this day. Because today, as I write these lines, the European and American proletariat is reviewing its fighting forces, mobilized for the first time, mobilized as *one* army, under *one* flag, for *one* immediate aim: the standard eight-hour working day, to be established by legal enactment, as proclaimed by the Geneva Congress of the International in 1866, and again by the Paris Workers’ Congress in 1889. And today’s spectacle will open the eyes of the capitalists and landlords of all countries to the fact that today the working men of all countries are united indeed.

If only Marx were still by my side to see this with his own eyes!

F. Engels

London, May 1, 1890

Written by Engels for the German edition which appeared in London in 1890

Printed according to the 1890 edition
Translated from the German

MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism. All the Powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies.

Where is the party in opposition that has not been decried as Communistic by its opponents in power? Where the Opposition that has not hurled back the branding reproach of Communism, against the more advanced opposition parties, as well as against its reactionary adversaries?

Two things result from this fact.

I. Communism is already acknowledged by all European Powers to be itself a Power.

II. It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the whole world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet this nursery tale of the Spectre of Communism with a Manifesto of the party itself.

To this end, Communists of various nationalities have assembled in London, and sketched the following Manifesto, to be published in the English, French, German, Italian, Flemish and Danish languages.

I

BOURGEOIS AND PROLETARIANS^a

The history of all hitherto existing society^b is the history of class struggles.

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master^c and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.

In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations.

The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.

Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisic, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class antagonisms.

^a By bourgeoisie is meant the class of modern Capitalists, owners of the means of social production and employers of wage-labour. By proletariat, the class of modern wage-labourers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour-power in order to live. [Note by Engels to the English edition of 1888.]

^b That is, all written history. In 1847, the pre-history of society, the social organization existing previous to recorded history, was all but unknown. Since then, Haxthausen discovered common ownership of land in Russia, Maurer proved it to be the social foundation from which all Teutonic races started in history, and by and bye village communities were found to be, or to have been the primitive form of society everywhere from India to Ireland. The inner organization of this primitive Communitistic society was laid bare, in its typical form, by Morgan's crowning discovery of the true nature of the *gens* and its relation to the *tribe*. With the dissolution of these primaeval communities society begins to be differentiated into separate and finally antagonistic classes. I have attempted to retrace this process of dissolution in: "Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats" [The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State], 2nd edition, Stuttgart 1886. [Note by Engels to the English edition of 1888.]

^c Guild-master, that is, a full member of a guild, a master within, not a head of a guild. [Note by Engels to the English edition of 1888.]

Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.

From the serfs of the Middle Ages sprang the chartered burghers of the earliest towns. From these burghesses the first elements of the bourgeoisie were developed. -

The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie. The East-Indian and Chinese markets, the colonisation of America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the means of exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry, an impulse never before known, and thereby, to the revolutionary element in the tottering feudal society, a rapid development.

The feudal system of industry, under which industrial production was monopolised by closed guilds, now no longer sufficed for the growing wants of the new markets. The manufacturing system took its place. The guild-masters were pushed on one side by the manufacturing middle class; division of labour between the different corporate guilds vanished in the face of division of labour in each single workshop.

Meantime the markets kept ever growing, the demand ever rising. Even manufacture no longer sufficed. Thereupon, steam and machinery revolutionised industrial production. The place of manufacture was taken by the giant, Modern Industry, the place of the industrial middle class, by industrial millionaires, the leaders of whole industrial armies, the modern bourgeois.

Modern industry has established the world-market, for which the discovery of America paved the way. This market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. This development has, in its turn, reacted on the extension of industry; and in proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, and pushed into the background every class handed down from the Middle Ages.

We see, therefore, how the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange.

Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that class. An oppressed class under the sway of the feudal nobility, an armed

and self-governing association in the mediaeval commune;^d here independent urban republic (as in Italy and Germany), there taxable "third estate" of the monarchy (as in France), afterwards, in the period of manufacture proper, serving either the semi-feudal or the absolute monarchy as a counterpoise against the nobility, and, in fact, corner-stone of the great monarchies in general, the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of Modern Industry and of the world-market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.

The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part.

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment." It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.

The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage-labourers.

The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation.

^d "Commune" was the name taken, in France, by the nascent towns even before they had conquered from their feudal lords and masters local self-government and political rights as the "Third Estate." Generally speaking, for the economical development of the bourgeoisie, England is here taken as the typical country; for its political development, France. [*Note by Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

This was the name given their urban communities by the townsmen of Italy and France, after they had purchased or wrested their initial rights of self-government from their feudal lords. [*Note by Engels to the German edition of 1890.*]

The bourgeoisie has disclosed how it came to pass that the brutal display of vigour in the Middle Ages, which Reactionists so much admire, found its fitting complement in the most slothful indolence. It has been the first to shew what man's activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former Exoduses of nations and crusades.

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere.

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilised nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal

inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world-literature.

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, *i.e.*, to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.

The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life. Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilised ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.

The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and of property. It has agglomerated population, centralised means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralisation. Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments and systems of taxation, became lumped together into one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class-interest, one frontier and one customs-tariff.

The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground—what

earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?

We see then: the means of production and of exchange, on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal organisation of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.

Into their place stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted to it, and by the economical and political sway of the bourgeois class.

A similar movement is going on before our own eyes. Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells. For many a decade past the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and of its rule. It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put on its trial, each time more threateningly, the existence of the entire bourgeois society. In these crises a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are periodically destroyed. In these crises there breaks out an epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity—the epidemic of over-production. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because there is too much civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce. The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole of

bourgeois society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property. The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented.

The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself.

But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons—the modern working class—the proletarians.

In proportion as the bourgeoisie, *i.e.*, capital, is developed, in the same proportion is the proletariat, the modern working class, developed—a class of labourers, who live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their labour increases capital. These labourers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market.

Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labour, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack, that is required of him. Hence, the cost of production of a workman is restricted, almost entirely, to the means of subsistence that he requires for his maintenance, and for the propagation of his race. But the price of a commodity, and therefore also of labour,¹ is equal to its cost of production. In proportion, therefore, as the repulsiveness of the work increases, the wage decreases. Nay more, in proportion as the use of machinery and division of labour increases, in the same proportion the burden of toil also increases, whether by prolongation of the working hours, by increase of the work exacted in a given time or by increased speed of the machinery, etc.

¹ Subsequently Marx pointed out that the worker does not sell his labour but his labour power. See in this connection Engels's introduction to Marx's *Wage Labour and Capital*, 1891. See pp. 70-78 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Modern industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory, are organised like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants. Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois State; they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the over-looker, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty, the more hateful and the more embittering it is.

The less the skill and exertion of strength implied in manual labour, in other words, the more modern industry becomes developed, the more is the labour of men superseded by that of women. Differences of age and sex have no longer any distinctive social validity for the working class. All are instruments of labour, more or less expensive to use, according to their age and sex.

No sooner is the exploitation of the labour by the manufacturer, so far, at an end, than he receives his wages in cash, than he is set upon by the other portions of the bourgeoisie, the landlord, the shopkeeper, the pawnbroker, etc.

The lower strata of the middle class—the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants—all these sink gradually into the proletariat, partly because their diminutive capital does not suffice for the scale on which Modern Industry is carried on, and is swamped in the competition with the large capitalists, partly because their specialised skill is rendered worthless by new methods of production. Thus the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population.

The proletariat goes through various stages of development. With its birth begins its struggle with the bourgeoisie. At first the contest is carried on by individual labourers, then by the workpeople of a factory, then by the operatives of one trade, in one locality, against the individual bourgeois who directly exploits them. They direct their attacks not against the bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of production themselves; they destroy imported wares that compete with their labour, they smash to pieces machinery, they set factories ablaze, they seek to restore by force the vanished status of the workman of the Middle Ages.

At this stage the labourers still form an incoherent mass scattered over the whole country, and broken up by their mutual competition. If anywhere they unite to form more compact bodies, this is not yet the consequence of their own active union, but of the union of the bourgeoisie, which class, in order to attain its own political ends, is compelled to set the whole proletariat in motion, and is moreover yet, for a time, able to do so. At this stage, therefore, the proletarians do not fight their enemies, but the enemies of their enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the petty bourgeoisie. Thus the whole historical movement is concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie; every victory so obtained is a victory for the bourgeoisie.

But with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more. The various interests and conditions of life within the ranks of the proletariat are more and more equalised, in proportion as machinery obliterates all distinctions of labour, and nearly everywhere reduces wages to the same low level. The growing competition among the bourgeois, and the resulting commercial crises, make the wages of the workers ever more fluctuating. The unceasing improvement of machinery, ever more rapidly developing, makes their livelihood more and more precarious; the collisions between individual workmen and individual bourgeois take more and more the character of collisions between two classes. Thereupon the workers begin to form combinations (Trades' Unions) against the bourgeois; they club together in order to keep up the rate of wages; they found permanent associations in order to make provision beforehand for these occasional revolts. Here and there the contest breaks out into riots.

Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever-expanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralise the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes. But every class struggle is a political struggle. And that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages, with their miserable high-

ways, required centuries, the modern proletarians, thanks to railways, achieve in a few years.

This organisation of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier. It compels legislative recognition of particular interests of the workers, by taking advantage of the divisions among the bourgeoisie itself. Thus the ten-hours' bill in England was carried.

Altogether collisions between the classes of the old society further, in many ways, the course of development of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie finds itself involved in a constant battle. At first with the aristocracy; later on, with those portions of the bourgeoisie itself, whose interests have become antagonistic to the progress of industry; at all times, with the bourgeoisie of foreign countries. In all these battles it sees itself compelled to appeal to the proletariat, to ask for its help, and thus, to drag it into the political arena. The bourgeoisie itself, therefore, supplies the proletariat with its own elements of political and general education, in other words, it furnishes the proletariat with weapons for fighting the bourgeoisie.

Further, as we have already seen, entire sections of the ruling classes are, by the advance of industry, precipitated into the proletariat, or are at least threatened in their conditions of existence. These also supply the proletariat with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress.

Finally, in times when the class-struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole.

Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product.

The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shop-keeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat, they thus defend not their present, but their future interests, they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat.

The "dangerous class," the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society, may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution, its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.

In the conditions of the proletariat, those of old society at large are already virtually swamped. The proletarian is without property; his relation to his wife and children has no longer anything in common with the bourgeois family-relations; modern industrial labour, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character. Law, morality, religion, are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests.

All the preceding classes that got the upper hand, sought to fortify their already acquired status by subjecting society at large to their conditions of appropriation. The proletarians cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation. They have nothing of their own to secure and to fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property.

All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the immense majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole superincumbent strata of official society being sprung into the air.

Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The

proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.

In depicting the most general phases of the development of the proletariat, we traced the more or less veiled civil war, raging within existing society, up to the point where that war breaks out into open revolution, and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat.

Hitherto, every form of society has been based, as we have already seen, on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes. But in order to oppress a class, certain conditions must be assured to it under which it can, at least, continue its slavish existence. The serf, in the period of serfdom, raised himself to membership in the commune, just as the petty bourgeois, under the yoke of feudal absolutism, managed to develop into a bourgeois. The modern labourer, on the contrary, instead of rising with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth. And here it becomes evident, that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its conditions of existence upon society as an over-riding law. It is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society.

The essential condition for the existence, and for the sway of the bourgeois class, is the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage-labour. Wage-labour rests exclusively on competition between the labourers. The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, is its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.

II PROLETARIANS AND COMMUNISTS

In what relation do the Communists stand to the proletarians as a whole?

The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working-class parties.

They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole.

They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement.

The Communists are distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. 2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.

The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.

The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of all the other proletarian parties: formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat.

The theoretical conclusions of the Communists are in no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be universal reformer.

They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes. The abolition of existing property-relations is not at all a distinctive feature of Communism.

All property-relations in the past have continually been subject to historical change consequent upon the change in historical conditions.

The French Revolution, for example, abolished feudal property in favour of bourgeois property.

The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few.

In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.

We Communists have been reproached with the desire of abolishing the right of personally acquiring property as the fruit of a man's own labour, which property is alleged to be the groundwork of all personal freedom, activity and independence.

Hard-won, self-acquired, self-earned property! Do you mean the property of the petty artisan and of the small peasant, a form of property that preceded the bourgeois form? There is no need to abolish that; the development of industry has to a great extent already destroyed it, and is still destroying it daily.

Or do you mean modern bourgeois private property?

But does wage-labour create any property for the labourer? Not a bit. It creates capital, *i.e.*, that kind of property which exploits wage-labour, and which cannot increase except upon condition of begetting a new supply of wage-labour for fresh exploitation. Property, in its present form, is based on the antagonism of capital and wage-labour. Let us examine both sides of this antagonism.

To be a capitalist, is to have not only a purely personal, but a social *status* in production. Capital is a collective product, and only by the united action of many members, nay, in the last resort, only by the united action of all members of society, can it be set in motion.

Capital is, therefore, not a personal, it is a social power.

When, therefore, capital is converted into common property, into the property of all members of society, personal property is not thereby transformed into social property. It is only the social character of the property that is changed. It loses its class-character.

Let us now take wage-labour.

The average price of wage-labour is the minimum wage, *i.e.*, that quantum of the means of subsistence, which is absolutely req-

uisite to keep the labourer in bare existence as a labourer. What, therefore, the wage-labourer appropriates by means of his labour, merely suffices to prolong and reproduce a bare existence. We by no means intend to abolish this personal appropriation of the products of labour, an appropriation that is made for the maintenance and reproduction of human life, and that leaves no surplus wherewith to command the labour of others. All that we want to do away with, is the miserable character of this appropriation, under which the labourer lives merely to increase capital, and is allowed to live only in so far as the interest of the ruling class requires it.

In bourgeois society, living labour is but a means to increase accumulated labour. In Communist society, accumulated labour is but a means to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the labourer.

In bourgeois society, therefore, the past dominates the present; in Communist society, the present dominates the past. In bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has no individuality.

And the abolition of this state of things is called by the bourgeois, abolition of individuality and freedom! And rightly so. The abolition of bourgeois individuality, bourgeois independence, and bourgeois freedom is undoubtedly aimed at.

By freedom is meant, under the present bourgeois conditions of production, free trade, free selling and buying.

But if selling and buying disappears, free selling and buying disappears also. This talk about free selling and buying, and all the other "brave words" of our bourgeoisie about freedom in general, have a meaning, if any, only in contrast with restricted selling and buying, with the fettered traders of the Middle Ages, but have no meaning when opposed to the Communistic abolition of buying and selling, of the bourgeois conditions of production, and of the bourgeoisie itself.

You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property. But in your existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths. You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is, the non-existence of any property for the immense majority of society.

In one word, you reproach us with intending to do away with your property. Precisely so; that is just what we intend.

From the moment when labour can no longer be converted into capital, money, or rent, into a social power capable of being monopolised, *i.e.*, from the moment when individual property can no longer be transformed into bourgeois property, into capital, from that moment, you say, individuality vanishes.

You must, therefore, confess that by "individual" you mean no other person than the bourgeois, than the middle-class owner of property. This person must, indeed, be swept out of the way, and made impossible.

Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of such appropriation.

It has been objected that upon the abolition of private property all work will cease, and universal laziness will overtake us.

According to this, bourgeois society ought long ago to have gone to the dogs through sheer idleness; for those of its members who work, acquire nothing, and those who acquire anything, do not work. The whole of this objection is but another expression of the tautology: that there can no longer be any wage-labour when there is no longer any capital.

All objections urged against the Communistic mode of producing and appropriating material products, have, in the same way, been urged against the Communistic modes of producing and appropriating intellectual products. Just as, to the bourgeois, the disappearance of class property is the disappearance of production itself, so the disappearance of class culture is to him identical with the disappearance of all culture.

That culture, the loss of which he laments, is, for the enormous majority, a mere training to act as a machine.

But don't wrangle with us so long as you apply, to our intended abolition of bourgeois property, the standard of your bourgeois notions of freedom, culture, law &c. Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all, a will, whose essential character and direction are determined by the economical conditions of existence of your class.

The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and of reason, the social forms springing

from your present mode of production and form of property—historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production—this misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you. What you see clearly in the case of ancient property, what you admit in the case of feudal property, you are of course forbidden to admit in the case of your own bourgeois form of property.

Abolition of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Communists.

On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain. In its completely developed form this family exists only among the bourgeoisie. But this state of things finds its complement in the practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public prostitution.

The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter of course when its complement vanishes, and both will vanish with the vanishing of capital.

Do you charge us with wanting to stop the exploitation of children by their parents? To this crime we plead guilty.

But, you will say, we destroy the most hallowed of relations, when we replace home education by social.

And your education! Is not that also social, and determined by the social conditions under which you educate, by the intervention, direct or indirect, of society, by means of schools, &c.? The Communists have not invented the intervention of society in education; they do but seek to alter the character of that intervention, and to rescue education from the influence of the ruling class.

The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about the hallowed co-relation of parent and child, becomes all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of Modern Industry, all family ties among the proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labour.

But you Communists would introduce community of women, screams the whole bourgeoisie in chorus.

The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears that the instruments of production are to be exploited in common, and, naturally, can come to no other conclusion than that the lot of being common to all will likewise fall to the women.

He has not even a suspicion that the real point aimed at is to

do away with the status of women as mere instruments of production.

For the rest, nothing is more ridiculous than the virtuous indignation of our bourgeois at the community of women which, they pretend, is to be openly and officially established by the Communists. The Communists have no need to introduce community of women; it has existed almost from time immemorial.

Our bourgeois, not content with having the wives and daughters of their proletarians at their disposal, not to speak of common prostitutes, take the greatest pleasure in seducing each other's wives.

Bourgeois marriage is in reality a system of wives in common and thus, at the most, what the Communists might possibly be reproached with, is that they desire to introduce, in substitution for a hypocritically concealed, an openly legalised community of women. For the rest, it is self-evident that the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of women springing from that system, *i.e.*, of prostitution both public and private.

The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries and nationality.

The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself *the* nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.

National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.

The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilised countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat.

In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.

The charges against Communism made from a religious, a

philosophical, and, generally, from an ideological standpoint, are not deserving of serious examination.

Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life?

What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual production changes its character in proportion as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class.

When people speak of ideas that revolutionise society, they do but express the fact, that within the old society, the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence.

When the ancient world was in its last throes, the ancient religions were overcome by Christianity. When Christian ideas succumbed in the 18th century to rationalist ideas, feudal society fought its death battle with the then revolutionary bourgeoisie. The ideas of religious liberty and freedom of conscience, merely gave expression to the sway of free competition within the domain of knowledge.

"Undoubtedly," it will be said, "religious, moral, philosophical and juridical ideas have been modified in the course of historical development. But religion, morality, philosophy, political science, and law, constantly survived this change."

"There are, besides, eternal truths, such as Freedom, Justice, etc., that are common to all states of society. But Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them on a new basis; it therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical experience."

What does this accusation reduce itself to? The history of all past society has consisted in the development of class antagonisms, antagonisms that assumed different forms at different epochs.

But whatever form they may have taken, one fact is common to all past ages, *viz.*, the exploitation of one part of society by the other. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms.

The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that its development involves the most radical rupture with traditional ideas.

But let us have done with the bourgeois objections to Communism.

We have seen above, that the first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy.

The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, *i.e.*, of the proletariat organised as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.

Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionising the mode of production.

These measures will of course be different in different countries.

Nevertheless in the most advanced countries, the following will be pretty generally applicable.

1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.

2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.

3. Abolition of all right of inheritance.

4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.

5. Centralisation of credit in the hands of the State, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly.

6. Centralisation of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State.

7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State; the bringing into cultivation of waste-lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.

8. Equal liability of all to labour. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.

9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equable distribution of the population over the country.

10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, &c., &c.

When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organise itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.

III

SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST LITERATURE

1. REACTIONARY SOCIALISM

a. Feudal Socialism

Owing to their historical position, it became the vocation of the aristocracies of France and England to write pamphlets against modern bourgeois society. In the French revolution of July 1830, and in the English reform agitation, these aristocracies again succumbed to the hateful upstart. Thenceforth, a serious political contest was altogether out of question. A literary battle alone remained possible. But even in the domain of literature the old cries of the restoration period* had become impossible.

* Not the English Restoration 1660 to 1689, but the French Restoration 1814 to 1830. [*Note by Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

In order to arouse sympathy, the aristocracy were obliged to lose sight, apparently, of their own interests, and to formulate their indictment against the bourgeoisie in the interest of the exploited working class alone. Thus the aristocracy took their revenge by singing lampoons on their new master, and whispering in his ears sinister prophecies of coming catastrophe.

In this way arose feudal Socialism: half lamentation, half lampoon; half echo of the past, half menace of the future; at times, by its bitter, witty and incisive criticism, striking the bourgeoisie to the very heart's core; but always ludicrous in its effect, through total incapacity to comprehend the march of modern history.

The aristocracy, in order to rally the people to them, waved the proletarian alms-bag in front for a banner. But the people, so often as it joined them, saw on their hindquarters the old feudal coats of arms, and deserted with loud and irreverent laughter.

One section of the French Legitimists¹ and "Young England"² exhibited this spectacle.

In pointing out that their mode of exploitation was different to that of the bourgeoisie, the feudalists forget that they exploited under circumstances and conditions that were quite different, and that are now antiquated. In showing that, under their rule, the modern proletariat never existed, they forget that the modern bourgeoisie is the necessary offspring of their own form of society.

For the rest, so little do they conceal the reactionary character of their criticism that their chief accusation against the bourgeoisie amounts to this, that under the bourgeois *régime* a class is being developed, which is destined to cut up root and branch the old order of society.

What they upbraid the bourgeoisie with is not so much that it creates a proletariat, as that it creates a *revolutionary* proletariat.

In political practice, therefore, they join in all coercive measures against the working-class; and in ordinary life, despite their high-falutin phrases, they stoop to pick up the golden apples

¹ *The Legitimists*: The party of the noble landowners, who advocated the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty.—*Ed.*

² *"Young England"*: A group of British Conservatives—aristocrats and men of politics and literature—formed about 1842. Prominent among them were Disraeli, Thomas Carlyle and others.—*Ed.*

dropped from the tree of industry, and to barter truth, love, and honour for traffic in wool, beetroot-sugar, and potato spirits.^b

As the parson has ever gone hand in hand with the landlord, so has Clerical Socialism with Feudal Socialism.

Nothing is easier than to give Christian asceticism a Socialist tinge. Has not Christianity declaimed against private property, against marriage, against the State? Has it not preached in the place of these, charity and poverty, celibacy and mortification of the flesh, monastic life and Mother Church? Christian Socialism is but the holy water with which the priest consecrates the heart-burnings of the aristocrat.

b. Petty-Bourgeois Socialism

The feudal aristocracy was not the only class that was ruined by the bourgeoisie, not the only class whose conditions of existence pined and perished in the atmosphere of modern bourgeois society. The mediaeval burgesses and the small peasant proprietors were the precursors of the modern bourgeoisie. In those countries which are but little developed, industrially and commercially, these two classes still vegetate side by side with the rising bourgeoisie.

In countries where modern civilisation has become fully developed, a new class of petty bourgeois has been formed, fluctuating between proletariat and bourgeoisie and ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society. The individual members of this class, however, are being constantly hurled down into the proletariat by the action of competition, and, as modern industry develops, they even see the moment approaching when they will completely disappear as an independent section of modern society, to be replaced, in manufactures, agriculture and commerce, by overlookers, bailiffs and shopmen.

In countries like France, where the peasants constitute far more than half of the population, it was natural that writers who

^b This applies chiefly to Germany where the landed aristocracy and squirearchy have large portions of their estates cultivated for their own account by stewards, and are, moreover, extensive beetroot-sugar manufacturers and distillers of potato spirits. The wealthier British aristocracy are, as yet, rather above that; but they, too, know how to make up for declining rents by lending their names to floaters of more or less shady joint-stock companies. [Note by Engels to the English edition of 1888.]

sided with the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, should use, in their criticism of the bourgeois *régime*, the standard of the peasant and petty bourgeois, and from the standpoint of these intermediate classes should take up the cudgels for the working class. Thus arose petty-bourgeois Socialism. Sismondi was the head of this school, not only in France but also in England.

This school of Socialism dissected with great acuteness the contradictions in the conditions of modern production. It laid bare the hypocritical apologies of economists. It proved, incontrovertibly, the disastrous effects of machinery and division of labour; the concentration of capital and land in a few hands; overproduction and crises; it pointed out the inevitable ruin of the petty bourgeois and peasant, the misery of the proletariat, the anarchy in production, the crying inequalities in the distribution of wealth, the industrial war of extermination between nations, the dissolution of old moral bonds, of the old family relations, of the old nationalities.

In its positive aims, however, this form of Socialism aspires either to restoring the old means of production and of exchange, and with them the old property relations, and the old society, or to cramping the modern means of production and of exchange, within the framework of the old property relations that have been, and were bound to be, exploded by those means. In either case, it is both reactionary and Utopian.

Its last words are: corporate guilds for manufacture; patriarchal relations in agriculture.

Ultimately, when stubborn historical facts had dispersed all intoxicating effects of self-deception, this form of Socialism ended in a miserable fit of the blues.

c. *German, or "True," Socialism*

The Socialist and Communist literature of France, a literature that originated under the pressure of a bourgeoisie in power, and that was the expression of the struggle against this power, was introduced into Germany at a time when the bourgeoisie, in that country, had just begun its contest with feudal absolutism.

German philosophers, would-be philosophers, and *beaux esprits*, eagerly seized on this literature, only forgetting, that when these writings immigrated from France into Germany, French social conditions had not immigrated along with them.

In contact with German social conditions, this French literature lost all its immediate practical significance, and assumed a purely literary aspect. Thus, to the German philosophers of the Eighteenth Century, the demands of the first French Revolution were nothing more than the demands of "Practical Reason" in general, and the utterance of the will of the revolutionary French bourgeoisie signified in their eyes the laws of pure Will, of Will as it was bound to be, of true human Will generally.

The work of the German *literati* consisted solely in bringing the new French ideas into harmony with their ancient philosophical conscience, or rather, in annexing the French ideas without deserting their own philosophic point of view.

This annexation took place in the same way in which a foreign language is appropriated, namely, by translation.

It is well known how the monks wrote silly lives of Catholic Saints *over* the manuscripts on which the classical works of ancient heathendom had been written. The German *literati* reversed this process with the profane French literature. They wrote their philosophical nonsense beneath the French original. For instance, beneath the French criticism of the economic functions of money, they wrote "Alienation of Humanity," and beneath the French criticism of the bourgeois State they wrote, "Dethronement of the Category of the General," and so forth.

The introduction of these philosophical phrases at the back of the French historical criticisms they dubbed "Philosophy of Action," "True Socialism," "German Science of Socialism," "Philosophical Foundation of Socialism," and so on.

The French Socialist and Communist literature was thus completely emasculated. And, since it ceased in the hands of the German to express the struggle of one class with the other, he felt conscious of having overcome "French one-sidedness" and of representing, not true requirements, but the requirements of Truth; not the interests of the proletariat, but the interests of Human Nature, of Man in general, who belongs to no class, has no reality, who exists only in the misty realm of philosophical fantasy.

This German Socialism, which took its schoolboy task so seriously and solemnly, and extolled its poor stock-in-trade in such mountebank fashion, meanwhile gradually lost its pedantic innocence.

The fight of the German, and, especially, of the Prussian bourgeoisie, against feudal aristocracy and absolute monarchy, in other words, the liberal movement, became more earnest.

By this, the long wished-for opportunity was offered to "True" Socialism of confronting the political movement with the Socialist demands, of hurling the traditional anathemas against liberalism, against representative government, against bourgeois competition, bourgeois freedom of the press, bourgeois legislation, bourgeois liberty and equality, and of preaching to the masses that they had nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by this bourgeois movement. German Socialism forgot, in the nick of time, that the French criticism, whose silly echo it was, presupposed the existence of modern bourgeois society, with its corresponding economic conditions of existence, and the political constitution adapted thereto, the very things whose attainment was the object of the pending struggle in Germany.

To the absolute governments, with their following of parsons, professors, country squires and officials, it served as a welcome scarecrow against the threatening bourgeoisie.

It was a sweet finish after the bitter pills of floggings and bullets with which these same governments, just at that time, dosed the German working-class risings.

While this "True" Socialism thus served the governments as a weapon for fighting the German bourgeoisie, it, at the same time, directly represented a reactionary interest, the interest of the German Philistines. In Germany the *petty-bourgeois* class, a relic of the sixteenth century, and since then constantly cropping up again under various forms, is the real social basis of the existing state of things.

To preserve this class is to preserve the existing state of things in Germany. The industrial and political supremacy of the bourgeoisie threatens it with certain destruction; on the one hand, from the concentration of capital; on the other, from the rise of a revolutionary proletariat. "True" Socialism appeared to kill these two birds with one stone. It spread like an epidemic.

The robe of speculative cobwebs, embroidered with flowers of rhetoric, steeped in the dew of sickly sentiment, this transcendental robe in which the German Socialists wrapped their sorry "eternal truths," all skin and bone, served to wonderfully increase the sale of their goods amongst such a public.

And on its part, German Socialism recognised, more and more, its own calling as the bombastic representative of the petty-bourgeois Philistine.

It proclaimed the German nation to be the model nation, and the German petty Philistine to be the typical man. To every villainous meanness of this model man it gave a hidden, higher, Socialistic interpretation, the exact contrary of its real character. It went to the extreme length of directly opposing the "brutally destructive" tendency of Communism, and of proclaiming its supreme and impartial contempt of all class struggles. With very few exceptions, all the so-called Socialist and Communist publications that now (1847) circulate in Germany belong to the domain of this foul and enervating literature.¹

2. CONSERVATIVE, OR BOURGEOIS, SOCIALISM

A part of the bourgeoisie is desirous of redressing social grievances, in order to secure the continued existence of bourgeois society.

To this section belong economists, philanthropists, humanitarians, improvers of the condition of the working class, organisers of charity, members of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, temperance fanatics, hole-and-corner reformers of every imaginable kind. This form of Socialism has, moreover, been worked out into complete systems.

We may cite Proudhon's *Philosophie de la Misère* as an example of this form.

The Socialistic bourgeois want all the advantages of modern social conditions without the struggles and dangers necessarily resulting therefrom. They desire the existing state of society minus its revolutionary and disintegrating elements. They wish for a bourgeoisie without a proletariat. The bourgeoisie naturally conceives the world in which it is supreme to be the best; and bourgeois Socialism develops this comfortable conception into various more or less complete systems. In requiring the proletariat to carry out such a system, and thereby to march straightway into the social New Jerusalem, it but requires in reality, that the

¹ The revolutionary storm of 1848 swept away this whole shabby tendency and cured its protagonists of the desire to dabble further in Socialism. The chief representative and classical type of this tendency is Herr Karl Grün. [Note by Engels to the German edition of 1890.]

proletariat should remain within the bounds of existing society, but should cast away all its hateful ideas concerning the bourgeoisie.

A second and more practical, but less systematic, form of this Socialism sought to depreciate every revolutionary movement in the eyes of the working class, by showing that no mere political reform, but only a change in the material conditions of existence, in economical relations, could be of any advantage to them. By changes in the material conditions of existence, this form of Socialism, however, by no means understands abolition of the bourgeois relations of production, an abolition that can be effected only by a revolution, but administrative reforms, based on the continued existence of these relations; reforms, therefore, that in no respect affect the relations between capital and labour, but, at the best, lessen the cost, and simplify the administrative work, of bourgeois government.

Bourgeois Socialism attains adequate expression, when, and only when, it becomes a mere figure of speech.

Free trade: for the benefit of the working class. Protective duties: for the benefit of the working class. Prison Reform: for the benefit of the working class. This is the last word and the only seriously meant word of bourgeois Socialism.

It is summed up in the phrase: the bourgeois is a bourgeois—for the benefit of the working class.

3. CRITICAL-UTOPIAN SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM

We do not here refer to that literature which, in every great modern revolution, has always given voice to the demands of the proletariat, such as the writings of Babeuf and others.

The first direct attempts of the proletariat to attain its own ends, made in times of universal excitement, when feudal society was being overthrown, these attempts necessarily failed, owing to the then undeveloped state of the proletariat, as well as to the absence of the economic conditions for its emancipation, conditions that had yet to be produced, and could be produced by the impending bourgeois epoch alone. The revolutionary literature that accompanied these first movements of the proletariat had necessarily a reactionary character. It inculcated universal asceticism and social levelling in its crudest form.

The Socialist and Communist systems properly so called.

those of St. Simon, Fourier, Owen and others, spring into existence in the early undeveloped period, described above, of the struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie (see Section I. Bourgeoisie and Proletariat).

The founders of these systems see, indeed, the class antagonisms, as well as the action of the decomposing elements in the prevailing form of society. But the proletariat, as yet in its infancy, offers to them the spectacle of a class without any historical initiative or any independent political movement.

Since the development of class antagonism keeps even pace with the development of industry, the economic situation, as they find it, does not as yet offer to them the material conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat. They therefore search after a new social science, after new social laws, that are to create these conditions.

Historical action is to yield to their personal inventive action, historically created conditions of emancipation to fantastic ones, and the gradual, spontaneous class-organisation of the proletariat to an organisation of society specially contrived by these inventors. Future history resolves itself, in their eyes, into the propaganda and the practical carrying out of their social plans.

In the formation of their plans they are conscious of caring chiefly for the interests of the working class, as being the most suffering class. Only from the point of view of being the most suffering class does the proletariat exist for them.

The undeveloped state of the class struggle, as well as their own surroundings, causes Socialists of this kind to consider themselves far superior to all class antagonisms. They want to improve the condition of every member of society, even that of the most favoured. Hence, they habitually appeal to society at large, without distinction of class; nay, by preference, to the ruling class. For how can people, when once they understand their system, fail to see in it the best possible plan of the best possible state of society?

Hence, they reject all political, and especially all revolutionary, action; they wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and endeavour, by small experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, and by the force of example, to pave the way for the new social Gospel.

Such fantastic pictures of future society, painted at a time when the proletariat is still in a very undeveloped state and has but a fantastic conception of its own position correspond with the

first instinctive yearnings of that class for a general reconstruction of society.

But these Socialist and Communist publications contain also a critical element. They attack every principle of existing society. Hence they are full of the most valuable materials for the enlightenment of the working class. The practical measures proposed in them—such as the abolition of the distinction between town and country, of the family, of the carrying on of industries for the account of private individuals, and of the wage system, the proclamation of social harmony, the conversion of the functions of the State into a mere superintendence of production, all these proposals point solely to the disappearance of class antagonisms which were, at that time, only just cropping up, and which, in these publications, are recognised in their earliest, indistinct and undefined forms only. These proposals, therefore, are of a purely Utopian character.

The significance of Critical-Utopian Socialism and Communism bears an inverse relation to historical development. In proportion as the modern class struggle develops and takes definite shape, this fantastic standing apart from the contest, these fantastic attacks on it, lose all practical value and all theoretical justification. Therefore, although the originators of these systems were, in many respects, revolutionary, their disciples have, in every case, formed mere reactionary sects. They hold fast by the original views of their masters, in opposition to the progressive historical development of the proletariat. They, therefore, endeavour, and that consistently, to deaden the class struggle and to reconcile the class antagonisms. They still dream of experimental realisation of their social Utopias, of founding isolated "*phalanstères*," of establishing "Home Colonies," of setting up a "Little Icaria"^c—duodecimo editions of the New Jerusalem—and to realise all these castles in the air, they are compelled to appeal to the feelings and purses of the bourgeois. By degrees they sink into the category of the reactionary conservative Socialists depicted

^c *Phalanstères* were Socialist colonies on the plan of Charles Fourier: *Icaria* was the name given by Cabet to his Utopia and, later on, to his American Communist colony. [Note by Engels to the English edition of 1888.]

"Home colonies" were what Owen called his Communist model societies. *Phalanstères* was the name of the public palaces planned by Fourier. *Icaria* was the name given to the Utopian land of fancy, whose Communist institutions Cabet portrayed. [Note by Engels to the German edition of 1890.]

above, differing from these only by more systematic pedantry, and by their fanatical and superstitious belief in the miraculous effects of their social science.

They, therefore, violently oppose all political action on the part of the working class; such action, according to them, can only result from blind unbelief in the new Gospel.

The Owenites in England, and the Fourierists in France, respectively oppose the Chartists and the *Réformistes*.¹

IV

POSITION OF THE COMMUNISTS IN RELATION TO THE VARIOUS EXISTING OPPOSITION PARTIES

Section II has made clear the relations of the Communists to the existing working-class parties, such as the Chartists in England and the Agrarian Reformers in America.

The Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aims, for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class; but in the movement of the present, they also represent and take care of the future of that movement. In France the Communists ally themselves with the Social-Democrats,^a against the conservative and radical bourgeoisie, reserving, however, the right to take up a critical position in regard to phrases and illusions traditionally handed down from the great Revolution.

In Switzerland they support the Radicals, without losing sight of the fact that this party consists of antagonistic elements, partly of Democratic Socialists, in the French sense, partly of radical bourgeois.

In Poland they support the party that insists on an agrarian revolution as the prime condition for national emancipation, that party which fomented the insurrection of Cracow in 1846.

¹ This refers to the adherents of the newspaper *Lu Réforme*, which was published in Paris from 1843 to 1850.—*Ed.*

^a The party then represented in Parliament by Ledru-Rollin, in literature by Louis Blanc, in the daily press by the *Réforme*. The name of Social-Democracy signified, with these its inventors, a section of the Democratic or Republican party more or less tinged with Socialism. [*Note by Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

The party in France which at that time called itself Socialist-Democratic was represented in political life by Ledru-Rollin and in literature by Louis Blanc; thus it differed immeasurably from present-day German Social-Democracy. [*Note by Engels to the German edition of 1890.*]

In Germany they fight with the bourgeoisie whenever it acts in a revolutionary way, against the absolute monarchy, the feudal squirearchy, and the petty bourgeoisie.¹

But they never cease, for a single instant, to instil into the working class the clearest possible recognition of the hostile antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat, in order that the German workers may straightway use, as so many weapons against the bourgeoisie, the social and political conditions that the bourgeoisie must necessarily introduce along with its supremacy, and in order that, after the fall of the reactionary classes in Germany, the fight against the bourgeoisie itself may immediately begin.

The Communists turn their attention chiefly to Germany, because that country is on the eve of a bourgeois revolution that is bound to be carried out under more advanced conditions of European civilisation, and with a much more developed proletariat, than that of England was in the seventeenth, and of France in the eighteenth century, and because the bourgeois revolution in Germany will be but the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution.

In short, the Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things.

In all these movements they bring to the front, as the leading question in each, the property question, no matter what its degree of development at the time;

Finally, they labour everywhere for the union and agreement of the democratic parties of all countries.

The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.

WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

Written by Marx and Engels in
December 1847—January 1848
Originally published in London
in February 1848

Printed according to the English
translation which was edited by
Engels and appeared in London
in 1888

¹ *Kleinbürgerei* in the German original. Marx and Engels used this term to describe the reactionary elements of the urban petty bourgeoisie.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

**THE BOURGEOISIE
AND THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION**

SECOND ARTICLE

Cologne, December 11

When the March deluge—a deluge in miniature—had subsided it left no monsters, no revolutionary colossi, on the Berlin surface of the earth but creatures of the old style, squat bourgeois figures—the liberals of the “United Landtag,” the representatives of the conscious Prussian bourgeoisie. The provinces which have the most developed bourgeoisie, the *Rhine Province* and *Silesia*, supplied the chief contingent for the new ministries. Behind them a whole train of Rhenish jurists. To the same extent that the bourgeoisie was forced into the background by the feudal lords the Rhine Province and Silesia made room in the ministries for the arch-Prussian provinces. Only an Elberfeld Tory still connects the Brandenburg ministry with the Rhine Province. *Hansemann* and *von der Heydt!* These two names signify to the Prussian bourgeoisie the whole difference between March and December 1848!

The Prussian bourgeoisie was hurled to the height of state power, however not in the manner it had desired, by a *peaceful bargain with the crown*, but by a *revolution*. It was to defend not its own interests but the *interests of the people*, versus the crown, that is, against *itself*, for a *popular movement* had paved the way for the bourgeoisie. The crown, however, was in its eyes but a screen by the grace of God behind which its own worldly interests were to find concealment. The inviolability of *its* own interests and of the political forms that were in consonance with its interests was to read as follows when rendered into the language of constitutions: *Inviolability of the Crown*. Hence the ecstatic fondness of the German and especially the Prussian bourgeoisie for the *constitutional monarchy*. While therefore the February Revolution together with its German reverberations was welcomed by the Prussian bourgeoisie because it placed the helm of state in its hands, it at the same time upset its calculations because its rule was hedged about with conditions which it neither wanted to nor could fulfil.

The bourgeoisie had not lifted a hand. It had permitted the people to fight its battle for it. The rule that was transferred to it was, therefore, not the rule of a general who has defeated his adversary but the rule of a Committee of Public Safety to which the victorious people entrusts the protection of its own interests.

Camphausen still felt the utter discomfort of this situation and the whole weakness of his ministry can be traced to this feeling and the circumstances that engendered it. A blush tints, as it were, the most shameless acts of his government. Undisguised *shamelessness* and *impudence* were the privilege of *Hansemann*. The red *colouring* is the only difference between these two painters.

The *Prussian March Revolution* must not be confused with the *English Revolution* of 1648 or the *French* of 1789.

In 1648 the bourgeoisie was allied with the modern nobility against the monarchy, against the feudal nobility and against the established church.

In 1789 the bourgeoisie was allied with the people against the monarchy, the nobility and the established church.

The Revolution of 1789 had as its prototype (at least in Europe) only the Revolution of 1648, and the Revolution of 1648 only the insurrection of the Netherlanders against Spain. Not only in time but also in content both revolutions were a century beyond their prototypes.

In both revolutions the bourgeoisie was the class that *really* formed the van of the movement. The *proletariat* and *the strata of the burghers which did not belong to the bourgeoisie* either had as yet no interests separate from those of the bourgeoisie or they did not yet constitute independently developed classes or subdivisions of classes. Hence where they came out in opposition to the bourgeoisie, as for instance in France in 1793 till 1794, they fought only for the realization of the interests of the bourgeoisie, even if not *in the fashion* of the bourgeoisie. The *whole French terrorism* was nothing but a *plebeian manner* of settling accounts with the *enemies of the bourgeoisie*, with absolutism, feudalism and philistinism.

The Revolutions of 1648 and 1789 were not *English* and *French* revolutions; they were revolutions of a *European* pattern. They were not the victory of a *definite* class of society over the *old political order*; they were the *proclamation of political order for the new European society*. The bourgeoisie was victorious in these revolutions; but the *victory of the bourgeoisie* was at that time the

victory of a new order of society, the victory of bourgeois property over feudal property, of nationality over provincialism, of competition over the guild, of partition over primogeniture, of the owner of the land over the domination of the owner by the land, of enlightenment over superstition, of the family over the family name, of industry over heroic laziness, of civil law over mediæval privilege. The Revolution of 1648 was the victory of the seventeenth century over the sixteenth century, the Revolution of 1789 the victory of the eighteenth century over the seventeenth century. These revolutions expressed still more the needs of the world of that day than of the sectors of the world in which they occurred, of England and France.

In the *March Revolution in Prussia* there was nothing of the kind.

The February Revolution had *abolished* the constitutional monarchy in reality and the rule of the bourgeoisie in the mind. The March Revolution in Prussia was to *establish* the constitutional monarchy in the mind and the rule of the bourgeoisie in reality. Far from being a *European revolution* it was but the stunted after-effect of a European revolution in a backward country. Instead of being ahead of its age it trailed more than half a century behind it. It was *secondary* from the outset, but it is a known fact that secondary diseases are more difficult to cure and at the same time waste the body more than original diseases. It was not a question of the establishment of a new society but of the rebirth in Berlin of the society that had passed away in Paris. The March Revolution in Prussia was not even *national, German*; it was *provincial-Prussian* from its inception. The Vienna, Cassel, Munich and every other sort of provincial uprising swept on alongside of it and contested its lead.

While 1648 and 1789 had taken infinite pride in being the acme of creation it was the ambition of the Berlin of 1848 to form an anachronism. Their light was like the light of the stars which reaches us who dwell on earth only after the bodies which radiated it have been extinct for a hundred-thousand years. The March Revolution in Prussia was, in miniature—as it was everything in miniature—just such a star for Europe. Its light was the light of the corpse of a society that had long ago become putrified.

The German bourgeoisie had developed so slothfully, cravenly and slowly that at the moment when it menacingly faced feudalism and absolutism it saw itself menacingly faced by the proletariat

and all factions of the burghers whose interests and ideas were akin to those of the proletariat. And it saw inimically arrayed not only a class *behind* it but all of Europe *before* it. The Prussian bourgeoisie was not, as the French of 1789 had been, the class which represented the *whole* of modern society *vis-à-vis* the representatives of the old society, the monarchy and the nobility. It had sunk to the level of a sort of *social estate*, as distinctly opposed to the crown as to the people, eager to be in the opposition to both, irresolute against each of its opponents, taken severally, because it always saw both of them before or behind it; inclined from the very beginning to betray the people and compromise with the crowned representative of the old society because it itself already belonged to the old society; representing not the interests of a new society against an old but renewed interests within a superannuated society; at the steering wheel of the revolution not because the people stood behind it but because the people prodded it on before it; in the van not because it represented the initiative of a new but only the rancour of an old social epoch; a stratum of the old state that had not cropped out but been upheaved to the surface of the new state by an earthquake; without faith in itself, without faith in the people, grumbling at those above, trembling before those below, egoistic towards both sides and conscious of its egoism, revolutionary in relation to the conservatives and conservative in relation to the revolutionists, distrustful of its own mottoes, phrases instead of ideas, intimidated by the world storm, exploiting the world storm; no energy in any respect, plagiarism in every respect; common because it lacked originality, original in its commonness; dickering with its own desires, without initiative, without faith in itself, without faith in the people, without a world-historical calling; an execrable old man, who saw himself doomed to guide and deflect the first youthful impulses of a robust people in his own senile interests—sans eyes, sans ears, sans teeth, sans everything—such was the *Prussian bourgeoisie* that found itself at the helm of the Prussian state after the March Revolution.

Written by Marx on December 11,
1848

Published in the *Neue Rheinische
Zeitung* of December 15, 1848

Unsigned

Printed according to the
newspaper text

Translated from the German

Karl Marx

WAGE LABOUR AND CAPITAL

INTRODUCTION BY FREDERICK ENGELS

The following work appeared as a series of leading articles in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*¹ from April 4, 1849 onwards. It is based on the lectures delivered by Marx in 1847 at the German Workers' Society in Brussels. The work as printed remained a fragment; the words at the end of No. 269: "To be continued," remained unfulfilled in consequence of the events which just then came crowding one after another: the invasion of Hungary by the Russians, the insurrections in Dresden, Iserlohn, Elberfeld, the Palatinate and Baden, which led to the suppression of the newspaper itself (May 19, 1849). The manuscript of the continuation was not found among Marx's papers after his death.

Wage Labour and Capital has appeared in a number of editions as a separate publication in pamphlet form, the last being in 1884, by the Swiss Co-operative Press, Hottingen-Zurich. The editions hitherto published retained the exact wording of the original. The present new edition, however, is to be circulated in not less than 10,000 copies as a propaganda pamphlet, and so the question could not but force itself upon me whether under these circumstances Marx himself would have approved of an unaltered reproduction of the original.

In the forties, Marx had not yet finished his critique of political economy. This took place only towards the end of the fifties. Consequently, his works which appeared before the first part of *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) differ in some points from those written after 1859, and contain expressions and whole sentences which, from the point of view of the

¹ *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* [*New Rheinisch Gazette*]: Appeared in Cologne from June 1, 1848 to May 19, 1849. Karl Marx was its editor-in-chief. —Ed.

later works, appear unfortunate and even incorrect. Now, it is self-evident that in ordinary editions intended for the general public this earlier point of view also has its place, as a part of the intellectual development of the author, and that both author and public have an indisputable right to the unaltered reproduction of these older works. And I should not have dreamed of altering a word of them.

It is another thing when the new edition is intended practically exclusively for propaganda among workers. In such a case Marx would certainly have brought the old presentation dating from 1849 into harmony with his new point of view. And I feel certain of acting as he would have done in undertaking *for this edition* the few alterations and additions which are required in order to attain this object in all essential points. I therefore tell the reader beforehand: this is not the pamphlet as Marx wrote it in 1849 but approximately as he would have written it in 1891. The actual text, moreover, is circulated in so many copies that this will suffice until I am able to reprint it again, unaltered, in a later complete edition.

My alterations all turn on one point. According to the original, the worker sells his *labour* to the capitalist for wages; according to the present text he sells his *labour power*. And for this alteration I owe an explanation. I owe it to the workers in order that they may see it is not a case here of mere juggling with words, but rather of one of the most important points in the whole of political economy. I owe it to the bourgeois, so that they can convince themselves how vastly superior the uneducated workers, for whom one can easily make comprehensible the most difficult economic analyses, are to our supercilious "educated people" to whom such intricate questions remain insoluble their whole life long.

Classical political economy¹ took over from industrial practice the current conception of the manufacturer, that he buys and pays for the *labour* of his workers. This conception had been quite adequate for the business needs, the book-keeping and price calculations of the manufacturer. But, naively transferred to polit-

¹ Marx says in *Capital*:

"... by classical Political Economy, I understand that economy which, since the time of W. Petty, has investigated the real relations of production in bourgeois society..." (Vol. I, Moscow 1954, p. 81.)

The most important representatives of classical political economy in England were Adam Smith and David Ricardo.—*Ed.*

ical economy, it produced there really wondrous errors and confusions.

Economics observes the fact that the prices of all commodities, among them also the price of the commodity that it calls "labour," are continually changing; that they rise and fall as the result of the most varied circumstances, which often bear no relation whatever to the production of the commodities themselves, so that prices seem, as a rule, to be determined by pure chance. As soon, then, as political economy made its appearance as a science,¹ one of its first tasks was to seek the law which was concealed behind this chance apparently governing the prices of commodities, and which, in reality, governed this very chance. Within the prices of commodities, continually fluctuating and oscillating, now upwards and now downwards, political economy sought for the firm central point around which these fluctuations and oscillations turned. In a word, it started from the *prices* of commodities in order to look for the *value* of the commodities as the law controlling prices, the value by which all fluctuations in price are to be explained and to which finally they are all to be ascribed.

Classical economics then found that the value of a commodity is determined by the labour contained in it, requisite for its production. With this explanation it contented itself. And we also can pause here for the time being. I will only remind the reader, in order to avoid misunderstandings, that this explanation has nowadays become totally inadequate. Marx was the first thoroughly to investigate the value-creating quality of labour and he discovered in so doing that not all labour apparently, or even really, necessary for the production of a commodity adds to it under all circumstances a magnitude of value which corresponds to the quantity of labour expended. If therefore today we say offhandedly with economists like Ricardo that the value of a commodity is determined by the labour necessary for its production, we always in so doing imply the reservations made by Marx. This suffices here; more is to be found in Marx's *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, 1859, and the first volume of *Capital*.

¹ "Although it first took shape in the minds of a few men of genius towards the end of the seventeenth century, political economy in the narrow sense, in its positive formulation by the physiocrats and Adam Smith, is nevertheless essentially a child of the eighteenth century..." (F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow 1954, p. 209.)—Ed.

But as soon as the economists applied this determination of value by labour to the commodity "labour," they fell into one contradiction after another. How is the value of "labour" determined? By the necessary labour contained in it. But how much labour is contained in the labour of a worker for a day, a week, a month, a year? The labour of a day, a week, a month, a year. If labour is the measure of all values, then indeed we can express the "value of labour" only in labour. But we know absolutely nothing about the value of an hour of labour, if we only know that it is equal to an hour of labour. This brings us not a hair's breadth nearer the goal; we keep on moving in a circle.

Classical economics, therefore, tried another tack. It said: The value of a commodity is equal to its cost of production. But what is the cost of production of labour? In order to answer this question, the economists have to tamper a little with logic. Instead of investigating the cost of production of labour itself, which unfortunately cannot be ascertained, they proceed to investigate the cost of production of the *worker*. And this can be ascertained. It varies with time and circumstance, but for a given state of society, a given locality and a given branch of production, it too is given, at least within fairly narrow limits. We live today under the domination of capitalist production, in which a large, ever-increasing class of the population can live only if it works for the owners of the means of production—the tools, machines, raw materials and means of subsistence—in return for wages. On the basis of this mode of production, the cost of production of the worker consists of that quantity of the means of subsistence—or their price in money—which, on the average, is necessary to make him capable of working, keep him capable of working, and to replace him, after his departure by reason of old age, sickness or death, with a new worker—that is to say, to propagate the working class in the necessary numbers. Let us assume that the money price of these means of subsistence averages three marks a day.

Our worker, therefore, receives a wage of three marks a day from the capitalist who employs him. For this, the capitalist makes him work, say, twelve hours a day, calculating roughly as follows:

Let us assume that our worker—a machinist—has to make a part of a machine which he can complete in one day. The raw material—iron and brass in the necessary previously prepared form—costs twenty marks. The consumption of coal by the steam

engine, and the wear and tear of this same engine, of the lathe and the other tools which our worker uses represent for one day, and reckoned by his share of their use, a value of one mark. The wage for one day, according to our assumption, is three marks. This makes twenty-four marks in all for our machine part. But the capitalist calculates that he will obtain, on an average, twenty-seven marks from his customers in return, or three marks more than his outlay.

Whence came the three marks pocketed by the capitalist? According to the assertion of classical economics, commodities are, on the average, sold at their values, that is, at prices corresponding to the amount of necessary labour contained in them. The average price of our machine part—twenty-seven marks—would thus be equal to its value, that is, equal to the labour embodied in it. But of these twenty-seven marks, twenty-one marks were values already present before our machinist began work. Twenty marks were contained in the raw materials, one mark in the coal consumed during the work, or in the machines and tools which were used in the process and which were diminished in their efficiency by the value of this sum. There remain six marks which have been added to the value of the raw material. But according to the assumption of our economists themselves, these six marks can only arise from the labour added to the raw material by our worker. His twelve hours' labour has thus created a new value of six marks. The value of his twelve hours' labour would, therefore, be equal to six marks. And thus we would at last have discovered what the "value of labour" is.

"Hold on there!" cries our machinist. "Six marks? But I have received only three marks! My capitalist swears by all that is holy that the value of my twelve hours' labour is only three marks, and if I demand six he laughs at me. How do you make that out?"

If previously we got into a vicious circle with our value of labour, we are now properly caught in an insoluble contradiction. We looked for the value of labour and we have found more than we can use. For the worker, the value of the twelve hours' labour is three marks, for the capitalist it is six marks, of which he pays three to the worker as wages and pockets three for himself. Thus labour would have not one but two values and very different values into the bargain!

The contradiction becomes still more absurd as soon as we reduce to labour time the values expressed in money. During the

twelve hours' labour a new value of six marks is created. Hence, in six hours three marks—the sum which the worker receives for twelve hours' labour. For twelve hours' labour the worker receives as an equivalent value the product of six hours' labour. Either, therefore, labour has two values, of which one is double the size of the other, or twelve equals six! In both cases we get pure nonsense.

Turn and twist as we will, we cannot get out of this contradiction, as long as we speak of the purchase and sale of labour and of the value of labour. And this also happened to the economists. The last offshoot of classical economics, the Ricardian school, was wrecked mainly by the insolubility of this contradiction. Classical economics had got into a blind alley. The man who found the way out of this blind alley was Karl Marx.

What the economists had regarded as the cost of production of "labour" was the cost of production not of labour but of the living worker himself. And what this worker sold to the capitalist was not his labour. "As soon as his labour actually begins," says Marx, "it has already ceased to belong to him; it can therefore no longer be sold by him." At the most, he might sell his *future* labour, that is, undertake to perform a certain amount of work in a definite time. In so doing, however, he does not sell labour (which would first have to be performed) but puts his labour power at the disposal of the capitalist for a definite time (in the case of time-work) or for the purpose of a definite output (in the case of piece-work) in return for a definite payment: he hires out, or sells, his *labour power*. But this labour power is intergrown with his person and inseparable from it. Its cost of production, therefore, coincides with his cost of production; what the economists called the cost of production of labour is really the cost of production of the worker and therewith of his labour power. And so we can go back from the cost of production of labour power to the *value* of labour power and determine the amount of socially necessary labour requisite for the production of labour power of a particular quality, as Marx has done in the chapter on the buying and selling of labour power. (*Kapital*, Band IV, 3.¹)

Now what happens after the worker has sold his labour power to the capitalist, that is, placed it at the disposal of the latter in return for a wage—day wage or piece wage—agreed upon be-

¹ Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow 1954, Chapter VI, pp. 167-76.—Ed.

forehand? The capitalist takes the worker into his workshop or factory, where all the things necessary for work—raw materials, auxiliary materials (coal, dyes, etc.), tools, machines—are already to be found. Here the worker begins to drudge. His daily wage may be, as above, three marks—and in this connection it does not make any difference whether he earns it as day wage or piece wage. Here also we again assume that in twelve hours the worker by his labour adds a new value of six marks to the raw materials used up, which new value the capitalist realizes on the sale of the finished piece of work. Out of this he pays the worker his three marks; the other three marks he keeps for himself. If, now, the worker creates a value of six marks in twelve hours, then in six hours he creates a value of three marks. He has, therefore, already repaid the capitalist the counter-value of the three marks contained in his wages when he has worked six hours for him. After six hours' labour they are both quits, neither owes the other a pfennig.

“Hold on there!” the capitalist now cries. “I have hired the worker for a whole day, for twelve hours. Six hours, however, are only half a day. So go right on working until the other six hours are up—only then shall we be quits!” And, in fact, the worker has to comply with his contract “voluntarily” entered into, according to which he has pledged himself to work twelve whole hours for a labour product which costs six hours of labour.

It is just the same with piece wages. Let us assume that our worker makes twelve items of a commodity in twelve hours. Each of these costs two marks in raw materials and depreciation and is sold at two and a half marks. Then the capitalist, on the same assumptions as before, will give the worker twenty-five pfennigs per item; that makes three marks for twelve items, to earn which the worker needs twelve hours. The capitalist receives thirty marks for the twelve items; deduct twenty-four marks for raw materials and depreciation and there remain six marks, of which he pays three marks to the worker in wages and pockets three marks. It is just as above. Here, too, the worker works six hours for himself, that is, for replacement of his wages (half an hour in each of the twelve hours) and six hours for the capitalist.

The difficulty over which the best economists came to grief, so long as they started out from the value of “labour,” vanishes as soon as we start out from the value of “labour *power*” instead.

In our present-day capitalist society, labour power is a commodity, a commodity like any other, and yet quite a peculiar commodity. It has, namely, the peculiar property of being a value-creating power, a source of value, and, indeed, with suitable treatment a source of more value than it itself possesses. With the present state of production, human labour power not only produces in one day a greater value than it itself possesses and costs; with every new scientific discovery, with every new technical invention, this surplus of its daily product over its daily cost increases, and therefore that portion of the labour day in which the worker works to produce the replacement of his day's wage decreases; consequently, on the other hand, that portion of the labour day in which he has to *make a present* of his labour to the capitalist without being paid for it increases.

And this is the economic constitution of the whole of our present-day society: it is the working class alone which produces all values. For value is only another expression for labour, that expression whereby in our present-day capitalist society is designated the amount of socially necessary labour contained in a particular commodity. These values produced by the workers do not, however, belong to the workers. They belong to the owners of the raw materials, machines, tools and the reserve funds which allow these owners to buy the labour power of the working class. From the whole mass of products produced by it, the working class, therefore, receives back only a part for itself. And as we have just seen, the other part, which the capitalist class keeps for itself and at most has to divide with the class of landowners, becomes larger with every new discovery and invention, while the part falling to the share of the working class (reckoned per head) either increases only very slowly and inconsiderably or not at all, and under certain circumstances may even fall.

But these discoveries and inventions which supersede each other at an ever-increasing rate, this productivity of human labour which rises day by day to an extent previously unheard of, finally gives rise to a conflict in which the present-day capitalist economy must perish. On the one hand are immeasurable riches and a superfluity of products which the purchasers cannot cope with; on the other hand, the great mass of society proletarianized, turned into wage-workers, and precisely for that reason made incapable of appropriating for themselves this superfluity of products. The division of society into a small, excessively rich class

and a large, propertyless class of wage-workers results in a society suffocating from its own superfluity, while the great majority of its members is scarcely, or even not at all, protected from extreme want. This state of affairs becomes daily more absurd and—more unnecessary. It *must* be abolished, it *can* be abolished. A new social order is possible in which the present class differences will have disappeared and in which—perhaps after a short transitional period involving some privation, but at any rate of great value morally—through the planned utilization and extension of the already existing enormous productive forces of all members of society, and with uniform obligation to work, the means for existence, for enjoying life, for the development and employment of all bodily and mental faculties will be available in an equal measure and in ever-increasing fulness. And that the workers are becoming more and more determined to win this new social order will be demonstrated on both sides of the ocean by May the First, tomorrow, and by Sunday, May 3.¹

London, April 30, 1891

Frederick Engels

Written by Engels for the separate edition of Marx's *Wage Labour and Capital*, Berlin 1891

Printed according to the text of the 1891 edition

Translated from the German

¹ The English trade unions used to celebrate May Day on the first Sunday after May 1, which in 1891 fell on May 3.—*Ed.*

WAGE LABOUR AND CAPITAL

I

From various quarters we have been reproached with not having presented the *economic relations* which constitute the material foundation of the present class struggles and national struggles. We have designedly touched upon these relations only where they directly forced themselves to the front in political conflicts.

The point was, above all, to trace the class struggle in current history, and to prove empirically by means of the historical material already at hand and which is being newly created daily, that, with the subjugation of the working class that February and March¹ had wrought, its opponents were simultaneously defeated—the bourgeois republicans in France and the bourgeois and peasant classes which were fighting feudal absolutism throughout the continent of Europe; that the victory of the “honest republic” in France was at the same time the downfall of the nations that had responded to the February Revolution by heroic wars of independence; finally, that Europe, with the defeat of the revolutionary workers, had relapsed into its old double slavery, the *Anglo-Russian* slavery. The June struggle in Paris, the fall of Vienna, the tragicomedy of Berlin’s November 1848, the desperate exertions of Poland, Italy and Hungary, the starving of Ireland into submission—these were the chief factors which characterized the European class struggle between bourgeoisie and working class and by means of which we proved that every revolutionary upheaval, however remote from the class struggle its goal may appear to be, must fail until the revolutionary working class is victorious, that every social reform remains a utopia until the

¹ This refers to the Revolution of February 23-24, 1848 in Paris, of March 13 in Vienna, and March 18 in Berlin.—Ed

proletarian revolution and the feudalistic counter-revolution measure swords in a *world war*. In our presentation, as in reality, *Belgium* and *Switzerland* were tragicomic genre-pictures akin to caricature in the great historical tableau, the one being the model state of the bourgeois monarchy, the other the model state of the bourgeois republic, both of them states which imagine themselves to be as independent of the class struggle as of the European revolution.

Now, after our readers have seen the class struggle develop in colossal political forms in 1848, the time has come to deal more closely with the economic relations themselves on which the existence of the bourgeoisie and its class rule, as well as the slavery of the workers, are founded.

We shall present in three large sections: 1) the relation of *wage labour to capital*, the slavery of the worker, the domination of the capitalist; 2) *the inevitable destruction of the middle bourgeois classes and of the so-called peasant estate under the present system*; 3) *the commercial subjugation and exploitation of the bourgeois classes of the various European nations by the despot of the world market—England*.

We shall try to make our presentation as simple and popular as possible and shall not presuppose even the most elementary notions of political economy. We wish to be understood by the workers. Moreover, the most remarkable ignorance and confusion of ideas prevails in Germany in regard to the simplest economic relations, from the accredited defenders of the existing state of things down to the *socialist miracle workers* and the *unrecognized political geniuses* in which fragmented Germany is even richer than in sovereign princes.

Now, therefore, for the first question: *What are wages? How are they determined?*

If workers were asked: "How much are your wages?" one would reply: "I get a mark a day from my employer"; another, "I get two marks," and so on. According to the different trades to which they belong, they would mention different sums of money which they receive from their respective employers for the performance of a particular piece of work, for example, weaving a yard of linen or type-setting a printed sheet. In spite of the variety of their statements, they would all agree on one point: wages are the sum of money paid by the capitalist for a particular labour time or for a particular output of labour.

The capitalist, it seems, therefore, *buys* their labour with money. They *sell* him their labour for money. But this is merely the appearance. In reality what they sell to the capitalist for money is their labour *power*. The capitalist buys this labour power for a day, a week, a month, etc. And after he has bought it, he uses it by having the workers work for the stipulated time. For the same sum with which the capitalist has bought their labour power, for example, two marks, he could have bought two pounds of sugar or a definite amount of any other commodity. The two marks, with which he bought two pounds of sugar, are the *price* of the two pounds of sugar. The two marks, with which he bought twelve hours' use of labour power, are the price of twelve hours' labour. Labour power, therefore, is a commodity, neither more nor less than sugar. The former is measured by the clock, the latter by the scales.

The workers exchange their commodity, labour power, for the commodity of the capitalist, for money, and this exchange takes place in a definite ratio. So much money for so long a use of labour power. For twelve hours' weaving, two marks. And do not the two marks represent all the other commodities which I can buy for two marks? In fact, therefore, the worker has exchanged his commodity, labour power, for other commodities of all kinds and that in a definite ratio. By giving him two marks, the capitalist has given him so much meat, so much clothing, so much fuel, light, etc., in exchange for his day's labour. Accordingly, the two marks express the ratio in which labour power is exchanged for other commodities, the *exchange value* of his labour power. The exchange value of a commodity, reckoned in *money*, is what is called its *price*. *Wages* are only a special name for the price of labour power, commonly called the *price of labour*, for the price of this peculiar commodity which has no other repository than human flesh and blood.

Let us take any worker, say, a weaver. The capitalist supplies him with the loom and yarn. The weaver sets to work and the yarn is converted into linen. The capitalist takes possession of the linen and sells it, say, for twenty marks. Now are the wages of the weaver a *share* in the linen, in the twenty marks, in the product of his labour? By no means. Long before the linen is sold, perhaps long before its weaving is finished, the weaver has received his wages. The capitalist, therefore, does not pay these wages

with the money which he will obtain from the linen, but with money already in reserve. Just as the loom and the yarn are not the product of the weaver to whom they are supplied by his employer, so likewise with the commodities which the weaver receives in exchange for his commodity, labour power. It was possible that his employer found no purchaser at all for his linen. It was possible that he did not get even the amount of the wages by its sale. It is possible that he sells it very profitably in comparison with the weaver's wages. All that has nothing to do with the weaver. The capitalist buys the labour power of the weaver with a part of his available wealth, of his capital, just as he has bought the raw material—the yarn—and the instrument of labour—the loom—with another part of his wealth. After he has made these purchases, and these purchases include the labour power necessary for the production of linen, he produces only with the *raw materials and instruments of labour belonging to him*. For the latter include now, true enough, our good weaver as well, who has as little share in the product or the price of the product as the loom has.

Wages are, therefore, not the worker's share in the commodity produced by him. Wages are the part of already existing commodities with which the capitalist buys for himself a definite amount of productive labour power.

Labour power is, therefore, a commodity which its possessor, the wage-worker, sells to capital. Why does he sell it? In order to live.

But the exercise of labour power, labour, is the worker's own life-activity, the manifestation of his own life. And this *life-activity* he sells to another person in order to secure the necessary *means of subsistence*. Thus his life-activity is for him only a means to enable him to exist. He works in order to live. He does not even reckon labour as part of his life, it is rather a sacrifice of his life. It is a commodity which he has made over to another. Hence, also, the product of his activity is not the object of his activity. What he produces for himself is not the silk that he weaves, not the gold that he draws from the mine, not the palace that he builds. What he produces for himself is *wages*, and silk, gold, palace resolve themselves for him into a definite quantity of the means of subsistence, perhaps into a cotton jacket, some copper coins and a lodging in a cellar. And the worker, who for twelve hours weaves, spins, drills, turns, builds, shovels, breaks stones, carries

loads, etc.—does he consider this twelve hours' weaving, spinning, drilling, turning, building, shovelling, stone breaking as a manifestation of his life, as life? On the contrary, life begins for him where this activity ceases, at table, in the public house, in bed. The twelve hours' labour, on the other hand, has no meaning for him as weaving, spinning, drilling, etc., but as *earnings*, which bring him to the table, to the public house, into bed. If the silk worm were to spin in order to continue its existence as a caterpillar, it would be a complete wage-worker. Labour power was not always a *commodity*. Labour was not always wage labour, that is, *free labour*. The *slave* did not sell his labour power to the slave owner, any more than the ox sells its services to the peasant. The slave, together with his labour power, is sold once and for all to his owner. He is a commodity which can pass from the hand of one owner to that of another. He is *himself* a commodity, but the labour power is not *his* commodity. The *serf* sells only a part of his labour power. He does not receive a wage from the owner of the land; rather the owner of the land receives a tribute from him.

The serf belongs to the land and turns over to the owner of the land the fruits thereof. The *free labourer*, on the other hand, sells himself and, indeed, sells himself piecemeal. He sells at auction eight, ten, twelve, fifteen hours of his life, day after day, to the highest bidder, to the owner of the raw materials, instruments of labour and means of subsistence, that is, to the capitalist. The worker belongs neither to an owner nor to the land, but eight, ten, twelve, fifteen hours of his daily life belong to him who buys them. The worker leaves the capitalist to whom he hires himself whenever he likes, and the capitalist discharges him whenever he thinks fit, as soon as he no longer gets any profit out of him, or not the anticipated profit. But the worker, whose sole source of livelihood is the sale of his labour power, cannot leave the *whole class of purchasers, that is, the capitalist class*, without renouncing his existence. He belongs not to this or that capitalist but to the *capitalist class*, and, moreover, it is his business to dispose of himself, that is, to find a purchaser within this capitalist class.

Now, before going more closely into the relation between capital and wage labour, we shall present briefly the most general relations which come into consideration in the determination of wages.

Wages, as we have seen, are the *price* of a definite commodity, of labour power. Wages are, therefore, determined by the same laws that determine the price of every other commodity. The question, therefore, is, *how is the price of a commodity determined?*

II

By what is the *price* of a commodity determined?

By competition between buyers and sellers, by the relation of inquiry to delivery, of demand to supply. Competition, by which the price of a commodity is determined, is *three-sided*.

The same commodity is offered by various sellers. With goods of the same quality, the one who sells most cheaply is certain of driving the others out of the field and securing the greatest sale for himself. Thus, the sellers mutually contend among themselves for sales, for the market. Each of them desires to sell, to sell as much as possible and, if possible, to sell alone, to the exclusion of the other sellers. Hence, one sells cheaper than another. Consequently, *competition* takes place *among the sellers*, which *depresses* the price of the *commodities* offered by them.

But *competition* also takes place *among the buyers*, which in its turn *causes* the commodities offered to *rise* in price.

Finally, *competition* occurs *between buyers and sellers*; the former desire to buy as cheaply as possible, the latter to sell as dearly as possible. The result of this competition between buyers and sellers will depend upon how the two above-mentioned sides of the competition are related, that is, whether the competition is stronger in the army of buyers or in the army of sellers. Industry leads two armies into the field against each other, each of which again carries on a battle within its own ranks, among its own troops. The army whose troops beat each other up the least gains the victory over the opposing host.

Let us suppose there are 100 bales of cotton on the market and at the same time buyers for 1,000 bales of cotton. In this case, therefore, the demand is ten times as great as the supply. Competition will be very strong among the buyers, each of whom desires to get one, and if possible all, of the hundred bales for himself. This example is no arbitrary assumption. We have experienced periods of cotton crop failure in the history of the trade, when a few capitalists in alliance have tried to buy, not one hundred bales, but all the cotton stocks of the world. Hence, in the ex-

ample mentioned, one buyer will seek to drive the other from the field by offering a relatively higher price per bale of cotton. The cotton sellers, who see that the troops of the enemy army are engaged in the most violent struggle among themselves and that the sale of all their hundred bales is absolutely certain, will take good care not to fall out among themselves and depress the price of cotton at the moment when their adversaries are competing with one another to force it up. Thus, peace suddenly descends on the army of the sellers. They stand facing the buyers as one man, fold their arms philosophically, and there would be no bounds to their demands were it not that the offers of even the most persistent and eager buyers have very definite limits.

If, therefore, the supply of a commodity is lower than the demand for it, then only slight competition, or none at all, takes place among the sellers. In the same proportion as this competition decreases, competition increases among the buyers. The result is a more or less considerable rise in commodity prices.

It is well known that the reverse case with a reverse result occurs more frequently. Considerable surplus of supply over demand; desperate competition among the sellers; lack of buyers; disposal of goods at ridiculously low prices.

But what is the meaning of a rise, a fall in prices; what is the meaning of high price, low price? A grain of sand is high when examined through a microscope, and a tower is low when compared with a mountain. And if price is determined by the relation between supply and demand, what determines the relation between supply and demand?

Let us turn to the first bourgeois we meet. He will not reflect for an instant but, like another Alexander the Great, will cut this metaphysical knot with the multiplication table. If the production of the goods which I sell has cost me 100 marks, he will tell us, and if I get 110 marks from the sale of these goods, within the year of course—then that is sound, honest, legitimate profit. But if I get in exchange 120 or 130 marks, that is a high profit; and if I get as much as 200 marks, that would be an extraordinary, an enormous profit. What, therefore, serves the bourgeois as his *measure* of profit? The *cost of production* of his commodity. If he receives in exchange for this commodity an amount of other commodities which it has cost less to produce, he has lost. If he receives in exchange for his commodity an amount of other commodities the production of which has cost more, he has gained. And

he calculates the rise or fall of the profit according to the degree in which the exchange value of his commodity stands above or below zero—the *cost of production*.

We have thus seen how the changing relation of supply and demand causes now a rise and now a fall of prices, now high, now low prices. If the price of a commodity rises considerably because of inadequate supply or disproportionate increase of the demand, the price of some other commodity must necessarily have fallen proportionately, for the price of a commodity only expresses in money the ratio in which other commodities are given in exchange for it. If, for example, the price of a yard of silk material rises from five marks to six marks, the price of silver in relation to silk material has fallen and likewise the prices of all other commodities that have remained at their old prices have fallen in relation to the silk. One has to give a larger amount of them in exchange to get the same amount of silks. What will be the consequence of the rising price of a commodity? A mass of capital will be thrown into that flourishing branch of industry and this influx of capital into the domain of the favoured industry will continue until it yields the ordinary profits or, rather, until the price of its products, through overproduction, sinks below the cost of production.

Conversely, if the price of a commodity falls below its cost of production, capital will be withdrawn from the production of this commodity. Except in the case of a branch of industry which has become obsolete and must, therefore, perish, the production of such a commodity, that is, its supply, will go on decreasing owing to this flight of capital until it corresponds to the demand, and consequently its price is again on a level with its cost of production or, rather, until the supply has sunk below the demand, that is, until its price rises again above its cost of production, *for the current price of a commodity is always either above or below its cost of production*.

We see how capital continually migrates in and out, out of the domain of one industry into that of another. High prices bring too great an immigration and low prices too great an emigration.

We could show from another point of view how not only supply but also demand is determined by the cost of production. But this would take us too far away from our subject.

We have just seen how the fluctuations of supply and demand

continually bring the price of a commodity back to the cost of production. *The real price of a commodity, it is true, is always above or below its cost of production; but rise and fall reciprocally balance each other*, so that within a certain period of time, taking the ebb and flow of the industry together, commodities are exchanged for one another in accordance with their cost of production, their price, therefore, being determined by their cost of production.

This determination of price by cost of production is not to be understood in the sense of the economists. The economists say that the *average price* of commodities is equal to the cost of production; that this is a *law*. The anarchical movement, in which rise is compensated by fall and fall by rise, is regarded by them as chance. With just as much right one could regard the fluctuations as the law and the determination by the cost of production as chance, as has actually been done by other economists. But it is solely these fluctuations, which, looked at more closely, bring with them the most fearful devastations and, like earthquakes, cause bourgeois society to tremble to its foundations—it is solely in the course of these fluctuations that prices are determined by the cost of production. The total movement of this disorder is its order. In the course of this industrial anarchy, in this movement in a circle, competition compensates, so to speak, for one excess by means of another.

We see, therefore, that the price of a commodity is determined by its cost of production in such manner that the periods in which the price of this commodity rises above its cost of production are compensated by the periods in which it sinks below the cost of production, and vice versa. This does not hold good, of course, for separate, particular industrial products but only for the whole branch of industry. Consequently, it also does not hold good for the individual industrialist but only for the whole class of industrialists.

The determination of price by the cost of production is equivalent to the determination of price by the labour time necessary for the manufacture of a commodity, for the cost of production consists of 1) raw materials and depreciation of instruments, that is, of industrial products the production of which has cost a certain amount of labour days and which, therefore, represent a certain amount of labour time, and 2) of direct labour, the measure of which is, precisely, time.

Now, the same general laws that regulate the price of commodities in general of course also regulate *wages*, the *price of labour*.

Wages will rise and fall according to the relation of supply and demand, according to the turn taken by the competition between the buyers of labour power, the capitalists, and the sellers of labour power, the workers. The fluctuations in wages correspond in general to the fluctuations in prices of commodities. *Within these fluctuations, however, the price of labour will be determined by the cost of production, by the labour time necessary to produce this commodity—labour power.*

What, then, is the cost of production of labour power?

It is the cost required for maintaining the worker as a worker and of developing him into a worker.

The less the period of training, therefore, that any work requires the smaller is the cost of production of the worker and the lower is the price of his labour, his wages. In those branches of industry in which hardly any period of apprenticeship is required and where the mere bodily existence of the worker suffices, the cost necessary for his production is almost confined to the commodities necessary for keeping him alive and capable of working. The *price of his labour* will, therefore, be determined by the *price of the necessary means of subsistence*.

Another consideration, however, also comes in. The manufacturer in calculating his cost of production and, accordingly, the price of the products takes into account the wear and tear of the instruments of labour. If, for example, a machine costs him 1,000 marks and wears out in ten years, he adds 100 marks annually to the price of the commodities so as to be able to replace the worn-out machine by a new one at the end of ten years. In the same way, in calculating the cost of production of simple labour power, there must be included the cost of reproduction, whereby the race of workers is enabled to multiply and to replace worn-out workers by new ones. Thus the depreciation of the worker is taken into account in the same way as the depreciation of the machine.

The cost of production of simple labour power, therefore, amounts to the *cost of existence and reproduction of the worker*. The price of this cost of existence and reproduction constitutes *wages*. Wages so determined are called the *wage minimum*. This wage minimum, like the determination of the price of commodities

by the cost of production in general, does not hold good for the *single individual* but for the *species*. Individual workers, millions of workers, do not get enough to be able to exist and reproduce themselves; *but the wages of the whole working class* level down, within their fluctuations, to this minimum.

Now that we have arrived at an understanding of the most general laws which regulate wages like the price of any other commodity, we can go into our subject more specifically.

III

Capital consists of raw materials, instruments of labour and means of subsistence of all kinds, which are utilized in order to produce new raw materials, new instruments of labour and new means of subsistence. All these component parts of capital are creations of labour, products of labour, *accumulated labour*. Accumulated labour which serves as a means of new production is capital.

So say the economists.

What is a Negro slave? A man of the black race. The one explanation is as good as the other.

A Negro is a Negro. He only becomes a slave in certain relations. A cotton-spinning jenny is a machine for spinning cotton. It becomes *capital* only in certain relations. Torn from these relationships it is no more capital than gold in itself is *money* or sugar the price of sugar.

In production, men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and relations does their action on nature, does production, take place.

These social relations into which the producers enter with one another, the conditions under which they exchange their activities and participate in the whole act of production, will naturally vary according to the character of the means of production. With the invention of a new instrument of warfare, firearms, the whole internal organization of the army necessarily changed; the relationships within which individuals can constitute an army and act as an army were transformed and the relations of different armies to one another also changed.

Thus the social relations within which individuals produce, the social relations of production, change, are transformed, with the change and development of the material means of production, the productive forces. The relations of production in their totality constitute what are called the social relations, society, and, specifically, a society at a definite stage of historical development, a society with a peculiar, distinctive character. Ancient society, feudal society, bourgeois society are such totalities of production relations, each of which at the same time denotes a special stage of development in the history of mankind.

Capital, also, is a social relation of production. It is a bourgeois production relation, a production relation of bourgeois society. Are not the means of subsistence, the instruments of labour, the raw materials of which capital consists, produced and accumulated under given social conditions, in definite social relations? Are they not utilized for new production under given social conditions, in definite social relations? And is it not just this definite social character which turns the products serving for new production into capital?

Capital consists not only of means of subsistence, instruments of labour and raw materials, not only of material products; it consists just as much of *exchange values*. All the products of which it consists are *commodities*. Capital is, therefore, not only a sum of material products; it is a sum of commodities, of exchange values, of *social magnitudes*.

Capital remains the same, whether we put cotton in place of wool, rice in place of wheat or steamships in place of railways, provided only that the cotton, the rice, the steamships—the body of capital—have the same exchange value, the same price as the wool, the wheat, the railways in which it was previously incorporated. The body of capital can change continually without the capital suffering the slightest alteration.

But while all capital is a sum of commodities, that is, of exchange values, not every sum of commodities, of exchange values, is capital.

Every sum of exchange values is an exchange value. Every separate exchange value is a sum of exchange values. For instance, a house that is worth 1,000 marks is an exchange value of 1,000 marks. A piece of paper worth a pfennig is a sum of exchange values of one-hundred hundredths of a pfennig. Products which are exchangeable for others are *commodities*. The particular ratio

in which they are exchangeable constitutes their *exchange value* or, expressed in money, their *price*. The quantity of these products can change nothing in their quality of being *commodities* or representing an *exchange value* or having a definite *price*. Whether a tree is large or small it is a tree. Whether we exchange iron for other products in ounces or in hundredweights, does this make any difference in its character as commodity, as exchange value? It is a commodity of greater or lesser value, of higher or lower price, depending upon the quantity.

How, then, does any amount of commodities, of exchange value, become capital?

By maintaining and multiplying itself as an independent social *power*, that is, as the power of a *portion of society*, by means of its *exchange for direct, living labour power*. The existence of a class which possesses nothing but its capacity to labour is a necessary prerequisite of capital.

It is only the domination of accumulated, past, materialized labour over direct, living labour that turns accumulated labour into capital.

Capital does not consist in accumulated labour serving living labour as a means for new production. It consists in living labour serving accumulated labour as a means for maintaining and multiplying the exchange value of the latter.

What takes place in the exchange between capitalist and wage-worker?

The worker receives means of subsistence in exchange for his labour power, but the capitalist receives in exchange for his means of subsistence labour, the productive activity of the worker, the creative power whereby the worker not only replaces what he consumes but *gives to the accumulated labour a greater value than it previously possessed*. The worker receives a part of the available means of subsistence from the capitalist. For what purpose do these means of subsistence serve him? For immediate consumption. As soon, however, as I consume the means of subsistence, they are irretrievably lost to me unless I use the time during which I am kept alive by them in order to produce new means of subsistence, in order during consumption to create by my labour new values in place of the values which perish in being consumed. But it is just this noble reproductive power that the worker surrenders to the capitalist in exchange for means of subsistence received. He has, therefore, lost it for himself.

Let us take an example: a tenant farmer gives his day labourer five silver groschen a day. For these five silver groschen the labourer works all day on the farmer's field and thus secures him a return of ten silver groschen. The farmer not only gets the value replaced that he has to give the day labourer; he doubles it. He has therefore employed, consumed, the five silver groschen that he gave to the labourer in a fruitful, productive manner. He has bought with the five silver groschen just that labour and power of the labourer which produces agricultural products of double value and makes ten silver groschen out of five. The day labourer, on the other hand, receives in place of his productive power, the effect of which he has bargained away to the farmer, five silver groschen, which he exchanges for means of subsistence, and these he consumes with greater or less rapidity. The five silver groschen have, therefore, been consumed in a double way, *productively* for capital, for they have been exchanged for labour power¹ which produced ten silver groschen, *unproductively* for the worker, for they have been exchanged for means of subsistence which have disappeared forever and the value of which he can only recover by repeating the same exchange with the farmer. *Thus capital presupposes wage labour; wage labour presupposes capital. They reciprocally condition the existence of each other; they reciprocally bring forth each other.*

Does a worker in a cotton factory produce merely cotton textiles? No, he produces capital. He produces values which serve afresh to command his labour and by means of it to create new values.

Capital can only increase by exchanging itself for labour power, by calling wage labour to life. The labour power of the wage-worker can only be exchanged for capital by increasing capital, by strengthening the power whose slave it is. *Hence, increase of capital is increase of the proletariat, that is, of the working class.*

The interests of the capitalist and those of the worker are, therefore, *one and the same*, assert the bourgeois and their economists. Indeed! The worker perishes if capital does not employ him. Capital perishes if it does not exploit labour power, and in order to exploit it, it must buy it. The faster capital intended for pro-

¹ The term "labour power" was not added here by Engels but had already been in the text Marx published in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*.—*Ed.*

duction, productive capital, increases, the more, therefore, industry prospers, the more the bourgeoisie enriches itself and the better business is, the more workers does the capitalist need, the more dearly does the worker sell himself.

The indispensable condition for a tolerable situation of the worker is, *therefore, the fastest possible growth of productive capital.*

But what is the growth of productive capital? Growth of the power of accumulated labour over living labour. Growth of the domination of the bourgeoisie over the working class. If wage labour produces the wealth of others that rules over it, the power that is hostile to it, capital, then the means of employment, that is, the means of subsistence, flow back to it from this hostile power, on condition that it makes itself afresh into a part of capital, into the lever which hurls capital anew into an accelerated movement of growth.

To say that the interests of capital and those of the workers are one and the same is only to say that capital and wage labour are two sides of one and the same relation. The one conditions the other, just as usurer and squanderer condition each other.

As long as the wage-worker is a wage-worker his lot depends upon capital. That is the much-vaunted community of interests between worker and capitalist.

IV

If capital grows, the mass of wage labour grows, the number of wage-workers grows; in a word, the domination of capital extends over a greater number of individuals. Let us assume the most favourable case: when productive capital grows, the demand for labour grows; consequently, the price of labour, wages, goes up.

A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But let a palace arise beside the little house, and it shrinks from a little house to a hut. The little house shows now that its owner has only very slight or no demands to make; and however high it may shoot up in the course of civilization, if the neighbouring palace grows to an equal or even greater extent, the occupant of the relatively small house will feel more and more uncomfortable, dissatisfied and cramped within its four walls.

A noticeable increase in wages presupposes a rapid growth of productive capital. The rapid growth of productive capital brings about an equally rapid growth of wealth, luxury, social wants, social enjoyments. Thus, although the enjoyments of the worker have risen, the social satisfaction that they give has fallen in comparison with the increased enjoyments of the capitalist, which are inaccessible to the worker, in comparison with the state of development of society in general. Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature.

In general, wages are determined not only by the amount of commodities for which I can exchange them. They embody various relations.

What the workers receive for their labour power is, in the first place, a definite sum of money. Are wages determined only by this money price?

In the sixteenth century, the gold and silver circulating in Europe increased as a result of the discovery of richer and more easily worked mines in America. Hence, the value of gold and silver fell in relation to other commodities. The workers received the same amount of coined silver for their labour power as before. The money price of their labour remained the same, and yet their wages had fallen, for in exchange for the same quantity of silver they received a smaller amount of other commodities. This was one of the circumstances which furthered the growth of capital and the rise of the bourgeoisie in the sixteenth century.

Let us take another case. In the winter of 1847, as a result of a crop failure, the most indispensable means of subsistence, cereals, meat, butter, cheese, etc., rose considerably in price. Assume that the workers received the same sum of money for their labour power as before. Had not their wages fallen? Of course. For the same money they received less bread, meat, etc., in exchange. Their wages had fallen, not because the value of silver had diminished, but because the value of the means of subsistence had increased.

Assume, finally, that the money price of labour remains the same while all agricultural and manufactured goods have fallen in price owing to the employment of new machinery, a favourable

season, etc. For the same money the workers can now buy more commodities of all kinds. Their wages, therefore, have risen, just because the money value of their wages has not changed.

Thus, the money price of labour, nominal wages, do not coincide with real wages, that is, with the sum of commodities which is actually given in exchange for the wages. If, therefore, we speak of a rise or fall of wages, we must keep in mind not only the money price of labour, the nominal wages.

But neither nominal wages, that is, the sum of money for which the worker sells himself to the capitalist, nor real wages, that is, the sum of commodities which he can buy for this money, exhaust the relations contained in wages.

Wages are, above all, also determined by their relation to the gain, to the profit of the capitalist—comparative, relative wages.

Real wages express the price of labour in relation to the price of other commodities; relative wages, on the other hand, express the share of direct labour in the new value it has created in relation to the share which falls to accumulated labour, to capital.

We said above, page 14:¹ “Wages are not the worker’s share in the commodity produced by him. Wages are the part of already existing commodities with which the capitalist buys for himself a definite amount of productive labour power.” But the capitalist must replace these wages out of the price at which he sells the product produced by the worker; he must replace it in such a way that there remains to him, as a rule, a surplus over the cost of production expended by him, a profit. For the capitalist, the selling price of the commodities produced by the worker is divided into three parts: *first*, replacement of the price of the raw materials advanced by him together with replacement of the depreciation of the tools, machinery and other means of labour also advanced by him; *secondly*, the replacement of the wages advanced by him, and *thirdly*, the surplus left over, the capitalist’s profit. While the first part only replaces *previously existing values*, it is clear that both the replacement of the wages and also the surplus profit of the capitalist are, on the whole, taken from the *new value created by the worker’s labour* and added to the raw materials. And *in this sense*, in order to compare them with one another, we can regard both wages and profit as shares in the product of the worker.

¹ See p. 82 of this volume.—Ed.

Real wages may remain the same, they may even rise, and yet relative wages may fall. Let us suppose, for example, that all means of subsistence have gone down in price by two-thirds while wages per day have only fallen by one-third, that is to say, for example, from three marks to two marks. Although the worker can command a greater amount of commodities with these two marks than he previously could with three marks, yet his wages have gone down in relation to the profit of the capitalist. The profit of the capitalist (for example, the manufacturer) has increased by one mark; that is, for a smaller sum of exchange values which he pays to the worker, the latter must produce a greater amount of exchange values than before. The share of capital relative to the share of labour has risen. The division of social wealth between capital and labour has become still more unequal. With the same capital, the capitalist commands a greater quantity of labour. The power of the capitalist class over the working class has grown, the social position of the worker has deteriorated, has been depressed one step further below that of the capitalist.

What, then, is the general law which determines the rise and fall of wages and profit in their reciprocal relation?

They stand in inverse ratio to each other. Capital's share, profit, rises in the same proportion as labour's share, wages, falls, and vice versa. Profit rises to the extent that wages fall; it falls to the extent that wages rise.

The objection will, perhaps, be made that the capitalist can profit by a favourable exchange of his products with other capitalists, by increase of the demand for his commodities, whether as a result of the opening of new markets, or as a result of a momentarily increased demand in the old markets, etc.; that the capitalist's profit can, therefore, increase by overreaching other capitalists, independently of the rise and fall of wages, of the exchange value of labour power; or that the capitalist's profit may also rise owing to the improvement of the instruments of labour, a new application of natural forces, etc.

First of all, it will have to be admitted that the result remains the same, although it is brought about in reverse fashion. True, the profit has not risen because wages have fallen, but wages have fallen because the profit has risen. With the same amount of other people's labour, the capitalist has acquired a greater amount of exchange values, without having paid more for the labour on

that account; that is, therefore, labour is paid less in proportion to the net profit which it yields the capitalist.

In addition, we recall that, in spite of the fluctuations in prices of commodities, the average price of every commodity, the ratio in which it is exchanged for other commodities, is determined by its *cost of production*. Hence the overreachings within the capitalist class necessarily balance one another. The improvement of machinery, new application of natural forces in the service of production, enable a larger amount of products to be created in a given period of time with the same amount of labour and capital, but not by any means a larger amount of exchange values. If, by the use of the spinning jenny, I can turn out twice as much yarn in an hour as before its invention, say, one hundred pounds instead of fifty, then in the long run I will receive for these hundred pounds no more commodities in exchange than formerly for the fifty pounds, because the cost of production has fallen by one-half, or because I can deliver double the product at the same cost.

Finally, in whatever proportion the capitalist class, the bourgeoisie, whether of one country or of the whole world market, shares the net profit of production within itself, the total amount of this net profit always consists only of the amount by which, on the whole, accumulated labour has been increased by direct labour. This total amount grows, therefore, in the proportion in which labour augments capital, that is, in the proportion in which profit rises in comparison with wages.

We see, therefore, that even if we remain *within the relation of capital and wage labour, the interests of capital and the interests of wage labour are diametrically opposed.*

A rapid increase of capital is equivalent to a rapid increase of profit. Profit can only increase rapidly if the price of labour, if relative wages, decrease just as rapidly. Relative wages can fall although real wages rise simultaneously with nominal wages, with the money value of labour, if they do not rise, however, in the same proportion as profit. If, for instance, in times when business is good, wages rise by five per cent, profit on the other hand by thirty per cent, then the comparative, the relative wages, have not *increased but decreased.*

Thus if the income of the worker increases with the rapid growth of capital, the social gulf that separates the worker from the capitalist increases at the same time, and the power of capi-

tal over labour, the dependence of labour on capital, likewise increases at the same time.

To say that the worker has an interest in the rapid growth of capital is only to say that the more rapidly the worker increases the wealth of others, the richer will be the crumbs that fall to him, the greater is the number of workers that can be employed and called into existence, the more can the mass of slaves dependent on capital be increased.

We have thus seen that:

Even the *most favourable situation* for the working class, the *most rapid possible growth of capital*, however much it may improve the material existence of the worker, does not remove the antagonism between his interests and the interests of the bourgeoisie, the interests of the capitalists. *Profit and wages* remain as before in *inverse proportion*.

If capital is growing rapidly, wages may rise; the profit of capital rises incomparably more rapidly. The material position of the worker has improved, but at the cost of his social position. The social gulf that divides him from the capitalist has widened.

Finally:

To say that the most favourable condition for wage labour is the most rapid possible growth of productive capital is only to say that the more rapidly the working class increases and enlarges the power that is hostile to it, the wealth that does not belong to it and that rules over it, the more favourable will be the conditions under which it is allowed to labour anew at increasing bourgeois wealth, at enlarging the power of capital, content with forging for itself the golden chains by which the bourgeoisie drags it in its train.

V

Are growth of productive capital and rise of wages really so inseparably connected as the bourgeois economists maintain? We must not take their word for it. We must not even believe them when they say that the fatter capital is, the better will its slave be fed. The bourgeoisie is too enlightened, it calculates too well, to share the prejudices of the feudal lord who makes a display by the brilliance of his retinue. The conditions of existence of the bourgeoisie compel it to calculate.

We must, therefore, examine more closely:

How does the growth of productive capital affect wages?

If, on the whole, the productive capital of bourgeois society grows, a *more manifold* accumulation of labour takes place. The capitals increase in number and extent. The *numerical increase* of the capitals increases the *competition between the capitalists*. The *increasing extent* of the capitals provides the means for *bringing more powerful labour armies with more gigantic instruments of war into the industrial battlefield*.

One capitalist can drive another from the field and capture his capital only by selling more cheaply. In order to be able to sell more cheaply without ruining himself, he must produce more cheaply, that is, raise the productive power of labour as much as possible. But the productive power of labour is raised, above all, by a *greater division of labour*, by a more universal introduction and continual improvement of *machinery*. The greater the labour army among whom labour is divided, the more gigantic the scale on which machinery is introduced, the more does the cost of production proportionately decrease, the more fruitful is labour. Hence, a general rivalry arises among the capitalists to increase the division of labour and machinery and to exploit them on the greatest possible scale.

If, now, by a greater division of labour, by the utilization of new machines and their improvement, by more profitable and extensive exploitation of natural forces, one capitalist has found the means of producing with the same amount of labour or of accumulated labour a greater amount of products, of commodities, than his competitors, if he can, for example, produce a whole yard of linen in the same labour time in which his competitors weave half a yard, how will this capitalist operate?

He could continue to sell half a yard of linen at the old market price; this would, however, be no means of driving his opponents from the field and of enlarging his own sales. But in the same measure in which his production has expanded, his need to sell has also increased. The more powerful and costly means of production that he has called into life *enable* him, indeed, to sell his commodities more cheaply, they *compel* him, however, at the same time *to sell more commodities*, to conquer a much *larger* market for his commodities; consequently, our capitalist will sell his half yard of linen more cheaply than his competitors.

The capitalist will not, however, sell a whole yard as cheaply as his competitors sell half a yard, although the production of the whole yard does not cost him more than the half yard costs the

others. Otherwise he would not gain anything extra but only get back the cost of production by the exchange. His possibly greater income would be derived from the fact of having set a larger capital into motion, but not from having made more of his capital than the others. Moreover, he attains the object he wishes to attain, if he puts the price of his goods only a small percentage lower than that of his competitors. He drives them from the field, he wrests from them at least a part of their sales, by *underselling* them. And, finally, it will be remembered that the current price always stands *above or below the cost of production*, according to whether the sale of the commodity occurs in a favourable or unfavourable industrial season. The percentage at which the capitalist who has employed new and more fruitful means of production sells above his real cost of production will vary, depending upon whether the market price of a yard of linen stands below or above its hitherto customary cost of production.

However, the *privileged position* of our capitalist is not of long duration; other competing capitalists introduce the same machines, the same division of labour, introduce them on the same or on a larger scale, and this introduction will become so general that the price of linen *is reduced* not only *below its old*, but *below its new cost of production*.

The capitalists find themselves, therefore, in the same position relative to one another as *before* the introduction of the new means of production, and if they are able to supply by these means double the production at the same price, they are *now* forced to supply the double product *below* the old price. On the basis of this new cost of production, the same game begins again. More division of labour, more machinery, enlarged scale of exploitation of machinery and division of labour. And again competition brings the same counter-action against this result.

We see how in this way the mode of production and the means of production are continually transformed, revolutionized, *how the division of labour is necessarily followed by greater division of labour, the application of machinery by still greater application of machinery, work on a large scale by work on a still larger scale*.

That is the law which again and again throws bourgeois production out of its old course and which compels capital to intensify the productive forces of labour, *because it has intensified them*, it, the law which gives capital no rest and continually whispers in its ear: "Go on! Go on!"

This law is none other than that which, within the fluctuations of trade periods, necessarily *levels out* the price of a commodity to its *cost of production*.

However powerful the means of production which a capitalist brings into the field, competition will make these means of production universal and from the moment when it has made them universal, the only result of the greater fruitfulness of his capital is that he must now supply *for the same price* ten, twenty, a hundred times as much as before. But, as he must sell perhaps a thousand times as much as before in order to outweigh the lower selling price by the greater amount of the product sold, because a more extensive sale is now necessary, not only in order to make more profit but in order to replace the cost of production—the instrument of production itself, as we have seen, becomes more and more expensive—and because this mass sale becomes a question of life and death not only for him but also for his rivals, the old struggle begins again *all the more violently the more fruitful the already discovered means of production are*. *The division of labour and the application of machinery, therefore, will go on anew on an incomparably greater scale.*

Whatever the power of the means of production employed may be, competition seeks to rob capital of the golden fruits of this power by bringing the price of the commodities back to the cost of production, by thus making cheaper production—the supply of ever greater amounts of products for the same total price—an imperative law to the same extent as production can be cheapened, that is, as more can be produced with the same amount of labour. Thus the capitalist would have won nothing by his own exertions but the obligation to supply more in the same labour time, in a word, *more difficult conditions for the augmentation of the value of his capital*. While, therefore, competition continually pursues him with its law of the cost of production and every weapon that he forges against his rivals recoils against himself, the capitalist continually tries to get the better of competition by incessantly introducing new machines, more expensive, it is true, but producing more cheaply, and new division of labour in place of the old, and by not waiting until competition has rendered the new ones obsolete.

If now we picture to ourselves this feverish simultaneous agitation on the *whole world market*, it will be comprehensible how the growth, accumulation and concentration of capital results in

an uninterrupted division of labour, and in the application of new and the perfecting of old machinery precipitately and on an ever more gigantic scale.

But how do these circumstances, which are inseparable from the growth of productive capital, affect the determination of wages?

The greater *division of labour* enables *one* worker to do the work of five, ten or twenty; it therefore multiplies competition among the workers fivefold, tenfold and twentyfold. The workers do not only compete by one selling himself cheaper than another; they compete by *one* doing the work of five, ten, twenty; and the *division of labour*, introduced by capital and continually increased, compels the workers to compete among themselves in this way.

Further, as the *division of labour* increases, labour *is simplified*. The special skill of the worker becomes worthless. He becomes transformed into a simple, monotonous productive force that does not have to use intense bodily or intellectual faculties. His labour becomes a labour that anyone can perform. Hence, competitors crowd upon him on all sides, and besides we remind the reader that the more simple and easily learned the labour is, the lower the cost of production needed to master it, the lower do wages sink, for, like the price of every other commodity, they are determined by the cost of production.

Therefore, as labour becomes more unsatisfying, more repulsive, competition increases and wages decrease. The worker tries to keep up the amount of his wages by working more, whether by working longer hours or by producing more in one hour. Driven by want, therefore, he still further increases the evil effects of the division of labour. The result is that *the more he works the less wages he receives*, and for the simple reason that he competes to that extent with his fellow workers, hence makes them into so many competitors who offer themselves on just the same bad terms as he does himself, and that, therefore, in the last resort he *competes with himself, with himself as a member of the working class.*

Machinery brings about the same results on a much greater scale, by replacing skilled workers by unskilled, men by women, adults by children. It brings about the same results, where it is newly introduced, by throwing the hand workers on to the streets in masses, and, where it is developed, improved and replaced by more productive machinery, by discharging workers in smaller

batches. We have portrayed above, in a hasty sketch, the industrial war of the capitalists among themselves; *this war has the peculiarity that its battles are won less by recruiting than by discharging the army of labour. The generals, the capitalists, compete with one another as to who can discharge most soldiers of industry.*

The economists tell us, it is true, that the workers rendered superfluous by machinery find *new* branches of employment.

They dare not assert directly that the same workers who are discharged find places in the new branches of labour. The facts cry out too loudly against this lie. They really only assert that new means of employment will open up for *other component sections of the working class*, for instance, for the portion of the young generation of workers that was ready to enter the branch of industry which has gone under. That is, of course, a great consolation for the disinherited workers. The worshipful capitalists will never want for fresh exploitable flesh and blood, and will let the dead bury their dead. This is a consolation which the bourgeois give themselves rather than one which they give the workers. If the whole class of wage-workers were to be abolished owing to machinery, how dreadful that would be for capital which, without wage labour, ceases to be capital!

Let us suppose, however, that those directly driven out of their jobs by machinery, and the entire section of the new generation that was already on the watch for this employment, *find a new occupation*. Does any one imagine that it will be as highly paid as that which has been lost? *That would contradict all the laws of economics*. We have seen how modern industry always brings with it the substitution of a more simple, subordinate occupation for the more complex and higher one.

How, then, could a mass of workers who have been thrown out of one branch of industry owing to machinery find refuge in another, unless the latter *is lower, worse paid?*

The workers who work in the manufacture of machinery itself have been cited as an exception. As soon as more machinery is demanded and used in industry, it is said, there must necessarily be an increase of machines, consequently of the manufacture of machines, and consequently of the employment of workers in the manufacture of machines; and the workers engaged in this branch of industry are claimed to be skilled, even educated workers.

Since the year 1840 this assertion, which even before was only half true, has lost all semblance of truth because ever more ver-

satile machines have been employed in the manufacture of machinery, no more and no less than in the manufacture of cotton yarn, and the workers employed in the machine factories, confronted by highly elaborate machines, can only play the part of highly unelaborate machines.

But in place of the man who has been discharged owing to the machine, the factory employs maybe *three* children and *one* woman. And did not the man's wages have to suffice for the three children and a woman? Did not the minimum of wages have to suffice to maintain and to propagate the race? What, then, does this favourite bourgeois phrase prove? Nothing more than that now four times as many workers' lives are used up in order to gain a livelihood for *one* worker's family.

Let us sum up: *The more productive capital grows, the more the division of labour and the application of machinery expands. The more the division of labour and the application of machinery expands, the more competition among the workers expands and the more their wages contract.*

In addition, the working class gains recruits from the *higher strata of society* also; a mass of petty industrialists and small rentiers are hurled down into its ranks and have nothing better to do than urgently stretch out their arms alongside those of the workers. Thus the forest of uplifted arms demanding work becomes ever thicker, while the arms themselves become ever thinner.

That the small industrialist cannot survive in a contest one of the first conditions of which is to produce on an ever greater scale, that is, precisely to be a large and not a small industrialist, is self-evident.

That the interest on capital decreases in the same measure as the mass and number of capitals increase, as capital grows; that, therefore, the small rentier can no longer live on his interest but must throw himself into industry, and, consequently, help to swell the ranks of the small industrialists and thereby of candidates for the proletariat—all this surely requires no further explanation.

Finally, as the capitalists are compelled, by the movement described above, to exploit the already existing gigantic means of production on a larger scale and to set in motion all the main-springs of credit to this end, there is a corresponding increase in industrial earthquakes, in which the trading world can only maintain itself by sacrificing a part of wealth, of products and even of productive forces to the gods of the nether world—in a word,

crises increase. They become more frequent and more violent, if only because, as the mass of production, and consequently the need for extended markets, grows, the world market becomes more and more contracted, fewer and fewer new markets remain available for exploitation, since every preceding crisis has subjected to world trade a market hitherto unconquered or only superficially exploited. But capital does not *live* only on labour. A lord, at once aristocratic and barbarous, it drags with it into the grave the corpses of its slaves, whole hecatombs of workers who perish in the crises. Thus we see: *if capital grows rapidly, competition among the workers grows incomparably more rapidly, that is, the means of employment, the means of subsistence, of the working class decrease proportionately so much the more, and, nevertheless, the rapid growth of capital is the most favourable condition for wage labour.*

Lectures delivered by Marx
December 14-30, 1847

Originally published
in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*
of April 5-8 and 11, 1849

Appeared as a separate pamphlet,
prefaced and edited by Engels, in
Berlin in 1891

Printed according to the text
of the pamphlet

Translated from the German

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

**ADDRESS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
TO THE COMMUNIST LEAGUE**

**THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
TO THE LEAGUE**

Brothers! In the two revolutionary years 1848-49 the League proved itself in double fashion: first, in that its members energetically took part in the movement in all places, that in the press, on the barricades and on the battlefields, they stood in the front ranks of the only decidedly revolutionary class, the proletariat. The League further proved itself in that its conception of the movement as laid down in the circulars of the congresses and of the Central Committee of 1847 as well as in the *Communist Manifesto* turned out to be the only correct one, that the expectations expressed in those documents were completely fulfilled and the conception of present-day social conditions, previously propagated only in secret by the League, is now on everyone's lips and is openly preached in the market places. At the same time the former firm organization of the League was considerably slackened. A large part of the members who directly participated in the revolutionary movement believed the time for secret societies to have gone by and public activities alone sufficient. The individual circles and communities allowed their connections with the Central Committee to become loose and gradually dormant. Consequently, while the democratic party, the party of the petty bourgeoisie, organized itself more and more in Germany, the workers' party lost its only firm foothold, remained organized at the most in separate localities for local purposes and in the general movement thus came completely under the domination and leadership of the petty-bourgeois democrats. An end must be put to this state of affairs, the independence of the workers

must be restored. The Central Committee realized this necessity and therefore already in the winter of 1848-49 it sent an emissary, Josef Moll, to Germany for the reorganization of the League. Moll's mission, however, was without lasting effect, partly because the German workers at that time had not acquired sufficient experience and partly because it was interrupted by the insurrection of the previous May. Moll himself took up the musket, entered the Baden-Palatinate army and fell on July 19 in the encounter at the Murg. The League lost in him one of its oldest, most active and most trustworthy members, one who had been active in all the congresses and Central Committees and even prior to this had carried out a series of missions with great success. After the defeat of the revolutionary parties of Germany and France in July 1849, almost all the members of the Central Committee came together again in London, replenished their numbers with new revolutionary forces and set about the reorganization of the League with renewed zeal.

Reorganization can only be carried out by an emissary, and the Central Committee considers it extremely important that the emissary should leave precisely at this moment when a new revolution is impending, when the workers' party, therefore, must act in the most organized, most unanimous and most independent fashion possible if it is not to be exploited and taken in tow again by the bourgeoisie as in 1848.

Brothers! We told you as early as 1848 that the German liberal bourgeois would soon come to power and would immediately turn their newly acquired power against the workers. You have seen how this has been fulfilled. In fact it was the bourgeois who, immediately after the March movement of 1848, took possession of the state power and used this power to force back at once the workers, their allies in the struggle, into their former oppressed position. Though the bourgeoisie was not able to accomplish this without uniting with the feudal party, which had been disposed of in March, without finally even surrendering power once again to this feudal absolutist party, still it has secured conditions for itself which, in the long run, owing to the financial embarrassment of the government, would place power in its hands and would safeguard all its interests, if it were possible for the revolutionary movement to assume already now a so-called peaceful development. The bourgeoisie, in order to safeguard its rule, would not even need to make itself obnoxious

by violent measures against the people, since all such violent steps have already been taken by the feudal counter-revolution. Developments, however, will not take this peaceful course. On the contrary, the revolution, which will accelerate this development, is near at hand, whether it will be called forth by an independent uprising of the French proletariat or by an invasion of the Holy Alliance against the revolutionary Babylon.¹

And the role, this so treacherous role which the German liberal bourgeois played in 1848 against the people, will in the impending revolution be taken over by the democratic petty bourgeois, who at present occupy the same position in the opposition as the liberal bourgeois before 1848. This party, the democratic party, which is far more dangerous to the workers than the previous liberal one, consists of three elements:

I. Of the most advanced sections of the big bourgeoisie, which pursue the aim of the immediate complete overthrow of feudalism and absolutism. This faction is represented by the one-time Berlin compromisers, by the tax resisters.

II. Of the democratic-constitutional petty bourgeois, whose main aim during the previous movement was the establishment of a more or less democratic federal state as striven for by their representatives, the Lefts in the Frankfort Assembly, and later by the Stuttgart parliament, and by themselves in the campaign for the Reich Constitution.

III. Of the republican petty bourgeois, whose ideal is a German federative republic after the manner of Switzerland, and who now call themselves Red and social-democratic because they cherish the pious wish of abolishing the pressure of big capital on small capital, of the big bourgeois on the small bourgeois. The representatives of this faction were the members of the democratic congresses and committees, the leaders of the democratic associations, the editors of the democratic newspapers.

Now, after their defeat, all these factions call themselves Republicans or Reds, just as the republican petty bourgeois in France now call themselves Socialists. Where, as in Württemberg, Bavaria, etc., they still find opportunity to pursue their aims constitutionally, they seize the occasion to retain their old

¹ *Revolutionary Babylon*: The reference is to Paris, which ever since the French bourgeois revolution of the end of the eighteenth century was considered the hotbed of the revolution.—*Ed.*

phrases and to prove by deeds that they have not changed in the least. It is evident, moreover, that the altered name of this party does not make the slightest difference in its attitude to the workers, but merely proves that they are now obliged to turn against the bourgeoisie, which is united with absolutism, and to seek support in the proletariat.

The petty-bourgeois democratic party in Germany is very powerful; it comprises not only the great majority of the bourgeois inhabitants of the towns, the small people in industry and trade and the guild masters; it numbers among its followers also the peasants and the rural proletariat, in so far as the latter has not yet found a support in the independent urban proletariat.

The relation of the revolutionary workers' party to the petty-bourgeois democrats is this: it marches together with them against the faction which it aims at overthrowing, it opposes them in everything whereby they seek to consolidate their position in their own interests.

Far from desiring to revolutionize all society for the revolutionary proletarians, the democratic petty bourgeois strive for a change in social conditions by means of which existing society will be made as tolerable and comfortable as possible for them. Hence they demand above all diminution of state expenditure by a curtailment of the bureaucracy and shifting the chief taxes on to the big landowners and bourgeois. Further, they demand the abolition of the pressure of big capital on small, through public credit institutions and laws against usury, by which means it will be possible for them and the peasants to obtain advances, on favourable conditions, from the state instead of from the capitalists; they also demand the establishment of bourgeois property relations in the countryside by the complete abolition of feudalism. To accomplish all this they need a democratic state structure, either constitutional or republican, that will give them and their allies, the peasants, a majority; also a democratic communal structure that will give them direct control over communal property and over a series of functions now performed by the bureaucrats.

The domination and speedy increase of capital is further to be counteracted partly by restricting the right of inheritance and partly by transferring as many jobs of work as possible to the state. As far as the workers are concerned, it remains certain above all that they are to remain wage-workers as before; the

democratic petty bourgeois only desire better wages and a more secure existence for the workers and hope to achieve this through partial employment by the state and through charity measures; in short, they hope to bribe the workers by more or less concealed aims and to break their revolutionary potency by making their position tolerable for the moment. The demands of the petty-bourgeois democracy here summarized are not put forward by all of its factions at the same time and only a very few members of them consider that these demands constitute definite aims in their entirety. The further separate individuals or factions among them go, the more of these demands will they make their own, and those few who see their own programme in what has been outlined above might believe that thereby they have put forward the utmost that can be demanded from the revolution. But these demands can in nowise suffice for the party of the proletariat. While the democratic petty bourgeois wish to bring the revolution to a conclusion as quickly as possible, and with the achievement, at most, of the above demands, it is our interest and our task to make the revolution permanent, until all more or less possessing classes have been forced out of their position of dominance, until the proletariat has conquered state power, and the association of proletarians, not only in one country but in all the dominant countries of the world, has advanced so far that competition among the proletarians of these countries has ceased and that at least the decisive productive forces are concentrated in the hands of the proletarians. For us the issue cannot be the alteration of private property but only its annihilation, not the smoothing over of class antagonisms but the abolition of classes, not the improvement of existing society but the foundation of a new one. That, during the further development of the revolution, the petty-bourgeois democracy will for a moment obtain predominating influence in Germany is not open to doubt. The question, therefore, arises as to what the attitude of the proletariat and in particular of the League will be in relation to it:

1. During the continuance of the present conditions where the petty-bourgeois democrats are likewise oppressed;
2. In the next revolutionary struggle, which will give them the upper hand;
3. After this struggle, during the period of preponderance over the overthrown classes and the proletariat.

1. At the present moment, when the democratic petty bourgeois are everywhere oppressed, they preach in general unity and reconciliation to the proletariat, they offer it their hand and strive for the establishment of a large opposition party which will embrace all shades of opinion in the democratic party, that is, they strive to entangle the workers in a party organization in which general social-democratic phrases predominate, behind which their special interests are concealed and in which the particular demands of the proletariat may not be brought forward for the sake of beloved peace. Such a union would turn out solely to their advantage and altogether to the disadvantage of the proletariat. The proletariat would lose its whole independent, laboriously achieved position and once more sink down to being an appendage of official bourgeois democracy. This union must, therefore, be most decisively rejected. Instead of once again stooping to serve as the applauding chorus of the bourgeois democrats, the workers, and above all the League, must exert themselves to establish an independent, secret and public organization of the workers' party alongside of the official democrats and make each section the central point and nucleus of workers' societies in which the attitude and interests of the proletariat will be discussed independently of bourgeois influences. How far the bourgeois democrats are from seriously considering an alliance in which the proletarians would stand side by side with them with equal power and equal rights is shown, for example, by the Breslau democrats who, in their organ, the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*,¹ most furiously attack the independently organized workers, whom they style Socialists. In the case of a struggle against a common adversary no special union is required. As soon as such an adversary has to be fought directly, the interests of both parties, for the moment, coincide, and, as previously, so also in the future, this connection, calculated to last only for the moment, will arise of itself. It is self-evident that in the impending bloody conflicts, as in all earlier ones, it is the workers who, in the main, will have to win the victory by their courage, determination and self-sacrifice. As previously, so also in this struggle, the mass of the petty bourgeois will as long as possible remain hesitant, undecided and inactive, and then, as soon as the issue has been decided, will seize the victory for them-

¹ *Neue Oder-Zeitung* [*New Oder Gazette*]: Appeared daily in Breslau in 1849-55.—Ed.

selves, will call upon the workers to maintain tranquillity and return to their work, will guard against so-called excesses and bar the proletariat from the fruits of victory. It is not in the power of the workers to prevent the petty-bourgeois democrats from doing this, but it is in their power to make it difficult for them to gain the upper hand as against the armed proletariat, and to dictate such conditions to them that the rule of the bourgeois democrats will from the outset bear within it the seeds of their downfall, and that their subsequent extrusion by the rule of the proletariat will be considerably facilitated. Above all things, the workers must counteract, as much as is at all possible, during the conflict and immediately after the struggle, the bourgeois endeavours to allay the storm, and must compel the democrats to carry out their present terrorist phrases. Their actions must be so aimed as to prevent the direct revolutionary excitement from being suppressed again immediately after the victory. On the contrary, they must keep it alive as long as possible. Far from opposing so-called excesses, instances of popular revenge against hated individuals or public buildings that are associated only with hateful recollections, such instances must not only be tolerated but the leadership of them taken in hand. During the struggle and after the struggle, the workers must, at every opportunity, put forward their own demands alongside of the demands of the bourgeois democrats. They must demand guarantees for the workers as soon as the democratic bourgeois set about taking over the government. If necessary they must obtain these guarantees by force and in general they must see to it that the new rulers pledge themselves to all possible concessions and promises—the surest way to compromise them. In general, they must in every way restrain as far as possible the intoxication of victory and the enthusiasm for the new state of things, which make their appearance after every victorious street battle, by a calm and dispassionate estimate of the situation and by unconcealed mistrust in the new government. Alongside of the new official governments they must establish simultaneously their own revolutionary workers' governments, whether in the form of municipal committees and municipal councils or in the form of workers' clubs or workers' committees, so that the bourgeois-democratic governments not only immediately lose the support of the workers but from the outset see themselves supervised and threatened by authorities which are backed by the whole mass of the workers. In a word,

from the first moment of victory, mistrust must be directed no longer against the conquered reactionary party, but against the workers' previous allies, against the party that wishes to exploit the common victory for itself alone.

2. But in order to be able energetically and threateningly to oppose this party, whose treachery to the workers will begin from the first hour of victory, the workers must be armed and organized. The arming of the whole proletariat with rifles, muskets, cannon and munitions must be put through at once, the revival of the old Citizens' Guard directed against the workers must be resisted. However, where the latter is not feasible the workers must attempt to organize themselves independently as a proletarian guard with commanders elected by themselves and with a general staff of their own choosing, and to put themselves at the command not of the state authority but of the revolutionary community councils which the workers will have managed to get adopted. Where workers are employed at the expense of the state they must see that they are armed and organized in a separate corps with commanders of their own choosing or as part of the proletarian guard. Arms and ammunition must not be surrendered on any pretext; any attempt at disarming must be frustrated, if necessary by force. Destruction of the influence of the bourgeois democrats upon the workers, immediate independent and armed organization of the workers and the enforcement of conditions as difficult and compromising as possible upon the inevitable momentary rule of the bourgeois democracy—these are the main points which the proletariat and hence the League must keep in view during and after the impending insurrection.

3. As soon as the new governments have consolidated their positions to some extent, their struggle against the workers will begin. Here, in order to be able to offer energetic opposition to the democratic petty bourgeois, it is above all necessary that the workers shall be independently organized and centralized in clubs. After the overthrow of the existing governments, the Central Committee will, as soon as it is at all possible, betake itself to Germany, immediately convene a congress and put before the latter the necessary proposals for the centralization of the workers' clubs under a leadership established in the chief seat of the movement. The speedy organization of at least a provincial interlinking of the workers' clubs is one of the most important points for the strengthening and development of the workers'

party; the immediate consequence of the overthrow of the existing governments will be the election of a national representative assembly. Here the proletariat must see to it:

I. That no groups of workers are barred on any pretext or by any kind of trickery on the part of local authorities or government commissioners.

II. That everywhere workers' candidates are put up alongside of the bourgeois-democratic candidates, that they should consist as far as possible of members of the League, and that their election is promoted by all possible means. Even where there is no prospect whatsoever of their being elected, the workers must put up their own candidates in order to preserve their independence, to count their forces and to bring before the public their revolutionary attitude and party standpoint. In this connection they must not allow themselves to be seduced by such arguments of the democrats as, for example, that by so doing they are splitting the democratic party and making it possible for the reactionaries to win. The ultimate intention of all such phrases is to dupe the proletariat. The advance which the proletarian party is bound to make by such independent action is infinitely more important than the disadvantage that might be incurred by the presence of a few reactionaries in the representative body. If the democracy from the outset comes out resolutely and terroristically against the reaction, the influence of the latter in the elections will be destroyed in advance.

The first point on which the bourgeois democrats will come into conflict with the workers will be the abolition of feudalism. As in the first French Revolution, the petty bourgeois will give the feudal lands to the peasants as free property, that is to say, try to leave the rural proletariat in existence and form a petty-bourgeois peasant class which will go through the same cycle of impoverishment and indebtedness which the French peasant is now still going through

The workers must oppose this plan in the interest of the rural proletariat and in their own interest. They must demand that the confiscated feudal property remain state property and be converted into workers' colonies cultivated by the associated rural proletariat with all the advantages of large-scale agriculture, through which the principle of common property immediately obtains a firm basis in the midst of the tottering bourgeois property relations. Just as the democrats combine with the peasants

so must the workers combine with the rural proletariat. Further, the democrats will work either directly for a federative republic or, if they cannot avoid a single and indivisible republic, they will at least attempt to cripple the central government by the utmost possible autonomy and independence for the communities¹ and provinces. The workers, in opposition to this plan, must not only strive for a single and indivisible German republic, but also within this republic for the most determined centralization of power in the hands of the state authority. They must not allow themselves to be misguided by the democratic talk of freedom for the communities, of self-government, etc. In a country like Germany where there are still so many relics of the Middle Ages to be abolished, where there is so much local and provincial obstinacy to be broken, it must under no circumstances be permitted that every village, every town and every province should put a new obstacle in the path of revolutionary activity, which can proceed with full force only from the centre. It is not to be tolerated that the present state of affairs should be renewed, that Germans must fight separately in every town and in every province for one and the same advance. Least of all is it to be tolerated that a form of property, namely, communal property, which still lags behind modern private property and which everywhere is necessarily passing into the latter, together with the quarrels resulting from it between poor and rich communities, as well as communal civil law, with its trickery against the workers, that exists alongside of state civil law, should be perpetuated by a so-called free communal constitution. As in France in 1793 so today in Germany it is the task of the really revolutionary party to carry through the strictest centralization.²

¹ *Community [Gemeinde]*: This term is employed here in a wide sense to embrace both urban municipalities and rural communities.—*Ed.*

² It must be recalled today that this passage is based on a misunderstanding. At that time—thanks to the Bonapartist and liberal falsifiers of history—it was considered as established that the French centralized machine of administration had been introduced by the Great Revolution and in particular that it had been operated by the Convention as an indispensable and decisive weapon for defeating the royalist and federalist reaction and the external enemy. It is now, however, a well-known fact that throughout the whole revolution up to the eighteenth Brumaire the whole administration of the departments, arrondissements and communes consisted of authorities elected by the respective constituents themselves, and that these authorities acted with complete freedom within the general state laws; that precisely this provincial and local self-government, similar to the American,

We have seen how the democrats will come to power with the next movement, how they will be compelled to propose more or less socialistic measures. It will be asked what measures the workers ought to propose in reply. At the beginning of the movement, of course, the workers cannot yet propose any directly communistic measures. But they can:

1. Compel the democrats to interfere in as many spheres as possible of the hitherto existing social order, to disturb its regular course and to compromise themselves as well as to concentrate the utmost possible productive forces, means of transport, factories, railways, etc., in the hands of the state;

2. They must drive the proposals of the democrats, who in any case will not act in a revolutionary but in a merely reformist manner, to the extreme and transform them into direct attacks upon private property; thus, for example, if the petty bourgeois propose purchase of the railways and factories, the workers must demand that these railways and factories shall be simply confiscated by the state without compensation as being the property of reactionaries. If the democrats propose proportional taxes, the workers must demand progressive taxes; if the democrats themselves put forward a moderately progressive tax, the workers must insist on a tax with rates that rise so steeply that big capital will be ruined by it; if the democrats demand the regulation of state debts, the workers must demand state bankruptcy. Thus, the demands of the workers must everywhere be governed by the concessions and measures of the democrats.

If the German workers are not able to attain power and achieve their own class interests without completely going through a lengthy revolutionary development, they at least know for a certainty this time that the first act of this approaching revolutionary drama will coincide with the direct victory of their own class in France and will be very much accelerated by it.

became the most powerful lever of the revolution and indeed to such an extent that Napoleon, immediately after his *coup d'état* of the eighteenth Brumaire, hastened to replace it by an administration by prefects, which still exists and which, therefore, was a pure instrument of reaction from the beginning. But just as little as local and provincial self-government is in contradiction to political, national centralization, so is it to an equally small extent necessarily bound up with that narrow-minded, cantonal or communal self-seeking which strikes us as so repulsive in Switzerland, and which all the South German federal republicans wanted to make the rule in Germany in 1849. [Note by Engels to the 1885 edition.]

ADDRESS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO COMMUNIST LEAGUE 117

But they themselves must do the utmost for their final victory by clarifying their minds as to what their class interests are, by taking up their position as an independent party as soon as possible and by not allowing themselves to be seduced for a single moment by the hypocritical phrases of the democratic petty bourgeois into refraining from the independent organization of the party of the proletariat. Their battle cry must be: The Revolution in Permanence.

London, March 1850

Written by Marx and Engels
Published by Engels in the third
edition of *Marx's Revelations About
the Cologne Communist Trial*,
Zurich, 1885

Printed according to the text
of the book

Translated from the German

Karl Marx

**THE CLASS STRUGGLES IN FRANCE
1848 TO 1850**

INTRODUCTION BY FREDERICK ENGELS¹

The work here republished was Marx's first attempt to explain a section of contemporary history by means of his materialist conception, on the basis of the given economic situation. In the *Communist Manifesto*, the theory was applied in broad outline to the whole of modern history; in the articles by Marx and myself in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*,² it was constantly used to inter-

¹ This Introduction of Engels's was subjected at the time to gross distortion by the opportunist leadership of the German Social-Democratic Party. In March 1895, Wilhelm Liebknecht printed in the *Vorwärts*, the central organ of the party, a number of excerpts, arbitrarily chosen, from the Introduction, taking everything "which could serve him to defend the tactics of peace at all costs and of the abhorrence of force. . . ." (from Engels's letter to Lafargue dated April 3, 1895). On April 1, 1895, Engels wrote concerning this to Kautsky: ". . . I see today in the *Vorwärts* an extract from my Introduction, printed *without my prior knowledge* and trimmed in such a fashion that I appear as a peaceful worshipper of legality *quand même* [at any price]. So much the more would I like the Introduction to appear unabridged in the *Neue Zeit*, so that this disgraceful impression will be wiped out."

Nevertheless, neither the *Neue Zeit* nor the separate 1895 publication of the booklet printed the Introduction in full.

Upon the insistence of the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party, which had written to Engels about the threat of a new Anti-Socialist Law in Germany, Engels was compelled to agree to the deletion of some of the politically most trenchant passages of the Introduction, where mention was made of the forthcoming armed struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie.

The leadership of the German Social-Democratic Party, which was in possession of the archive of Marx and Engels, never published Engels's article in full. It used the abridged text to substantiate that party's opportunist policy.

The unabridged text of Engels's Introduction was published for the first time in the U.S.S.R.—Ed.

² *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* [*New Rhenish Gazette*]: Appeared in Cologne from June 1, 1848 to May 19, 1849. Karl Marx was its editor-in-chief.—Ed.

pret political events of the day. Here, on the other hand, the question was to demonstrate the inner causal connection in the course of a development which extended over some years, a development as critical, for the whole of Europe, as it was typical; hence, in accordance with the conception of the author, to trace political events back to effects of what were, in the final analysis, economic causes.

If events and series of events are judged by current history, it will never be possible to go back to the *ultimate* economic causes. Even today, when the specialized press concerned provides such rich material, it still remains impossible even in England to follow day by day the movement of industry and trade in the world market and the changes which take place in the methods of production in such a way as to be able to draw a general conclusion, for any point of time, from these manifold, complicated and ever-changing factors, the most important of which, into the bargain, generally operate a long time in secret before they suddenly make themselves violently felt on the surface. A clear survey of the economic history of a given period can never be obtained contemporaneously, but only subsequently, after a collecting and sifting of the material has taken place. Statistics are a necessary auxiliary means here, and they always lag behind. For this reason, it is only too often necessary, in current history, to treat this, the most decisive, factor as constant, and the economic situation existing at the beginning of the period concerned as given and unalterable for the whole period, or else to take notice of only such changes in this situation as arise out of the patently manifest events themselves, and are, therefore, likewise patently manifest. Hence, the materialist method has here quite often to limit itself to tracing political conflicts back to the struggles between the interests of the existing social classes and fractions of classes created by the economic development, and to prove the particular political parties to be the more or less adequate political expression of these same classes and fractions of classes.

It is self-evident that this unavoidable neglect of contemporaneous changes in the economic situation, the very basis of all the processes to be examined, must be a source of error. But all the conditions of a comprehensive presentation of current history unavoidably include sources of error—which, however, keeps nobody from writing current history.

When Marx undertook this work, the source of error mentioned was even more unavoidable. It was simply impossible during the period of the Revolution of 1848-49 to follow up the economic transformations taking place at the same time or even to keep them in view. It was the same during the first months of exile in London, in the autumn and winter of 1849-50. But that was just the time when Marx began this work. And in spite of these unfavourable circumstances, his exact knowledge both of the economic situation in France before, and of the political history of that country after the February Revolution made it possible for him to give a picture of events which laid bare their inner connections in a way never attained ever since, and which later brilliantly stood the double test applied by Marx himself.

The first test resulted from the fact that after the spring of 1850 Marx once again found leisure for economic studies, and first of all took up the economic history of the last ten years. Thereby what he had hitherto deduced, half *a priori*, from gappy material, became absolutely clear to him from the facts themselves, namely, that the world trade crisis of 1847 had been the true mother of the February and March Revolutions, and that the industrial prosperity, which had been returning gradually since the middle of 1848 and attained full bloom in 1849 and 1850, was the revitalizing force of the newly strengthened European reaction. That was decisive. Whereas in the first three articles (which appeared in the January, February and March issues of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung, Politisch-ökonomische Revue*,¹ Hamburg, 1850) there was still the expectation of an early new upsurge of revolutionary energy, the historical review written by Marx and myself for the last issue, a double issue (May to October), which was published in the autumn of 1850, breaks once and for all with these illusions: "A new revolution is possible only in the wake of a new crisis. It is, however, just as certain as this crisis." But that was the only essential change which had to be made. There was absolutely nothing to alter in the interpretation of events given in the earlier chapters, or in the causal connections established therein, as the continuation of the narrative from March 10 up to the autumn of

¹ *Neue Rheinische Zeitung. Politisch-ökonomische Revue* [*New Rhenish Gazette. Politico-Economic Review*]: A journal published by Marx and Engels in January-October 1850.—*Ed.*

1850 in the review in question proves. I have, therefore, included this continuation as the fourth article in the present new edition.

The second test was even more severe. Immediately after Louis Bonaparte's *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851, Marx worked out anew the history of France from February 1848 up to this event, which concluded the revolutionary period for the time being. (*The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Third edition, Hamburg, Meissner, 1885.) In this pamphlet the period depicted in our present publication is again dealt with, although more briefly. Compare this second presentation, written in the light of the decisive event which happened over a year later, with ours and it will be found that the author had very little to change.

What, besides, gives our work quite special significance is the circumstance that it was the first to express the formula in which, by common agreement, the workers' parties of all countries in the world briefly summarize their demand for economic transformation: the appropriation of the means of production by society. In the second chapter, in connection with the "right to work," which is characterized as "the first clumsy formula wherein the revolutionary demands of the proletariat are summarized," it is said: "But behind the right to work stands the power over capital; behind the power over capital, the *appropriation of the means of production*, their subjection to the associated working class and, therefore, the abolition of wage labour as well as of capital and of their mutual relations." Thus, here, for the first time, the proposition is formulated by which modern workers' socialism is equally sharply differentiated both from all the different shades of feudal, bourgeois, petty-bourgeois, etc., socialism and also from the confused community of goods of utopian and of spontaneous workers' communism. If, later, Marx extended the formula to include appropriation of the means of exchange, this extension, which in any case was self-evident after the *Communist Manifesto*, only expressed a corollary to the main proposition. A few wise-acres in England have of late added that the "means of distribution" should also be handed over to society. It would be difficult for these gentlemen to say what these economic means of distribution are, as distinct from the means of production and exchange; unless *political* means of distribution are meant, taxes, poor relief, including the *Sachsenwald*¹ and other endowments. But, first,

¹ *Sachsenwald*: A vast estate granted to Bismarck by William I in 1871.—Ed.

these are already now means of distribution in possession of society in the aggregate, either of the state or of the community, and, secondly, it is precisely the abolition of these that we desire.

* * *

When the February Revolution broke out, all of us, as far as our conceptions of the conditions and the course of revolutionary movements were concerned, were under the spell of previous historical experience, particularly that of France. It was, indeed, the latter which had dominated the whole of European history since 1789, and from which now once again the signal had gone forth for general revolutionary change. It was, therefore, natural and unavoidable that our conceptions of the nature and the course of the "social" revolution proclaimed in Paris in February 1848, of the revolution of the proletariat, should be strongly coloured by memories of the prototypes of 1789 and 1830. Moreover, when the Paris uprising found its echo in the victorious insurrections in Vienna, Milan and Berlin; when the whole of Europe right up to the Russian frontier was swept into the movement; when thereupon in Paris, in June, the first great battle for power between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie was fought; when the very victory of its class so shook the bourgeoisie of all countries that it fled back into the arms of the monarchist-feudal reaction which had just been overthrown—there could be no doubt for us, under the circumstances then obtaining, that the great decisive combat had commenced, that it would have to be fought out in a single, long and vicissitudinous period of revolution, but that it could only end in the final victory of the proletariat.

After the defeats of 1849 we in no way shared the illusions of the vulgar democracy grouped around the future provisional governments *in partibus*.¹ This vulgar democracy reckoned on a speedy and finally decisive victory of the "people" over the "tyrants"; we looked to a long struggle, after the removal of the "tyrants," among the antagonistic elements concealed within this "people" itself. Vulgar democracy expected a renewed outbreak any day; we declared as early as autumn 1850 that at least the *first* chapter of the revolutionary period was closed and that nothing was to be expected until the outbreak of a new world economic crisis. For which reason we were excommunicated, as traitors to

¹ *In partibus infidelium*: literally, in the lands of the infidels, that is, beyond the frontiers of one's own country, in emigration.—*Ed.*

the revolution, by the very people who later, almost without exception, made their peace with Bismarck—so far as Bismarck found them worth the trouble.

But history has shown us too to have been wrong, has revealed our point of view of that time to have been an illusion. It has done even more: it has not merely dispelled the erroneous notions we then held; it has also completely transformed the conditions under which the proletariat has to fight. The mode of struggle of 1848 is today obsolete in every respect, and this is a point which deserves closer examination on the present occasion.

All revolutions up to the present day have resulted in the displacement of one definite class rule by another; but all ruling classes up to now have been only small minorities in relation to the ruled mass of the people. One ruling minority was thus overthrown; another minority seized the helm of state in its stead and refashioned the state institutions to suit its own interests. This was on every occasion the minority group qualified and called to rule by the given degree of economic development; and just for that reason, and only for that reason, it happened that the ruled majority either participated in the revolution for the benefit of the former or else calmly acquiesced in it. But if we disregard the concrete content in each case, the common form of all these revolutions was that they were minority revolutions. Even when the majority took part, it did so—whether wittingly or not—only in the service of a minority; but because of this, or even simply because of the passive, unresisting attitude of the majority, this minority acquired the appearance of being the representative of the whole people.

As a rule, after the first great success, the victorious minority divided; one half was satisfied with what had been gained, the other wanted to go still further, and put forward new demands, which, partly at least, were also in the real or apparent interest of the great mass of the people. In individual cases these more radical demands were actually forced through, but often only for the moment; the more moderate party would regain the upper hand, and what had last been won would wholly or partly be lost again; the vanquished would then shriek of treachery or ascribe their defeat to accident. In reality, however, the truth of the matter was largely this: the achievements of the first victory were only safeguarded by the second victory of the more radical party; this having been attained, and, with it, what was necessary for the

moment, the radicals and their achievements vanished once more from the stage.

All revolutions of modern times, beginning with the great English Revolution of the seventeenth century, showed these features, which appeared inseparable from every revolutionary struggle. They appeared applicable, also, to the struggle of the proletariat for its emancipation; all the more applicable, since precisely in 1848 there were but a very few people who had any idea at all of the direction in which this emancipation was to be sought. The proletarian masses themselves, even in Paris, after the victory, were still absolutely in the dark as to the path to be taken. And yet the movement was there, instinctive, spontaneous, irrepressible. Was not this just the situation in which a revolution had to succeed, led, true, by a minority, but this time not in the interest of the minority, but in the veriest interest of the majority? If, in all the longer revolutionary periods, it was so easy to win the great masses of the people by the merely plausible false representations of the forward-thrusting minorities, why should they be less susceptible to ideas which were the truest reflection of their economic condition, which were nothing but the clear, rational expression of their needs, of needs not yet understood but merely vaguely felt by them? To be sure, this revolutionary mood of the masses had almost always, and usually very speedily, given way to lassitude or even to a revulsion of feeling as soon as illusion evaporated and disappointment set in. But here it was not a question of false representations, but of giving effect to the highest special interests of the great majority itself, interests which, true, were at that time by no means clear to this great majority, but which soon enough had to become clear to it, in the course of giving practical effect to them, by their convincing obviousness. And when, as Marx showed in his third article, in the spring of 1850, the development of the bourgeois republic that arose out of the "social" Revolution of 1848 had even concentrated real power in the hands of the big bourgeoisie—monarchistically inclined as it was into the bargain—and, on the other hand, had grouped all the other social classes, peasantry as well as petty bourgeoisie, round the proletariat, so that, during and after the common victory, not they but the proletariat grown wise by experience had to become the decisive factor—was there not every prospect then of turning the revolution of the minority into a revolution of the majority?

History has proved us, and all who thought like us, wrong. It has made it clear that the state of economic development on the Continent at that time was not, by a long way, ripe for the elimination of capitalist production; it has proved this by the economic revolution which, since 1848, has seized the whole of the Continent, and has caused big industry to take real root in France, Austria, Hungary, Poland and, recently, in Russia, while it has made Germany positively an industrial country of the first rank—all on a capitalist basis, which in the year 1848, therefore, still had great capacity for expansion. But it is just this industrial revolution which has everywhere produced clarity in class relations, has removed a number of intermediate forms handed down from the period of manufacture and in Eastern Europe even from guild handicraft, has created a genuine bourgeoisie and a genuine large-scale industrial proletariat and has pushed them into the foreground of social development. However, owing to this, the struggle between these two great classes, a struggle which, apart from England, existed in 1848 only in Paris and, at the most, in a few big industrial centres, has spread over the whole of Europe and reached an intensity still inconceivable in 1848. At that time the many obscure evangels of the sects, with their panaceas; to-day the *one* generally recognized, crystal-clear theory of Marx, sharply formulating the ultimate aims of the struggle. At that time the masses, sundered and differing according to locality and nationality, linked only by the feeling of common suffering, undeveloped, helplessly tossed to and fro from enthusiasm to despair; today the *one* great international army of Socialists, marching irresistibly on and growing daily in number, organization, discipline, insight and certainty of victory. If even this mighty army of the proletariat has still not reached its goal, if, far from winning victory by one mighty stroke, it has slowly to press forward from position to position in a hard, tenacious struggle, this only proves, once and for all, how impossible it was in 1848 to win social transformation by a simple surprise attack.

A bourgeoisie split into two dynastic-monarchist sections,¹ a bourgeoisie, however, which demanded, above all, peace and

¹ The parties referred to are the *Legitimists*, the supporters of the "legitimate" Bourbon dynasty, who were in power in France up to 1792 and also during the epoch of the Restoration (1814-30), and the *Orleanists*, the supporters of the Orleans dynasty, who came to power during the July Revolution of 1830 and were overthrown by the Revolution of 1848.—Ed.

security for its financial operations, faced by a proletariat vanquished, indeed, but still always a menace, a proletariat round which petty bourgeois and peasants grouped themselves more and more—the continual threat of a violent outbreak, which, nevertheless, offered absolutely no prospect of a final solution—such was the situation, as if specially created for the *coup d'état* of the third, the pseudo-democratic pretender, Louis Bonaparte. On December 2, 1851, by means of the army, he put an end to the tense situation and secured Europe domestic tranquillity in order to confer upon it the blessing of a new era of wars.¹ The period of revolutions from below was concluded for the time being; there followed a period of revolutions from above.

The reversion to the empire in 1851 gave new proof of the unripeness of the proletarian aspirations of that time. But it was itself to create the conditions under which they were bound to ripen. Internal tranquillity ensured the full development of the new industrial boom; the necessity of keeping the army occupied and of diverting the revolutionary currents outwards produced the wars in which Bonaparte, under the pretext of asserting "the principle of nationality," sought to hook annexations for France. His imitator, Bismarck, adopted the same policy for Prussia; he made his *coup d'état*, his revolution from above, in 1866, against the German Confederation and Austria, and no less against the Prussian *Konfliktskammer*.² But Europe was too small for two Bonapartes and the irony of history so willed it that Bismarck overthrew Bonaparte, and King William of Prussia not only established the little German empire,³ but also the French republic. The general result, however, was that in Europe the independence and internal unity of the great nations, with the exception of Poland, had become a fact. Within relatively modest limits, it is true, but, for all that, on a scale large enough to allow the development of the working class to proceed without finding

¹ During the reign of Napoleon III, France took part in the Crimean Campaign (1854-55), carried on war with Austria on account of Italy (1859), participated together with England in the wars against China (1856-58 and 1860), began the conquest of Indo-China, organized an expedition into Syria (1860-61) and Mexico (1862-67), and finally, in 1870-71, waged war against Prussia.—*Ed.*

² *Konfliktskammer*, that is, the Prussian Chamber then in conflict with the government.—*Ed.*

³ This term is applied to the German Empire (without Austria) that arose in 1871 under Prussia's hegemony.—*Ed.*

national complications any longer a serious obstacle. The grave-diggers of the Revolution of 1848 had become the executors of its will. And alongside of them already rose threateningly the heir of 1848, the proletariat, in the shape of the *International*.

After the war of 1870-71, Bonaparte vanishes from the stage and Bismarck's mission is fulfilled, so that he can now sink back again into the ordinary *Junker*. The period, however, is brought to a close by the Paris Commune. An underhand attempt by Thiers to steal the cannon of the Paris National Guard called forth a victorious rising. It was shown once more that in Paris none but a proletarian revolution is any longer possible. After the victory power fell, quite of itself and quite undisputed, into the hands of the working class. And once again it was proved how impossible even then, twenty years after the time described in our work, this rule of the working class still was. On the one hand, France left Paris in the lurch, looked on while it bled profusely from the bullets of MacMahon; on the other hand, the Commune was consumed in unfruitful strife between the two parties which split it, the Blanquists (the majority) and the Proudhonists (the minority), neither of which knew what was to be done. The victory which came as a gift in 1871 remained just as unfruitful as the surprise attack of 1848.

It was believed that the militant proletariat had been finally buried with the Paris Commune. But, completely to the contrary, it dates its most powerful resurgence from the Commune and the Franco-Prussian War. The recruitment of the whole of the population able to bear arms into armies that henceforth could be counted only in millions, and the introduction of fire-arms, projectiles and explosives of hitherto undreamt-of efficacy, created a complete revolution in all warfare. This revolution, on the one hand, put a sudden end to the Bonapartist war period and ensured peaceful industrial development by making any war other than a world war of unheard-of cruelty and absolutely incalculable outcome an impossibility. On the other hand, it caused military expenditure to rise in geometrical progression and thereby forced up taxes to exorbitant levels and so drove the poorer classes of people into the arms of socialism. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, the immediate cause of the mad competition in armaments, was able to set the French and German bourgeoisie chauvinistically at each other's throats; for the workers of the two countries it became a

new bond of unity. And the anniversary of the Paris Commune became the first universal day of celebration of the whole proletariat.

The war of 1870-71 and the defeat of the Commune transferred the centre of gravity of the European workers' movement for the time being from France to Germany, as Marx had foretold. In France it naturally took years to recover from the blood-letting of May 1871. In Germany, on the other hand, where industry—fostered, in addition, in positively hothouse fashion by the blessing of the French milliards¹—developed more and more rapidly, Social-Democracy experienced a still more rapid and enduring growth. Thanks to the intelligent use which the German workers made of the universal suffrage introduced in 1866, the astonishing growth of the party is made plain to all the world by incontestable figures: 1871, 102,000; 1874, 352,000; 1877, 493,000 Social-Democratic votes. Then came recognition of this advance by high authority in the shape of the Anti-Socialist Law; the party was temporarily broken up, the number of votes dropped to 312,000 in 1881. But that was quickly overcome, and then, under the pressure of the Exceptional Law, without a press, without a legal organization and without the right of combination and assembly, rapid expansion really began: 1884, 550,000; 1887, 763,000; 1890, 1,427,000 votes. Thereupon the hand of the state was paralyzed. The Anti-Socialist Law disappeared; socialist votes rose to 1,787,000, over a quarter of all the votes cast. The government and the ruling classes had exhausted all their expedients—uselessly, purposelessly, unsuccessfully. The tangible proofs of their impotence, which the authorities, from night watchman to the imperial chancellor, had had to accept—and that from the despised workers!—these proofs were counted in millions. The state was at the end of its tether, the workers only at the beginning of theirs.

But, besides, the German workers rendered a second great service to their cause in addition to the first, a service performed by their mere existence as the strongest, best disciplined and most rapidly growing Socialist Party. They supplied their comrades in all countries with a new weapon, and one of the sharp-

¹ The reference is to the payment of the 5,000,000,000 franc indemnity by France to Germany under the terms of the Frankfurt Peace Treaty of May 10, 1871.—*Ed.*

est, when they showed them how to make use of universal suffrage.

There had long been universal suffrage in France, but it had fallen into disrepute through the misuse to which the Bonapartist government had put it. After the Commune there was no workers' party to make use of it. It also existed in Spain since the republic, but in Spain boycott of elections was ever the rule of all serious opposition parties. The experience of the Swiss with universal suffrage was also anything but encouraging for a workers' party. The revolutionary workers of the Latin countries had been wont to regard the suffrage as a snare, as an instrument of government trickery. It was otherwise in Germany. The *Communist Manifesto* had already proclaimed the winning of universal suffrage, of democracy, as one of the first and most important tasks of the militant proletariat, and Lassalle had again taken up this point. Now, when Bismarck found himself compelled to introduce this franchise as the only means of interesting the mass of the people in his plans, our workers immediately took it in earnest and sent August Bebel to the first, constituent Reichstag. And from that day on, they have used the franchise in a way which has paid them a thousandfold and has served as a model to the workers of all countries. The franchise has been, in the words of the French Marxist programme, *transformé, de moyen de duperie qu'il a été jusqu'ici, en instrument d'émancipation*—transformed by them from a means of deception, which it was before, into an instrument of emancipation.¹ And if universal suffrage had offered no other advantage than that it allowed us to count our numbers every three years; that by the regularly established, unexpectedly rapid rise in the number of our votes it increased in equal measure the workers' certainty of victory and the dismay of their opponents, and so became our best means of propaganda; that it accurately informed us concerning our own strength and that of all hostile parties, and thereby provided us with a measure of proportion for our actions second to none, safeguarding us from untimely timidity as much as from untimely foolhardiness—if this had been the only advantage we gained from the suffrage, it would still have been much more than enough. But it did more

¹ This phrase was taken from the preamble, written by Marx, of the programme of the French Workers' Party. The programme was adopted in 1880, at the Havre Congress of the Party.—Ed.

than this by far. In election agitation it provided us with a means, second to none, of getting in touch with the mass of the people where they still stand aloof from us; of forcing all parties to defend their views and actions against our attacks before all the people; and, further, it provided our representatives in the Reichstag with a platform from which they could speak to their opponents in parliament, and to the masses without, with quite other authority and freedom than in the press or at meetings. Of what avail was their Anti-Socialist Law to the government and the bourgeoisie when election campaigning and socialist speeches in the Reichstag continually broke through it?

With this successful utilization of universal suffrage, however, an entirely new method of proletarian struggle came into operation, and this method quickly developed further. It was found that the state institutions, in which the rule of the bourgeoisie is organized, offer the working class still further opportunities to fight these very state institutions. The workers took part in elections to particular Diets, to municipal councils and to trades courts; they contested with the bourgeoisie every post in the occupation of which a sufficient part of the proletariat had a say. And so it happened that the bourgeoisie and the government came to be much more afraid of the legal than of the illegal action of the workers' party, of the results of elections than of those of rebellion.

For here, too, the conditions of the struggle had essentially changed. Rebellion in the old style, street fighting with barricades, which decided the issue everywhere up to 1848, was to a considerable extent obsolete.

Let us have no illusions about it: a real victory of an insurrection over the military in street fighting, a victory as between two armies, is one of the rarest exceptions. And the insurgents counted on it just as rarely. For them it was solely a question of making the troops yield to moral influences which, in a fight between the armies of two warring countries, do not come into play at all or do so to a much smaller extent. If they succeed in this, the troops fail to respond, or the commanding officers lose their heads, and the insurrection wins. If they do not succeed in this, then, even where the military are in the minority, the superiority of better equipment and training, of single leadership, of the planned employment of the military forces and of discipline makes itself felt. The most that an insurrection can achieve in the way of actual

tactical operations is the proper construction and defence of a single barricade. Mutual support, the disposition and employment of reserves—in short, concerted and co-ordinated action of the individual detachments, indispensable even for the defence of one section of a town, not to speak of the whole of a large town, will be attainable only to a very limited extent, and most of the time not at all. Concentration of the military forces at a decisive point is, of course, out of question here. Hence passive defence is the prevailing form of fighting; the attack will rise here and there, but only by way of exception, to occasional thrusts and flank assaults; as a rule, however, it will be limited to occupation of positions abandoned by retreating troops. In addition, the military have at their disposal artillery and fully equipped corps of trained engineers, resources of war which, in nearly every case, the insurgents entirely lack. No wonder, then, that even the barricade fighting conducted with the greatest heroism—Paris, June 1848; Vienna, October 1848; Dresden, May 1849—ended in the defeat of the insurrection as soon as the leaders of the attack, unhampered by political considerations, acted from the purely military standpoint, and their soldiers remained reliable.

The numerous successes of the insurgents up to 1848 were due to a great variety of causes. In Paris, in July 1830 and February 1848, as in most of the Spanish street fighting, a citizens' guard stood between the insurgents and the military. This guard either sided directly with the insurrection, or else by its lukewarm, indecisive attitude caused the troops likewise to vacillate, and supplied the insurrection with arms into the bargain. Where this citizens' guard opposed the insurrection from the outset, as in June 1848 in Paris, the insurrection was vanquished. In Berlin in 1848, the people were victorious partly through a considerable accession of new fighting forces during the night and the morning of [March] the 19th, partly as a result of the exhaustion and bad victualling of the troops, and, finally, partly as a result of the paralysis that was seizing the command. But in all cases the fight was won because the troops failed to respond, because the commanding officers lost the faculty to decide or because their hands were tied.

Even in the classic time of street fighting, therefore, the barricade produced more of a moral than a material effect. It was a means of shaking the steadfastness of the military. If it held out until this was attained, victory was won; if not, there was defeat.

This is the main point, which must be kept in view, likewise, when the chances of possible future street fighting are examined.

Already in 1849, these chances were pretty poor. Everywhere the bourgeoisie had thrown in its lot with the governments, "culture and property" had hailed and feasted the military moving against insurrection. The spell of the barricade was broken; the soldier no longer saw behind it "the people," but rebels, agitators, plunderers, levellers, the scum of society; the officer had in the course of time become versed in the tactical forms of street fighting, he no longer marched straight ahead and without cover against the improvised breastwork, but went round it through gardens, yards and houses. And this was now successful, with a little skill, in nine cases out of ten.

But since then there have been very many more changes, and all in favour of the military. If the big towns have become considerably bigger, the armies have become bigger still. Paris and Berlin have, since 1848, grown less than fourfold, but their garrisons have grown more than that. By means of the railways, these garrisons can, in twenty-four hours, be more than doubled, and in forty-eight hours they can be increased to huge armies. The arming of this enormously increased number of troops has become incomparably more effective. In 1848 the smooth-bore, muzzle-loading percussion gun, today the small-calibre, breech-loading magazine rifle, which shoots four times as far, ten times as accurately and ten times as fast as the former. At that time the relatively ineffective round shot and grape-shot of the artillery; today the percussion shells, of which one is sufficient to demolish the best barricade. At that time the pick-axe of the sapper for breaking through fire-walls; today the dynamite cartridge.

On the other hand, all the conditions of the insurgents' side have grown worse. An insurrection with which all sections of the people sympathize will hardly recur; in the class struggle all the middle strata will probably never group themselves round the proletariat so exclusively that in comparison the party of reaction gathered round the bourgeoisie will well-nigh disappear. The "people," therefore, will always appear divided, and thus a most powerful lever, so extraordinarily effective in 1848, is gone. If more soldiers who have seen service came over to the insurrectionists, the arming of them would become so much the more difficult. The hunting and fancy guns of the munitions shops—

even if not previously made unusable by removal of part of the lock by order of the police—are far from being a match for the magazine rifle of the soldier, even in close fighting. Up to 1848 it was possible to make the necessary ammunition oneself out of powder and lead; today the cartridges differ for each gun, and are everywhere alike only in one point, namely, that they are a complicated product of big industry, and therefore not to be manufactured *ex tempore*, with the result that most guns are useless as long as one does not possess the ammunition specially suited to them. And, finally, since 1848 the newly built quarters of the big cities have been laid out in long, straight, broad streets, as though made to give full effect to the new cannon and rifles. The revolutionist would have to be mad who himself chose the new working class districts in the North or East of Berlin for a barricade fight.

Does that mean that in the future street fighting will no longer play any role? Certainly not. It only means that the conditions since 1848 have become far more unfavourable for civilian fighters and far more favourable for the military. In future, street fighting can, therefore, be victorious only if this disadvantageous situation is compensated by other factors. Accordingly, it will occur more seldom in the beginning of a great revolution than in its further progress, and will have to be undertaken with greater forces. These, however, may then well prefer, as in the whole great French Revolution or on September 4 and October 31, 1870,¹ in Paris, the open attack to the passive barricade tactics.

Does the reader now understand why the powers that be positively want to get us to go where the guns shoot and the sabres slash? Why they accuse us today of cowardice, because we do not betake ourselves without more ado into the street, where we are certain of defeat in advance? Why they so earnestly implore us to play for once the part of cannon fodder?

The gentlemen pour out their prayers and their challenges for nothing, for absolutely nothing. We are not so stupid. They might just as well demand from their enemy in the next war that

¹ On September 4, 1870, the government of Louis Bonaparte was overthrown and the republic proclaimed, and on October 31 of the same year there took place the unsuccessful attempt of the Blanquists to make an insurrection against the Government of "National Defence."—Ed.

he should accept battle in the line formation of old Fritz,¹ or in the columns of whole divisions *à la* Wagram and Waterloo, and with the flint-lock in his hands at that. If conditions have changed in the case of war between nations, this is no less true in the case of the class struggle. The time of surprise attacks, of revolutions carried through by small conscious minorities at the head of unconscious masses, is past. Where it is a question of a complete transformation of the social organization, the masses themselves must also be in it, must themselves already have grasped what is at stake, what they are going in for with body and soul. The history of the last fifty years has taught us that. But in order that the masses may understand what is to be done, long, persistent work is required, and it is just this work that we are now pursuing, and with a success which drives the enemy to despair.

In the Latin countries, also, it is being realized more and more that the old tactics must be revised. Everywhere the German example of utilizing the suffrage, of winning all posts accessible to us, has been imitated; everywhere the unprepared launching of an attack has been relegated to the background. In France, where for more than a hundred years the ground has been undermined by revolution after revolution, where there is not a single party which has not done its share in conspiracies, insurrections and all other revolutionary actions; in France, where, as a result, the government is by no means sure of the army and where, in general, the conditions for an insurrectionary *coup de main* are far more favourable than in Germany—even in France the Socialists are realizing more and more that no lasting victory is possible for them, unless they first win the great mass of the people, that is, in this case, the peasants. Slow propaganda work and parliamentary activity are recognized here, too, as the immediate tasks of the party. Successes were not lacking. Not only have a whole series of municipal councils been won; fifty Socialists have seats in the Chambers, and they have already overthrown three ministries and a president of the republic. In Belgium last year the workers forced the adoption of the franchise, and have been victorious in a quarter of the constituencies. In Switzerland, in Italy, in Denmark, yes, even in Bulgaria and Rumania the Socialists are represented in the parliaments. In Austria all parties agree that our admission to the *Reichsrat* can no longer be with-

¹ Frederick II, King of Prussia (1740-86).—Ed.

held. We will get in, that is certain; the only question still in dispute is: by which door? And even in Russia, when the famous *Zemsky Sobor* meets—that National Assembly to which young Nicholas offers such vain resistance—even there we can reckon with certainty on being represented in it.

Of course, our foreign comrades do not thereby in the least renounce their right to revolution. The right to revolution is, after all, the only *really* "historical right," the only right on which all modern states without exception rest, Mecklenburg included, whose aristocratic revolution was ended in 1755 by the "hereditary settlement" ["Erbvergleich"], the glorious charter of feudalism still valid today. The right to revolution is so incontestably recognized in the general consciousness that even General von Boguslawski derives the right to a *coup d'état*, which he vindicates for his Kaiser, solely from this popular right.

But whatever may happen in other countries, the German Social-Democracy occupies a special position and therewith, at least in the immediate future, has a special task. The two million voters whom it sends to the ballot box, together with the young men and women who stand behind them as non-voters, form the most numerous, most compact mass, the decisive "shock force" of the international proletarian army. This mass already supplies over a fourth of the votes cast; and as the by-elections to the *Reichstag*, the Diet elections in individual states, the municipal council and trades court elections demonstrate, it increases incessantly. Its growth proceeds as spontaneously, as steadily, as irresistibly, and at the same time as tranquilly as a natural process. All government intervention has proved powerless against it. We can count even today on two and a quarter million voters. If it continues in this fashion, by the end of the century we shall conquer the greater part of the middle strata of society, petty bourgeois and small peasants, and grow into the decisive power in the land, before which all other powers will have to bow, whether they like it or not. To keep this growth going without interruption until it of itself gets beyond the control of the prevailing governmental system, not to fritter away this daily increasing shock force in vanguard skirmishes, but to keep it intact until the decisive day, that is our main task. And there is only one means by which the steady rise of the socialist fighting forces in Germany could be temporarily halted, and even thrown back for some time: a clash on a big scale with the military, a blood-

letting like that of 1871 in Paris. In the long run that would also be overcome. To shoot a party which numbers millions out of existence is too much even for all the magazine rifles of Europe and America. But the normal development would be impeded, the shock force would, perhaps, not be available at the critical moment, the decisive combat would be delayed, protracted and attended by heavier sacrifices.

The irony of world history turns everything upside down. We, the "revolutionists," the "overthrowers"—we are thriving far better on legal methods than on illegal methods and overthrow. The parties of Order, as they call themselves, are perishing under the legal conditions created by themselves. They cry despairingly with Odilon Barrot: *la légalité nous tue*, legality is the death of us; whereas we, under this legality, get firm muscles and rosy cheeks and look like life eternal. And if *we* are not so crazy as to let ourselves be driven to street fighting in order to please them, then in the end there is nothing left for them to do but themselves break through this fatal legality.

Meanwhile they make new laws against overthrows. Again everything is turned upside down. These anti-overthrow fanatics of today, are they not themselves the overthrowers of yesterday? Have *we* perchance evoked the civil war of 1866? Have *we* driven the King of Hanover, the Elector of Hesse, and the Duke of Nassau from their hereditary lawful domains and annexed these hereditary domains? And these overthrowers of the German Confederation and three crowns by the grace of God complain of overthrow! *Quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes?*¹ Who could allow the Bismarck worshippers to rail at overthrow?

Let them, nevertheless, put through their anti-overthrow bills, make them still worse, transform the whole penal law into indiarubber, they will gain nothing but new proof of their impotence. If they want to deal Social-Democracy a serious blow they will have to resort to quite other measures, in addition. They can cope with the Social-Democratic overthrow, which just now is doing so well by keeping the law, only by an overthrow on the part of the parties of Order, an overthrow which cannot live without breaking the law. Herr Rössler, the Prussian bureaucrat, and Herr von Boguslawski, the Prussian general, have shown them the only way perhaps still possible of getting at the workers,

¹ Who would suffer the Gracchi to complain of sedition?—*Ed.*

who simply refuse to let themselves be lured into street fighting. Breach of the constitution, dictatorship, return to absolutism, *regis voluntas suprema lex!*¹ Therefore, take courage, gentlemen; here half measures will not do; here you must go the whole hog!

But do not forget that the German empire, like all small states and generally all modern states, is a *product of contract*; of the contract, first, of the princes with one another and, second, of the princes with the people. If one side breaks the contract, the whole contract falls to the ground; the other side is then also no longer bound, as Bismarck demonstrated to us so beautifully in 1866. If, therefore, you break the constitution of the Reich, the Social-Democracy is free, and can do as it pleases with regard to you. But it will hardly blurt out to you today what it is going to do then.

It is now, almost to the year, sixteen centuries since a dangerous party of overthrow was likewise active in the Roman empire. It undermined religion and all the foundations of the state; it flatly denied that Caesar's will was the supreme law; it was without a fatherland, was international; it spread over all countries of the empire, from Gaul to Asia, and beyond the frontiers of the empire. It had long carried on seditious activities in secret, underground; for a considerable time, however, it had felt itself strong enough to come out into the open. This party of overthrow, which was known by the name of Christians, was also strongly represented in the army; whole legions were Christian. When they were ordered to attend the sacrificial ceremonies of the pagan established church, in order to do the honours there, the subversive soldiers had the audacity to stick peculiar emblems—crosses—on their helmets in protest. Even the wonted barrack bullying of their superior officers was fruitless. The Emperor Diocletian could no longer quietly look on while order, obedience and discipline in his army were being undermined. He interfered energetically, while there was still time. He promulgated an anti-Socialist—beg pardon, I meant to say anti-Christian—law. The meetings of the overthrowers were forbidden, their meeting halls were closed or even pulled down, the Christian emblems, crosses, etc., were, like the red handkerchiefs in Saxony, prohibited. Christians were declared incapable of holding public office; they were not to be allowed to become even corporals. Since there

¹ The King's will is the supreme law!—Ed.

were not available at that time judges so well trained in "respect of persons" as Herr von Köller's anti-overthrow bill¹ assumes, Christians were forbidden out of hand to seek justice before a court. This exceptional law was also without effect. The Christians tore it down from the walls with scorn; they are even supposed to have burnt the Emperor's palace in Nicomedia over his head. Then the latter revenged himself by the great persecution of Christians in the year 303 of our era. It was the last of its kind. And it was so effective that seventeen years later the army consisted overwhelmingly of Christians, and the succeeding autocrat of the whole Roman empire, Constantine, called the Great by the priests, proclaimed Christianity the state religion.

London, March 6, 1895

Written by Engels

Published in abridged form
in a separate edition of Marx's
The Class Struggles in France,
1848 to 1850, Berlin 1895

Published according to the extant
galleys of Engels's original text

Translated from the German

¹ A new bill against the Socialists, introduced in the Reichstag on December 5, 1894, and rejected on May 11, 1895.—Ed.

THE CLASS STRUGGLES IN FRANCE 1848 TO 1850

With the exception of only a few chapters, every more important part of the annals of the revolution from 1848 to 1849 carries the heading: *Defeat of the revolution!*

What succumbed in these defeats was not the revolution. It was the pre-revolutionary traditional appendages, results of social relationships which had not yet come to the point of sharp class antagonisms—persons, illusions, conceptions, projects from which the revolutionary party before the February Revolution was not free, from which it could be freed not by the *victory of February*, but only by a series of *defeats*.

In a word: the revolution made progress, forged ahead, not by its immediate tragicomic achievements, but on the contrary by the creation of a powerful, united counter-revolution, by the creation of an opponent in combat with whom, only, the party of overthrow ripened into a really revolutionary party.

To prove this is the task of the following pages.

I

THE DEFEAT OF JUNE 1848¹

After the July Revolution, when the liberal banker Laffitte led his companion, the Duke of Orleans,² in triumph to the *Hôtel de Ville*,³ he let fall the words: "*From now on the bankers will rule.*" Laffitte had betrayed the secret of the revolution.

¹ The headings of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd chapters are given in accordance with the original text of the present work published by Marx himself in 1850. In the 1895 text edited by Engels the chapter headings were changed.—*Ed.*

² *Duke of Orleans*: Louis Philippe, who became king of France.—*Ed.*

³ *Hôtel de Ville*: City Hall, seat of the Provisional Government.—*Ed.*

It was not the French bourgeoisie that ruled under Louis Philippe, but *one* faction of it: bankers, stock-exchange kings, railway kings, owners of coal and iron mines and forests, a part of the landed proprietors associated with them—the so-called *finance aristocracy*. It sat on the throne, it dictated laws in the Chambers, it distributed public offices, from cabinet portfolios to tobacco bureau posts.

The *industrial bourgeoisie* proper formed part of the official opposition, that is, it was represented only as a minority in the Chambers. Its opposition was expressed all the more resolutely, the more unalloyed the autocracy of the finance aristocracy became, and the more it itself imagined that its domination over the working class was ensured after the mutinies of 1832, 1834 and 1839, which had been drowned in blood. *Grandin*, Rouen manufacturer and the most fanatical instrument of bourgeois reaction in the Constituent as well as in the Legislative National Assembly, was the most violent opponent of Guizot in the Chamber of Deputies. *Léon Faucher*, later known for his impotent efforts to climb into prominence as the Guizot of the French counter-revolution, in the last days of Louis Philippe waged a war of the pen for industry against speculation and its train bearer, the government. *Bastiat* agitated in the name of Bordeaux and the whole of wine-producing France against the ruling system.

The *petty bourgeoisie* of all gradations, and the *peasantry* also, were completely excluded from political power. Finally, in the official opposition or entirely outside the *pays légal*,¹ there were the *ideological* representatives and spokesmen of the above classes, their savants, lawyers, doctors, etc., in a word: their so-called *men of talent*.

Owing to its financial straits, the July monarchy was dependent from the beginning on the big bourgeoisie, and its dependence on the big bourgeoisie was the inexhaustible source of increasing financial straits. It was impossible to subordinate the administration of the state to the interests of national production without balancing the budget, without establishing a balance between state expenditures and revenues. And how was this balance to be established without limiting state expenditures, that is, without encroaching on interests which were so many props of the ruling system, and without redistributing taxes, that is, with-

¹ Outside the circle of persons enjoying the right to vote.—Ed.

out shifting a considerable share of the burden of taxation on to the shoulders of the big bourgeoisie itself?

On the contrary, the faction of the bourgeoisie that ruled and legislated through the Chambers had a *direct interest* in the *indebtedness of the state*. The *state deficit* was really the main object of its speculation and the chief source of its enrichment. At the end of each year a new deficit. After the lapse of four or five years a new loan. And every new loan offered new opportunities to the finance aristocracy for defrauding the state, which was kept artificially on the verge of bankruptcy—it had to negotiate with the bankers under the most unfavourable conditions. Each new loan gave a further opportunity, that of plundering the public which invested its capital in state bonds by means of stock-exchange manipulations, into the secrets of which the government and the majority in the Chambers were initiated. In general, the instability of state credit and the possession of state secrets gave the bankers and their associates in the Chambers and on the throne the possibility of evoking sudden, extraordinary fluctuations in the quotations of government securities, the result of which was always bound to be the ruin of a mass of smaller capitalists and the fabulously rapid enrichment of the big gamblers. As the state deficit was in the direct interest of the ruling faction of the bourgeoisie, it is clear why the *extraordinary* state expenditure in the last years of Louis Philippe's reign was far more than double the extraordinary state expenditure under Napoleon, indeed reached a yearly sum of nearly 400,000,000 francs, whereas the whole average annual export of France seldom attained a volume amounting to 750,000,000 francs. The enormous sums which, in this way, flowed through the hands of the state facilitated, moreover, swindling contracts for deliveries, bribery, defalcations and all kinds of roguery. The defrauding of the state, practised wholesale in connection with loans, was repeated retail in public works. What occurred in the relations between Chamber and Government became multiplied in the relations between individual departments and individual *entrepreneurs*.

The ruling class exploited the *building of railways* in the same way as it exploited state expenditures in general and state loans. The Chambers piled the main burdens on the state, and secured the golden fruits to the speculating finance aristocracy. One recalls the scandals in the Chamber of Deputies, when by chance

it leaked out that all the members of the majority, including a number of ministers, had been interested as shareholders in the very railway constructions which as legislators they caused to be carried out afterwards at the cost of the state.

On the other hand, the smallest financial reform was wrecked due to the influence of the bankers. For example, the *postal reform*. Rothschild protested. Was it permissible for the state to curtail sources of revenue out of which interest was to be paid on its ever-increasing debt?

The July monarchy was nothing other than a joint-stock company for the exploitation of France's national wealth, the dividends of which were divided among ministers, Chambers, 240,000 voters and their adherents. Louis Philippe was the director of this company—Robert Macaire¹ on the throne. Trade, industry, agriculture, shipping, the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie, were bound to be continually endangered and prejudiced under this system. Cheap government, *gouvernement à bon marché*, was what it had inscribed in the July days on its banner.

Since the finance aristocracy made the laws, was at the head of the administration of the state, had command of all the organized public authorities, dominated public opinion through the actual state of affairs and through the press, the same prostitution, the same shameless cheating, the same mania to get rich was repeated in every sphere, from the Court to the Café Borgne,² to get rich not by production, but by pocketing the already available wealth of others. Clashing every moment with the bourgeois laws themselves, an unbridled assertion of unhealthy and dissolute appetites manifested itself, particularly at the top of bourgeois society—lusts wherein wealth derived from gambling naturally seeks its satisfaction, where pleasure becomes debauched, where money, filth and blood commingle. The finance aristocracy, in its mode of acquisition as well as in its pleasures, is nothing but the *rebirth of the lumpenproletariat on the heights of bourgeois society*.

¹ *Robert Macaire* is a typical clever swindler, a character created by the famous French actor Frédéric Lemaître and immortalized in the caricatures of Honoré Daumier. The figure of Robert Macaire was a biting satire on the domination of the finance aristocracy under the July monarchy.—*Ed.*

² *Café Borgne*: This term was applied in France to cafés of dubious character.—*Ed.*

And the non-ruling factions of the French bourgeoisie cried: *corruption!* The people cried: *à bas les grands voleurs! à bas les assassins!*¹ when in 1847, on the most prominent stages of bourgeois society, the same scenes were publicly enacted that regularly lead the *lumpenproletariat* to brothels, to workhouses and lunatic asylums, to the bar of justice, to the dungeon and to the scaffold. The industrial bourgeoisie saw its interests endangered, the petty bourgeoisie was filled with moral indignation, the imagination of the people was offended, Paris was flooded with pamphlets—"The Rothschild Dynasty," "Usurers Kings of the Epoch," etc.—in which the rule of the finance aristocracy was denounced and stigmatized with greater or less wit.

*Rien pour la gloire!*² Glory brings no profit! *La paix partout et toujours!*³ War depresses the quotations of the three and four per cents! the France of the Bourse jobbers had inscribed on her banner. Her foreign policy was therefore lost in a series of mortifications to French national sentiment, which reacted all the more vigorously when the rape of Poland was brought to its conclusion with the incorporation of Cracow by Austria, and when Guizot came out actively on the side of the Holy Alliance in the Swiss *Sonderbund* war. The victory of the Swiss liberals in this mimic war raised the self-respect of the bourgeois opposition in France; the bloody uprising of the people in Palermo worked like an electric shock on the paralyzed masses of the people and awoke their great revolutionary memories and passions.⁴

The eruption of the general discontent was finally accelerated and the mood for revolt ripened by *two economic world events*.

The *potato blight* and the *crop failures* of 1845 and 1846 increased the general ferment among the people. The dearth of 1847 called forth bloody conflicts in France as well as on the rest of the Continent. As against the shameless orgies of the finance aristocracy, the struggle of the people for the prime necessities of life! At Buzançais, hunger rioters executed; in Paris, oversatiated *escrocs*⁵ snatched from the courts by the royal family!

¹ Down with the big thieves, down with the assassins!—*Ed.*

² Nothing for glory!—*Ed.*

³ Peace everywhere and always!—*Ed.*

⁴ Annexation of Cracow by Austria in agreement with Russia and Prussia on November 11, 1846.—Swiss *Sonderbund* war: November 4 to 28, 1847.—Rising in Palermo January 12, 1848; at the end of January, nine days' bombardment of the town by the Neapolitans. [*Note by Engels to the edition of 1895.*]

⁵ *Escrocs*: Swindlers.—*Ed.*

The second great economic event which hastened the outbreak of the revolution was a *general commercial and industrial crisis* in England. Already heralded in the autumn of 1845 by the wholesale reverses of the speculators in railway shares, staved off during 1846 by a number of incidents such as the impending abolition of the corn duties, the crisis finally burst in the autumn of 1847 with the bankruptcy of the London wholesale grocers, on the heels of which followed the insolvencies of the land banks and the closing of the factories in the English industrial districts. The after-effect of this crisis on the Continent had not yet spent itself when the February Revolution broke out.

The devastation of trade and industry caused by the economic epidemic made the autocracy of the finance aristocracy still more unbearable. Throughout the whole of France the bourgeois opposition *agitated at banquets* for an *electoral reform* which should win for it the majority in the Chambers and overthrow the Ministry of the Bourse. In Paris the industrial crisis had, moreover, the particular result of throwing a multitude of manufacturers and big traders, who under the existing circumstances could no longer do any business in the foreign market, on to the home market. They set up large establishments, the competition of which ruined the small *épiciers*¹ and *boutiquiers*² *en masse*. Hence the innumerable bankruptcies among this section of the Paris bourgeoisie, and hence their revolutionary action in February. It is well known how Guizot and the Chambers answered the reform proposals with an unambiguous challenge, how Louis Philippe too late resolved on a Ministry led by Barrot, how things went as far as hand-to-hand fighting between the people and the army, how the army was disarmed by the passive conduct of the National Guard, how the July monarchy had to give way to a Provisional Government.

The *Provisional Government* which emerged from the February barricades necessarily mirrored in its composition the different parties which shared in the victory. It could not be anything but a *compromise between the different classes* which together had overturned the July throne, but whose interests were mutually antagonistic. The *great majority* of its members consisted of representatives of the bourgeoisie. The republican petty bour-

¹ *Épiciers*: Storekeepers.—Ed.

² *Boutiquiers*: Shopkeepers.—Ed.

geoisie was represented by Ledru-Rollin and Flocon, the republican bourgeoisie by the people from the *National*,¹ the dynastic opposition by Crémieux, Dupont de l'Eure, etc. The working class had only two representatives, Louis Blanc and Albert. Finally, Lamartine in the Provisional Government, this was at first no real interest, no definite class; this was the February Revolution itself, the common uprising with its illusions, its poetry, its visionary content and its phrases. For the rest, the spokesman of the February Revolution, by his position and his views, belonged to the *bourgeoisie*.

If Paris, as a result of political centralization, rules France, the workers, in moments of revolutionary earthquakes, rule Paris. The first act in the life of the Provisional Government was an attempt to escape from this overpowering influence by an appeal from intoxicated Paris to sober France. Lamartine disputed the right of the barricade fighters to proclaim a republic on the ground that only the majority of Frenchmen had that right; they must await their votes, the Paris proletariat must not besmirch its victory by a usurpation. The bourgeoisie allows the proletariat only one usurpation—that of fighting.

Up to noon of February 25 the republic had not yet been proclaimed; on the other hand, all the ministries had already been divided among the bourgeois elements of the Provisional Government and among the generals, bankers and lawyers of the *National*. But the workers were determined this time not to put up with any bamboozlement like that of July 1830. They were ready to take up the fight anew and to get a republic by force of arms. With this message, *Raspail* betook himself to the *Hôtel de Ville*. In the name of the Paris proletariat he *commanded* the Provisional Government to proclaim a republic; if this order of the people were not fulfilled within two hours, he would return at the head of 200,000 men. The bodies of the fallen were scarcely cold, the barricades were not yet cleared away, the workers not yet disarmed, and the only force which could be opposed to them was the National Guard. Under these circumstances the doubts born of considerations of state policy and the juristic scruples of conscience entertained by the Provisional Government suddenly vanished. The time limit of two hours had not yet expired when all

¹ *Le National*: A newspaper which appeared in Paris in 1830-51; organ of the bourgeois-republican party.—*Ed.*

the walls of Paris were resplendent with the gigantesque historical words:

République française! Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité!

Even the memory of the limited aims and motives which drove the bourgeoisie into the February Revolution was extinguished by the proclamation of the republic on the basis of universal suffrage. Instead of only a few factions of the bourgeoisie, all classes of French society were suddenly hurled into the orbit of political power, forced to leave the boxes, the stalls and the gallery and to act in person upon the revolutionary stage! With the constitutional monarchy vanished also the semblance of a state power independently confronting bourgeois society as well as the whole series of subordinate struggles which this semblance of power called forth!

By dictating the republic to the Provisional Government and through the Provisional Government to the whole of France, the proletariat stepped into the foreground forthwith as an independent party, but at the same time challenged the whole of bourgeois France to enter the lists against it. What it won was the terrain for the fight for its revolutionary emancipation, but by no means this emancipation itself.

The first thing that the February republic had to do was, rather, to *complete the rule of the bourgeoisie* by allowing, beside the finance aristocracy, *all the propertied classes* to enter the orbit of political power. The majority of the great landowners, the Legitimists, were emancipated from the political nullity to which they had been condemned by the July monarchy. Not for nothing had the *Gazette de France*¹ agitated in common with the opposition papers; not for nothing had La Rochejaquelein taken the side of the revolution in the session of the Chamber of Deputies on February 24. The nominal proprietors, who form the great majority of the French people, the *peasants*, were put by universal suffrage in the position of arbiters of the fate of France. The February republic finally brought the rule of the bourgeoisie clearly into view, since it struck off the crown behind which capital kept itself concealed.

Just as the workers in the July days had fought for and won the *bourgeois monarchy*, so in the February days they fought for

¹ *Gazette de France*: One of the oldest French newspapers, it was published in Paris since the seventeenth century. Its trend was monarchistic.—*Ed.*

and won the *bourgeois republic*. Just as the July monarchy had to proclaim itself a *monarchy surrounded by republican institutions*, so the February republic was forced to proclaim itself a *republic surrounded by social institutions*. The Paris proletariat *compelled* this concession, too.

Marche, a worker, dictated the decree by which the newly formed Provisional Government pledged itself to guarantee the workers a livelihood by means of labour, to provide work for all citizens, etc. And when, a few days later, it forgot its promises and seemed to have lost sight of the proletariat, a mass of 20,000 workers marched on the *Hôtel de Ville* with the cry: *Organize labour! Form a special Ministry of Labour!* Reluctantly and after long debate, the Provisional Government nominated a permanent special commission charged with *finding* means of improving the lot of the working classes! This commission consisted of delegates from the corporations of Paris artisans and was presided over by Louis Blanc and Albert. The Luxembourg palace was assigned to it as its meeting place. In this way the representatives of the working class were banished from the seat of the Provisional Government, the bourgeois part of which retained the real state power and the reins of administration exclusively in its hands; and *side by side* with the Ministries of Finance, Trade and Public Works, *side by side* with the Bank and the Bourse, there arose a *socialist synagogue* whose high priests, Louis Blanc and Albert, had the task of discovering the promised land, of preaching the new gospel and of providing work for the Paris proletariat. Unlike any profane state power, they had no budget, no executive authority at their disposal. They were supposed to break the pillars of bourgeois society by dashing their heads against them. While the Luxembourg sought the philosopher's stone, in the *Hôtel de Ville* they minted the current coinage.

And yet the claims of the Paris proletariat, so far as they went beyond the bourgeois republic, could win no other existence than the nebulous one of the Luxembourg.

In common with the bourgeoisie the workers had made the February Revolution, and *alongside* the bourgeoisie they sought to secure the advancement of their interest, just as they had installed a worker in the Provisional Government itself alongside the bourgeois majority. *Organize labour!* But wage labour, that is the existing, the bourgeois organization of labour. Without it

there is no capital, no bourgeoisie, no bourgeois society. *A Special Ministry of Labour!* But the Ministries of Finance, of Trade, of Public Works—are not these the *bourgeois* Ministries of Labour? And *alongside* these a *proletarian* Ministry of Labour had to be a ministry of impotence, a ministry of pious wishes, a Luxembourg Commission. Just as the workers thought they would be able to emancipate themselves side by side with the bourgeoisie, so they thought they would be able to consummate a proletarian revolution within the national walls of France, side by side with the remaining bourgeois nations. But French relations of production are conditioned by the foreign trade of France, by her position on the world market and the laws thereof; how was France to break them without a European revolutionary war, which would strike back at the despot of the world market, England?

As soon as it has risen up, a class in which the revolutionary interests of society are concentrated finds the content and the material for its revolutionary activity directly in its own situation: foes to be laid low, measures dictated by the needs of the struggle to be taken; the consequences of its own deeds drive it on. It makes no theoretical inquiries into its own task. The French working class had not attained this level; it was still incapable of accomplishing its own revolution.

The development of the industrial proletariat is, in general, conditioned by the development of the industrial bourgeoisie. Only under its rule does the proletariat gain that extensive national existence which can raise its revolution to a national one, and does it itself create the modern means of production, which become just so many means of its revolutionary emancipation. Only its rule tears up the material roots of feudal society and levels the ground on which alone a proletarian revolution is possible. French industry is more developed and the French bourgeoisie more revolutionary than that of the rest of the Continent. But was not the February Revolution levelled directly against the finance aristocracy? This fact proved that the industrial bourgeoisie did not rule France. The industrial bourgeoisie can rule only where modern industry shapes all property relations to suit itself, and industry can win this power only where it has conquered the world market, for national bounds are inadequate for its development. But French industry, to a great extent, maintains its command even of the national market only through a more or less modified system of prohibitive duties. While, there-

fore, the French proletariat, at the moment of a revolution, possesses in Paris actual power and influence which spur it on to a drive beyond its means, in the rest of France it is crowded into separate, scattered industrial centres, being almost lost in the superior numbers of peasants and petty bourgeois. The struggle against capital in its developed, modern form, in its decisive aspect, the struggle of the industrial wage-worker against the industrial bourgeois, is in France a partial phenomenon, which after the February days could so much the less supply the national content of the revolution, since the struggle against capital's secondary modes of exploitation, that of the peasant against usury and mortgages or of the petty bourgeois against the wholesale dealer, banker and manufacturer, in a word, against bankruptcy, was still hidden in the general uprising against the finance aristocracy. Nothing is more understandable, then, than that the Paris proletariat sought to secure the advancement of its own interests *side by side* with those of the bourgeoisie, instead of enforcing them as the revolutionary interests of society itself, that it let the *red* flag be lowered to the *tricolour*. The French workers could not take a step forward, could not touch a hair of the bourgeois order, until the course of the revolution had aroused the mass of the nation, peasants and petty bourgeois, standing between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, against this order, against the rule of capital, and had forced it to attach itself to the proletarians as their protagonists. The workers could buy this victory only through the tremendous defeat in June.

The Luxembourg Commission, this creation of the Paris workers, must be given the credit of having disclosed, from a Europe-wide tribune, the secret of the revolution of the nineteenth century: *the emancipation of the proletariat*. The *Moniteur*¹ reddened when it had to propagate officially the "wild ravings" which up to that time lay buried in the apocryphal writings of the Socialists and reached the ear of the bourgeoisie only from time to time as remote, half terrifying, half ludicrous legends. Europe awoke astonished from its bourgeois doze. Therefore, in the minds of the proletarians, who confused the finance aristocracy with the bourgeoisie in general; in the imagination of the good old republicans who denied the very existence of classes or, at most, admitted

¹ *Moniteur Universel*: The official organ of the French Government.—Ed.

them as a result of the constitutional monarchy; in the hypocritical phrases of the factions of the bourgeoisie which up to now had been excluded from power, the *rule of the bourgeoisie* was abolished with the introduction of the republic. At that time all the royalists were transformed into republicans and all the millionaires of Paris into workers. The phrase which corresponded to this imaginary abolition of class relations was *fraternité*, universal fraternization and brotherhood. This pleasant abstraction from class antagonisms, this sentimental reconciliation of contradictory class interests, this visionary elevation above the class struggle, this *fraternité* was the real catchword of the February Revolution. The classes were divided by a mere *misunderstanding* and Lamartine baptized the Provisional Government on February 24 "un gouvernement qui suspende *ce malentendu terrible qui existe entre les différentes classes*."¹ The Paris proletariat revelled in this magnanimous intoxication of fraternity.

The Provisional Government, on its part, once it was compelled to proclaim the republic, did everything to make it acceptable to the bourgeoisie and to the provinces. The bloody terror of the first French republic was disavowed by the abolition of the death penalty for political offences; the press was opened to all opinions; the army, the courts, the administration remained with a few exceptions in the hands of their old dignitaries; none of the July monarchy's great offenders was brought to book. The bourgeois republicans of the *National* amused themselves by exchanging monarchist names and costumes for old republican ones. To them the republic was only a new ball dress for the old bourgeois society. The young republic sought its chief merit not in frightening, but rather in constantly taking fright itself, and in winning existence and disarming resistance by the soft compliance and non-resistance of its existence. At home to the privileged classes, abroad to the despotic powers, it was loudly announced that the republic was of a peaceful nature. Live and let live was its professed motto. In addition thereto, shortly after the February Revolution the Germans, Poles, Austrians, Hungarians and Italians revolted, each people in accordance with its immediate situation. Russia and England—the latter itself agitated, the former cowed—were not prepared. The republic, therefore, had no *national*

¹ "A government that removes this terrible misunderstanding which exists between the different classes."—Ed.

enemy to face. Consequently, there were no great foreign complications which could fire the energies, hasten the revolutionary process, drive the Provisional Government forward or throw it overboard. The Paris proletariat, which looked upon the republic as its own creation, naturally acclaimed each act of the Provisional Government which facilitated the firm emplacement of the latter in bourgeois society. It willingly allowed itself to be employed on police service by Caussidière in order to protect property in Paris, just as it allowed Louis Blanc to arbitrate wage disputes between workers and masters. It made it a *point d'honneur* to preserve the bourgeois honour of the republic unblemished in the eyes of Europe.

The republic encountered no resistance either abroad or at home. This disarmed it. Its task was no longer the revolutionary transformation of the world, but consisted only in adapting itself to the relations of bourgeois society. Concerning the fanaticism with which the Provisional Government undertook this task there is no more eloquent testimony than its *financial measures*.

Public credit and *private credit* were naturally shaken. *Public credit* rests on confidence that the state will allow itself to be exploited by the wolves of finance. But the old state had vanished and the revolution was directed above all against the finance aristocracy. The vibrations of the last European commercial crisis had not yet ceased. Bankruptcy still followed bankruptcy.

Private credit was therefore paralyzed, circulation restricted, production at a standstill before the February Revolution broke out. The revolutionary crisis increased the commercial crisis. And if private credit rests on confidence that bourgeois production in the entire scope of its relations, that the bourgeois order, will not be touched, will remain inviolate, what effect must a revolution have had which questioned the basis of bourgeois production, the economic slavery of the proletariat, which set up against the Bourse the sphinx of the Luxembourg? The uprising of the proletariat is the abolition of bourgeois credit; for it is the abolition of bourgeois production and its order. Public credit and private credit are the economic thermometer by which the intensity of a revolution can be measured. *The more they fall, the more the fervour and generative power of the revolution rises.*

The Provisional Government wanted to strip the republic of its anti-bourgeois appearance. And so it had, above all, to try to peg the *exchange value* of this new form of state, its *quotation*

on the Bourse. Private credit necessarily rose again, together with the current Bourse quotation of the republic.

In order to allay the very *suspicion* that it would not or could not honour the obligations assumed by the monarchy, in order to build up confidence in the republic's bourgeois morality and capacity to pay, the Provisional Government took refuge in braggadocio as undignified as it was childish. *In advance* of the legal date of payment it paid out the interest on the 5 per cent, 4½ per cent and 4 per cent bonds to the state creditors. The bourgeois aplomb, the self-assurance of the capitalists, suddenly awoke when they saw the anxious haste with which it was sought to buy their confidence.

The financial embarrassment of the Provisional Government was naturally not lessened by a theatrical stroke which robbed it of its stock of ready cash. The financial pinch could no longer be concealed and *petty bourgeois, domestic servants and workers* had to pay for the pleasant surprise which had been prepared for the state creditors.

It was announced that no more money could be drawn on *savings bank books* for an amount of over one hundred francs. The sums deposited in the savings banks were confiscated and by decree transformed into an irredeemable state debt. This embittered the already hard pressed *petty bourgeois* against the republic. Since he received state debt certificates in place of his savings bank books, he was forced to go to the Bourse in order to sell them and thus deliver himself directly into the hands of the Bourse jobbers, against whom he had made the February Revolution.

The finance aristocracy, which ruled under the July monarchy, had its high church in the *Bank*. Just as the Bourse governs state credit, the Bank governs *commercial credit*.

Directly threatened not only in its rule but in its very existence by the February Revolution, the Bank tried from the outset to discredit the republic by making the lack of credit general. It suddenly stopped the credits of the bankers, the manufacturers and the merchants. As it did not immediately call forth a counter-revolution, this manoeuvre necessarily reacted on the Bank itself. The capitalists drew out the money which they had deposited in the vaults of the Bank. The possessors of bank notes rushed to the pay office in order to exchange them for gold and silver.

The Provisional Government could have forced the Bank into

bankruptcy without forcible interference, in a legal manner; it would only have had to remain passive and leave the Bank to its fate. The *bankruptcy of the Bank* would have been the deluge which in a trice would have swept from French soil the finance aristocracy, the most powerful and dangerous enemy of the republic, the golden pedestal of the July monarchy. And once the Bank was bankrupt, the bourgeoisie itself would have had to regard it as a last desperate attempt at rescue, if the government had formed a national bank and subjected national credit to the control of the nation.

The Provisional Government, on the contrary, fixed a *compulsory quotation* for the notes of the bank. It did more. It transformed all provincial banks into branches of the *Banque de France* and allowed it to cast its net over the whole of France. Later it pledged the *state forests* to the Bank as a guarantee for a loan that it contracted from it. In this way the February Revolution directly strengthened and enlarged the bankocracy which it should have overthrown.

Meanwhile the Provisional Government was writhing under the incubus of a growing deficit. In vain it begged for patriotic sacrifices. Only the workers threw it their alms. Recourse had to be had to a heroic measure, to the imposition of a *new tax*. But who was to be taxed? The Bourse wolves, the bank kings, the state creditors, the *rentiers*, the industrialists? That was not the way to ingratiate the republic with the bourgeoisie. That would have meant, on the one hand, to endanger state credit and commercial credit, while, on the other, attempts were made to purchase them with such great sacrifices and humiliations. But someone had to fork out the cash. Who was sacrificed to bourgeois credit? *Jacques le bonhomme*,¹ the *peasant*.

The Provisional Government imposed an additional tax of 45 centimes in the franc on the four direct taxes. The government press cajoled the Paris proletariat into believing that this tax would fall chiefly on the big landed proprietors, on the possessors of the milliard granted by the Restoration.² But in truth it hit the *peasant class* above all, that is, the large majority of the

¹ *Jacques le bonhomme*: A contemptuous nickname applied by the French landowners to the peasants.—*Ed.*

² The sum assigned in 1825 to compensate the aristocrats whose property had been confiscated during the bourgeois revolution of the end of the eighteenth century.—*Ed.*

French people. *They had to pay the costs of the February Revolution*; in them the counter-revolution gained its main material. The 45 centimes tax was a question of life and death for the French peasant; he made it a life-and-death question for the republic. From that moment the *republic* meant to the French peasant the 45 centimes tax, and he saw in the Paris proletariat the spend-thrift who did himself well at his expense.

Whereas the Revolution of 1789 began by shaking the feudal burdens off the peasants, the Revolution of 1848 announced itself to the rural population by the imposition of a new tax, in order not to endanger capital and to keep its state machine going.

There was only one means by which the Provisional Government could set aside all these inconveniences and jerk the state out of its old rut—a *declaration of state bankruptcy*. Everyone recalls how Ledru-Rollin in the National Assembly subsequently recited the virtuous indignation with which he repudiated this presumptuous proposal of the Bourse wolf Fould, now French Finance Minister. Fould had handed him the apple from the tree of knowledge.

By honouring the bills drawn on the state by the old bourgeois society, the Provisional Government succumbed to the latter. It had become the hard pressed debtor of bourgeois society instead of confronting it as the pressing creditor that had to collect the revolutionary debts of many years. It had to consolidate the shaky bourgeois relationships in order to fulfil obligations which are only to be fulfilled within these relationships. Credit became a condition of life for it, and the concessions to the proletariat, the promises made to it, became so many *fetters* which *had* to be struck off. The emancipation of the workers—even as a *phrase*—became an unbearable danger to the new republic, for it was a standing protest against the restoration of credit, which rests on undisturbed and untroubled recognition of the existing economic class relations. Therefore, it was necessary *to have done with the workers*.

The February Revolution had cast the army out of Paris. The National Guard, that is, the bourgeoisie in its different gradations, constituted the sole power. Alone, however, it did not feel itself a match for the proletariat. Moreover, it was forced gradually and piecemeal to open its ranks and admit armed proletarians, albeit after the most tenacious resistance and after setting

up a hundred different obstacles. There consequently remained but one way out: *to play off one part of the proletariat against the other.*

For this purpose the Provisional Government formed 24 battalions of *Mobile Guards*, each a thousand strong, composed of young men from 15 to 20 years. They belonged for the most part to the *lumpenproletariat*, which in all big towns forms a mass sharply differentiated from the industrial proletariat, a recruiting ground for thieves and criminals of all kinds, living on the crumbs of society, people without a definite trade, vagabonds, *gens sans feu et sans aveu*,¹ varying according to the degree of civilization of the nation to which they belong, but never renouncing their *lazzaroni*² character; at the youthful age at which the Provisional Government recruited them, thoroughly malleable, as capable of the most heroic deeds and the most exalted sacrifices as of the basest banditry and the foulest corruption. The Provisional Government paid them 1 franc 50 centimes a day, that is, it bought them. It gave them their own uniform, that is, it made them outwardly distinct from the blouse-wearing workers. In part it had assigned them officers from the standing army as leaders; in part they themselves elected young sons of the bourgeoisie whose rodomontades about death for the fatherland and devotion to the republic captivated them.

And so the Paris proletariat was confronted with an army, drawn from its own midst, of 24,000 young, strong, foolhardy men. It gave cheers for the Mobile Guard on its marches through Paris. It acknowledged it to be its foremost fighters on the barricades. It regarded it as the *proletarian* guard in contradistinction to the bourgeois National Guard. Its error was pardonable.

Besides the Mobile Guard, the government decided to rally round itself an army of industrial workers. A hundred thousand workers, thrown on the streets by the crisis and the revolution, were enrolled by the Minister Marie in so-called national *ateliers*.³ Under this grandiose name was hidden nothing else than the employment of the workers on tedious, monotonous, un-

¹ Folk without hearth or home.—*Ed.*

² *Lazzaroni*: Name applied in Italy to the declassed, lumpenproletarian elements of the population repeatedly used by the absolute governments for counter-revolutionary purposes.—*Ed.*

³ *Ateliers*: Workshops.—*Ed.*

productive *earthworks* at a wage of 23 sous. *English workhouses*¹ *in the open*—that is what these national *ateliers* were. The Provisional Government believed that it had formed, in them, *a second proletarian army against the workers themselves*. This time the bourgeoisie was mistaken in the national *ateliers*, just as the workers were mistaken in the Mobile Guard. It had created an *army for mutiny*.

But one purpose was achieved.

National ateliers was the name of the people's workshops, which Louis Blanc preached in the Luxembourg palace. Marie's *ateliers*, devised in direct *antagonism* to the Luxembourg, offered occasion, thanks to the common label, for a plot of errors worthy of the Spanish comedy of servants. The Provisional Government itself surreptitiously spread the report that these national *ateliers* were the discovery of Louis Blanc, and this seemed the more plausible because Louis Blanc, the prophet of the national *ateliers*, was a member of the Provisional Government. And in the half naïve, half intentional confusion of the Paris bourgeoisie, in the artificially moulded opinion of France, of Europe, these workhouses were the first realization of socialism, which was put in the pillory with them.

In their appellation, though not in their content, the *national ateliers* were the embodied protest of the proletariat against bourgeois industry, bourgeois credit and the bourgeois republic. The whole hate of the bourgeoisie was, therefore, turned upon them. It had found in them, simultaneously, the point against which it could direct the attack, as soon as it was strong enough to break openly with the February illusions. All the discontent, all the ill humour of the *petty bourgeois* too was directed against these national *ateliers*, the common target. With real fury they reckoned up the sums that the proletarian loafers swallowed up, while their own situation was becoming daily more unbearable. A state pension for sham labour, so that's socialism! they grumbled to themselves. They sought the reason for their misery in the national *ateliers*, the declamations of the Luxembourg, the processions of the workers through Paris. And no one was more fanatic about the alleged machinations of the Communists than

¹ The Poor Law adopted in England in 1834 provided for building "workhouses" for the poor instead of "relief" in money or kind. These workhouses were called "Bastilles for the poor" and were objects of terror to them.—*Ed.*

the petty bourgeoisie, who hovered hopelessly on the brink of bankruptcy.

Thus in the approaching *mêlée* between bourgeoisie and proletariat, all the advantages, all the decisive posts, all the middle strata of society were in the hands of the bourgeoisie, at the same time as the waves of the February Revolution rose high over the whole Continent, and each new post brought a new bulletin of revolution, now from Italy, now from Germany, now from the remotest parts of South-Eastern Europe, and maintained the general ecstasy of the people, giving it constant testimony of a victory that it had already forfeited.

March 17 and *April 16* were the first skirmishes in the big class struggle, which the bourgeois republic hid under its wings.

March 17 revealed the ambiguous situation of the proletariat, which permitted of no decisive act. Its demonstration originally pursued the purpose of pushing the Provisional Government back on to the path of revolution, of effecting the exclusion of its bourgeois members, according to circumstances, and of compelling the postponement of the election days for the National Assembly and the National Guard. But on *March 16* the bourgeoisie represented in the National Guard staged a hostile demonstration against the Provisional Government. With the cry: *à bas Ledru-Rollin!* it surged to the *Hôtel de Ville*. And the people were forced, on *March 17*, to shout: Long live Ledru-Rollin! Long live the Provisional Government! They were forced to take sides against the bourgeoisie in support of the bourgeois republic, which seemed to them to be in danger. They strengthened the Provisional Government, instead of subordinating it to themselves. *March 17* went off in a melodramatic scene, and whereas the Paris proletariat on this day once more displayed its giant body, the bourgeoisie both inside and outside the Provisional Government was all the more determined to smash it.

April 16 was a *misunderstanding* engineered by the Provisional Government in alliance with the bourgeoisie. The workers had gathered in great numbers in the Field of Mars and in the Hippodrome to prepare their elections to the general staff of the National Guard. Suddenly throughout Paris, from one end to the other, a rumour spread as quick as lightning, to the effect, that the workers had met armed in the Field of Mars, under the leadership of Louis Blanc, Blanqui, Cabet and Raspail, in order to march thence on the *Hôtel de Ville*, overthrow the Provisional

Government and proclaim a communist government. The general alarm is sounded—Ledru-Rollin, Marrast and Lamartine later contended for the honour of having initiated this—and in an hour 100,000 men are under arms; the *Hôtel de Ville* is occupied at all points by the National Guard; the cry: Down with the Communists! Down with Louis Blanc, with Bianqui, with Raspail, with Cabel! thunders throughout Paris. Innumerable deputations pay homage to the Provisional Government, all ready to save the fatherland and society. When the workers finally appear before the *Hôtel de Ville*, in order to hand over to the Provisional Government a patriotic collection which they had made in the Field of Mars, they learn to their amazement that bourgeois Paris had defeated their shadow in a very carefully calculated sham battle. The terrible attempt of April 16 furnished the excuse *for recalling the army to Paris*—the real purpose of the clumsily staged comedy—and for the reactionary federalist demonstrations in the provinces.

On May 4 the *National Assembly*, the result of the *direct general elections*, convened. Universal suffrage did not possess the magic power which republicans of the old school had ascribed to it. They saw in the whole of France, at least in the majority of Frenchmen, *citoyens*¹ with the same interests, the same understanding, etc. This was their *cult of the people*. Instead of their *imaginary* people, the elections brought the *real* people to the light of day, that is, representatives of the different classes into which it falls. We have seen why peasants and petty bourgeois had to vote under the leadership of a bourgeoisie spoiling for a fight and of big landowners frantic for restoration. But if universal suffrage was not the miracle-working magic wand for which the republican worthies had taken it, it possessed the incomparably higher merit of unchaining the class struggle, of letting the various middle strata of bourgeois society rapidly get over their illusions and disappointments, of tossing all the sections of the exploiting class at one throw to the apex of the state, and thus tearing from them their deceptive mask, whereas the monarchy with its property qualifications only let certain factions of the bourgeoisie compromise themselves, allowing the others to lie hidden behind the scenes and surrounding them with the halo of a common opposition.

¹ *Citoyens*: Citizens.--Ed.

In the Constituent National Assembly, which met on May 4, the *bourgeois republicans*, the republicans of the *National*, had the upper hand. Even Legitimists and Orleanists at first dared to show themselves only under the mask of bourgeois republicanism. The fight against the proletariat could be undertaken only in the name of the republic.

The republic dates from May 4, not from February 25, that is, the republic recognized by the French people; it is not the republic which the Paris proletariat thrust upon the Provisional Government, not the republic with social institutions, not the vision which hovered before the fighters on the barricades. The republic proclaimed by the National Assembly, the sole legitimate republic, is a republic which is no revolutionary weapon against the bourgeois order, but rather its political reconstitution, the political reconsolidation of bourgeois society, in a word, *a bourgeois republic*. This contention resounded from the tribune of the National Assembly, and in the entire republican and anti-republican bourgeois press it found its echo.

And we have seen how the February republic in reality was not and could not be other than a *bourgeois republic*; how the Provisional Government, nevertheless, was forced by the immediate pressure of the proletariat to announce it as a *republic with social institutions*; how the Paris proletariat was still incapable of going beyond the bourgeois republic otherwise than in its *fancy*, in *imagination*; how everywhere it acted in its service when it really came to action; how the promises made to it became an unbearable danger for the new republic; how the whole life process of the Provisional Government was comprised in a continuous fight against the demands of the proletariat.

In the National Assembly all France sat in judgement upon the Paris proletariat. The Assembly broke immediately with the social illusions of the February Revolution; it roundly proclaimed the *bourgeois republic*, nothing but the bourgeois republic. It at once excluded the representatives of the proletariat, Louis Blanc and Albert, from the Executive Commission appointed by it; it threw out the proposal of a special Labour Ministry, and received with acclamation the statement of the Minister Trélat: "The question now is merely one of *bringing labour back to its old conditions*."

But all this was not enough. The February republic was won by the workers with the passive support of the bourgeoisie. The proletarians rightly regarded themselves as the victors of Feb-

ruary, and they made the arrogant claims of victors. They had to be vanquished in the streets, they had to be shown that they were worsted as soon as they did not fight *with* the bourgeoisie, but *against* the bourgeoisie. Just as the February republic, with its socialist concessions, required a battle of the proletariat, united with the bourgeoisie, against the monarchy, so a second battle was necessary in order to sever the republic from the socialist concessions, in order to officially work out the *bourgeois republic* as dominant. The bourgeoisie had to refute, arms in hand, the demands of the proletariat. And the real birthplace of the bourgeois republic is not the *February victory*; it is the *June defeat*.

The proletariat hastened the decision when, on the 15th of May, it pushed its way into the National Assembly, sought in vain to recapture its revolutionary influence and only delivered its energetic leaders to the jailers of the bourgeoisie.¹ *Il faut en finir!* This situation must end! With this cry the National Assembly gave vent to its determination to force the proletariat into a decisive struggle. The Executive Commission issued a series of provocative decrees, such as that prohibiting congregations of people, etc. The workers were directly provoked, insulted and derided from the tribune of the Constituent National Assembly. But the real point of the attack was, as we have seen, the *national ateliers*. The Constituent Assembly imperiously pointed these out to the Executive Commission, which only waited to hear its own plan proclaimed the command of the National Assembly.

The Executive Commission began by making admission to the national *ateliers* more difficult, by turning the day wage into a piece wage, by banishing workers not born in Paris to the Sologne, ostensibly for the construction of earthworks. These earthworks were only a rhetorical formula with which to embellish their exile, as the workers, returning disillusioned, announced to their comrades. Finally, on June 21, a decree appeared in the *Monteur* which ordered the forcible expulsion of all unmarried workers from the national *ateliers* or their enrolment in the army.

The workers were left no choice; they had to starve or let fly. They answered on June 22 with the tremendous insurrection in

¹ In connection with the events of May 15, 1848, Barbès, Albert, Raspail, Sobrier, and within a few days Blanqui also, were arrested and cast into the Vincennes prison.—*Ed.*

which the first great battle was fought between the two classes that split modern society. It was a fight for the preservation or annihilation of the *bourgeois* order. The veil that shrouded the republic was torn asunder.

It is well known how the workers, with unexampled bravery and ingenuity, without leaders, without a common plan, without means and, for the most part, lacking weapons, held in check for five days the army, the Mobile Guard, the Paris National Guard, and the National Guard that streamed in from the provinces. It is well known how the bourgeoisie compensated itself for the mortal anguish it suffered by unheard-of brutality, massacring over 3,000 prisoners.

The official representatives of French democracy were steeped in republican ideology to such an extent that it was only some weeks later that they began to have an inkling of the significance of the June fight. They were stupefied by the gunpowder smoke in which their fantastic republic dissolved.

The immediate impression which the news of the June defeat made on us, the reader will allow us to describe in the words of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*:

"The last official remnant of the February Revolution, the Executive Commission, has melted away, like an apparition, before the seriousness of events. The fireworks of Lamartine have turned into the war rockets of Cavaignac. *Fraternité*, the fraternity of antagonistic classes, of which one exploits the other, this *fraternité*, proclaimed in February, written in capital letters on the brow of Paris, on every prison, on every barracks—its true, unadulterated, its prosaic expression is *civil war*, civil war in its most frightful form, the war of labour and capital. This fraternity flamed in front of all the windows of Paris on the evening of June 25, when the Paris of the bourgeoisie was illuminated, whilst the Paris of the proletariat burnt, bled, moaned unto death. Fraternity endured just as long as the interests of the bourgeoisie were in fraternity with the interests of the proletariat.

"Pedants of the old revolutionary traditions of 1793; socialist systematizers who begged at the doors of the bourgeoisie on behalf of the people and were allowed to preach long sermons and to compromise themselves as long as the proletarian lion had to be lulled to sleep; republicans who demanded the old bourgeois order in its entirety, with the exception of the crowned head;

adherents of the dynasty among the opposition upon whom accident foisted the overthrow of the dynasty instead of a change of ministers; Legitimists who did not want to cast aside the livery but to change its cut—these were the allies with whom the people made its February.—The February Revolution was the *beautiful* revolution, the revolution of universal sympathy, because the antagonisms which had flared up in it against the monarchy slumbered *undeveloped*, harmoniously side by side, because the social struggle which formed its background had won only an airy existence, an existence of phrases, of words. The *June Revolution* is the *ugly* revolution, the repulsive revolution, because deeds have taken the place of phrases, because the republic uncovered the head of the monster itself by striking off the crown that shielded and concealed it.—*Order!* was the battle cry of Guizot. *Order!* cried Sébastiani, the follower of Guizot, when Warsaw became Russian. *Order!* shouts Cavaignac, the brutal echo of the French National Assembly and of the republican bourgeoisie. *Order!* thundered his grape-shot, as it ripped up the body of the proletariat. None of the numerous revolutions of the French bourgeoisie since 1789 was an attack on *order*; for they allowed the rule of the class, they allowed the slavery of the workers, they allowed the *bourgeois* order to endure, no matter how often the political form of this rule and this slavery changed. June has violated this order. Woe to June!" (*N. Rh. Z.*, June 29, 1848.)

Woe to June! re-echoes Europe.

The Paris proletariat was *forced* into the June insurrection by the bourgeoisie. This sufficed to mark its doom. Its immediate, avowed needs did not drive it to engage in a fight for the forcible overthrow of the bourgeoisie, nor was it equal to this task. The *Moniteur* had to inform it officially that the time was past when the republic saw any occasion to bow and scrape to its illusions, and only its defeat convinced it of the truth that the slightest improvement in its position remains a *utopia within* the bourgeois republic, a utopia that becomes a crime as soon as it wants to become a reality. In place of its demands, exuberant in form, but petty and even bourgeois still in content, the concession of which it wanted to wring from the February republic, there appeared the bold slogan of revolutionary struggle: *Overthrow of the bourgeoisie! Dictatorship of the working class!*

By making its burial place the birthplace of the *bourgeois republic*, the proletariat compelled the latter to come out forthwith in its pure form as the state whose admitted object it is to perpetuate the rule of capital, the slavery of labour. Having constantly before its eyes the scarred, irreconcilable, invincible enemy—invincible because his existence is the condition of its own life—bourgeois rule, freed from all fetters, was bound to turn immediately into *bourgeois terrorism*. With the proletariat removed for the time being from the stage and bourgeois dictatorship recognized officially, the middle strata of bourgeois society, the petty bourgeoisie and the peasant class, had to adhere more and more closely to the proletariat as their position became more unbearable and their antagonism to the bourgeoisie more acute. Just as earlier they had to find the cause of their distress in its upsurge, so now in its defeat.

If the June insurrection raised the self-assurance of the bourgeoisie all over the Continent, and caused it to league itself openly with the feudal monarchy against the people, who was the first victim of this alliance? The Continental bourgeoisie itself. The June defeat prevented it from consolidating its rule and from bringing the people, half satisfied and half out of humour, to a standstill at the lowest stage of the bourgeois revolution.

Finally, the defeat of June divulged to the despotic powers of Europe the secret that France must maintain peace abroad at any price in order to be able to wage civil war at home. Thus the peoples who had begun the fight for their national independence were abandoned to the superior power of Russia, Austria and Prussia, but, at the same time, the fate of these national revolutions was made subject to the fate of the proletarian revolution, and they were robbed of their apparent autonomy, their independence of the great social revolution. The Hungarian shall not be free, nor the Pole, nor the Italian, as long as the worker remains a slave!

Finally, with the victories of the Holy Alliance, Europe has taken on a form that makes every fresh proletarian upheaval in France directly coincide with a *world war*. The new French revolution is forced to leave its national soil forthwith and *conquer the European terrain*, on which alone the social revolution of the nineteenth century can be accomplished.

Thus only the June defeat has created all the conditions under which France can seize the *initiative* of the European revolution.

Only after being dipped in the blood of the *June insurgents* did the tricolour become the flag of the European revolution—the *red flag!*

And we exclaim: *The revolution is dead!—Long live the revolution!*

II

JUNE 13, 1849

February 25, 1848, had granted the *republic* to France, June 25 thrust the *revolution* upon her. And revolution, after June, meant: *overthrow of bourgeois society*, whereas before February it had meant: *overthrow of the form of government*.

The June fight had been led by the *republican* faction of the bourgeoisie; with victory political power necessarily fell to its share. The state of siege laid gagged Paris unresisting at its feet, and in the provinces there prevailed a moral state of siege, the threatening, brutal arrogance of victory of the bourgeoisie and the unleashed property fanaticism of the peasants. No danger, therefore, from *below!*

The crash of the revolutionary might of the workers was simultaneously a crash of the political influence of the *democratic republicans*, that is, of the republicans in the sense of the *petty bourgeoisie*, represented in the Executive Commission by Ledru-Rollin, in the Constituent National Assembly by the party of the *Montagne* and in the press by the *Réforme*. Together with the bourgeois republicans they had conspired on April 16 against the proletariat, together with them they had warred against it in the June days. Thus they themselves blasted the background against which their party stood out as a power, for the petty bourgeoisie can preserve a revolutionary attitude toward the bourgeoisie only as long as the proletariat stands behind it. They were dismissed. The sham alliance concluded with them reluctantly and with mental reservations during the epoch of the Provisional Government and the Executive Commission was openly broken by the bourgeois republicans. Spurned and repulsed as allies, they sank down to subordinate henchmen of the tricolour-men, from whom they could not wring any concessions, but whose domination they had to support whenever it, and with it the republic, seemed to be put in jeopardy by the anti-republican bourgeois factions. Lastly, these factions, the Orleanists and the Legitimists,

were from the very beginning in a minority in the Constituent National Assembly. Before the June days, they dared to react only under the mask of bourgeois republicanism; the June victory allowed for a moment the whole of bourgeois France to greet its saviour in Cavaignac, and when, shortly after the June days, the anti-republican party regained independence, the military dictatorship and the state of siege in Paris permitted it to put out its antennae only very timidly and cautiously.

Since 1830, the *bourgeois republican* faction, in the person of its writers, its spokesmen, its men of talent and ambition, its deputies, generals, bankers and lawyers, had grouped itself round a Parisian journal, the *National*. In the provinces this journal had its branch newspapers. The coterie of the *National* was the *dynasty of the tricolour republic*. It immediately took possession of all state dignities, of the ministries, the prefecture of police, the post-office directorship, the positions of prefect, the higher army-officers' posts now become vacant. At the head of the executive power stood its general, *Cavaignac*; its editor-in-chief, *Marrast*, became permanent president of the Constituent National Assembly. As master of ceremonies he at the same time did the honours, in his salons, of the respectable republic.

Even revolutionary French writers, awed, as it were, by the republican tradition, have strengthened the mistaken belief that the royalists dominated the Constituent National Assembly. On the contrary, after the June days, the Constituent Assembly remained the *exclusive representative of bourgeois republicanism* and it emphasized this aspect all the more resolutely, the more the influence of the tricolour republicans collapsed outside the Assembly. If the question was one of maintaining the *form* of the bourgeois republic, then the Assembly had the votes of the democratic republicans at its disposal; if one of maintaining the *content*, then even its mode of speech no longer separated it from the royalist bourgeois factions, for it is the interests of the bourgeoisie, the material conditions of its class rule and class exploitation, that form the content of the bourgeois republic.

Thus it was not royalism but bourgeois republicanism that was realized in the life and work of this Constituent Assembly, which in the end did not die, nor was killed, but decayed.

For the entire duration of its rule, as long as it gave its grand performance of state on the proscenium, an unbroken sacrificial feast was being staged in the background—the continual sentenc-

ing by courts-martial of the captured June insurgents or their deportation without trial. The Constituent Assembly had the tact to admit that in the June insurgents it was not judging criminals but wiping out enemies.

The first act of the Constituent National Assembly was the setting up of a *commission of enquiry* into the events of June and of May 15, and into the part played by the socialist and democratic party leaders during these days. The enquiry was directly aimed at Louis Blanc, Ledru-Rollin and Caussidière. The bourgeois republicans burned with impatience to rid themselves of these rivals. They could have entrusted the venting of their spleen to no more suitable subject than M. *Odilon Barrot*, the former chief of the dynastic opposition, the incarnation of liberalism, the *nullité grave*, the thoroughly shallow person who not only had a dynasty to revenge, but even had to settle accounts with the revolutionists for thwarting his premiership. A sure guarantee of his relentlessness. This Barrot was, therefore, appointed chairman of the commission of enquiry, and he constructed a complete legal process against the February Revolution, which process may be summarized thus: March 17, *demonstration*; April 16, *conspiracy*; May 15, *attempt*; June 23, *civil war*! Why did he not stretch his erudite criminologist's researches as far back as February 24? The *Journal des Débats*¹ answered: February 24—that is the *foundation of Rome*. The origin of states gets lost in a myth, in which one may believe, but which one may not discuss. Louis Blanc and Caussidière were handed over to the courts. The National Assembly completed the work of purging itself which it had begun on May 15.

The plan formed by the Provisional Government, and again taken up by Goudchaux, of taxing capital—in the form of a mortgage tax—was rejected by the Constituent Assembly; the law that limited the working day to ten hours was repealed; imprisonment for debt was once more introduced; the large section of the French population that can neither read nor write was excluded from jury service. Why not from the franchise also? Journals again had to deposit caution-money; the right of association was restricted.

But in their haste to give back to the old bourgeois relationships their old guarantees, and to wipe out every trace left behind

¹ *Journal des Débats*: Conservative daily newspaper, which began to appear in Paris in 1789.—Ed.

by the waves of the revolution, the bourgeois republicans encountered a resistance which threatened them with unexpected danger.

No one had fought more fanatically in the June days for the salvation of property and the restoration of credit than the Parisian petty bourgeois—keepers of cafés and restaurants, *mar-chanas de vins*, small traders, shopkeepers, handicraftsmen, etc. The shopkeeper had pulled himself together and marched against the barricades in order to restore the traffic which leads from the streets into the shop. But behind the barricade stood the customers and the debtors; before it the creditors of the shop. And when the barricades were thrown down and the workers were crushed and the shopkeepers, drunk with victory, rushed back to their shops, they found the entrance barred by a saviour of property, an official agent of credit, who presented them with threatening notices: Overdue promissory note! Overdue house rent! Overdue bond! Doomed shop! Doomed shopkeeper!

Salvation of property! But the house in which they lived was not their property; the shop which they kept was not their property; the commodities in which they dealt were not their property. Neither their business, nor the plate from which they ate, nor the bed on which they slept belonged to them any longer. It was precisely from them that *this property had to be saved*—for the houseowner who let the house, for the banker who discounted the promissory note, for the capitalist who made the advances in cash, for the manufacturer who entrusted the sale of his commodities to these retailers, for the wholesale dealer who had credited the raw materials to these handicraftsmen. *Restoration of credit!* But credit, having regained strength, proved itself a vigorous and jealous god, for it turned the debtor who could not pay out of his four walls, together with wife and child, surrendered his sham property to capital, and threw the man himself into the debtors' prison, which had once more reared its head threateningly over the corpses of the June insurgents.

The petty bourgeois saw with horror that by striking down the workers they had delivered themselves without resistance into the hands of their creditors. Their bankruptcy, which since February had been dragging on in chronic fashion and had been apparently ignored, was openly declared after June.

Their *nominal property* had been left unassailed as long as it was of consequence to drive them to the battlefield *in the name of property*. Now that the great issue with the proletariat had

been settled, the small matter of the *épiciers* could in turn be settled. In Paris the mass of overdue paper amounted to over 21,000,000 francs; in the provinces to over 11,000,000. The proprietors of more than 7,000 Paris firms had not paid their rent since February.

While the National Assembly had instituted an *enquête*¹ into the *political guilt*, going as far back as the end of February, the petty bourgeois, on their part, now demanded an *enquête* into the *civil debts* up to February 24. They assembled *en masse* in the Bourse hall and threateningly demanded, on behalf of every businessman who could prove that his insolvency was due solely to the stagnation caused by the revolution and that his business had been in good condition on February 24, an extension of the term of payment by order of a commerce court and the compulsory liquidation of creditors' claims in consideration of a moderate percentage payment. As a legislative proposal, this question was dealt with in the National Assembly in the form of *concordats à l'amiable*.² The Assembly vacillated; then it suddenly learnt that, at the same time, at the Porte St. Denis, thousands of wives and children of the insurgents had prepared an amnesty petition.

In the presence of the resurrected spectre of June, the petty bourgeoisie trembled and the National Assembly retrieved its implacability. The *concordats à l'amiable*, the amicable settlement between debtor and creditor, was rejected in its most essential points.

Thus, long after the democratic representatives of the petty bourgeois had been repulsed within the National Assembly by the republican representatives of the bourgeoisie, this parliamentary breach received its bourgeois, its real economic meaning by the petty bourgeois as debtors being handed over to the bourgeois as creditors. A large part of the former were completely ruined and the remainder were allowed to continue their businesses only under conditions which made them absolute serfs of capital. On August 22, 1848, the National Assembly rejected the *concordats à l'amiable*; on September 19, 1848, in the midst of the state of siege, Prince Louis Bonaparte and the prisoner of Vincennes, the Communist Raspail, were elected representatives of Paris. The bourgeoisie, however, elected the usurious money-changer and Orleanist Fould. From all sides at once, therefore, open declana-

¹ *Enquête*: Enquiry.—Ed.

² *Concordats à l'amiable*: Amicable agreements.—Ed.

tion of war against the Constituent National Assembly, against bourgeois republicanism, against Cavaignac.

It needs no argument to show how the mass bankruptcy of the Paris petty bourgeois was bound to produce after-effects far transcending the circle of its immediate victims, and to convulse bourgeois commerce once more, while the state deficit was swollen anew by the costs of the June insurrection, and state revenues sank continuously through the hold-up of production, the restricted consumption and the decreasing imports. Cavaignac and the National Assembly could have recourse to no other expedient than a new loan, which forced them still further under the yoke of the finance aristocracy.

While the petty bourgeois had harvested bankruptcy and liquidation by order of court as the fruit of the June victory, Cavaignac's Janissaries, the *Mobile Guards*, found their reward in the soft arms of the courtesans, and as "the youthful saviours of society" they received all kinds of homage in the salons of Marrast, the *gentilhomme*¹ of the tricolour, who at the same time served as the Amphitryon and the troubadour of the respectable republic. Meanwhile, this social favouritism and the disproportionately higher pay of the Mobile Guard embittered the *army*, while at the same time vanished all those national illusions with which bourgeois republicanism, through its journal, the *National*, had been able to attach to itself a part of the army and peasant class under Louis Philippe. The role of mediator, which Cavaignac and the National Assembly played in *North Italy* in order, together with England, to betray it to Austria—this one day of rule destroyed eighteen years of opposition on the part of the *National*. No government was less national than that of the *National*, none more dependent on England, and, under Louis Philippe, the *National* lived by paraphrasing daily Cato's dictum: *Carthaginem esse delendam*;² none was more servile towards the Holy Alliance, and from a Guizot the *National* had demanded the tearing up of the Treaties of Vienna. The irony of history made Bastide, the editor for foreign affairs of the *National*, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, so that he might refute every one of his articles in every one of his despatches.

For a moment, the army and the peasant class had believed

¹ *Gentilhomme*: Knight.—*Ed.*

² Carthage must be destroyed.—*Ed.*

that, simultaneously with the military dictatorship, war abroad and *gloire* had been placed on the order of the day in France. But Cavaignac was not the dictatorship of the sabre over bourgeois society; he was the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie by the sabre. And of the soldier they now required only the gendarme. Under the stern features of antique-republican resignation Cavaignac concealed humdrum submission to the humiliating conditions of his bourgeois office. *L'argent n'a pas de maitre!* Money has no master! He, as well as the Constituent Assembly in general, idealized this old election cry of the *tiers état*¹ by translating it into political speech: The bourgeoisie has no king; the true form of its rule is the republic.

And the "great organic work" of the Constituent National Assembly consisted in working out this *form*, in producing a republican *constitution*. The re-christening of the Christian calendar as a republican one, of the saintly Bartholomew as the saintly Robespierre, made no more change in the wind and weather than this constitution made or was supposed to make in bourgeois society. Where it went beyond a *change of costume*, it put on record the *existing* facts. Thus it solemnly registered the fact of the republic, the fact of universal suffrage, the fact of a single sovereign National Assembly in place of two limited constitutional chambers. Thus it registered and regulated the fact of the dictatorship of Cavaignac by replacing the stationary, irresponsible hereditary monarchy with an ambulatory, responsible, elective monarchy, with a quadrennial presidency. Thus it elevated no less to an organic law the fact of the extraordinary powers with which the National Assembly, after the horrors of May 15 and June 25, had providently invested its president in the interest of its own security. The remainder of the constitution was a work of terminology. The royalist labels were torn off the mechanism of the old monarchy and republican labels stuck on. Marrast, former editor-in-chief of the *National*, now editor-in-chief of the constitution, acquitted himself of this academic task not without talent.

The Constituent Assembly resembled that Chilean official who wanted to regulate property relations in land more firmly by a cadastral survey just at the moment when subterranean rumblings already announced the volcanic eruption that was to hurl

¹ *Tiers état*: Third estate.—Ed.

away the land from under his very feet. While in theory it accurately marked off the forms in which the rule of the bourgeoisie found republican expression, in reality it held its own only by the abolition of all formulas, by force *sans phrase*,¹ by the *state of siege*. Two days before it began its work on the constitution, it proclaimed a prolongation of the state of siege. Formerly, constitutions had been made and adopted as soon as the social process of revolution had reached a point of rest, the newly formed class relationships had established themselves and the contending factions of the ruling class had had recourse to a compromise which allowed them to continue the struggle among themselves and at the same time to keep the exhausted masses of the people out of it. This constitution, on the contrary, did not sanction any social revolution; it sanctioned the momentary victory of the old society over the revolution.

The first draft of the constitution, made before the June days, still contained the *droit au travail*, the right to work, the first clumsy formula wherein the revolutionary demands of the proletariat are summarized. It was transformed into the *droit à l'assistance*, the right to public relief, and what modern state does not feed its paupers in some form or other? The right to work is, in the bourgeois sense, an absurdity, a miserable, pious wish. But behind the right to work stands the power over capital; behind the power over capital, the appropriation of the means of production, their subjection to the associated working class and, therefore, the abolition of wage labour, of capital and of their mutual relations. Behind the "*right to work*" stood the June insurrection. The Constituent Assembly, which in fact put the revolutionary proletariat *hors la loi*, outside the law, had on principle to throw the *proletariat's* formula out of the constitution, the law of laws, had to pronounce its anathema upon the "right to work." But it did not stop there. As Plato banned the poets from his republic, so it banished forever from its republic—the *progressive tax*. And the progressive tax is not only a bourgeois measure, which can be carried out within the existing relations of production to a greater or less degree; it was the only means of binding the middle strata of bourgeois society to the "respectable" republic, of reducing the state debt, of holding the anti-republican majority of the bourgeoisie in check.

¹ *Sans phrase*: Without circumlocution.—Ed.

In the matter of the *concordats à l'amiable*, the tricolour republicans had actually sacrificed the petty bourgeoisie to the big bourgeoisie. They elevated this isolated fact to a principle by the legal prohibition of a progressive tax. They put bourgeois reform on the same level as proletarian revolution. But what class then remained as the mainstay of their republic? The big bourgeoisie. And its mass was anti-republican. While it exploited the republicans of the *National* in order to consolidate again the old relations of economic life, it thought, on the other hand, of exploiting the once more consolidated social relations in order to restore the political forms that corresponded to them. Already at the beginning of October, Cavaignac felt compelled to make Dufaure and Vivien, previously Ministers of Louis Philippe, Ministers of the republic, however much the brainless puritans of his own party growled and blustered.

While the tricolour constitution rejected every compromise with the petty bourgeoisie and was unable to win the attachment of any new social element to the new form of government, it hastened, on the other hand, to restore its traditional inviolability to a body that constituted the most hard-bitten and fanatical defender of the old state. It raised the *irremovability of judges*, which had been questioned by the Provisional Government, to an organic law. The one king whom it had removed rose again, by the score, in these irremovable inquisitors of legality.

The French press has analyzed from numerous aspects the contradictions of M. Marrast's constitution; for example, the co-existence of two sovereigns, the National Assembly and the President, etc., etc.

The comprehensive contradiction of this constitution, however, consists in the following: The classes whose social slavery the constitution is to perpetuate, proletariat, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, it puts in possession of political power through universal suffrage. And from the class whose old social power it sanctions, the bourgeoisie, it withdraws the political guarantees of this power. It forces the political rule of the bourgeoisie into democratic conditions, which at every moment help the hostile classes to victory and jeopardize the very foundations of bourgeois society. From the ones it demands that they should not go forward from political to social emancipation; from the others that they should not go back from social to political restoration.

These contradictions perturbed the bourgeois republicans little.

To the extent that they ceased to be *indispensable*—and they were indispensable only as the protagonists of the old society against the revolutionary proletariat—they fell, a few weeks after their victory, from the position of a *party* to that of a *coterie*. And they treated the constitution as a big *intrigue*. What was to be constituted in it was, above all, the rule of the *coterie*. The President was to be a protracted Cavaignac; the Legislative Assembly a protracted Constituent Assembly. They hoped to reduce the political power of the masses of the people to a semblance of power, and to be able to make sufficient play with this sham power itself to keep continually hanging over the majority of the bourgeoisie the dilemma of the June days: *realm of the National* or *realm of anarchy*.

The work on the constitution, which was begun on September 4, was finished on October 23. On September 2 the Constituent Assembly had decided not to dissolve until the organic laws supplementing the constitution were enacted. Nonetheless, it now decided to bring to life the creation that was most peculiarly its own, the President, already on December 10, long before the circle of its own activity was closed. So sure was it of hailing, in the *homunculus* of the constitution, the son of his mother. As a precaution it was provided that if none of the candidates received two million votes, the election should pass over from the nation to the Constituent Assembly.

Futile provisions! The first day of the realization of the constitution was the last day of the rule of the Constituent Assembly. In the abyss of the ballot box lay its sentence of death. It sought the "son of his mother" and found "the nephew of his uncle." Saul Cavaignac slew one million votes, but David Napoleon slew six million. Saul Cavaignac was beaten six times over.

December 10, 1848, was the day of the *peasant insurrection*. Only from this day does the February of the French peasants date. The symbol that expressed their entry into the revolutionary movement, clumsily cunning, knavishly naïve, doltishly sublime, a calculated superstition, a pathetic burlesque, a cleverly stupid anachronism, a world-historic piece of buffoonery and an undecipherable hieroglyphic for the understanding of the civilized—this symbol bore the unmistakable physiognomy of the class that represents barbarism within civilization. The republic had announced itself to this class with the *tax collector*; it an-

nounced itself to the republic with the *emperor*. Napoleon was the only man who had exhaustively represented the interests and the imagination of the peasant class, newly created in 1789. By writing his name on the frontispiece of the republic, it declared war abroad and the enforcing of its class interests at home. Napoleon was to the peasants not a person but a programme. With banners, with beat of drums and blare of trumpets, they marched to the polling booths shouting: *plus d'impôts, à bas les riches, à bas la république, vive l'Empereur!* No more taxes, down with the rich, down with the republic, long live the emperor! Behind the emperor was hidden the peasant war. The republic that they voted down was the *republic of the rich*.

December 10 was the *coup d'état* of the peasants, which overthrew the existing government. And from that day on, when they had taken a government from France and given a government to her, their eyes were fixed steadily on Paris. For a moment active heroes of the revolutionary drama, they could no longer be forced back into the inactive and spineless role of the chorus.

The other classes helped to complete the election victory of the peasants. To the *proletariat*, the election of Napoleon meant the deposition of Cavaignac, the overthrow of the Constituent Assembly, the dismissal of bourgeois republicanism, the cassation of the June victory. To the *petty bourgeoisie*, Napoleon meant the rule of the debtor over the creditor. For the majority of the *big bourgeoisie*, the election of Napoleon meant an open breach with the faction of which it had had to make use, for a moment, against the revolution, but which became intolerable to it as soon as this faction sought to consolidate the position of the moment into a constitutional position. Napoleon in place of Cavaignac meant to this majority the monarchy in place of the republic, the beginning of the royalist restoration, a shy hint at Orleans, the lily¹ hidden beneath the violet. Lastly, the *army* voted for Napoleon against the Mobile Guard, against the peace idyll, for war.

Thus it happened, as the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* stated, that the most simple-minded man in France acquired the most multifarious significance. Just because he was nothing, he could signify everything save himself. Meanwhile, different as the

¹ *Lily*: The device of the Bourbons, the legitimist monarchy.—Ed

meaning of the name Napoleon might be in the mouths of the different classes, with this name each wrote on its ballot: Down with the party of the *National*, down with Cavaignac, down with the Constituent Assembly, down with the bourgeois republic. Minister Dufaure publicly declared in the Constituent Assembly: December 10 is a second February 24.

Petty bourgeoisie and proletariat had voted *en bloc*¹ for Napoleon, in order to vote *against* Cavaignac and, by pooling their votes, to wrest the final decision from the Constituent Assembly. The more advanced sections of the two classes, however, put forward their own candidates. Napoleon was the *collective name* of all parties in coalition against the bourgeois republic; *Ledru-Rollin* and *Raspail* were the *proper names*, the former of the democratic petty bourgeoisie, the latter of the revolutionary proletariat. The votes for Raspail—the proletarians and their socialist spokesmen declared it loudly—were to be merely a demonstration, so many protests against any presidency, that is, against the constitution itself, so many votes against Ledru-Rollin, the first act by which the proletariat, as an independent political party, declared its separation from the democratic party. This party, on the other hand—the democratic petty bourgeoisie and its parliamentary representative, the *Montagne*—treated the candidature of Ledru-Rollin with all the seriousness with which it is in the habit of solemnly duping itself. For the rest, this was its last attempt to set itself up as an independent party, as against the proletariat. Not only the republican bourgeois party, but also the democratic petty bourgeoisie and its *Montagne* were beaten on December 10.

France now possessed a *Napoleon* side by side with a *Montagne*, proof that both were only the lifeless caricatures of the great realities whose names they bore. Louis Napoleon, with the emperor's hat and the eagle, parodied the old Napoleon no more miserably than the *Montagne*, with its phrases borrowed from 1793 and its demagogic poses, parodied the old *Montagne*. Thus the traditional 1793 superstition was stripped off at the same time as the traditional Napoleon superstition. The revolution had come into its own only when it had won its *own*, its *original* name, and it could do that only when the modern revolutionary class, the industrial proletariat, came dominantly

¹ As a *bloc*.—Ed.

into its foreground. One can say that December 10 dumbfounded the *Montagne* and caused it to grow confused in its own mind, if for no other reason than because that day laughingly cut short with a contemptuous peasant jest the classical analogy to the old revolution.

On December 20, Cavaignac laid down his office and the Constituent Assembly proclaimed Louis Napoleon president of the republic. On December 19, the last day of its sole rule, it rejected the proposal of amnesty for the June insurgents. Would revoking the decree of June 27, under which it had condemned 15,000 insurgents to deportation without judicial sentence, not have meant revoking the June battle itself?

Odilon Barrot, the last Minister of Louis Philippe, became the first Minister of Louis Napoleon. Just as Louis Napoleon dated his rule, not from December 10, but from a decree of the Senate of 1804,¹ so he found a prime minister who did not date his ministry from December 20, but from a royal decree of February 24. As the legitimate heir of Louis Philippe, Louis Napoleon mollified the change of government by retaining the old ministry, which, moreover, had not had time to be worn off, since it had not found time to embark upon life.

The leaders of the royalist bourgeois factions advised him in this choice. The head of the old dynastic opposition, who had unconsciously constituted the transition to the republicans of the *National*, was still more fitted to constitute with full consciousness the transition from the bourgeois republic to the monarchy.

Odilon Barrot was the leader of the one old opposition party which, always fruitlessly struggling for ministerial portfolios, had not yet been used up. In rapid succession the revolution hurled all the old opposition parties to the top of the state, so that they would have to deny, to repudiate their old phrases not only in deeds but even in words, and might finally be flung all together, combined in a repulsive commixture, on the dung heap of history by the people. And no apostasy was spared this Barrot, this incarnation of bourgeois liberalism, who for eighteen years had hidden the rascally vacuity of his mind behind the serious demeanour of his body. If, at certain moments, the far too striking contrast between the thistles of the present and the laurels

¹ Under the Senate's decree of April 18, 1804 Napoleon I was given the title of the Emperor of Frenchmen.—*Ed.*

of the past startled the man himself, one glance in the mirror gave him back his ministerial composure and human self-admiration. What beamed at him from the mirror was Guizot, whom he had always envied, who had always mastered him, Guizot himself, but Guizot with the Olympian forehead of Odilon. What he overlooked were the ears of Midas.

The Barrot of February 24 first became manifest in the Barrot of December 20. Associated with him, the Orleanist and Voltairian, was the Legitimist and Jesuit Falloux, as Minister of Public Worship.

A few days later, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was given to Léon Faucher, the Malthusian. Law, religion and political economy! The ministry of Barrot contained all this and, in addition, a combination of Legitimists and Orleanists. Only the Bonapartist was lacking. Bonaparte still hid his longing to signify Napoleon, for *Soulouque* did not yet play Toussaint Louverture.

The party of the *National* was immediately relieved of all the higher posts, where it had entrenched itself. The Prefecture of Police, the office of the Director of the Post, the Procuratorship General, the *Mairie*¹ of Paris, were all filled with old creatures of the monarchy. Changarnier, the Legitimist, received the unified supreme command of the National Guard of the Department of the Seine, of the Mobile Guard and the troops of the line of the first military division; Bugeaud, the Orleanist, was appointed commander-in-chief of the Alpine army. This change of officials continued uninterruptedly under the Barrot government. The first act of his ministry was the restoration of the old royalist administration. The official scene was transformed in a trice—scenery, costumes, speech, actors, supers, mutes, prompters, the position of the parties, the theme of the drama, the content of the conflict, the whole situation. Only the premundane Constituent Assembly still remained in its place. But from the hour when the National Assembly had installed Bonaparte, Bonaparte Barrot and Barrot Changarnier, France stepped out of the period of republican constitution into the period of the constituted republic. And what place was there for a Constituent Assembly in a constituted republic? After the earth had been created, there was nothing else for its creator to do but to flee to heaven. The Constituent Assembly was determined not to follow his example; the National

¹ *Mairie*: The office of the Mayor.—*Ed.*

Assembly was the last asylum of the party of the bourgeois republicans. If all levers of executive power had been wrested from it, was there not left to it constituent omnipotence? Its first thought was to hold under all circumstances the position of sovereignty that it occupied, and thence to reconquer the lost ground. Once the Barrot ministry was displaced by a ministry of the *National*, the royalist personnel would have to vacate the palaces of the administration forthwith and the tricolour personnel would move in again triumphantly. The National Assembly resolved on the overthrow of the ministry and the ministry itself offered an opportunity for the attack, than which the Constituent Assembly could not have invented a better.

It will be remembered that for the peasants Louis Bonaparte signified: No more taxes! Six days he sat in the President's chair, and on the seventh, on December 27, his ministry proposed the *retention of the salt tax*, the abolition of which the Provisional Government had decreed. The salt tax shares with the wine tax the privilege of being the scapegoat of the old French financial system, particularly in the eyes of the country folk. The Barrot ministry could not have put into the mouth of the choice of the peasants a more mordant epigram on his electors than the words: *Restoration of the salt tax!* With the salt tax, Bonaparte lost his revolutionary salt—the Napoleon of the peasant insurrection dissolved like an apparition, and nothing remained but the great unknown of royalist bourgeois intrigue. And not without intention did the Barrot ministry make this act of tactlessly rude disillusionment the first governmental act of the President.

The Constituent Assembly, on its part, seized eagerly on the double opportunity of overthrowing the ministry, and, as against the elect of the peasantry, of setting itself up as the representative of peasant interests. It rejected the proposal of the finance minister, reduced the salt tax to a third of its former amount, thus increasing by sixty millions a state deficit of five hundred and sixty millions, and, after this *vote of no confidence*, calmly awaited the resignation of the ministry. So little did it comprehend the new world that surrounded it and its own changed position. Behind the ministry stood the President and behind the President stood six millions, who had placed in the ballot box as many votes of *no confidence* in the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly gave the nation back its *no confidence* vote. Absurd exchange! It forgot that its votes were no longer legal tender. The

rejection of the salt tax only matured the decision of Bonaparte and his ministry "to end" the Constituent Assembly. There began that long duel which lasted the entire latter half of the life of the Constituent Assembly. *January 29*, March 21 and May 8 are the *journées*, the great days of this crisis, just so many fore-runners of *June 13*.

Frenchmen, for example Louis Blanc, have construed January 29 as the date of the emergence of a constitutional contradiction, the contradiction between a sovereign, indissoluble National Assembly born of universal suffrage, and a President who, to go by the wording, was responsible to the Assembly, but who, to go by reality, was not only similarly sanctioned by universal suffrage and, in addition, united in his own person all the votes that were split up a hundred times and distributed among the individual members of the National Assembly, but who was also in full possession of the whole executive power, above which the National Assembly hovered as a merely moral force. This interpretation of January 29 confuses the language of the struggle on the platform, through the press and in the clubs with its real content. Louis Bonaparte as against the Constituent National Assembly—that was not one unilateral constitutional power as against another; that was not the executive power as against the legislative; that was the constituted bourgeois republic itself as against the instruments of its constitution, as against the ambitious intrigues and ideological demands of the revolutionary faction of the bourgeoisie that had founded it and was now amazed to find that its constituted republic looked like a restored monarchy, and now desired forcibly to prolong the constituent period with its conditions, its illusions, its language and its personages and to prevent the mature bourgeois republic from emerging in its complete and peculiar form. As the Constituent National Assembly represented Cavaignac who had fallen back into its midst, so Bonaparte represented the Legislative National Assembly that had not yet been divorced from him, that is, the National Assembly of the constituted bourgeois republic.

The election of Bonaparte could only become explicable by putting in the place of the one name its manifold meanings, by repeating itself in the election of the new National Assembly. The mandate of the old was annulled by December 10. Thus on January 29, it was not the President and the National Assembly of the *same* republic that were face to face; it was the National

Assembly of the republic that was coming into being and the President of the republic that had come into being, two powers that embodied quite different periods in the life process of the republic; the one, the small republican faction of the bourgeoisie that alone could proclaim the republic, wrest it from the revolutionary proletariat by street fighting and a reign of terror, and draft its ideal basic features in the constitution; and the other, the whole royalist mass of the bourgeoisie that alone could rule in this constituted bourgeois republic, strip the constitution of its ideological trimmings, and realize by its legislation and administration the indispensable conditions for the subjugation of the proletariat.

The storm which broke on January 29 gathered its elements during the whole month of January. The Constituent Assembly wanted to drive the Barrot ministry to resign by its no confidence vote. The Barrot ministry, on the other hand, proposed to the Constituent Assembly that it should give itself a definitive no confidence vote, decide on suicide and decree its *own dissolution*. On January 6 Râteau, one of the most obscure deputies, brought this motion at the order of the ministry before the Constituent Assembly, the same Constituent Assembly that already in August had resolved not to dissolve until a whole series of organic laws supplementing the constitution had been enacted by it. Fould, the ministerialist, bluntly declared to it that its dissolution was necessary "*for the restoration of the deranged credit.*" And did it not derange credit when it prolonged the provisional stage and, with Barrot, again called Bonaparte in question, and, with Bonaparte, the constituted republic? Barrot the Olympian became a raving Roland on the prospect of seeing the finally pocketed premiership, which the republicans had already withheld from him once for a decennium, that is, for ten months, again torn from him after scarcely two weeks' enjoyment of it—Barrot, confronting this wretched Assembly, out-tyrannized the tyrant. His mildest words were "no future is possible with it." And actually it did only represent the past. "It is incapable," he added ironically, "of providing the republic with the institutions which are necessary for its consolidation." Incapable indeed! Its bourgeois energy was broken simultaneously with its exceptional antagonism to the proletariat, and with its antagonism to the royalists its republican exuberance lived anew. Thus it was doubly incapable of consolidating the bourgeois republic, which it no

longer comprehended, by means of the corresponding institutions.

Simultaneously with Râteau's motion the ministry evoked a *storm of petitions* throughout the land, and from all corners of France came flying daily at the head of the Constituent Assembly bundles of *billets doux* in which it was more or less categorically requested to *dissolve* and make its will. The Constituent Assembly, on its side, called forth counter-petitions, in which it caused itself to be requested to remain alive. The election struggle between Bonaparte and Cavaignac was renewed as a petition struggle for and against the dissolution of the National Assembly. The petitions were to be belated commentaries on December 10. This agitation continued during the whole of January.

In the conflict between the Constituent Assembly and the President, the former could not refer back to the general election as its origin, for the appeal was from the Assembly to universal suffrage. It could base itself on no regularly constituted power, for the issue was the struggle against the legal power. It could not overthrow the ministry by no confidence votes, as it again essayed to do on January 6 and 26, for the ministry did not ask for its confidence. Only one possibility was left to it, that of *insurrection*. The fighting forces of the insurrection were the *republican part of the National Guard, the Mobile Guard* and the centres of the revolutionary proletariat, the *clubs*. The Mobile Guard, those heroes of the June days, in December formed the organized fighting force of the republican faction of the bourgeoisie, just as before June the *national ateliers* had formed the organized fighting force of the revolutionary proletariat. As the Executive Commission of the Constituent Assembly directed its brutal attack on the national *ateliers*, when it had to put an end to the pretensions, become unbearable, of the proletariat, so the ministry of Bonaparte directed its attack on the Mobile Guard, when it had to put an end to the pretensions, become unbearable, of the republican faction of the bourgeoisie. It ordered the *disbandment of the Mobile Guard*. One half of it was dismissed and thrown on the street, the other was organized on monarchist instead of democratic lines, and its pay was reduced to the usual pay of troops of the line. The Mobile Guard found itself in the position of the June insurgents and every day the press carried *public confessions* in which it admitted its blame for June and implored the proletariat to forgive it.

And the *clubs*? From the moment when the Constituent Assembly in the person of Barrot called in question the President, and in the person of the President the constituted bourgeois republic, and in the person of the constituted bourgeois republic the bourgeois republic in general, all the constituent elements of the February republic necessarily ranged themselves around it—all the parties that wished to overthrow the existing republic and by a violent retrograde process to transform it into a republic of their class interests and principles. The scrambled eggs were unscrambled, the crystallizations of the revolutionary movement had again become fluid, the republic that was being fought for was again the indefinite republic of the February days, the defining of which each party reserved to itself. For a moment the parties again took up their old February positions, without sharing the illusions of February. The tricolour republicans of the *National* again leant on the democratic republicans of the *Réforme* and pushed them as protagonists into the foreground of the parliamentary struggle. The democratic republicans again leant on the socialist republicans—on January 27 a public manifesto announced their reconciliation and union—and prepared their insurrectional background in the clubs. The ministerial press rightly treated the tricolour republicans of the *National* as the resurrected insurgents of June. In order to maintain themselves at the head of the bourgeois republic, they called in question the bourgeois republic itself. On January 26 Minister Faucher proposed a law on the right of association, the first paragraph of which read: "*Clubs are forbidden.*" He moved that this bill should immediately be discussed as urgent. The Constituent Assembly rejected the motion of urgency, and on January 27 Ledru-Rollin put forward a proposition, with 230 signatures appended to it, to impeach the ministry for violation of the constitution. The impeachment of the ministry at times when such an act was a tactless disclosure of the impotence of the judge, to wit, the majority of the Chamber, or an impotent protest of the accuser against this majority itself—that was the great revolutionary trump that the latter-day *Montagne* played from now on at each high spot of the crisis. Poor *Montagne*! crushed by the weight of its own name!

On May 15, Blanqui, Barbès, Raspail, etc., had attempted to break up the Constituent Assembly by forcing an entrance into its hall of session at the head of the Paris proletariat. Barrot pre-

pared a moral May 15 for the same Assembly when he wanted to dictate its self-dissolution and close the hall. The same Assembly had commissioned Barrot to make the *enquête* against the May accused, and now, at the moment when he appeared before it like a royalist Blanqui, when it sought for allies against him in the clubs, among the revolutionary proletarians, in the party of Blanqui—at this moment the relentless Barrot tormented it with the proposal to withdraw the May prisoners from the Court of Assizes with its jury and hand them over to the High Court, to the *haute cour* devised by the party of the *National*. Remarkable how panic fear for a ministerial portfolio could pound out of the head of a Barrot points worthy of a Beaumarchais! After much vacillation the National Assembly accepted his proposal. As against the makers of the May attempt, it reverted to its normal character.

If the Constituent Assembly, as against the President and the ministers, was driven to *insurrection*, the President and the ministers, as against the Constituent Assembly, were driven to a *coup d'état*, for they had no legal means of dissolving it. But the Constituent Assembly was the mother of the constitution and the constitution was the mother of the President. With the *coup d'état*, the President tore up the constitution and extinguished his republican legal title. He was then forced to pull out his imperial legal title, but the imperial legal title woke up the Orleanist legal title and both paled before the Legitimist legal title. The downfall of the legal republic could shoot to the top only its extreme antipode, the Legitimist monarchy, at a moment when the Orleanist party was still only the vanquished of February and Bonaparte was still only the victory of December 10, when both could oppose to republican usurpation only their likewise usurped monarchist titles. The Legitimists were aware of the propitiousness of the moment; they conspired openly. They could hope to find their *Monk*¹ in General Changarnier. The imminence of the *White monarchy* was as openly announced in their clubs as was that of the *Red republic* in the proletarian clubs.

The ministry would have escaped all difficulties by a happily suppressed rising. "Legality is the death of us," cried Odilon Barrot. A rising would have allowed it, under the pretext of the

¹ *George Monk*: An allusion to the English general who in 1660 used the troops under him for the restoration of the Stuart dynasty.—*Ed.*

salut public,¹ to dissolve the Constituent Assembly, to violate the constitution in the interests of the constitution itself. The brutal behaviour of Odilon Barrot in the National Assembly, the motion for the dissolution of the clubs, the tumultuous removal of 50 tricolour prefects and their replacement by royalists, the dissolution of the Mobile Guard, the ill-treatment of their chiefs by Changarnier, the reinstatement of Lerminier, the professor who was impossible even under Guizot, the toleration of the Legitimist braggadocio—all these were just so many provocations to mutiny. But the mutiny remained mute. It expected its signal from the Constituent Assembly and not from the ministry.

Finally came January 29, the day on which the decision was to be taken on the motion of Mathieu (de la Drôme) for unconditional rejection of Râteau's motion. Legitimists, Orleanists, Bonapartists, Mobile Guard, *Montagne*, clubs—all conspired on this day, each just as much against the ostensible enemy as against the ostensible ally. Bonaparte, mounted on horseback, mustered a part of the troops on the *Place de la Concorde*; Changarnier play-acted with a display of strategic manoeuvres; the Constituent Assembly found its building occupied by the military. This Assembly, the centre of all the conflicting hopes, fears, expectations, ferments, tensions and conspiracies, this lion-hearted Assembly did not falter for a moment when it came nearer to the world spirit [Weltgeist] than ever. It was like that fighter who not only feared to make use of his own weapons, but also felt himself obliged to maintain the weapons of his opponent unimpaired. Scorning death, it signed its own death warrant, and rejected the unconditional rejection of the Râteau motion. Itself in a state of siege, it set limits to a constituent activity whose necessary frame had been the state of siege of Paris. It revenged itself worthily when, on the following day, it instituted an enquiry into the fright that the ministry had given it on January 29. The *Montagne* showed its lack of revolutionary energy and political understanding by allowing itself to be used by the party of the *National* in this great comedy of intrigues as the crier in the contest. The party of the *National* had made its last attempt to continue to maintain, in the constituted republic, the monopoly of rule that it had possessed during the inchoative period of the bourgeois republic. It was shipwrecked.

¹ *Salut public*: Public welfare.—Ed.

While in the January crisis it was a question of the existence of the Constituent Assembly, in the crisis of March 21 it was a question of the existence of the constitution—there of the personnel of the *National* party, here of its ideal. There is no need to point out that the respectable republicans surrendered the exaltation of their ideology more cheaply than the worldly enjoyment of governmental power.

On March 21 Faucher's bill against the right of association: *the suppression of the clubs*, was on the order of the day in the National Assembly. Article 8 of the constitution guarantees to all Frenchmen the right to associate. The prohibition of the clubs was, therefore, an unequivocal violation of the constitution, and the Constituent Assembly itself was to canonize the profanation of its holies. But the clubs—these were the gathering points, the conspiratorial seats of the revolutionary proletariat. The National Assembly had itself forbidden the coalition of the workers against their bourgeois. And the clubs—what were they but a coalition of the whole working class against the whole bourgeois class, the formation of a workers' state against the bourgeois state? Were they not just so many constituent assemblies of the proletariat and just so many military detachments of revolt in fighting trim? What the constitution was to constitute above all else was the rule of the bourgeoisie. By the right of association the constitution, therefore, could manifestly mean only associations that harmonized with the rule of the bourgeoisie, that is, with bourgeois order. If, for reasons of theoretical propriety, it expressed itself in general terms, was not the government and the National Assembly there to interpret and apply it in a special case? And if in the primeval epoch of the republic, the clubs actually were forbidden by the state of siege, had they not to be forbidden in the ordered, constituted republic by the law? The tricolour republicans had nothing to oppose to this prosaic interpretation of the constitution but the high-flown phraseology of the constitution. A section of them, Pagnerre, Duclerc, etc., voted for the ministry and thereby gave it a majority. The others, with the archangel Cavaignac and the father of the church Marrast at their head, retired, after the article on the prohibition of the clubs had gone through, to a special committee room, jointly with Ledru-Rollin and the *Montagne*—"and held a council." The National Assembly was paralyzed; it no longer had a quorum. At the right time, M. Crémieux remembered in the committee room that the way from here led directly to

the street and that it was no longer February 1848, but March 1849. The party of the *National*, suddenly enlightened, returned to the National Assembly's hall of session, behind it the *Montagne*, duped once more. The latter, constantly tormented by revolutionary longings, just as constantly clutched at constitutional possibilities, and still felt itself more in place behind the bourgeois republicans than in front of the revolutionary proletariat. Thus the comedy was played. And the Constituent Assembly itself had decreed that the violation of the letter of the constitution was the only appropriate realization of its spirit.

There was only one point left to settle, the relation of the constituted republic to the European revolution, its *foreign policy*. On May 8, 1849, unwonted excitement prevailed in the Constituent Assembly, whose term of life was due to end in a few days. The attack of the French army on Rome, its repulse by the Romans, its political infamy and military disgrace, the foul assassination of the Roman republic by the French republic, the first Italian campaign of the second Bonaparte was on the order of the day. The *Montagne* had once more played its great trump; Ledru-Rollin had laid on the President's table the inevitable bill of impeachment against the ministry, and this time also against Bonaparte, for violation of the constitution.

The motive of May 8 was repeated later as the motive of June 13. Let us get clear about the expedition to Rome.

Already in the middle of November 1848, Cavaignac had sent a battle fleet to Civitavecchia in order to protect the Pope, to take him on board and to ship him over to France. The Pope was to consecrate the respectable republic, and to ensure the election of Cavaignac as president. With the Pope, Cavaignac wanted to angle for the priests, with the priests for the peasants, and with the peasants for the presidency. The expedition of Cavaignac, an election advertisement in its immediate purpose, was at the same time a protest and a threat against the Roman revolution. It contained in embryo France's intervention in favour of the Pope.

This intervention on behalf of the Pope in association with Austria and Naples against the Roman republic was decided on at the first meeting of Bonaparte's ministerial council on December 23. Falloux in the ministry, that meant the Pope in Rome and in the Rome—of the Pope. Bonaparte did not need the Pope any longer in order to become the President of the peasants; but he needed the conservation of the Pope in order to conserve the peas-

ants of the President. Their credulity had made him President. With faith they would lose credulity, and with the Pope, faith. And the Orleanists and Legitimists in coalition, who ruled in Bonaparte's name! Before the king was restored, the power that consecrates kings had to be restored. Apart from their royalism: without the old Rome, subject to his temporal rule, no Pope; without the Pope, no catholicism; without catholicism, no French religion; and without religion, what would become of the old French society? The mortgage that the peasant has on heavenly possessions guarantees the mortgage that the bourgeois has on peasant possessions. The Roman revolution was, therefore, an attack on property, on the bourgeois order, dreadful as the June revolution. Re-established bourgeois rule in France required the restoration of papal rule in Rome. Finally, to smite the Roman revolutionists was to smite the allies of the French revolutionists; the alliance of the counter-revolutionary classes in the constituted French republic was necessarily supplemented by the alliance of the French republic with the Holy Alliance, with Naples and Austria. The decision of the ministerial council of December 23 was no secret for the Constituent Assembly. On January 8, Ledru-Rollin had already interpellated the ministry concerning it; the ministry had denied it and the National Assembly had proceeded to the order of the day. Did it trust the word of the ministry? We know that it spent the whole month of January in giving the ministry no confidence votes. But if it was part of the ministry's role to lie, it was part of the National Assembly's role to feign belief in its lie and thereby save the republican *déhors*.¹

Meanwhile Piedmont was beaten, Charles-Albert had abdicated and the Austrian army knocked at the gates of France. Ledru-Rollin vehemently interpellated. The ministry proved that it had only continued in North Italy the policy of Cavaignac, and Cavaignac only the policy of the Provisional Government, that is, of Ledru-Rollin. This time it even reaped a vote of confidence from the National Assembly and was authorized to occupy temporarily a suitable point in Upper Italy in order to give support to peaceful negotiations with Austria concerning the integrity of Sardinian territory and the question of Rome. It is known that the fate of Italy is decided on the battlefields of North Italy. Hence Rome would fall with Lombardy and Piedmont, or France would have

¹ *Déhors: Appearances.*—Ed.

to declare war on Austria and thereby on the European counter-revolution. Did the National Assembly suddenly take the Barrot ministry for the old Committee of Public Safety? Or itself for the Convention? Why, then, the military occupation of a point in Upper Italy? This transparent veil covered the expedition against Rome.

On April 14, 14,000 men sailed under Oudinot for Civitavecchia; on April 16, the National Assembly voted the ministry a credit of 1,200,000 francs for the maintenance of a fleet of intervention in the Mediterranean Sea for three months. Thus it gave the ministry every means of intervening against Rome, while it adopted the pose of letting it intervene against Austria. It did not see what the ministry did; it only heard what it said. Such faith was not found in Israel; the Constituent Assembly had fallen into the position of not daring to know what the constituted republic had to do.

Finally, on May 8, the last scene of the comedy was played; the Constituent Assembly urged the ministry to take swift measures to bring the Italian expedition back to the aim set for it. Bonaparte that same evening inserted a letter in the *Moniteur*, in which he lavished the greatest appreciation on Oudinot. On May 11, the National Assembly rejected the bill of impeachment against this same Bonaparte and his ministry. And the *Montagne*, which, instead of tearing this web of deceit to pieces, took the parliamentary comedy tragically in order itself to play in it the role of Fouquier-Tinville, did it not betray its natural petty-bourgeois calf's hide under the borrowed lion's skin of the Convention!

The latter half of the life of the Constituent Assembly is summarized thus: On January 29 it admits that the royalist bourgeois factions are the natural superiors of the republic constituted by it; on March 21, that the violation of the constitution is its realization; and on May 11, that the bombastically proclaimed passive alliance of the French republic with the struggling peoples means its active alliance with the European counter-revolution.

This miserable Assembly left the stage after it had given itself the satisfaction, two days before the anniversary of its birthday, May 4, of rejecting the motion of amnesty for the June insurgents. Its power shattered, held in deadly hatred by the people, repulsed, maltreated, contemptuously thrown aside by the bourgeoisie, whose tool it was, forced in the second half of its life to disavow

the first, robbed of its republican illusions, without having created anything great in the past, without hope in the future and with its living body dying bit by bit, it was able to galvanize its own corpse into life only by continually recalling and living through the June victory over and over again, affirming itself by constantly repeated damnation of the damned. Vampire that lived on the blood of the June insurgents!

It left behind a state deficit increased by the costs of the June insurrection, by the loss of the salt tax, by the compensation it paid the plantation owners for abolishing Negro slavery, by the costs of the Roman expedition, by the loss of the wine tax, the abolition of which it resolved upon when already at its last gasp, a malicious old man, happy to impose on his laughing heir a compromising debt of honour.

With the beginning of March the agitation for the election of the *Legislative National Assembly* had commenced. Two main groups opposed each other, the *party of Order* and the *democratic-socialist*, or *Red, party*; between the two stood the *Friends of the Constitution*, under which name the tricolour republicans of the *National* sought to put forward a party. The *party of Order* was formed directly after the June days; only after December 10 had allowed it to cast off the coterie of the *National*, of the bourgeois republicans, was the secret of its existence, the *coalition of Orleanists and Legitimists into one party*, disclosed. The bourgeois class fell apart into two big factions, which, alternately, the *big landed proprietors* under the *restored monarchy* and the *finance aristocracy* and the *industrial bourgeoisie* under the *July monarchy*, had maintained a monopoly of power. *Bourbon* was the royal name for the predominant influence of the interests of the one faction, *Orleans* the royal name for the predominant influence of the interests of the other faction—the *nameless realm of the republic* was the only one in which both factions could maintain with equal power the common class interest without giving up their mutual rivalry. If the bourgeois republic could not be anything but the perfected and clearly expressed rule of the whole bourgeois class, could it be anything but the rule of the Orleanists supplemented by the Legitimists, and of the Legitimists supplemented by the Orleanists, the *synthesis of the restoration and the July monarchy*? The bourgeois republicans of the *National* did not represent any large faction of their class resting on economic foundations. They possessed only the importance and the historical claim of having

asserted, under the monarchy, as against the two bourgeois factions that only understood their *particular régime*, the general régime of the bourgeois class, the *nameless realm of the republic*, which they idealized and embellished with antique arabesques, but in which, above all, they hailed the rule of their coterie. If the party of the *National* grew confused in its own mind when it described the royalists in coalition at the top of the republic founded by it, these royalists deceived themselves no less concerning the fact of their united rule. They did not comprehend that if each of their factions, regarded separately, by itself, was royalist, the product of their chemical combination had necessarily to be *republican*, that the white and the blue monarchy had to neutralize each other in the tricolour republic. Forced, by antagonism to the revolutionary proletariat and the transition classes thronging more and more round it as their centre, to summon their united strength and to conserve the organization of this united strength, each faction of the party of Order had to assert, as against the desire for restoration and the overweening presumption of the other, their joint rule, that is, the *republican form* of bourgeois rule. Thus we find these royalists in the beginning believing in an immediate restoration, later preserving the republican form with foaming rage and deadly invective against it on their lips, and finally confessing that they can endure each other only in the republic and postponing the restoration indefinitely. The enjoyment of the united rule itself strengthened each of the two factions, and made each of them still more unable and unwilling to subordinate itself to the other, that is, to restore the monarchy.

The *Party of Order* directly proclaimed in its election programme the rule of the bourgeois class, that is, the preservation of the life conditions of its rule: *property, family, religion, order!* Naturally it represented its class rule and the conditions of its class rule as the rule of civilization and as the necessary conditions of material production as well as of the relations of social intercourse arising from it. The party of Order had enormous money resources at its command; it organized its branches throughout France; it had all the ideologists of the old society in its pay; it had the influence of the existing governmental power at its disposal; it possessed an army of unpaid vassals in the whole mass of petty bourgeois and peasants, who, still removed from the revolutionary movement, found in the high dignitaries of property the natural representatives of their petty property and its petty prejudices. This party,

represented throughout the country by countless petty kings, could punish the rejection of their candidates as insurrection, dismiss the rebellious workers, the recalcitrant farm-hands, domestic servants, clerks, railway officials, penmen, all the functionaries civilly subordinate to it. Finally, here and there, it could maintain the delusion that the republican Constituent Assembly had prevented the Bonaparte of December 10 from manifesting his wonder-working powers. We have not mentioned the Bonapartists in connection with the party of Order. They were not a serious faction of the bourgeois class, but a collection of old, superstitious invalids and of young, unbelieving soldiers of fortune. The party of Order was victorious in the elections; it sent a large majority into the Legislative Assembly.

As against the coalesced counter-revolutionary bourgeois class, the sections of the petty bourgeoisie and peasant class already revolutionized had naturally to ally themselves with the high dignitary of revolutionary interests, the revolutionary proletariat. We have seen how the democratic spokesmen of the petty bourgeoisie in parliament, that is, the *Montagne*, were driven by parliamentary defeats to the socialist spokesmen of the proletariat, and how the actual petty bourgeoisie, outside of parliament, was driven by the *concordats à l'amiable*, by the brutal enforcement of bourgeois interests and by bankruptcy, to the actual proletarians. On January 27, *Montagne* and Socialists had celebrated their reconciliation; at the great banquet of February 1849, they repeated their act of union. The social and the democratic party, the party of the workers and that of the petty bourgeois, united to form the *social-democratic party*, that is, the *Red party*.

Paralyzed for a moment by the agony that followed the June days, the French republic had lived through a continuous series of feverish excitements since the raising of the state of siege, since October 19. First the struggle for the presidency, then the struggle between the President and the Constituent Assembly; the struggle for the clubs; the trial in Bourges,¹ which,

¹ The trial of those who had taken part in the events of May 15, 1848, on the charge of conspiracy against the government. There appeared before the court, which was held in the town of Bourges, representatives of the proletariat (Blanqui, Barbès) and also part of the Mountain. Blanqui was sentenced to ten years' solitary confinement; B. Floote, Sobrier and Raspail, to varying terms of years of imprisonment, while Barbès, Albert, Louis Blanc, Caussidière, Laviron and Huber were exiled.—Ed.

in contrast with the petty figures of the President, the coalesced royalists, the respectable republicans, the democratic *Montagne* and the socialist doctrinaires of the proletariat, caused the proletariat's real revolutionists to appear as primordial monsters, such as only a deluge leaves behind on the surface of society, or such as could only precede a social deluge; the election agitation; the execution of the Bréa murderers;¹ the continual proceedings against the press; the violent interference of the government with the banquets by police action; the insolent royalist provocations; the exhibition of the portraits of Louis Blanc and Caussidière on the pillory; the unbroken struggle between the constituted republic and the Constituent Assembly, which each moment drove the revolution back to its starting-point, which each moment made the victors the vanquished and the vanquished the victors and, in a trice, changed around the positions of the parties and the classes, their separations and connections; the rapid march of the European counter-revolution; the glorious Hungarian fight; the armed uprisings in Germany; the Roman expedition; the ignominious defeat of the French army before Rome—in this vortex of the movement, in this torment of historical unrest, in this dramatic ebb and flow of revolutionary passions, hopes and disappointments, the different classes of French society had to count their epochs of development in weeks where they had previously counted them in half centuries. A considerable part of the peasants and of the provinces was revolutionized. Not only were they disappointed in Napoleon, but the Red party offered them, instead of the name, the content, instead of illusory freedom from taxation, repayment of the milliard paid to the Legitimists, the adjustment of mortgages and the abolition of usury.

The army itself was infected with the revolutionary fever. In voting for Bonaparte it had voted for victory, and he gave it defeat. In him it had voted for the Little Corporal, behind whom the great revolutionary general is concealed, and he once more gave it the great generals, behind whom the pipe-clay corporal shelters himself. There was no doubt that the Red party, that is, the coalesced democratic party, was bound to celebrate, if not victory, still, great triumphs; that Paris, the army and a great part of the

¹ General Bréa, who was in command of part of the troops which suppressed the June rising of the Paris proletariat, was killed by the insurgents at the gates of Fontainebleau on June 25, 1848. In connection with this, two of the participants in the rising were executed.—*Ed.*

provinces would vote for it. *Ledru-Rollin*, the leader of the *Montagne*, was elected by five Departments; no leader of the party of Order carried off such a victory, no candidate belonging to the proletarian party proper. This election reveals to us the secret of the democratic-socialist party. If, on the one hand, the *Montagne*, the parliamentary champion of the democratic petty bourgeoisie, was forced to unite with the socialist doctrinaires of the proletariat—the proletariat, forced by the terrible material defeat of June to raise itself up again through intellectual victories and not yet enabled through the development of the remaining classes to seize the revolutionary dictatorship, had to throw itself into the arms of the doctrinaires of its emancipation, the founders of socialist sects—the revolutionary peasants, the army and the provinces, on the other hand, ranged themselves behind the *Montagne*, which thus became the lord and master in the revolutionary army camp and through the understanding with the Socialists had eliminated every antagonism in the revolutionary party. In the latter half of the life of the Constituent Assembly it represented the republican fervour of the same and caused to be buried in oblivion its sins during the Provisional Government, during the Executive Commission, during the June days. In the same measure as the party of the *National*, in accordance with its half-and-half, nature, had allowed itself to be put down by the royalist ministry, the party of the Mountain, which had been brushed aside during the omnipotence of the *National*, rose and asserted itself as the parliamentary representative of the revolution. In fact, the party of the *National* had nothing to oppose to the other, royalist factions but ambitious personalities and idealistic humbug. The party of the Mountain, on the contrary, represented a mass hovering between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, a mass whose material interests demanded democratic institutions. In comparison with the Cavaignacs and the Marrasts, Ledru-Rollin and the *Montagne*, therefore, represented the true revolution, and from the consciousness of this important situation they drew the greater courage the more the expression of revolutionary energy limited itself to parliamentary attacks, bringing in bills of impeachment, threats, raised voices, thundering speeches, and extremes which were only pushed as far as phrases. The peasants were in about the same position as the petty bourgeoisie; they had more or less the same social demands to put forward. All the middle strata of society, so far as they were driven into the revolutionary movement, were therefore

bound to find their hero in Ledru-Rollin. Ledru-Rollin was the personage of the democratic petty bourgeoisie. As against the party of Order, the half conservative, half revolutionary and wholly utopian reformers of this order had first to be pushed to the forefront.

The party of the *National*, "the Friends of the Constitution *quand même*," the *républicains purs et simples*, were completely defeated in the elections. A tiny minority of them was sent into the Legislative Chamber, their most noted leaders vanished from the stage, even Marast, the editor-in-chief and the Orpheus of the respectable republic.

On May 28,¹ the Legislative Assembly convened; on June 11, the collision of May 8 was renewed and, in the name of the *Montagne*, Ledru-Rollin brought in a bill of impeachment against the President and the ministry for violation of the constitution, for the bombardment of Rome. On June 12, the Legislative Assembly rejected the bill of impeachment, just as the Constituent Assembly had rejected it on May 11, but the proletariat this time drove the *Montagne* on to the streets, not to a street battle, however, but only to a street procession. It is enough to say that the *Montagne* was at the head of this movement to know that the movement was defeated, and that June 1849 was a caricature, as ridiculous as it was vile, of June 1848. The great retreat of June 13 was only eclipsed by the still greater battle report of Changarnier, the great man that the party of Order improvised. Every social epoch needs its great men, and when it does not find them, it invents them, as Helvétius says.

On December 20 only one half of the constituted bourgeois republic was in existence, the *President*; on May 28 it was completed by the other half, the *Legislative Assembly*. In June 1848, the constituent bourgeois republic, by an unspeakable battle against the proletariat, and in June 1849, the constituted bourgeois republic, by an unutterable comedy with the petty bourgeoisie, had engraved their names in the birth register of history. June 1849 was the Nemesis of June 1848. In June 1849, it was not the workers that were vanquished; it was the petty bourgeois, who stood between them and the revolution, that were felled. June

¹ In the first and all subsequent editions of *The Class Struggles in France* and of *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, the date given was May 29. Actually, the Legislative Assembly opened on May 28, 1849. —Ed.

1849 was not a bloody tragedy between wage labour and capital, but a prison-filling and lamentable play of debtors and creditors. The party of Order had won, it was all-powerful; it had now to show what it was.

III

CONSEQUENCES OF JUNE 13, 1849

On December 20, the Janus head of the *constitutional republic* had still shown only one face, the executive face with the indistinct, plain features of L. Bonaparte; on May 28, 1849, it showed its second face, the *legislative*, pitted with the scars that the orgies of the Restoration and the July monarchy had left behind. With the Legislative National Assembly the phenomenon of the *constitutional republic* was completed, that is, the republican form of government in which the rule of the bourgeois class is constituted, the common rule, therefore, of the two great royalist factions that form the French bourgeoisie, the coalesced Legitimists and Orleanists, the *party of Order*. While the French republic thus became the property of the coalition of the royalist parties, the European coalition of the counter-revolutionary powers embarked, simultaneously, upon a general crusade against the last places of refuge of the March revolutions. Russia invaded Hungary; Prussia marched against the army defending the Reich constitution, and Oudinot bombarded Rome. The European crisis was evidently approaching a decisive turning-point; the eyes of all Europe were turned on Paris, and the eyes of all Paris on the *Legislative Assembly*.

On June 11 Ledru-Rollin mounted its tribune. He made no speech; he formulated a requisitory against the ministers, naked, unadorned, factual, concentrated, forceful.

The attack on Rome is an attack on the constitution; the attack on the Roman republic is an attack on the French republic. Article V of the constitution reads: "The French republic never employs its forces against the liberty of any people whatsoever"—and the President employs the French army against Roman liberty. Article 54 of the constitution forbids the executive power to declare any war whatsoever without the consent of the National Assembly. The Constituent Assembly's resolution of May 8 expressly commands the ministers to make the Rome expedition conform with the utmost speed to its original mission; it therefore just

as expressly prohibits war on Rome—and Oudinot bombards Rome. Thus Ledru-Rollin called the constitution itself as a witness for the prosecution against Bonaparte and his ministers. At the royalist majority of the National Assembly, he, the tribune of the constitution, hurled the threatening declaration: "The republicans will know how to command respect for the constitution by every means, be it even by force of arms!" "*By force of arms!*" repeated the hundredfold echo of the *Montagne*. The majority answered with a terrible tumult; the President of the National Assembly called Ledru-Rollin to order; Ledru-Rollin repeated the challenging declaration, and finally laid on the President's table a motion for the impeachment of Bonaparte and his ministers. By 361 votes to 203, the National Assembly resolved to pass on from the bombardment of Rome to the next item on the agenda.

Did Ledru-Rollin believe that he could beat the National Assembly by means of the constitution, and the President by means of the National Assembly?

To be sure, the constitution forbade any attack on the liberty of foreign peoples, but what the French army attacked in Rome was, according to the ministry, not "liberty" but the "despotism of anarchy." Had the *Montagne* still not comprehended, all experiences in the Constituent Assembly notwithstanding, that the interpretation of the constitution did not belong to those who had made it, but only to those who had accepted it? That its wording must be construed in its viable meaning and that the bourgeois meaning was its only viable meaning? That Bonaparte and the royalist majority of the National Assembly were the authentic interpreters of the constitution, as the priest is the authentic interpreter of the bible, and the judge the authentic interpreter of the law? Should the National Assembly, freshly emerged from the general elections, feel itself bound by the testamentary provisions of the dead Constituent Assembly, whose will while living an Odilon Barrot had broken? When Ledru-Rollin cited the Constituent Assembly's resolution of May 8, had he forgotten that the same Constituent Assembly on May 11 had rejected his first motion for the impeachment of Bonaparte and the ministers; that it had acquitted the President and the ministers; that it had thus sanctioned the attack on Rome as "constitutional"; that he only lodged an appeal against a judgement already delivered; that he, lastly, appealed from the republican Constituent Assembly to the royalist Legislative Assembly? The constitution itself calls insur-

rection to its aid by summoning, in a special article, every citizen to protect it. Ledru-Rollin based himself on this article. But, at the same time, are not the public authorities organized for the defence of the constitution, and does not the violation of the constitution begin only from the moment when one of the constitutional public authorities rebels against the other? And the President of the republic, the ministers of the republic and the National Assembly of the republic were in the most harmonious agreement.

What the *Montagne* attempted on June 11 was "*an insurrection within the limits of pure reason*," that is, a purely *parliamentary insurrection*. The majority of the Assembly, intimidated by the prospect of an armed rising of the popular masses, was, in Bonaparte and the ministers, to destroy its own power and the significance of its own election. Had not the Constituent Assembly similarly attempted to annul the election of Bonaparte, when it insisted so obstinately on the dismissal of the Barrot-Falloux ministry?

Neither were there lacking from the time of the Convention models for parliamentary insurrections which had suddenly transformed completely the relation between the majority and the minority—and should the young *Montagne* not succeed where the old had succeeded?—nor did the relations at the moment seem unfavourable for such an undertaking. Popular unrest in Paris had reached an alarmingly high point; the army, according to its vote at the election, did not seem favourably inclined towards the government; the legislative majority itself was still too young to have become consolidated and, in addition, it consisted of old gentlemen. If the *Montagne* were successful in a parliamentary insurrection, the helm of state would fall directly into its hands. The democratic petty bourgeoisie, for its part, wished, as always, for nothing more fervently than to see the battle fought out in the clouds over its head between the departed spirits of parliament. Finally, both of them, the democratic petty bourgeoisie and its representatives, the *Montagne*, would, through a parliamentary insurrection, achieve their great purpose, that of breaking the power of the bourgeoisie without unleashing the proletariat or letting it appear otherwise than in perspective; the proletariat would have been used without becoming dangerous.

After the vote of the National Assembly on June 11, a conference took place between some members of the *Montagne* and delegates of the secret worker's societies. The latter urged that the

attack be started the same evening. The *Montagne* decisively rejected this plan. On no account did it want to let the leadership slip out of its hands; its allies were as suspect to it as its antagonists, and rightly so. The memory of June 1848 surged through the ranks of the Paris proletariat more vigorously than ever. Nevertheless it was chained to the alliance with the *Montagne*. The latter represented the largest part of the Departments; it exaggerated its influence in the army; it had at its disposal the democratic section of the National Guard; it had the moral power of the shopkeepers behind it. To begin the revolution at this moment against the will of the *Montagne* would have meant for the proletariat, decimated moreover by cholera and driven out of Paris in considerable numbers by unemployment, to repeat uselessly the June days of 1848, without the situation which had forced this desperate struggle. The proletarian delegates did the only rational thing. They obligated the *Montagne* to *compromise* itself, that is, to come out beyond the confines of the parliamentary struggle in the event of its bill of impeachment being rejected. During the whole of June 13, the proletariat maintained this same sceptically watchful attitude, and awaited a seriously engaged irrevocable *mêlée* between the democratic National Guard and the army, in order then to plunge into the fight and push the revolution forward beyond the petty-bourgeois aim set for it. In the event of victory a proletarian commune was already formed which would take its place beside the official government. The Parisian workers had learned in the bloody school of June 1848.

On June 12 Minister Lacrosse himself brought forward in the Legislative Assembly the motion to proceed at once to the discussion of the bill of impeachment. During the night the government had made every provision for defence and attack; the majority of the National Assembly was determined to drive the rebellious minority out into the streets; the minority itself could no longer retreat; the die was cast; the bill of impeachment was rejected by 377 votes to 8. The Mountain, which had abstained from voting, rushed resentfully into the propaganda halls of the "pacific democracy," into the newspaper offices of the *Démocratie pacifique*.¹

Its withdrawal from the parliament building broke its strength as withdrawal from the earth broke the strength of Antaeus, her giant son. Samsons in the precincts of the Legislative Assem-

¹ *Démocratie pacifique*: Organ of the Fourierists, published by Considérant in Paris in 1843-51.—Ed.

bly, they were only Philistines in the precincts of the "pacific democracy." A long, noisy, rambling debate ensued. The *Montagne* was determined to compel respect for the constitution by every means, "only not by force of arms." In this decision it was supported by a manifesto and by a deputation of the "Friends of the Constitution." "Friends of the Constitution" was what the wreckage of the coterie of the *National*, of the bourgeois-republican party, called itself. While six of its remaining parliamentary representatives had voted *against*, the others in a body voting *for*, the rejection of the bill of impeachment, while *Cavaignac* placed his sabre at the disposal of the party of Order, the larger, extra-parliamentary part of the coterie greedily seized the opportunity to emerge from its position of a political pariah, and to press into the ranks of the democratic party. Did they not appear as the natural shield bearers of this party, which hid itself behind their shield, behind their *principles*, behind the *constitution*?

Till break of day the "Mountain" was in labour. It gave birth to "a proclamation to the people," which, on the morning of June 13, occupied a more or less shamed place in two socialist journals. It declared the President, the ministers and the majority of the Legislative Assembly "outside the constitution" (*hors la Constitution*) and summoned the National Guard, the army and finally also the people "to arise." "Long live the Constitution!" was the slogan that it put forward, a slogan that signified nothing other than "Down with the revolution!"

In conformity with the constitutional proclamation of the Mountain, there was a so-called *peaceful demonstration* of the petty bourgeois on June 13, that is, a street procession from the *Château d'Eau* through the boulevards, 30,000 strong, mainly National Guards, unarmed, with an admixture of members of the secret workers' sections, moving along with the cry: "Long live the Constitution!" which was uttered mechanically, icily, and with a bad conscience by the members of the procession itself, and thrown back ironically by the echo of the people that surged along the sidewalks, instead of swelling up like thunder. From the many-voiced song the chest notes were missing. And when the procession swung by the meeting hall of the "Friends of the Constitution" and a hired herald of the constitution appeared on the house-top, violently cleaving the air with his *claqueur* hat and from tremendous lungs letting the catchcry "Long live the Constitution!" fall like hail on the heads of the pilgrims, they them-

selves seemed overcome for a moment by the comedy of the situation. It is known how the procession, having arrived at the termination of the *rue de la Paix*, was received in the boulevards by the dragoons and chasseurs of Changarnier in an altogether unparliamentary way, how in a trice it scattered in all directions and how it threw behind it a few shouts of "to arms" only in order that the parliamentary call to arms of June 11 might be fulfilled.

The majority of the *Montagne* assembled in the *rue du Hasard* scattered when this violent dispersion of the peaceful procession, the muffled rumours of murder of unarmed citizens on the boulevards and the growing tumult in the streets seemed to herald the approach of a rising. *Ledru-Rollin* at the head of a small band of deputies saved the honour of the Mountain. Under the protection of the Paris Artillery, which had assembled in the *Palais National*, they betook themselves to the *Conservatoire des arts et métiers*,¹ where the fifth and sixth legions of the National Guard were to arrive. But the *Montagnards* waited in vain for the fifth and sixth legions; these discreet National Guards left their representatives in the lurch; the Paris Artillery itself prevented the people from throwing up barricades; chaotic disorder made any decision impossible; the troops of the line advanced with fixed bayonets; some of the representatives were taken prisoner, while others escaped. Thus ended June 13.

If June 23, 1848, was the insurrection of the revolutionary proletariat, June 13, 1849, was the insurrection of the democratic petty bourgeois, each of these two insurrections being the *classically pure* expression of the class which had been its vehicle.

Only in Lyons did it come to an obstinate, bloody conflict. Here, where the industrial bourgeoisie and the industrial proletariat stand directly opposed to one another, where the workers' movement is not, as in Paris, included in and determined by the general movement, June 13, in its repercussion, lost its original character. Wherever else it broke out in the provinces it did not kindle fire—*a cold lightning flash*.

June 13 closes the *first period in the life of the constitutional republic*, which had attained its normal existence on May 28, 1849 with the meeting of the Legislative Assembly. The whole period of this prologue is filled with vociferous struggle between the party of Order and the *Montagne*, between the big bourgeoisie and the

¹ Museum of Arts and Trades.—Ed.

petty bourgeoisie, which strove in vain against the consolidation of the bourgeois republic, for which it had itself continuously conspired in the Provisional Government and in the Executive Commission, and for which, during the June days, it had fought fanatically against the proletariat. The 13th of June breaks its resistance and makes the *legislative dictatorship* of the united royalists a *fait accompli*. From this moment the National Assembly is only a *Committee of Public Safety of the party of Order*.

Paris had put the President, the ministers and the majority of the National Assembly in a "*state of impeachment*"; they put Paris in a "*state of siege*." The Mountain had declared the majority of the Legislative Assembly "*outside the constitution*"; for violation of the constitution the majority handed over the Mountain to the *haute cour*¹ and proscribed everything in it that still had vital force. It was decimated to a rump without head or heart. The minority had gone as far as to attempt a *parliamentary insurrection*; the majority elevated its *parliamentary despotism* to law. It decreed *new standing orders*, which annihilate the freedom of the tribune and authorize the President of the National Assembly to punish representatives for violation of the standing orders with censure, with fines, with stoppage of their salaries, with suspension of membership, with incarceration. Over the rump of the Mountain it hung the rod instead of the sword. The remainder of the deputies of the Mountain owed it to their honour to make a mass exit. By such an act the dissolution of the party of Order would have been hastened. It would have had to break up into its original component parts the moment when not even the semblance of an opposition would hold it together any longer.

Simultaneously with their *parliamentary* power, the democratic petty bourgeois were robbed of their *armed* power through the dissolution of the Paris Artillery and the 8th, 9th and 12th legions of the National Guard. On the other hand, the legion of high finance, which on June 13 had raided the print shops of Boulé and Roux, demolished the presses, played havoc with the offices of the republican journals and arbitrarily arrested editors, compositors, printers, shipping clerks and errand boys, received encouraging approval from the tribune of the National Assembly. All over France the disbandment of National Guards suspected of republicanism was repeated.

¹ *Haute cour*: High court.—Ed.

A new *press law*, a new *law of association*, a new *law on the state of siege*, the prisons of Paris overflowing, the political refugees driven out, all the journals that go beyond the limits of the *National* suspended, Lyons and the five Departments surrounding it abandoned to the brutal persecution of military despotism, the courts ubiquitous and the army of officials, so often purged, purged once more—these were the inevitable, the constantly recurring *commonplaces* of victorious reaction, worth mentioning after the massacres and the deportations of June only because this time they were directed not only against Paris, but also against the Departments, not only against the proletariat, but, above all, against the middle classes.

The repressive laws, by which the declaration of a state of siege was left to the discretion of the government, the press still more firmly muzzled and the right of association annihilated, absorbed the whole of the legislative activity of the National Assembly during the months of June, July and August.

However, this epoch is characterized not by the exploitation of victory *in fact*, but *in principle*: not by the resolutions of the National Assembly, but by the grounds advanced for these resolutions; not by the thing, but by the phrase; not by the phrase but by the accent and the gesture which enliven the phrase. The brazen, unreserved expression of *royalist sentiments*, the contemptuously aristocratic insults to the republic, the coquettishly frivolous babbling of the restoration aims, in a word, the boastful violation of *republican decorum* give its peculiar tone and colour to this period. Long live the Constitution! was the battle cry of the *vanquished* of June 13. The *victors* were therefore absolved from the hypocrisy of constitutional, that is, republican, speech. The counter-revolution subjugated Hungary, Italy and Germany, and they believed that the restoration was already at the gates of France. Among the masters of ceremonies of the factions of order there ensued a real competition to document their royalism in the *Moniteur*, and to confess, repent and crave pardon before God and man for liberal sins perchance committed by them under the monarchy. No day passed without the February Revolution being declared a national calamity from the tribune of the National Assembly, without some Legitimist provincial cabbage-Junker solemnly stating that he had never recognized the republic, without one of the cowardly deserters of and traitors to the July monarchy relating the belated deeds of heroism in the performance of

which only the philanthropy of Louis Philippe or other misunderstandings had hindered him. What was admirable in the February days was not the magnanimity of the victorious people, but the self-sacrifice and moderation of the royalists, who had allowed it to be victorious. One Representative of the People proposed to divert part of the money destined for the relief of those wounded in February to the *Municipal Guards*, who alone in those days had deserved well of the fatherland. Another wanted to have an equestrian statue decreed to the Duke of Orleans in the *Place du Carrousel*. Thiers called the constitution a dirty piece of paper. There appeared in succession on the tribune Orleanists, to repent of their conspiracy against the legitimate monarchy; Legitimists, who reproached themselves with having hastened the overthrow of monarchy in general by resisting the illegitimate monarchy; Thiers, who repented of having intrigued against Molé; Molé, who repented of having intrigued against Guizot; Barrot, who repented of having intrigued against all three. The cry "Long live the Social-Democratic Republic!" was declared unconstitutional; the cry "Long live the Republic!" was prosecuted as social-democratic. On the anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo, a Representative declared: "I fear an invasion of the Prussians less than the entry of the revolutionary refugees into France." To the complaints about the terrorism which was organized in Lyons and in the neighbouring Departments, Baraguey d'Hilliers answered: "I prefer the White terror to the Red terror." (*J'aime mieux la terreur blanche que la terreur rouge.*) And the Assembly applauded frantically every time that an epigram against the republic, against the revolution, against the constitution, for the monarchy or for the Holy Alliance fell from the lips of its orators. Every infringement of the minutest republican formality, for example, addressing the Representatives as *citoyens*, filled the knights of order with enthusiasm.

The by-elections in Paris on July 8, held under the influence of the state of siege and of the abstention of a great part of the proletariat from the ballot box, the taking of Rome by the French army, the entry into Rome of the red eminences and, in their train, of the inquisition and monkish terrorism, added fresh victories to the victory of June and increased the intoxication of the party of Order.

Finally, in the middle of August, half with the intention of attending the Department Councils just assembled, half through

exhaustion from the tendentious orgy of many months, the royalists decreed the prorogation of the National Assembly for two months. With transparent irony they left behind a commission of twenty-five Representatives, the cream of the Legitimists and the Orleanists, a Molé and a Changarnier, as proxies for the National Assembly and as *guardians of the republic*. The irony was more profound than they suspected. They, condemned by history to help to overthrow the monarchy they loved, were destined by it to conserve the republic they hated.

The *second period in the life of the constitutional republic*, its *royalist period of sowing wild oats*, closes with the *proroguing* of the Legislative Assembly.

The state of siege in Paris had again been raised, the activities of the press had again begun. During the suspension of the social-democratic papers, during the period of repressive legislation and royalist bluster, the *Siècle*, the old literary representative of the *monarchist-constitutional petty bourgeois*, *republicanized* itself; the *Presse*, the old literary exponent of the *bourgeois reformers*, *democratized* itself;¹ while the *National*, the old classic organ of the *republican bourgeois*, *socialized* itself.

The *secret societies* grew in extent and intensity in the same degree that the *public clubs* became impossible. The *workers' industrial co-operatives*, tolerated as purely commercial societies, while of no account economically, became politically so many means of cementing the proletariat. June 13 had struck off the official heads of the various semi-revolutionary parties; the masses that remained won a head of their own. The knights of order had practised intimidation by prophecies of the terror of the Red republic; the base excesses, the hyperborean atrocities of the victorious counter-revolution in Hungary, in Baden and in Rome washed the "*Red republic*" white. And the malcontent intermediate classes of French society began to prefer the promises of the Red republic with its problematic terrors to the terrors of the Red monarchy with its actual hopelessness. No Socialist in France spread more revolutionary propaganda than *Haynau*. *A chaque capacité selon ses oeuvres!*²

In the meantime Louis Bonaparte exploited the recess of the National Assembly to make princely tours of the provinces, the

¹ *Siècle (Age)* and *Presse* were daily newspapers which began to appear in Paris in 1836.—*Ed.*

² To each man of talent according to his work!—*Ed.*

most hot-blooded Legitimists made pilgrimages to Ems, to the grandchild of the saintly Louis,¹ and the mass of the popular representatives on the side of order intrigued in the Department Councils, which had just met. It was necessary to make them pronounce what the majority of the National Assembly did not yet dare to pronounce, an *urgent motion for immediate revision of the constitution*. According to the constitution, it could not be revised before 1852, and then only by a National Assembly called together expressly for this purpose. If, however, the majority of the Department Councils expressed themselves to this effect, was not the National Assembly bound to sacrifice the virginity of the constitution to the voice of France? The National Assembly entertained the same hopes in regard to these provincial assemblies as the nuns in Voltaire's *Henriade* entertained in regard to the pandurs. But, some exceptions apart, the Potiphars of the National Assembly had to deal with just so many Josephs of the provinces. The vast majority did not want to understand the importunate insinuation. The revision of the constitution was frustrated by the very instruments by which it was to have been called into being, by the votes of the Department Councils. The voice of France, and indeed of bourgeois France, had spoken and had spoken against revision.

At the beginning of October the Legislative National Assembly met once more—*tantum mutatus ab illo!*² Its physiognomy was completely changed. The unexpected rejection of revision on the part of the Department Councils had put it back within the limits of the constitution and indicated the limits of its term of life. The Orleanists had become mistrustful because of the pilgrimages of the Legitimists to Ems; the Legitimists had grown suspicious on account of the negotiations of the Orleanists with London;³ the journals of the two factions had fanned the fire and weighed the reciprocal claims of their pretenders. Orleanists and Legitimists grumbled in unison at the machinations of the Bonapartists, which showed themselves in the princely tours, in the more or less transparent emancipatory attempts of the President, in the presumptuous language of the Bonapartist newspapers;

¹ The reference is to Count Chambord (later Henry V), the Bourbon pretender to the French throne.—*Ed.*

² How great was the change since then.—*Ed.*

³ Louis Philippe, who had fled to England after the February Revolution, lived in the environs of London.—*Ed.*

Louis Bonaparte grumbled at a National Assembly which found only the Legitimist-Orleanist conspiracy legitimate, at a ministry which betrayed him continually to this National Assembly. Finally, the ministry was itself divided on the Roman policy and on the *income tax* proposed by Minister *Pussy*, and decried as socialistic by the conservatives.

One of the first bills of the Barrot ministry in the re-assembled Legislative Assembly was a demand for a credit of 300,000 francs for the payment of a widow's pension to the *Duchess of Orleans*. The National Assembly granted it and added to the list of debts of the French nation a sum of seven million francs. Thus, while Louis Philippe continued to play with success the role of the *pauvre honteux*, of the shamefaced beggar, the ministry neither dared to move an increase of salary for Bonaparte nor did the Assembly appear inclined to grant it. And Louis Bonaparte, as ever, vacillated in the dilemma: *Aut Caesar aut Clichy!*¹

The minister's second demand for a credit, one of nine million francs for the *costs of the Rome expedition*, increased the tension between Bonaparte, on the one hand, and the ministers and the National Assembly, on the other. Louis Bonaparte had inserted a letter to his military aide, Edgar Ney, in the *Moniteur*, in which he bound the papal government to constitutional guarantees. The Pope, on his part, had published an address, *motu proprio*,² in which he rejected any limitation of his restored rule. Bonaparte's letter, with studied indiscretion, raised the curtain of his cabinet, in order to expose himself to the eyes of the gallery as a benevolent genius who was, however, misunderstood and shackled in his own house. It was not the first time that he had coquetted with the "furtive flights of a free soul." *Thiers*, the reporter of the commission, completely ignored Bonaparte's flight and contented himself with translating the papal allocution into French. It was not the ministry, but *Victor Hugo* that sought to save the President through an order of the day in which the National Assembly was to express its agreement with Napoleon's letter. *Allons donc! Allons donc!*³ With this disrespectful, frivolous interjection the majority buried Hugo's motion. The policy of the President? The letter of the President? The President himself? *Allons*

¹ *Either Caesar or Clichy. Clichy: Paris prison for insolvent debtors.*
—Ed.

² Of his own motion.—Ed.

³ Get along with you!—Ed.

donc! Allons donc! Who the devil takes Monsieur Bonaparte *au sérieux?*¹ Do you believe, Monsieur Victor Hugo, that we believe you that you believe in the President? *Allons donc! Allons donc!*

Finally, the breach between Bonaparte and the National Assembly was hastened by the discussion on the *recall of the Orleanists and the Bourbons*. In default of the ministry, the cousin of the President, the son of the ex-king of Westphalia, had put forward this motion, which had no other purpose than to push the Legitimist and the Orleanist pretenders down to the same level, or rather a *lower* level than the Bonapartist pretender, who at least stood in fact at the pinnacle of the state.

Napoleon Bonaparte was disrespectful enough to make the *recall of the expelled royal families* and the *amnesty of the June insurgents* parts of one and the same motion. The indignation of the majority compelled him immediately to apologize for this sacrilegious concatenation of the holy and the impious, of the royal races and the proletarian brood, of the fixed stars of society and of its swamp lights, and to assign to each of the two motions its proper place. The majority energetically rejected the recall of the royal family, and *Berryer*, the Demosthenes of the Legitimists, left no doubt about the meaning of the vote. The civic degradation of the pretenders, that is what is intended! It is desired to rob them of their halo, of the last majesty that is left to them, the *majesty of exile!* What, cried Berryer, would be thought of him among the pretenders who, forgetting his august origin, came here to live as a simple private individual? It could not have been more clearly intimated to Louis Bonaparte that he had not gained the day by his presence, that whereas the royalists in coalition needed him here in France as a *neutral man* in the presidential chair, the serious pretenders to the throne had to be kept out of profane sight by the fog of exile.

On November 1, Louis Bonaparte answered the Legislative Assembly with a message which in pretty brusque words announced the dismissal of the Barrot ministry and the formation of a new ministry. The Barrot-Falloux ministry was the ministry of the royalist coalition, the d'Hautpoul ministry was the ministry of Bonaparte, the organ of the President as against the Legislative Assembly, the *ministry of the clerks*.

¹ *Au sérieux*: Seriously.—Ed.

Bonaparte was no longer the merely *neutral man* of December 10, 1848. Possession of the executive power had grouped a number of interests around him, the struggle with anarchy forced the party of Order itself to increase his influence, and if he was no longer popular, the party of Order was unpopular. Could he not hope to compel the Orleanists and the Legitimists, through their rivalry as well as through the necessity of some sort of monarchist restoration, to recognize the *neutral pretender*?

From November 1, 1849 dates the third period in the life of the constitutional republic, a period which closes with March 10, 1850. The regular game, so much admired by Guizot, of the constitutional institutions, the wrangling between executive and legislative power, now begins. More; as against the hankering for restoration on the part of the united Orleanists and Legitimists, Bonaparte defends his title to his actual power, the republic; as against the hankering for restoration on the part of Bonaparte, the party of Order defends its title to its common rule, the republic; as against the Orleanists, the Legitimists, and as against the Legitimists, the Orleanists, defend the *status quo*, the republic. All these factions of the party of Order, each of which has its own king and its own restoration *in petto*,¹ mutually enforce, as against their rivals' hankering for usurpation and revolt, the common rule of the bourgeoisie, the form in which the special claims remain neutralized and reserved—the *republic*.

Just as Kant makes the republic, so these royalists make *the monarchy*, the only rational form of state, a postulate of practical reason whose realization is never attained, but whose attainment must always be striven for and mentally adhered to as the goal.

Thus the constitutional republic had gone forth from the hands of the bourgeois republicans as a hollow ideological formula to become a form full of content and life in the hands of the royalists in coalition. And Thiers spoke more truly than he suspects when he said: "We, the royalists, are the true pillars of the constitutional republic."

The overthrow of the ministry of the coalition and the appearance of the ministry of the clerks has a second significance. Its finance minister was *Fould*. Fould as finance minister signifies the official surrender of France's national wealth to the Bourse, the management of the state's property by the Bourse and in

¹ *In petto*: In its bosom, that is, secretly.—Ed.

the interests of the Bourse. With the nomination of Fould, the finance aristocracy announced its restoration in the *Moniteur*. This restoration necessarily supplemented the other restorations, which form just so many links in the chain of the constitutional republic.

Louis Philippe had never dared to make a genuine *loup-cervier* (stock exchange shark) finance minister. Just as his monarchy was the ideal name for the rule of the big bourgeoisie, so in his ministries the privileged interests had to bear ideologically disinterested names. The bourgeois republic everywhere pushed into the forefront what the different monarchies, Legitimist as well as Orleanist, kept concealed in the background. It made earthly what they had made heavenly. In place of the names of the saints it put the bourgeois proper names of the dominant class interests.

Our whole exposition has shown how the republic, from the first day of its existence, did not overthrow but consolidated the finance aristocracy. But the concessions that were made to it were a fate to which submission was made without the desire to bring it about. With Fould, the initiative in the government returned to the finance aristocracy.

The question will be asked, how the coalesced bourgeoisie could bear and suffer the rule of finance, which under Louis Philippe depended on the exclusion or subordination of the remaining bourgeois factions.

The answer is simple.

First of all, the finance aristocracy itself forms a weighty, authoritative part of the royalist coalition, whose common governmental power is denominated republic. Are not the spokesmen and leading lights among the Orleanists the old confederates and accomplices of the finance aristocracy? Is it not itself the golden phalanx of Orleanism? As far as the Legitimists are concerned, they had participated in practice already under Louis Philippe in all the orgies of the Bourse, mine and railway speculations. In general, the combination of large landed property with high finance is a *normal fact*. Proof: *England*; proof: even *Austria*.

In a country like France, where the volume of national production stands at a disproportionately lower level than the amount of the national debt, where government bonds form the most important subject of speculation and the Bourse the chief market for the investment of capital that wants to turn itself to account

in an unproductive way—in such a country a countless number of people from all bourgeois or semi-bourgeois classes must have an interest in the state debt, in the Bourse gambings, in finance. Do not all these interested subalterns find their natural mainstays and commanders in the faction which represents this interest in its vastest outlines, which represents it as a whole?

By what is the accrual of state property to high finance conditioned? By the constantly growing indebtedness of the state. And the indebtedness of the state? By the constant excess of its expenditure over its income, a disproportion which is simultaneously the cause and effect of the system of state loans.

In order to escape from this indebtedness, the state must either restrict its expenditure, that is, simplify and curtail the government organism, govern as little as possible, employ as small a personnel as possible, enter as little as possible into relations with bourgeois society. This path was impossible for the party of Order, whose means of repression, whose official interference in the name of the state and whose ubiquity through organs of state were bound to increase in the same measure as the number of quarters increased from which its rule and the conditions for the existence of its class were threatened. The *gendarmérie* cannot be reduced in the same measure as attacks on persons and property increase.

Or the state must seek to evade the debts and produce an immediate but transitory balance in its budget by putting *extraordinary taxes* on the shoulders of the wealthiest classes. But was the party of Order to sacrifice its own wealth on the altar of the fatherland in order to stop the national wealth from being exploited by the Bourse? *Pas si bête!*¹

Therefore, without a complete revolution in the French state, no revolution in the French state budget. Along with this state budget necessarily goes state indebtedness, and with state indebtedness necessarily goes the lordship of the trade in state debts, of the state creditors, the bankers, the money dealers and the wolves of the Bourse. Only one faction of the party of Order was directly concerned in the overthrow of the finance aristocracy—the *manufacturers*. We are not speaking of the middle, of the smaller people engaged in industry; we are speaking of the reigning princes of the manufacturing interests, who had formed

¹ It is not so stupid!—Ed.

the broad basis of the dynastic opposition under Louis Philippe. Their interest is indubitably reduction of the costs of production and hence reduction of the taxes, which enter into production, and hence reduction of the state debts, the interest on which enters into the taxes, hence the overthrow of the finance aristocracy.

In England—and the largest French manufacturers are petty bourgeois compared with their English rivals—we really find the manufacturers, a Cobden, a Bright, at the head of the crusade against the bank and the stock-exchange aristocracy. Why not in France? In England industry predominates; in France, agriculture. In England industry requires free trade; in France, protective tariffs, national monopoly alongside of the other monopolies. French industry does not dominate French production; the French industrialists, therefore, do not dominate the French bourgeoisie. In order to secure the advancement of their interests as against the remaining factions of the bourgeoisie, they cannot, like the English, take the lead of the movement and simultaneously push their class interests to the fore; they must follow in the train of the revolution, and serve interests which are opposed to the collective interests of their class. In February they had misunderstood their position; February sharpened their wits. And who is more directly threatened by the workers than the employer, the industrial capitalist? The manufacturer, therefore, of necessity became in France the most fanatical member of the party of Order. The reduction of his *profit* by finance, *what is that compared with the abolition of profit by the proletariat?*

In France, the petty bourgeois does what normally the industrial bourgeois would have to do; the worker does what normally would be the task of the petty bourgeois; and the task of the worker, who accomplishes that? No one. In France it is not accomplished; in France it is proclaimed. It is not accomplished anywhere within the national walls; the class war within French society turns into a world war, in which the nations confront one another. Accomplishment begins only at the moment when, through the world war, the proletariat is pushed to the van of the people that dominates the world market, to the van of England. The revolution, which finds here not its end, but its organizational beginning, is no short-lived revolution. The present generation is like the Jews whom Moses led through the wilderness. It has not only a new world to conquer,

it must go under in order to make room for the men who are able to cope with a new world.

Let us return to Fould.

On November 14, 1849, Fould mounted the tribune of the National Assembly and expounded his system of finance: an apology for the old system of taxes! Retention of the wine tax! Abandonment of Passy's income tax!

Passy, too, was no revolutionist; he was an old minister of Louis Philippe's. He belonged to the puritans of the Dufaure brand and to the most intimate confidants of Teste,¹ the scapegoat of the July monarchy. Passy, too, had praised the old tax system and recommended the retention of the wine tax; but he had, at the same time, torn the veil from the state deficit. He had declared the necessity for a new tax, the income tax, if the bankruptcy of the state was to be avoided. Fould, who had recommended state bankruptcy to Ledru-Rollin, recommended the state deficit to the Legislative Assembly. He promised economies, the secret of which later revealed itself in that, for example, expenditures diminished by sixty millions while the floating debt increased by two hundred millions—conjurers' tricks in the grouping of figures, in the drawing up of accounts, which all finally amounted to new loans.

Alongside the other jealous bourgeois factions, the finance aristocracy naturally did not act in so shamelessly corrupt a manner under Fould as under Louis Philippe. But, once it existed, the system remained the same: constant increase in the debts, masking of the deficit. And, in time, the old Bourse swindling came out more openly. Proof: the law concerning the Avignon Railway; the mysterious fluctuations in government securities, for a brief space the topic of the day throughout Paris; finally, the ill-starred speculations of Fould and Bonaparte on the elections of March 10.

With the official restoration of the finance aristocracy, the French people had soon again to stand before a February 24.

¹ On July 8, 1847, before the Chamber of Peers in Paris, began the trial of Parmentier and General Cubières for bribery of officials with a view to obtaining a salt works concession, and of the then Minister of Public Works, Teste, for accepting such money bribes. The latter, during the trial, attempted to commit suicide. All were sentenced to pay heavy fines, Teste, in addition, to serve three years' imprisonment. [*Note by Engels to the 1895 edition.*]

The Constituent Assembly, in an attack of misanthropy against its heir, had abolished the wine tax for the year of our Lord 1850. New debts could not be paid with the abolition of old taxes. *Creton*, a cretin of the party of Order, had moved the retention of the wine tax even before the prorogation of the Legislative Assembly. Fould took up this motion in the name of the Bonapartist ministry and on December 20, 1849, the anniversary of the day when Bonaparte was proclaimed President, the National Assembly decreed the *restoration of the wine tax*.

The sponsor of this restoration was not a financier; it was the Jesuit chief *Montalembert*. His argument was strikingly simple: Taxation is the maternal breast on which the government is suckled. The government is the instruments of repression; it is the organs of authority; it is the army; it is the police; it is the officials, the judges, the ministers; it is the *priests*. An attack on taxation is an attack by the anarchists on the sentinels of order, who safeguard the material and spiritual production of bourgeois society from the inroads of the proletarian vandals. Taxation is the fifth god, side by side with property, the family, order and religion. And the wine tax is incontestably taxation and, moreover, not ordinary, but traditional, monarchically disposed, respectable taxation. *Vive l'impôt des boissons!*¹ Three cheers and one cheer more!

When the French peasant paints the devil, he paints him in the guise of a tax collector. From the moment when Montalembert elevated taxation to a god, the peasant became godless, atheist, and threw himself into the arms of the devil, of *socialism*. The religion of order had forfeited him; the Jesuits had forfeited him; Bonaparte had forfeited him. December 20, 1849 had irrevocably compromised December 20, 1848. The "nephew of his uncle" was not the first of his family whom the wine tax defeated, this tax which, in the expression of Montalembert, heralds the revolutionary storm. The real, the great Napoleon declared on St. Helena that the reintroduction of the wine tax had contributed more to his downfall than all else, since it had alienated from him the peasants of Southern France. Already under Louis XIV the favourite object of the hatred of the people (see the writings of Boisguillebert and Vauban), abolished by the first revolution, it was reintroduced by Napoleon

¹ Long live the tax on drinks!—*Ed.*

in a modified form in 1808. When the restoration entered France, there trotted before it not only the Cossacks, but also the promises to abolish the wine tax. The *gentilhommerie*¹ naturally did not need to keep its word to the *gent taillable à merci et miséricorde*.² The year 1830 promised the abolition of the wine tax. It was not its way to do what it said or say what it did. The year 1848 promised the abolition of the wine tax, just as it promised everything. Finally, the Constituent Assembly, which promised nothing, made, as already mentioned, a testamentary provision whereby the wine tax was to disappear on January 1, 1850. And just ten days before January 1, 1850, the Legislative Assembly introduced it once more, so that the French people perpetually pursued it, and when it had thrown it out the door saw it come in again through the window.

The popular hatred of the wine tax is explained by the fact that it unites in itself all the odiousness of the French system of taxation. The mode of its collection is odious, the mode of its distribution aristocratic, for the rates of taxation are the same for the commonest as for the costliest wines; it increases, therefore, in geometrical progression as the wealth of the consumer decreases, an inverted progressive tax. It accordingly directly provokes the poisoning of the labouring classes by putting a premium on adulterated and imitation wines. It lessens consumption, since it sets up *octrois*³ before the gates of all towns of over 4,000 inhabitants and transforms each such town into a foreign country with a protective tariff against French wine. The big wine merchants, but still more the small ones, the *marchands de vins*, the keepers of wine saloons, whose livelihood directly depends on the consumption of wine, are so many avowed enemies of the wine tax. And, finally, by lessening consumption the wine tax curtails the producers' market. While it renders the urban workers incapable of paying for wine, it renders the wine growers incapable of selling it. And France has a wine-growing population of about twelve million. One can, therefore, understand the hatred of the people in general; one can, in particular, understand the fanaticism of the peasants against the wine tax. And, in addition, they saw in its restoration no isolated, more or less

¹ *Gentilhommerie*: Nobility.—Ed.

² *People taxable at arbitrary discretion*.—Ed.

³ *Octrois*: Local customs offices at the gates of towns.—Ed.

accidental, event. The peasants have a kind of historical tradition of their own, which is handed down from father to son, and in this historical school it is muttered that whenever any government wants to dupe the peasants, it promises the abolition of the wine tax, and as soon as it has duped the peasants, retains or reintroduces the wine tax. In the wine tax the peasant tests the bouquet of the government, its tendency. The restoration of the wine tax on December 20 meant *Louis Bonaparte is like the rest*. But he was not like the rest; he was a *peasant discovery*, and in the petitions carrying millions of signatures against the wine tax they took back the votes that they had given a year before to the "nephew of his uncle."

The country folk—over two-thirds of the total French population—consist for the most part of so-called free *landowners*. The first generation, gratuitously freed by the revolution of 1789 from its feudal burdens, had paid no price for the soil. But the following generations paid, under the form of the *price of land*, what their semi-serf forefathers had paid in the form of rent, tithes, *corvée*, etc. The more, on the one hand, the population grew and the more, on the other hand, the partition of the soil increased, the higher became the price of the parcels, for the demand for them increased with their smallness. But in proportion as the price which the peasant paid for his parcel rose, whether he bought it directly or whether he had it accounted as capital by his coheirs, necessarily also rose the *indebtedness of the peasant*, that is, the *mortgage*. The claim to a debt encumbering the land is termed a *mortgage*, a pawn-ticket in respect of the land. Just as *privileges* accumulated on the mediaeval estate, *mortgages* accumulate on the modern small allotment. On the other hand: under the system of parcellation the soil is purely an *instrument of production* for its proprietor. Now the fruitfulness of land diminishes in the same measure as land is divided. The application of machinery to the land, the division of labour, major soil improvement measures, such as cutting drainage and irrigation canals and the like, become more and more impossible, while the *unproductive costs* of cultivation increase in the same proportion as the division of the instrument of production itself. All this, regardless of whether the possessor of the small allotment possesses capital or not. But the more the division increases, the more does the parcel of land with its utterly wretched inventory form the entire cap-

ital of the small allotment peasant, the more does investment of capital in the land diminish, the more does the colter lack land, money and education for making use of the progress in agronomy, and the more does the cultivation of the soil retrogress. Finally, the *net proceeds* diminish in the same proportion as the *gross consumption* increases, as the whole family of the peasant is kept back from other occupations through its holding and yet is not enabled to live by it.

In the measure, therefore, that the population and, with it, the division of the land increases, *does the instrument of production, the soil, become dearer and its fertility decrease, does agriculture decline and the peasant become loaded with debt.* And what was the effect becomes, in its turn, the cause. Each generation leaves behind another more deeply in debt; each new generation begins under more unfavourable and more aggravating conditions; mortgaging begets mortgaging, and when it becomes impossible for the peasant to offer his small holding as security for *new debts*, that is, to encumber it with new mortgages, he falls a direct victim to *usury*, and *usurious interest rates* become so much the more exorbitant.

Thus it came about that the French peasant cedes to the capitalist, in the form of *interest* on the *mortgages* encumbering the soil and in the form of interest on the *advances made by the usurer without mortgages*, not only ground rent, not only the industrial profit, in a word, not only the *whole net profit*, but even *a part of the wages*, and that therefore he has sunk to the level of the *Irish tenant farmer*—all under the pretence of being a *private proprietor*.

This process was accelerated in France by the ever growing *burden of taxes*, by *court costs* called forth in part directly by the formalities themselves with which French legislation encumbers the ownership of land, in part by the innumerable conflicts over parcels everywhere bounding and crossing each other, and in part by the litigiousness of the peasants, whose enjoyment of property is limited to the fanatical assertion of their title to their fancied property, of their *property rights*.

According to a statistical statement of 1840, the gross production of French agriculture amounted to 5,237,178,000 francs. Of this, the costs of cultivation come to 3,552,000,000 francs, including the consumption by the persons working. There remains a net product of 1,685,178,000 francs, from which 550,000,000

have to be deducted for interest on mortgages, 100,000,000 for law officials, 350,000,000 for taxes and 107,000,000 for registration money, stamp duty, mortgage fees, etc. There is left one-third of the net product, or 538,000,000; when distributed over the population, not 25 francs per head net product.¹ Naturally neither usury outside of mortgage nor lawyers' fees, etc., are included in this calculation.

The condition of the French peasants, when the republic had added new burdens to their old ones, is comprehensible. It can be seen that their exploitation differs only in *form* from the exploitation of the industrial proletariat. The exploiter is the same: *capital*. The individual capitalists exploit the individual peasants through *mortgages* and *usury*; the capitalist class exploits the peasant class through the *state taxes*. The peasant's title to property is the talisman by which capital held him hitherto under its spell, the pretext under which it set him against the industrial proletariat. Only the fall of capital can raise the peasant; only an anti-capitalist, a proletarian government can break his economic misery, his social degradation. The *constitutional republic* is the dictatorship of his united exploiters; the *social-democratic*, the *Red* republic, is the dictatorship of his allies. And the scale rises or falls, according to the votes that the peasant casts into the ballot box. He himself has to decide his fate. So spoke the Socialists in pamphlets, almanacs, calendars and leaflets of all kinds. This language became more understandable to him through the counter-writings of the party of Order, which, for its part, turned to him, and which, by gross exaggeration, by its brutal conception and representation of the intentions and ideas of the Socialists, struck the true peasant note and overstimulated his lust after forbidden fruit. But most understandable was the language of the actual experience that the peasant class had gained from the use of the suffrage, were the disillusionments overwhelming him, blow upon blow, with revolutionary speed. *Revolutions are the locomotives of history.*

The gradual revolutionizing of the peasants was manifested by various symptoms. It already revealed itself in the elections to the Legislative Assembly; it was revealed in the state of siege

¹ The figures given by Marx do not tally. Presumably due to a misprint, the text reads 538,000,000 instead of 578,000,000. However, Marx's general conclusion is not affected by the misprint, for in either case the net per capita income is less than 25 francs.—*Ed.*

in the five Departments bordering Lyons; it was revealed a few months after June 13 in the election of a *Montagnard* in place of the former president of the *Chambre introuvable*¹ by the Department of the Gironde; it was revealed on December 20, 1849, in the election of a Red in place of a deceased Legitimist deputy in the Department *du Gard*, that promised land of the Legitimists, the scene of the most frightful infamies committed against the republicans in 1794 and 1795 and the centre of the *terreur blanche* in 1815, where liberals and Protestants were publicly murdered. This revolutionizing of the most stationary class is most clearly evident since the reintroduction of the wine tax. The governmental measures and the laws of January and February 1850 are directed almost exclusively against the *Departments* and the *peasants*. The most striking proof of their progress.

The Hautpoul circular, by which the gendarme was appointed inquisitor of the prefect, of the sub-prefect and, above all, of the mayor, and by which espionage was organized even in the hidden corners of the remotest village community; the *law against the school teachers*, by which they, the men of talent, the spokesmen, the educators and interpreters of the peasant class, were subjected to the arbitrary power of the prefect, they, the proletarians of the learned class, were chased like hunted beasts from one community to another; the *bill against the mayors*, by which the Damocles sword of dismissal was hung over their heads, and they, the presidents of the peasant communities, were every moment set in opposition to the President of the Republic and the party of Order; the *ordinance* which transformed the seventeen military districts of France into four pashalics and forced the barracks and the bivouac on the French as their national *salon*; the *education law*, by which the party of Order proclaimed the unconsciousness and the forcible stupefaction of France as the condition of its life under the regime of universal suffrage—what were all these laws and measures? Desperate attempts to reconquer the Departments and the peasants of the Departments for the party of Order.

Regarded as *repression*, they were wretched methods that wrung the neck of their own purpose. The big measures, like the

¹ *Chambre introuvable*: This is the name given by history to the fanatically ultra-royalist and reactionary Chamber of Deputies elected immediately after the second overthrow of Napoleon, in 1815. [Note by Engels to the 1895 edition.]

retention of the wine tax, of the 45 centimes tax, the scornful rejection of the peasant petitions for the repayment of the milliard, etc., all these legislative thunderbolts struck the peasant class only once, wholesale, from the centre; the laws and measures instanced made attack and the resistance *general*, the topic of the day in every hut; they inoculated every village with revolution; they *localized and peasantized the revolution*.

On the other hand, do not these proposals of Bonaparte and their acceptance by the National Assembly prove the unity of the two powers of the constitutional republic, so far as it is a question of repression of anarchy, that is, of all the classes that rise against the bourgeois dictatorship? Had not *Soulouque*, directly after his brusque message,¹ assured the Legislative Assembly of his *dévouement*² to order, through the immediately following message of *Carlier*, that dirty, mean caricature of Fouché, as Louis Bonaparte himself was the shallow caricature of Napoleon?

The *education law* shows us the alliance of the young Catholics with the old Voltairians. Could the rule of the united bourgeois be anything else but the coalesced despotism of the pro-Jesuit Restoration and the make-believe free-thinking July monarchy? Had not the weapons that the one bourgeois faction had distributed among the people against the other faction in their mutual struggle for supremacy again to be torn from it, the people, since the latter was confronting their united dictatorship? Nothing has aroused the Paris shopkeeper more than this coquetish *étalage*³ of *Jesuitism*, not even the rejection of the *concordats à l'amiable*.

Meanwhile the collisions between the different factions of the party of Order, as well as between the National Assembly and Bonaparte, continued. The National Assembly was far from pleased that Bonaparte, immediately after his *coup d'état*, after appointing his own, Bonapartist, ministry, summoned before him the invalids of the monarchy, newly appointed prefects, and made their unconstitutional agitation for his re-election as President the condition of their appointment; that Carlier celebrated his inauguration with the closing of a Legitimist club, or that

¹ The reference is to the message sent by Napoleon III to the National Assembly, in which he stated that he had dismissed the Barrot ministry and formed another.—*Ed.*

² *Dévouement*: Devotion.—*Ed.*

³ *Étalage*: Display.—*Ed.*

Bonaparte founded a journal of his own, *Le Napoleon*, which betrayed the secret longings of the President to the public, while his ministers had to deny them from the tribune of the Legislative Assembly. The latter was far from pleased by the defiant retention of the ministry, notwithstanding its various votes of no confidence; far from pleased by the attempt to win the favour of the non-commissioned officers by an extra pay of four sous a day, and the favour of the proletariat by a plagiarization of Eugène Sue's *Mystères*,¹ by an honour loan bank; far from pleased, finally, by the effrontery with which the ministers were made to move the deportation of the remaining June insurgents to Algiers, in order to heap unpopularity on the Legislative Assembly *en gros*,² while the President reserved popularity for himself *en détail*,³ by individual grants of pardon. *Thiers* let fall threatening words about *coups d'état* and *coups de tête*,⁴ and the Legislative Assembly revenged itself on Bonaparte by rejecting every proposed law which he put forward for his own benefit, and by inquiring, with noisy mistrust, in every instance where he made a proposal in the common interest, whether he did not aspire, through increase of the executive power, to augment the personal power of Bonaparte. In a word, it *revenged itself by a conspiracy of contempt*.

The Legitimist party, on its part, saw with vexation the more capable Orleanists once more occupying almost all posts and *centralization* increasing, while it sought its salvation principally in *decentralization*. And so it was. The counter-revolution *centralized forcibly*, that is, it prepared the mechanism of the revolution. It even *centralized* the gold and silver of France in the Paris bank through the compulsory quotation of bank notes, and so created the *ready war chest* of the revolution.

Lastly, the Orleanists saw with vexation the emergent principle of legitimacy contrasted with their bastard principle, and themselves every moment snubbed and maltreated as the bourgeois *mésalliance* of a noble spouse.

Little by little we have seen peasants, petty bourgeois, the middle classes in general, stepping alongside the proletariat, driven into open antagonism to the official republic and treated

¹ Full English title: *The Mysteries of Paris*.—Ed.

² *En gros*: Wholesale.—Ed.

³ *En détail*: Retail.—Ed.

⁴ *Coups de tête*: Rash deeds.—Ed.

by it as antagonists. *Revolt against bourgeois dictatorship, need of a change of society, adherence to democratic-republican institutions as organs of their movement, grouping round the proletariat as the decisive revolutionary power*—these are the common characteristics of the so-called *party of social-democracy, the party of the Red republic*. This *party of Anarchy*, as its opponents christened it, is no less a coalition of different interests than the *party of Order*. From the smallest reform of the old social disorder to the overthrow of the old social order, from bourgeois liberalism to revolutionary terrorism—as far apart as this lie the extremes that form the starting-point and the finishing-point of the party of “Anarchy.”

Abolition of the protective tariff—socialism! For it strikes at the monopoly of the *industrial* faction of the party of Order. Regulation of the state budget—socialism! For it strikes at the monopoly of the *financial* faction of the party of Order. Free admission of foreign meat and corn—socialism! For it strikes at the monopoly of the third faction of the party of Order, *large landed property*. The demands of the free-trade party, that is, of the most advanced English bourgeois party, appear in France as so many socialist demands. Voltairianism—socialism! For it strikes at a fourth faction of the party of Order, the *Catholic*. Freedom of the press, right of association, universal public education—socialism, socialism! They strike at the general monopoly of the party of Order.

So swiftly had the march of the revolution ripened conditions that the friends of reform of all shades, the most moderate claims of the middle classes, were compelled to group themselves round the banner of the most extreme party of revolution, round the *red flag*.

Yet, manifold as the *socialism* of the different large sections of the party of Anarchy was, according to the economic conditions and the total revolutionary requirements of their class or faction and of a class arising out of these, in *one* point it is in harmony: in proclaiming itself to be *the means of emancipating the proletariat* and the emancipation of the latter, its *object*. Deliberate deception on the part of some; self-deception on the part of the others, who give out the world transformed according to their own needs as the best world for all, as the realization of all revolutionary claims and the elimination of all revolutionary collisions.

Behind the *general* socialist phrases of the "*party of Anarchy*," which sound rather alike, there is concealed the *socialism of the "National," of the "Presse" and the "Siècle,"* which more or less consistently wants to overthrow the rule of the finance aristocracy and to free industry and trade from their hitherto existing fetters. This is the socialism of industry, of trade and of agriculture, whose bosses in the party of Order deny these interests, in so far as they no longer coincide with their private monopolies. Socialism proper, *petty-bourgeois socialism*, socialism *par excellence*, is distinct from this *bourgeois socialism*, to which, as to every variety of socialism, a section of the workers and petty bourgeois naturally rallies. Capital hounds this class chiefly as its *creditor*, so it demands *credit institutions*; capital crushes it by *competition*, so it demands *associations* supported by the state; capital overwhelms it by *concentration*, so it demands *progressive taxes*, limitations on inheritance, taking over of large construction projects by the state, and other measures that *forcibly stem the growth of capital*. Since it dreams of the peaceful achievement of its socialism—allowing, perhaps, for a second February Revolution lasting a brief day or so—the coming historical process naturally appears to it as an *application of systems*, which the thinkers of society, whether in companies or as individual inventors, devise or have devised. Thus they become the eclectics or adepts of the existing socialist *systems*, of *doctrinaire socialism*, which was the theoretical expression of the proletariat only as long as it had not yet developed further into a free historical movement of its own.

While this *utopia, doctrinaire socialism*, which subordinates the total movement to one of its moments, which puts in place of common, social production the brainwork of individual pedants and, above all, in fantasy does away with the revolutionary struggle of the classes and its requirements by small conjurers' tricks or great sentimentality; while this doctrinaire socialism, which at bottom only idealizes present society, takes a picture of it without shadows and wants to achieve its ideal athwart the realities of present society; while the proletariat surrenders this socialism to the petty bourgeoisie; while the struggle of the different socialist leaders among themselves sets forth each of the so-called systems as a pretentious adherence to one of the transit points of the social revolution as against another—the *proletariat* rallies more and more round *revolutionary socialism*, round

communism, for which the bourgeoisie has itself invented the name of *Blanqui*. This socialism is the *declaration of the permanence of the revolution*, the *class dictatorship* of the proletariat as the necessary transit point to the *abolition of class distinctions generally*, to the abolition of all the relations of production on which they rest, to the abolition of all the social relations that correspond to these relations of production, to the revolutionizing of all the ideas that result from these social relations.

The scope of this exposition does not permit of developing the subject further.

We have seen that just as in the party of *Order* the *finance aristocracy* necessarily took the lead, so in the party of "*Anarchy*" the *proletariat*. While the different classes, united in a revolutionary league, grouped themselves round the proletariat, while the Departments became ever more unsafe and the Legislative Assembly itself ever more morose towards the pretensions of the French Soulouque, the long deferred and delayed by-election of substitutes for the *Montagnards*, proscribed after June 13, drew near.

The government, scorned by its foes, maltreated and daily humiliated by its alleged friends, saw only one means of emerging from this repugnant and untenable position—a *revolt*. A revolt in Paris would have permitted the proclamation of a state of siege in Paris and the Departments and thus the control of the elections. On the other hand, the friends of order, in face of a government that had gained victory over anarchy, were constrained to make concessions, if they did not want to appear as anarchists themselves.

The government set to work. At the beginning of February 1850, provocation of the people by chopping down the trees of liberty. In vain. If the trees of liberty lost their place, it itself lost its head and fell back, frightened by its own provocation. The National Assembly, however, received this clumsy attempt at emancipation on the part of Bonaparte with ice-cold mistrust. The removal of the wreaths of the *immortelles* from the July column was no more successful. It gave a part of the army an opportunity for revolutionary demonstrations and the National Assembly the occasion for a more or less veiled vote of no confidence in the ministry. In vain the government press threatened the abolition of universal suffrage and the invasion of the Cossacks. In vain was d'Hautpoul's direct challenge, issued right

in the Legislative Assembly to the Left, to betake itself to the streets, and his declaration that the government was ready to receive it. Hautpoul received nothing but a call to order from the President, and the party of Order, with silent, malicious joy, allowed a deputy of the Left to mock Bonaparte's usurpatory longings. In vain, finally, was the prophecy of a revolution on *February 24*. The government caused February 24 to be ignored by the people.

The proletariat did not allow itself to be provoked to *revolt*, because it was on the point of making a *revolution*.

Unhindered by the provocations of the government, which only heightened the general exasperation at the existing situation, the election committee, wholly under the influence of the workers, put forward three candidates for Paris: *Defflotte*, *Vidal* and *Carnot*. Defflotte was a June deportee, amnestied through one of Bonaparte's popularity-seeking ideas; he was a friend of Blanqui and had taken part in the attempt of May 15. Vidal, known as a communist writer through his book *Concerning the Distribution of Wealth*, was formerly secretary to Louis Blanc in the Luxembourg Commission. Carnot, son of the man of the Convention who had organized the victory, the least compromised member of the *National* party, Minister of Education in the Provisional Government and the Executive Commission, was through his democratic public education bill a living protest against the education law of the Jesuits. These three candidates represented the three allied classes: at the head, the June insurgent, the representative of the revolutionary proletariat; next to him, the doctrinaire Socialist, the representative of the socialist petty bourgeoisie; finally, the third, the representative of the republican bourgeois party, the democratic formulas of which had gained a socialist significance *vis-à-vis* the party of Order and had long lost their own significance. This was a *general coalition against the bourgeoisie and the government, as in February*. But this time the *proletariat was at the head of the revolutionary league*.

In spite of all efforts the socialist candidates won. The army itself voted for the June insurgent against its own War Minister, La Hitte. The party of Order was thunderstruck. The elections in the Departments did not solace them; they gave a majority to the *Montagnards*.

The election of March 10, 1850! It was the revocation of June 1848: the butchers and deporters of the June insurgents returned to the National Assembly, but returned, bowed down, in the train of the deported, and with their principles on their lips. *It was the revocation of June 13, 1849:* the *Montagne*, proscribed by the National Assembly, returned to the National Assembly, but as advance trumpeters of the revolution, no longer as its commanders. *It was the revocation of December 10:* Napoleon had lost out with his minister La Hitte. The parliamentary history of France knows only one analogy: the rejection of d'Haussez, minister of Charles X, in 1830. Finally, the election of March 10, 1850, was the cancellation of the election of May 13, which had given the party of Order a majority. The election of March 10 protested against the majority of May 13. March 10 was a revolution. Behind the ballots lie the paving stones.

"The vote of March 10 means war," shouted Ségur d'Aguesseau, one of the most advanced members of the party of Order.

With March 10, 1850, the constitutional republic entered a new phase, *the phase of its dissolution*. The different factions of the majority are again united among themselves and with Bonaparte; they are again the saviours of order; he is again their *neutral man*. If they remember that they are royalists it happens only from despair of the possibility of a bourgeois republic; if he remembers that he is a pretender, it happens only because he despairs of remaining President.

At the command of the party of Order, Bonaparte answers the election of Defflotte, the June insurgent, by appointing *Baroche* Minister of Internal Affairs, Baroche, the accuser of Blanqui and Barbès, of Ledru-Rollin and Guinard. The Legislative Assembly answers the election of Carnot by adopting the education law, the election of Vidal by suppressing the socialist press. The party of Order seeks to blare away its own fears by the trumpet-blasts of its press. "The sword is holy," cries one of its organs; "the defenders of order must take the offensive against the Red party," cries another; "between socialism and society there is a duel to the death, a war without surcease or mercy; in this duel of desperation one or the other must go under; if society does not annihilate socialism, socialism will annihilate society," crows a third cock of order. Throw up the barricades of order, the barricades of religion, the barricades of the family! An end must be made of the 127,000 voters of Paris! A Bartholomew's night for

the Socialists! And the party of Order believes for a moment in its own certainty of victory.

Their organs hold forth most fanatically of all against the "*bouliquiers of Paris*." The June insurgent of Paris elected by the shopkeepers of Paris as their representative! This means that a second June 1848 is impossible; this means that a second June 13, 1849 is impossible; this means that the moral influence of capital is broken; this means that the bourgeois assembly now represents only the bourgeoisie; this means that big property is lost, because its vassal, small property, seeks its salvation in the camp of the propertyless.

The party of Order naturally returns to its inevitable *commonplace*. "*More repression*," it cries, "*tenfold repression!*" But its power of repression has diminished tenfold, while resistance has increased a hundredfold. Must not the chief instrument of repression, the army, itself be repressed? And the party of Order speaks its last word: "The iron ring of suffocating legality must be broken. *The constitutional republic is impossible*. We must fight with our true weapons; since February 1848, we have fought the revolution with *its* weapons and on *its* terrain; we have accepted *its* institutions; the constitution is a fortress which safeguards only the besiegers, not the besieged! By smuggling ourselves into holy Ilion in the belly of the Trojan horse, we have, unlike our forefathers, the *Grecks*,¹ not conquered the hostile town, but made prisoners of ourselves."

The foundation of the constitution, however, is *universal suffrage*. *Annihilation of universal suffrage*—such is the last word of the party of Order, of the bourgeois dictatorship.

On May 4, 1848, on December 20, 1848, on May 13, 1849, and on July 8, 1849, universal suffrage admitted that they were right. On March 10, 1850, universal suffrage admitted that it had itself been wrong. Bourgeois rule as the outcome and result of universal suffrage, as the express act of the sovereign will of the people—that is the meaning of the bourgeois constitution. But has the constitution any further meaning from the moment that the content of this suffrage, of this sovereign will, is no longer bourgeois rule? Is it not the duty of the bourgeoisie so to regulate the suffrage that it wills the reasonable, its rule? By

¹ *Grecks*—play on words: Greeks, but also professional cheats. [Note by Engels to the 1895 edition.]

ever and anon putting an end to the existing state power and creating it anew out of itself, does not universal suffrage put an end to all stability, does it not every moment question all the powers that be, does it not annihilate authority, does it not threaten to elevate anarchy itself to the position of authority? After March 10, 1850, who would still doubt it?

By repudiating universal suffrage, with which it hitherto draped itself and from which it sucked its omnipotence, the bourgeoisie openly confesses, "*Our dictatorship has hitherto existed by the will of the people; it must now be consolidated against the will of the people.*" And, consistently, it seeks its props no longer within *France*, but without, in foreign countries, in *invasion*.

With the invasion, it, a second Coblenz,¹ its seat established in France itself, rouses all the national passions against itself. With the attack on universal suffrage it provides a *general pretext* for the new revolution, and the revolution requires such a pretext. Every *special* pretext would divide the factions of the revolutionary league, and give prominence to their differences. The *general* pretext stuns the semi-revolutionary classes; it permits them to deceive themselves concerning the *definite character* of the coming revolution, concerning the consequences of their own act. Every revolution requires a banquet question. Universal suffrage is the banquet question of the new revolution.

The bourgeois factions in coalition, however, are already condemned, since they take flight from the only possible form of their *united* power, from the most potent and complete form of their *class rule*, the *constitutional republic*, back to the subordinate, incomplete, weaker form of *monarchy*. They resemble that old man who, in order to regain his youthful strength, fetched out his boyhood apparel and suffered torment trying to get his withered limbs into it. Their republic had the sole merit of being the *hothouse of the revolution*.

March 10, 1850 bears the inscription:

Après moi le déluge! After me the delugel

¹ *Coblenz*: a city in Germany, was the centre of the French counter-revolutionary *émigré* nobles at the time of the French bourgeois revolution of the end of the eighteenth century.—*Ed.*

IV

THE ABOLITION OF UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE IN 1850

(The continuation of the three foregoing chapters is found in the *Revue* in the fifth and sixth double issue of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, the last to appear. Here, after the great commercial crisis that broke out in England in 1847 had first been described and the coming to a head of the political complications on the European Continent in the Revolutions of February and March 1848 had been explained by its reactions there, it is then shown how the prosperity of trade and industry that again set in during the course of 1848 and increased still further in 1849 paralyzed the revolutionary upsurge and made possible the simultaneous victories of the reaction. With special reference to France, it is then said:)¹

The same symptoms have shown themselves in *France* since 1849, and particularly since the beginning of 1850. The Parisian industries are abundantly employed and the cotton factories of Rouen and Mülhausen are also doing pretty well, although here, as in England, the high prices of the raw material have exercised a retarding influence. The development of prosperity in France was, in addition, especially promoted by the comprehensive tariff reform in Spain and by the reduction of the duties on various luxury articles in Mexico; the export of French commodities to both markets has considerably increased. The growth of capital in France led to a series of speculations, for which the exploitation of the California gold mines on a large scale served as a pretext. A swarm of companies has sprung up, the low denomination of whose shares and whose socialist-coloured prospectuses appeal directly to the purses of the petty bourgeois and the workers, but which all and sundry result in that sheer swindling which is characteristic of the French and Chinese alone. One of these companies is even patronized directly by the government. The import duties in France during the first nine months of 1848 amounted to 63,000,000 francs, of 1849 to 95,000,000 francs and of 1850 to 93,000,000 francs. Moreover, in the month of September 1850, they again

¹ The introductory paragraph was written by Engels for the 1895 edition.—*Ed.*

rose by more than a million compared with the same month of 1849. Exports also rose in 1849, and still more in 1850.

The most striking proof of restored prosperity is the bank's reintroduction of specie payment by the law of August 6, 1850. On March 15, 1848, the bank had been authorized to suspend specie payment. Its note circulation, including the provincial banks, amounted at that time to 373,000,000 francs (£14,920,000). On November 2, 1849, this circulation amounted to 482,000,000 francs, or £19,280,000, an increase of £4,360,000, and on September 2, 1850, to 496,000,000 francs, or £19,840,000, an increase of about £5,000,000. This was not accompanied by any depreciation of the notes; on the contrary, the increased circulation of the notes was accompanied by the steadily increasing accumulation of gold and silver in the vaults of the bank, so that in the summer of 1850 its metallic reserve amounted to about £14,000,000, an unprecedented sum in France. That the bank was thus placed in a position to increase its circulation and therewith its active capital by 123,000,000 francs, or £5,000,000, is striking proof of the correctness of our assertion in an earlier issue that the finance aristocracy has not only not been overthrown by the revolution, but has even been strengthened. This result becomes still more evident from the following survey of French bank legislation during the last few years. On June 10, 1847, the bank was authorized to issue notes of 200 francs; hitherto the smallest denomination had been 500 francs. A decree of March 15, 1848, declared the notes of the Bank of France legal tender and relieved the bank of the obligation of redeeming them in specie. Its note issue was limited to 350,000,000 francs. It was simultaneously authorized to issue notes of 100 francs. A decree of April 27 prescribed the merging of the departmental banks in the Bank of France; another decree, of May 2, 1848, increased the latter's note issue to 442,000,000 francs. A decree of December 22, 1849, raised the maximum of the note issue to 525,000,000 francs. Finally, the law of August 6, 1850, re-established the exchangeability of notes for specie. These facts, the continual increase in the circulation, the concentration of the whole of French credit in the hands of the bank and the accumulation of all French gold and silver in the bank's vaults led M. Proudhon to the conclusion that the bank must now shed its old snake-skin and metamorphose itself into a Proudhonist people's bank. He did not even

need to know the history of the English bank restriction from 1797-1819;¹ he only needed to direct his glance across the Channel to see that this fact, for him unprecedented in the history of bourgeois society, was nothing more than a very normal bourgeois event, which now only occurred in France for the first time. One sees that the allegedly revolutionary theoreticians who, after the Provisional Government, talked big in Paris, were just as ignorant of the nature and the results of the measures taken as the gentlemen of the Provisional Government themselves.

In spite of the industrial and commercial prosperity that France momentarily enjoys, the mass of the people, the twenty-five million peasants, suffer from a great depression. The good harvests of the last few years have forced the prices of corn much lower even than in England, and the position of the peasants under such circumstances, in debt, sucked dry by usury and crushed by taxes, must be anything but splendid. The history of the last three years has, however, provided sufficient proof that this class of the population is absolutely incapable of any revolutionary initiative.

Just as the period of crisis occurs later on the Continent than in England, so does that of prosperity. The original process always takes place in England; it is the demiurge of the bourgeois cosmos. On the Continent, the different phases of the cycle through which bourgeois society is ever speeding anew occur in secondary and tertiary form. First, the Continent exported incomparably more to England than to any other country. This export to England, however, in turn depends on the position of England, particularly with regard to the overseas market. Then England exports to the overseas lands incomparably more than the entire Continent, so that the quantity of Continental exports to these lands is always dependent on England's overseas exports at the time. While, therefore, the crises first produce revolutions on the Continent, the foundation for these is, nevertheless, always laid in England. Violent outbreaks must naturally occur rather in the extremities of the bourgeois body than in its heart, since the possibility of adjustment is greater here than there. On the

¹ To save the Bank of England from bankruptcy the government, in 1797, had a special act passed making bank notes legal tender and authorizing the Bank to suspend the payment of gold for its bank notes. In 1819 gold payment was resumed.—*Ed.*

other hand, the degree to which the Continental revolutions react on England is at the same time the barometer which indicates how far these revolutions really call in question the bourgeois conditions of life, or how far they only hit their political formations.

With this general prosperity, in which the productive forces of bourgeois society develop as luxuriantly as is at all possible within bourgeois relationships, there can be no talk of a real revolution. Such a revolution is only possible in the periods when *both* these factors, the *modern* productive forces and the *bourgeois productive forms* come in collision with each other. The various quarrels in which the representatives of the individual factions of the Continental party of Order now indulge and mutually compromise themselves, far from providing the occasion for new revolutions are, on the contrary, possible only because the basis of the relationships is momentarily so secure and, what the reaction does not know, so *bourgeois*. From it all attempts of the reaction to hold up bourgeois development will rebound just as certainly as all moral indignation and all enthusiastic proclamations of the democrats. *A new revolution is possible only in consequence of a new crisis. It is, however, just as certain as this crisis.*

Let us now turn to *France*.

The victory that the people, in conjunction with the petty bourgeois, had won in the elections of March 10 was annulled by it itself when it provoked the new election of April 28. Vidal was elected not only in Paris, but also in the Lower Rhine. The Paris Committee, in which the *Montagne* and the petty bourgeoisie were strongly represented, induced him to accept for the Lower Rhine. The victory of March 10 ceased to be a decisive one; the date of the decision was once more postponed; the tension of the people was relaxed; it became accustomed to legal triumphs instead of revolutionary ones. The revolutionary meaning of March 10, the rehabilitation of the June insurrection, was finally completely annihilated by the candidature of Eugène Sue, the sentimental petty-bourgeois social-fantast, which the proletariat could at best accept as a joke to please the grisettes. As against this well-meaning candidature, the party of Order, emboldened by the vacillating policy of its opponents, put up a candidate who was to represent the June *victory*. This comic candidate was the Spartan *pater familias* Leclerc, from whose

person, however, the heroic armour was torn piece by piece by the press, and who experienced a brilliant defeat in the election. The new election victory on April 28 put the *Montagne* and the petty bourgeoisie in high feather. They already exulted in the thought of being able to arrive at the goal of their wishes in a purely legal way and without again pushing the proletariat into the foreground through a new revolution; they reckoned positively on bringing Ledru-Rollin into the presidential chair and a majority of *Montagnards* into the Assembly through universal suffrage in the new elections of 1852. The party of Order, rendered perfectly certain, by the prospective elections, by Sue's candidature and by the mood of the *Montagne* and the petty bourgeoisie, that the latter were resolved to remain quiet no matter what happened, answered the two election victories with an *election law* which abolished universal suffrage.

The government took good care not to make this legislative proposal on its own responsibility. It made an apparent concession to the majority by entrusting the working out of the bill to the high dignitaries of this majority, to the seventeen burgraves.¹ Thus, it was not the government that proposed the repeal of the universal suffrage to the Assembly; the majority of the Assembly proposed it to itself.

On May 8, the project was brought into the Chamber. The entire social-democratic press rose as one man in order to preach to the people dignified bearing, *calme majestueux*, passivity and trust in its representatives. Every article of these journals was a confession that a revolution would, above all, annihilate the so-called revolutionary press and that, therefore, it was now a question of its self-preservation. The allegedly revolutionary press betrayed its whole secret. It signed its own death warrant.

On May 21, the *Montagne* put the preliminary question to debate and moved the rejection of the whole project on the ground that it violated the constitution. The party of Order answered that the constitution would be violated if it were necessary; there was, however, no need for this at present, because

¹ *Burgraves*: The reference is to the party of Order deputies' Bureau in the Legislative Assembly. Its members were scornfully called burgraves to indicate the impotent lust for power and feudal aspirations of the monarchists. This sobriquet was taken from Victor Hugo's drama by the same name.—Ed.

the constitution was capable of every interpretation, and because the majority alone was competent to decide on the correct interpretation. To the unbridled, savage attacks of Thiers and Montalembert the *Montagne* opposed a decorous and refined humanism. It took its stand on the ground of law; the party of Order referred it to the ground on which the law grows, to bourgeois property. The *Montagne* whimpered: Did they really want, then, to conjure up revolutions by main force? The party of Order replied: One would await them.

On May 22, the preliminary question was settled by 462 votes to 227. The same men who had proved with such solemn profundity that the National Assembly and every individual deputy would be renouncing his mandate if he renounced the people, his mandator, now stuck to their seats and suddenly sought to let the country act, through petitions at that, instead of acting themselves; and still sat there unmoved when, on May 31, the law went through in splendid fashion. They sought to revenge themselves by a protest in which they recorded their innocence of the rape of the constitution, a protest which they did not even submit openly, but smuggled into the President's pocket from behind.

An army of 150,000 men in Paris, the long deferment of the decision, the appeasing attitude of the press, the pusillanimity of the *Montagne* and of the newly elected representatives, the majestic calm of the petty bourgeois, but, above all, the commercial and industrial prosperity, prevented any attempt at revolution on the part of the proletariat.

Universal suffrage had fulfilled its mission. The majority of the people had passed through the school of development, which is all that universal suffrage can serve for in a revolutionary period. It had to be set aside by a revolution or by the reaction.

The *Montagne* developed a still greater display of energy on an occasion that soon afterwards arose. From the tribune War Minister d'Hautpoul had termed the February Revolution a baneful catastrophe. The orators of the *Montagne*, who, as always, distinguished themselves by their morally indignant bluster, were not allowed by the President, Dupin, to speak. Girardin proposed to the *Montagne* that it should walk out at once *en masse*. Result: the *Montagne* remained seated, but Girardin was cast out from its midst as unworthy.

The election law still needed one thing to complete it, a new *press law*. This was not long in coming. A proposal of the government, made many times more drastic by amendments of the party of Order, increased the caution money, put an extra stamp on feuilleton novels (answer to the election of Eugène Sue), taxed all publications appearing weekly or monthly up to a certain number of sheets and finally provided that every article of a journal must bear the signature of the author. The provisions concerning the caution money killed the so-called revolutionary press; the people regarded its extinction as satisfaction for the abolition of universal suffrage. However, neither the tendency nor the effect of the new law extended only to this section of the press. As long as the newspaper press was anonymous, it appeared as the organ of a numberless and nameless public opinion; it was the third power in the state. Through the signature of every article, a newspaper became a mere collection of literary contributions from more or less known individuals. Every article sank to the level of an advertisement. Hitherto the newspapers had circulated as the paper money of public opinion; now they were resolved into more or less bad *solo* bills, whose worth and circulation depended on the credit not only of the drawer but also of the endorser. The press of the party of Order had incited not only for the repeal of universal suffrage but also for the most extreme measures against the bad press. However, in its sinister anonymity even the good press was irksome to the party of Order and still more to its individual provincial representatives. As for itself, it demanded only the paid writer, with name, address and description. In vain the good press bemoaned the ingratitude with which its services were rewarded. The law went through; the provision concerning the giving of names hit it hardest of all. The names of republican journalists were pretty well known; but the respectable firms of the *Journal des Débats*, the *Assemblée Nationale*,¹ the *Constitutionnel*,² etc., etc., cut a sorry figure in their high protestations of state wisdom, when the mysterious company all at once disintegrated into purchasable penny-a-liners of long practice, who had defended all possible causes for cash, like Granier de

¹ *Assemblée Nationale*: Monarchist daily newspaper, which appeared in Paris 1848-57.—Ed.

² *Constitutionnel*: Daily organ of the constitutional monarchists, which appeared in Paris 1815-70.—Ed.

Cassagnac, or into old milksops who called themselves statesmen, like Capefigue, or into coquettish fops, like M. Lemoinne of the *Débats*.

In the debate on the press law the *Montagne* had already sunk to such a level of moral degeneracy that it had to confine itself to applauding the brilliant tirades of an old notability of Louis Philippe's time, M. Victor Hugo.

With the election law and the press law the revolutionary and democratic party exits from the official stage. Before their departure home, shortly after the end of the session, the two factions of the *Montagne*, the socialist democrats and the democratic Socialists, issued two manifestoes, two *testimonia paupertatis*,¹ in which they proved that while power and success were never on their side, they nonetheless had ever been on the side of eternal justice and all the other eternal truths.

Let us now consider the party of Order. The *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* had said (Heft 3, S. 16): "As against the hankering for restoration on the part of the united Orleanists and Legitimists, Bonaparte defends his title to his actual power, the republic; as against the hankering for restoration on the part of Bonaparte, the party of Order defends its title to its common rule, the republic. As against the Orleanists, the Legitimists, and as against the Legitimists, the Orleanists, defend the *status quo*, the republic. All these factions of the party of Order, each of which has its own king and its own restoration *in petto*, mutually enforce, as against their rivals' hankering for usurpation and revolt, the common rule of the bourgeoisie, the form in which the special claims remain neutralized and reserved—the republic. . . . And Thiers spoke more truly than he suspects when he said: 'We, the royalists, are the true pillars of the constitutional republic.'"

This comedy of the *républicains malgré eux*,² the antipathy to the *status quo* and the constant consolidation of it; the incessant friction between Bonaparte and the National Assembly; the ever renewed threat of the party of Order to split into its separate component parts, and the ever repeated conjugation of its factions; the attempt of each faction to transform each victory over the common foe into a defeat for its temporary allies; the mutual petty jealousy, chicanery, harassment, the tireless

¹ *Testimonia paupertatis*: Certificates of poverty.—*Ed.*

² Republicans in spite of themselves.—*Ed.*

drawing of swords that ever and again ends with a *baiser-Lamourette*¹—this whole unedifying comedy of errors never developed more classically than during the last six months.

The party of Order regarded the election law at the same time as a victory over Bonaparte. Had not the government abdicated when it handed over the editing of and responsibility for its own proposal to the Commission of Seventeen? And did not the chief strength of Bonaparte as against the Assembly lie in the fact that he was the chosen of six millions? Bonaparte, on his part, treated the election law as a concession to the Assembly, with which he claimed to have purchased harmony between the legislative and executive powers. As reward, the vulgar adventurer demanded an increase of three millions in his civil list. Dared the National Assembly enter into a conflict with the executive at a moment when it had excommunicated the great majority of Frenchmen? It was roused to anger; it appeared to want to go to extremes; its Commission rejected the motion; the Bonapartist press threatened, and referred to the disinherited people, deprived of its franchise; numerous noisy attempts at an arrangement took place, and the Assembly finally gave way in fact, but at the same time revenged itself in principle. Instead of increasing the civil list in principle by three millions per annum, it granted him an accommodation of 2,160,000 francs. Not satisfied with this, it made even this concession only after it had been supported by Changarnier, the general of the party of Order and the protector thrust upon Bonaparte. Therefore it really granted the two millions not to Bonaparte, but to Changarnier.

This sop, thrown to him *de mauvaise grâce*,² was accepted by Bonaparte quite in the spirit of the donor. The Bonapartist press blustered anew against the National Assembly. When, now in the debate on the press law, the amendment was made on the signing of names, which, in turn, was directed especially against the less important papers, the representatives of the

¹ *Lamourette*: Deputy in the Legislative Assembly during the French Revolution of the end of the eighteenth century. He was famous for his proposal, on July 7, 1792, to end all party dissension with a fraternal kiss. Under the influence of his proposal, the representatives of the hostile parties heartily embraced one another but, as might have been expected, on the following day this hypocritical "fraternal kiss" was forgotten.—*Ed.*

² *De mauvaise grâce*: With a bad grace.—*Ed.*

private interests of Bonaparte, the principal Bonapartist paper, the *Pouvoir*, published an open and vehement attack on the National Assembly. The ministers had to disavow the paper before the Assembly; the *gérant*¹ of the *Pouvoir* was summoned before the bar of the National Assembly and sentenced to pay the highest fine, 5,000 francs. Next day, the *Pouvoir* published a still more insolent article against the Assembly, and, as the revenge of the government, the public prosecutor promptly prosecuted a number of Legitimist journals for violating the constitution.

Finally there came the question of proroguing the Chamber. Bonaparte desired this in order to be able to operate unhindered by the Assembly. The party of Order desired it, partly for the purpose of carrying on its factional intrigues, partly for the pursuit of the private interests of the individual deputies. Both needed it in order to consolidate and push further the victories of the reaction in the provinces. The Assembly therefore adjourned from August 11 until November 11. Since, however, Bonaparte in no way concealed that his only concern was to get rid of the irksome surveillance of the National Assembly, the Assembly imprinted on the vote of confidence itself the stamp of want of confidence in the President. All Bonapartists were kept off the permanent commission of twenty-eight members, who stayed on during the recess as guardians of the virtue of the republic. In their stead, even some republicans of the *Siècle* and the *National* were elected to it, in order to prove to the President the attachment of the majority to the constitutional republic.

Shortly before and, especially, immediately after the prorogation of the Chamber, the two big factions of the party of Order, the Orleanists and the Legitimists, appeared to want to be reconciled, and this by a fusion of the two royal houses under whose flags they were fighting. The papers were full of reconciliation proposals that were said to have been discussed at the sick-bed of Louis Philippe at St. Leonards, when the death of Louis Philippe suddenly simplified the situation. Louis Philippe was the usurper; Henry V, the dispossessed; the Count of Paris, on the other hand, owing to the childlessness of Henry V, his lawful heir to the throne. Every pretext for objecting to a

¹ *Gérant*: Responsible manager.—Ed.

fusion of the two dynastic interests was now removed. But now, precisely, the two factions of the bourgeoisie first discovered that it was not zeal for a definite royal house that divided them, but that it was rather their divided class interests that kept the two dynasties apart. The Legitimists, who had made a pilgrimage to the residence of Henry V at Wiesbaden just as their competitors had to St. Leonards, received there the news of Louis Philippe's death. Forthwith they formed a ministry *in partibus infidelium*, which consisted mostly of members of that commission of guardians of the virtue of the republic and which on the occasion of a squabble in the bosom of the party came out with the most outspoken proclamation of right by the grace of God. The Orleanists rejoiced over the compromising scandal that this manifesto called forth in the press, and did not conceal for a moment their open enmity to the Legitimists.

During the adjournment of the National Assembly, the councils of the Departments met. The majority of them declared for a more or less qualified revision of the constitution, that is, they declared for a not definitely specified monarchist restoration, for a "solution," and confessed at the same time that they were too incompetent and too cowardly to find this solution. The Bonapartist faction at once construed this desire for revision in the sense of a prolongation of Bonaparte's presidency.

The constitutional solution, the retirement of Bonaparte in May 1852, the simultaneous election of a new president by all the electors of the land, the revision of the constitution by a Chamber of Revision during the first months of the new presidency, is utterly inadmissible for the ruling class. The day of the new presidential election would be the day of *rendezvous* for all the hostile parties, the Legitimists, the Orleanists, the bourgeois republicans, the revolutionists. It would have to come to a violent decision between the different factions. Even if the party of Order should succeed in uniting round the candidature of a neutral person outside the dynastic families, he would still be opposed by Bonaparte. In its struggle with the people, the party of Order is compelled constantly to increase the power of the executive. Every increase of the executive's power increases the power of its bearer, Bonaparte. In the same measure, therefore, as the party of Order strengthens its joint might, it strengthens the fighting resources of Bonaparte's dynastic pretensions, it strengthens his chance of frustrating a constitutional solution

by force on the day of the decision. He will then have, as against the party of Order, no more scruples about the one pillar of the constitution than that party had, as against the people, about the other pillar in the matter of the election law. He would, seemingly even against the Assembly, appeal to universal suffrage. In a word, the constitutional solution questions the entire political *status quo* and behind the jeopardizing of the *status quo* the bourgeois sees chaos, anarchy, civil war. He sees his purchases and sales, his promissory notes, his marriages, his agreements, duly acknowledged before a notary, his mortgages, his ground rents, house rents, profits, all his contracts and sources of income called in question on the first Sunday in May 1852, and he cannot expose himself to this risk. Behind the jeopardizing of the political *status quo* lurks the danger of the collapse of the entire bourgeois society. The only possible solution in the sense of the bourgeoisie is the postponement of the solution. It can save the constitutional republic only by a violation of the constitution, by the prolongation of the power of the President. This is also the last word of the press of Order, after the protracted and profound debates on the "solutions" in which it indulged after the session of the general councils. The high and mighty party of Order thus finds itself, to its shame, compelled to take seriously the ridiculous, commonplace and, to it, odious person of the pseudo-Bonaparte.

This dirty figure likewise deceived himself concerning the causes that clothed him more and more with the character of the indispensable man. While his party had sufficient insight to ascribe the growing importance of Bonaparte to circumstances, he believed that he owed it solely to the magic power of his name and his continual caricaturing of Napoleon. He became more enterprising every day. To offset the pilgrimages to St. Leonards and Wiesbaden, he made his round trips through France. The Bonapartists had so little faith in the magic effect of his personality that they sent with him everywhere as *claqueurs* people from the Society of December 10,¹ that organization of the Paris *lumpenproletariat*, packed *en masse* into railway trains and post-chaises. They put speeches into the mouth of their marionette which, according to the reception in the different towns, proclaimed republican resignation or peren-

¹ See pp. 295-98 of this volume.—Ed.

nial tenacity as the keynote of the President's policy. In spite of all manoeuvres these journeys were anything but triumphal processions.

When Bonaparte believed he had thus enthused the people, he set out to win the army. He caused great reviews to be held on the plain of Satory, near Versailles, at which he sought to buy the soldiers with garlic sausages, champagne and cigars. Whereas the genuine Napoleon, amid the hardships of his campaigns of conquest, knew how to cheer up his weary soldiers with outbursts of patriarchal familiarity, the pseudo-Napoleon believed it was in gratitude that the troops shouted: *Vive Napoléon, vive le saucisson!* that is, hurrah for the sausage [*Wurst*], hurrah for the buffoon [*Hanswurst*]!

These reviews led to the outbreak of the long suppressed dissension between Bonaparte and his War Minister d'Hautpoul, on the one hand, and Changarnier, on the other. In Changarnier, the party of Order had found its real neutral man, in whose case there could be no question of his own dynastic claims. It had designated him Bonaparte's successor. In addition, Changarnier had become the great general of the party of Order through his conduct on January 29 and June 13, 1849, the modern Alexander, whose brutal intervention had, in the eyes of the timid bourgeois, cut the Gordian knot of the revolution. At bottom just as ridiculous as Bonaparte, he had thus become a power in the very cheapest manner and was set up by the National Assembly to watch the President. He himself coquetted, for example, in the matter of the salary grant, with the protection that he gave Bonaparte, and rose up ever more overpoweringly against him and the ministers. When, on the occasion of the election law, an insurrection was expected, he forbade his officers to take any orders whatever from the War Minister or the President. The press was also instrumental in magnifying the figure of Changarnier. With the complete absence of great personalities, the party of Order naturally found itself compelled to endow a single individual with the strength lacking in its class as a whole and so puff up this individual to a prodigy. Thus arose the myth of Changarnier, the "*bulwark of society*." The arrogant charlatanry, the secretive air of importance with which Changarnier condescended to carry the world on his shoulders, forms the most ridiculous contrast to the events during and after the Satory review, which irrefutably

proved that it needed only a stroke of the pen by Bonaparte, the infinitely little, to bring this fantastic offspring of bourgeois fear, the colossus Changarnier, back to the dimensions of mediocrity, and transform him, society's heroic saviour, into a pensioned general.

Bonaparte had for some time been revenging himself on Changarnier by provoking the War Minister to disputes in matters of discipline with the irksome protector. The last review of Satory finally brought the old animosity to a climax. The constitutional indignation of Changarnier knew no bounds when he saw the cavalry regiments file past with the unconstitutional cry: *vive l'Empereur!* In order to forestall any unpleasant debate on this cry in the coming session of the Chamber, Bonaparte removed the War Minister d'Hautpoul by appointing him Governor of Algiers. In his place he put a reliable old general of the time of the empire, one who was fully a match for Changarnier in brutality. But so that the dismissal of d'Hautpoul might not appear as a concession to Changarnier, he simultaneously transferred General Neumayer, the right hand of the great saviour of society, from Paris to Nantes. It had been Neumayer who at the last review had induced the whole of the infantry to file past the successor of Napoleon in icy silence. Changarnier, himself hit in the person of Neumayer, protested and threatened. To no purpose. After two days' negotiations, the decree transferring Neumayer appeared in the *Moniteur*, and there was nothing left for the hero of order but to submit to discipline or resign.

Bonaparte's struggle with Changarnier is the continuation of his struggle with the party of Order. The re-opening of the National Assembly on November 11 will, therefore, take place under threatening auspices. It will be a storm in a teacup. In essence the old game must go on. Meanwhile the majority of the party of Order will, despite the clamour of the sticklers on principle of its different factions, be compelled to prolong the power of the President. Similarly, Bonaparte, already humbled by lack of money, will, despite all preliminary protestations, accept this prolongation of power from the hands of the National Assembly as simply delegated to him. Thus the solution is postponed; the *status quo* continued; one faction of the party of Order compromised, weakened, made impossible by the other; the repression of the common enemy, the mass of the nation, extended and exhausted, until the economic relations themselves

have again reached the point of development where a new explosion blows into the air all these squabbling parties with their constitutional republic.

For the peace of mind of the bourgeois it must be said, however, that the scandal between Bonaparte and the party of Order has the result of ruining a multitude of small capitalists on the Bourse and putting their assets into the pockets of the big wolves of the Bourse.

Written by Marx in 1850
Originally published in the journal
*Neue Rheinische Zeitung. Politisch-
ökonomische Revue*, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5-6
for 1850

Printed according to the text of the
journal, checked with the text of
the 1895 edition
Translated from the German

Appeared as a separate pamphlet,
edited and prefaced by Engels,
Berlin 1895

Karl Marx

**THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE
OF LOUIS BONAPARTE**

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

My friend *Joseph Weydemeyer*,¹ whose death was so untimely, intended to publish a political weekly in New York starting from January 1, 1852. He invited me to provide this weekly with a history of the *coup d'état*. Down to the middle of February, I accordingly wrote him weekly articles under the title: *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Meanwhile Weydemeyer's original plan had fallen through. Instead, in the spring of 1852 he began to publish a monthly, *Die Revolution*, the first number of which consists of my *Eighteenth Brumaire*. A few hundred copies of this found their way into Germany at that time, without, however, getting into the actual book trade. A German publisher of extremely radical pretensions to whom I offered the sale of my book was most virtuously horrified at a "presumption" so "contrary to the times."

From the above facts it will be seen that the present work took shape under the immediate pressure of events and its historical material does not extend beyond the month of February (1852). Its re-publication now is due in part to the demand of the book trade, in part to the urgent requests of my friends in Germany.

Of the writings dealing with the same subject approximately *at the same time* as mine, only two deserve notice: Victor Hugo's *Napoleon the Little* and Proudhon's *Coup d'Etat*.

¹ Military commandant of the St. Louis district during the American Civil War. [*Note by Marx.*]

Victor Hugo confines himself to bitter and witty invective against the responsible publisher of the *coup d'état*. The event itself appears in his work like a bolt from the blue. He sees in it only the violent act of a single individual. He does not notice that he makes this individual great instead of little by ascribing to him a personal power of initiative such as would be without parallel in world history. Proudhon, for his part, seeks to represent the *coup d'état* as the result of an antecedent historical development. Unnoticeably, however, his historical construction of the *coup d'état* becomes a historical *apologia* for its hero. Thus he falls into the error of our so-called *objective* historians. I, on the contrary, demonstrate how the *class struggle* in France created circumstances and relationships that made it possible for a grotesque mediocrity to play a hero's part.

A revision of the present work would have robbed it of its peculiar colouring. Accordingly I have confined myself to mere correction of printer's errors and to striking out allusions now no longer intelligible.

The concluding words of my work: "But when the imperial mantle finally falls on the shoulders of Louis Bonaparte, the bronze statue of Napoleon will crash from the top of the Vendôme Column," have already been fulfilled.

Colonel Charras opened the attack on the Napoleon cult in his work on the campaign of 1815. Subsequently, and particularly in the last few years, French literature made an end of the Napoleon legend with the weapons of historical research, of criticism, of satire and of wit. Outside France this violent breach with the traditional popular belief, this tremendous mental revolution, has been little noticed and still less understood.

Lastly, I hope that my work will contribute towards eliminating the school-taught phrase now current, particularly in Germany, of so-called *Caesarism*. In this superficial historical analogy the main point is forgotten, namely, that in ancient Rome the class struggle took place only within a privileged minority, between the free rich and the free poor, while the great productive mass of the population, the slaves, formed the purely passive pedestal for these combatants. People forget *Sismondi's* significant saying: The Roman proletariat lived at the expense of society, while modern society lives at the expense of the proletariat. With so complete a difference between the material, economic conditions of the ancient and the modern class struggles, the political figures

produced by them can likewise have no more in common with one another than the Archbishop of Canterbury has with the High Priest Samuel.

Karl Marx

London, June 23, 1869

Written by Marx for the second edition of his *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Hamburg 1869

Printed according to the text of the second edition

Translated from the German

F. ENGELS'S PREFACE TO THE THIRD GERMAN EDITION

The fact that a new edition of *The Eighteenth Brumaire* has become necessary, thirty-three years after its first appearance, proves that even today this little book has lost none of its value.

It was in truth a work of genius. Immediately after the event that struck the whole political world like a thunderbolt from the blue, that was condemned by some with loud cries of moral indignation and accepted by others as salvation from the revolution and as punishment for its errors, but was only wondered at by all and understood by none—immediately after this event Marx came out with a concise, epigrammatic exposition that laid bare the whole course of French history since the February days in its inner interconnection, reduced the miracle of December 2 to a natural, necessary result of this interconnection and in so doing did not even need to treat the hero of the *coup d'état* otherwise than with the contempt he so well deserved. And the picture was drawn with such a master hand that every fresh disclosure since made has only provided fresh proofs of how faithfully it reflected reality. This eminent understanding of the living history of the day, this clear-sighted appreciation of events at the moment of happening, is indeed without parallel.

But for this, Marx's thorough knowledge of French history was needed. France is the land where, more than anywhere else, the historical class struggles were each time fought out to a decision, and where, consequently, the changing political forms within which they move and in which their results are summarized have

been stamped in the sharpest outlines. The centre of feudalism in the Middle Ages, the model country of unified monarchy, resting on estates, since the Renaissance, France demolished feudalism in the Great Revolution and established the unalloyed rule of the bourgeoisie in a classical purity unequalled by any other European land. And the struggle of the upward-striving proletariat against the ruling bourgeoisie appeared here in an acute form unknown elsewhere. This was the reason why Marx not only studied the past history of France with particular predilection, but also followed her current history in every detail, stored up the material for future use and, consequently, events never took him by surprise.

In addition, however, there was still another circumstance. It was precisely Marx who had first discovered the great law of motion of history, the law according to which all historical struggles, whether they proceed in the political, religious, philosophical or some other ideological domain, are in fact only the more or less clear expression of struggles of social classes, and that the existence and thereby the collisions, too, between these classes are in turn conditioned by the degree of development of their economic position, by the mode of their production and of their exchange determined by it. This law, which has the same significance for history as the law of the transformation of energy has for natural science—this law gave him here, too, the key to an understanding of the history of the Second French Republic. He put his law to the test on these historical events, and even after thirty-three years we must still say that it has stood the test brilliantly.

Frederick Engels

Written by Engels for the third edition of Marx's *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Hamburg 1885

Printed according to the text of the third edition

Translated from the German

THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE

I

Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce. Causidière for Danton, Louis Blanc for Robespierre, the *Montagne* of 1848 to 1851 for the *Montagne* of 1793 to 1795, the Nephew for the Uncle. And the same caricature occurs in the circumstances attending the second edition of the eighteenth Brumaire!

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language. Thus Luther donned the mask of the Apostle Paul, the Revolution of 1789 to 1814 draped itself alternately as the Roman republic and the Roman empire, and the Revolution of 1848 knew nothing better to do than to parody, now 1789, now the revolutionary tradition of 1793 to 1795. In like manner a beginner who has learnt a new language always translates it back into his mother tongue, but he has assimilated the spirit of the new language and can freely express himself in it only when he finds his way in it without recalling the old and forgets his native tongue in the use of the new.

Consideration of this conjuring up of the dead of world history reveals at once a salient difference. Camille Desmoulins, Danton, Robespierre, Saint-Just, Napoleon, the heroes as well as the parties and the masses of the old French Revolution, performed the task of their time in Roman costume and with Roman phrases, the task of unchaining and setting up modern *bourgeois* society. The first ones knocked the feudal basis to pieces and mowed off the feudal heads which had grown on it. The other created inside France the conditions under which alone free competition could be developed, parcelled landed property exploited and the unchained industrial productive power of the nation employed; and beyond the French borders he everywhere swept the feudal institutions away, so far as was necessary to furnish bourgeois society in France with a suitable up-to-date environment on the European Continent. The new social formation once established, the antediluvian Colossi disappeared and with them resurrected Romanity—the Brutuses, Gracchi, Publicolas, the tribunes, the senators, and Caesar himself. Bourgeois society in its sober reality had begotten its true interpreters and mouthpieces in the Says, Cousins, Royer-Collards, Benjamin Constants and Guizots; its real military leaders sat behind the office desks, and the hog-headed Louis XVIII was its political chief. Wholly absorbed in the production of wealth and in peaceful competitive struggle, it no longer comprehended that ghosts from the days of Rome had watched over its cradle. But unheroic as bourgeois society is, it nevertheless took heroism, sacrifice, terror, civil war and battles of peoples to bring it into being. And in the classically austere traditions of the Roman republic its gladiators found the ideals and the art forms, the self-deceptions that they needed in order to conceal from themselves the bourgeois limitations of the content of their struggles and to keep their enthusiasm on the high plane of the great historical tragedy. Similarly, at another stage of development, a century earlier, Cromwell and the English people had borrowed speech, passions and illusions from the Old Testament for their bourgeois revolution. When the real aim had been achieved, when the bourgeois transformation of English society had been accomplished, Locke supplanted Habakkuk.

Thus the awakening of the dead in those revolutions served the purpose of glorifying the new struggles, not of parodying the old; of magnifying the given task in imagination, not of fleeing

from its solution in reality; of finding once more the spirit of revolution, not of making its ghost walk about again.

From 1848 to 1851 only the ghost of the old revolution walked about, from Marrast, the *républicain en gants jaunes*,¹ who disguised himself as the old Bailly, down to the adventurer, who hides his commonplace repulsive features under the iron death mask of Napoleon. An entire people, which had imagined that by means of a revolution it had imparted to itself an accelerated power of motion, suddenly finds itself set back into a defunct epoch and, in order that no doubt as to the relapse may be possible, the old dates arise again, the old chronology, the old names, the old edicts, which had long become a subject of antiquarian erudition, and the old minions of the law, who had seemed long decayed. The nation feels like that mad Englishman in Bedlam who fancies that he lives in the times of the ancient Pharaohs and daily bemoans the hard labour that he must perform in the Ethiopian mines as a gold digger, immured in this subterranean prison, a dimly burning lamp fastened to his head, the overseer of the slaves behind him with a long whip, and at the exits a confused welter of barbarian mercenaries, who understand neither the forced labourers in the mines nor one another, since they speak no common language. "And all this is expected of me," sighs the mad Englishman, "of me, a freeborn Briton, in order to make gold for the old Pharaohs." "In order to pay the debts of the Bonaparte family," sighs the French nation. The Englishman, so long as he was in his right mind, could not get rid of the fixed idea of making gold. The French, so long as they were engaged in revolution, could not get rid of the memory of Napoleon, as the election of December 10 proved. They hankered to return from the perils of revolution to the flesh-pots of Egypt, and December 2, 1851 was the answer. They have not only a caricature of the old Napoleon, they have the old Napoleon himself, caricatured as he must appear in the middle of the nineteenth century.

The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped off all superstition in regard to the past. Earlier revolutions required recollections of past world history in order to drug themselves concerning their own content. In order to arrive at its own content, the revolution of the nine-

¹ Republican in yellow gloves.—Ed.

teenth century must let the dead bury their dead. There the phrase went beyond the content; here the content goes beyond the phrase.

The February Revolution was a surprise attack, a *taking* of the old society *unawares*, and the people proclaimed this unexpected *stroke* as a deed of world importance, ushering in a new epoch. On December 2 the February Revolution is conjured away by a cardsharp's trick, and what seems overthrown is no longer the monarchy but the liberal concessions that were wrung from it by centuries of struggle. Instead of *society* having conquered a new content for itself, it seems that the *state* only returned to its oldest form, to the shamelessly simple domination of the sabre and the cowl. This is the answer to the *coup de main*¹ of February 1848, given by the *coup de tête*² of December 1851. Easy come, easy go. Meanwhile the interval of time has not passed by unused. During the years 1848 to 1851 French society has made up, and that by an abbreviated because revolutionary method, for the studies and experiences which, in a regular, so to speak, textbook course of development would have had to precede the February Revolution, if it was to be more than a ruffling of the surface. Society now seems to have fallen back behind its point of departure; it has in truth first to create for itself the revolutionary point of departure, the situation, the relations, the conditions under which alone modern revolution becomes serious.

Bourgeois revolutions, like those of the eighteenth century, storm swiftly from success to success; their dramatic effects outdo each other; men and things seem set in sparkling brilliants; ecstacy is the everyday spirit; but they are short-lived; soon they have attained their zenith, and a long crapulent depression lays hold of society before it learns soberly to assimilate the results of its storm-and-stress period. On the other hand, proletarian revolutions, like those of the nineteenth century, criticize themselves constantly, interrupt themselves continually in their own course, come back to the apparently accomplished in order to begin it afresh, deride with unmerciful thoroughness the inadequacies, weaknesses and paltrinesses of their first attempts, seem to throw down their adversary only in order that he may

¹ *Coup de main*: Unexpected stroke.—Ed.

² *Coup de tête*: Rash act.—Ed.

draw new strength from the earth and rise again, more gigantic, before them, recoil ever and anon from the indefinite prodigiousness of their own aims, until a situation has been created which makes all turning back impossible, and the conditions themselves cry out:

Hic Rhodus, hic salta!
Here is the rose, here dance!

For the rest, every fairly competent observer, even if he had not followed the course of French developments step by step, must have had a presentiment that an unheard-of fiasco was in store for the revolution. It was enough to hear the self-complacent howl of victory with which Messieurs the Democrats congratulated each other on the expected gracious consequences of the second Sunday in May 1852.² In their minds the second Sunday in May 1852 had become a fixed idea, a dogma, like the day on which Christ should reappear and the millennium begin, in the minds of the Chiliasts. As ever, weakness had taken refuge in a belief in miracles, fancied the enemy overcome when he was only conjured away in imagination, and it lost all understanding of the present in a passive glorification of the future that was in store for it and of the deeds it had *in petto* but which it merely did not want to carry out as yet. Those heroes who seek to disprove their demonstrated incapacity by mutually offering each other their sympathy and getting together in a crowd had tied up their bundles, collected their laurel wreaths in advance and were just then engaged in discounting on the exchange market the republics *in partibus* for which they had already providently organized the government personnel with all the calm of their unassuming disposition. December 2 struck them like a thunderbolt from a clear sky, and the peoples that in periods of pusillanimous depression gladly let their inward apprehension be drowned out by the loudest bawlers will perchance have convinced themselves that

¹ Here is Rhodes, leap here!—This phrase is taken from one of Aesop's fables: A swaggerer claimed to have witnesses to prove that he had once made a remarkable leap in Rhodes, to which he received the reply: "Why cite witnesses if it is true? Here is Rhodes, leap here!" In other words: Show right here by action what you can do!—*Ed.*

² On this day the term of office of the President of the republic expired, and according to the constitution no one could be elected to the presidency for a second term.—*Ed.*

the times are past when the cackle of geese could save the Capitol.

The Constitution, the National Assembly, the dynastic parties, the blue and the red republicans, the heroes of Africa, the thunder from the platform, the sheet lightning of the daily press, the entire literature, the political names and the intellectual reputations, the civil law and the penal code, the *liberté, égalité, fraternité* and the second Sunday in May 1852—all has vanished like a phantasmagoria before the spell of a man whom even his enemies do not make out to be a magician. Universal suffrage seems to have survived only for a moment, in order that with its own hand it may make its last will and testament before the eyes of all the world and declare in the name of the people itself: All that exists deserves to perish.¹

It is not enough to say, as the French do, that their nation was taken unawares. A nation and a woman are not forgiven the unguarded hour in which the first adventurer that came along could violate them. The riddle is not solved by such turns of speech, but merely formulated differently. It remains to be explained how a nation of thirty-six millions can be surprised and delivered unresisting into captivity by three swindlers.

Let us recapitulate in general outline the phases that the French Revolution went through from February 24, 1848, to December 1851.

Three main periods are unmistakable: *the February period*; May 4, 1848, to May 28, 1849: *the period of the constitution of the republic, or of the Constituent National Assembly*; May 28, 1849, to December 2, 1851: *the period of the constitutional republic or of the Legislative National Assembly*.

The *first period*, from February 24, or the overthrow of Louis Philippe, to May 4, 1848, the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, the *February period* proper, may be described as the *prologue* to the revolution. Its character was officially expressed in the fact that the government improvised by it itself declared that it was *provisional* and, like the government, everything that was mooted, attempted or enunciated during this period proclaimed itself to be only *provisional*. Nothing and nobody ventured to lay claim to the right of existence and of real action. All the elements

¹ Mephistopheles in Goethe's *Faust*.—Ed.

that had prepared or determined the revolution, the dynastic opposition, the republican bourgeoisie, the democratic-republican petty bourgeoisie and the social-democratic workers, provisionally found their place in the February *government*.

It could not be otherwise. The February days originally intended an electoral reform, by which the circle of the politically privileged among the possessing class itself was to be widened and the exclusive domination of the aristocracy of finance overthrown. When it came to the actual conflict, however, when the people mounted the barricades, the National Guard maintained a passive attitude, the army offered no serious resistance and the monarchy ran away, the republic appeared to be a matter of course. Every party construed it in its own way. Having secured its arms in hand, the proletariat impressed its stamp upon it and proclaimed it to be a *social republic*. There was thus indicated the general content of the modern revolution, a content which was in most singular contradiction to everything that, with the material available, with the degree of education attained by the masses, under the given circumstances and relations, could be immediately realized in practice. On the other hand, the claims of all the remaining elements that had collaborated in the February Revolution were recognized by the lion's share that they obtained in the government. In no period do we, therefore, find a more confused mixture of high-flown phrases and actual uncertainty and clumsiness, of more enthusiastic striving for innovation and more deeply-rooted domination of the old routine, of more apparent harmony of the whole of society and more profound estrangement of its elements. While the Paris proletariat still revelled in the vision of the wide prospects that had opened before it and indulged in seriously-meant discussions on social problems, the old powers of society had grouped themselves, assembled, reflected and found unexpected support in the mass of the nation, the peasants and petty bourgeois, who all at once stormed on to the political stage, after the barriers of the July monarchy had fallen.

The *second period*, from May 4, 1848, to the end of May 1849, is the period of the *constitution*, the *foundation*, of the *bourgeois republic*. Directly after the February days not only had the dynastic opposition been surprised by the republicans and the republicans by the Socialists, but all France by Paris. The National Assembly, which met on May 4, 1848, had emerged from the national elections and represented the nation. It was a living

protest against the pretensions of the February days and was to reduce the results of the revolution to the bourgeois scale. In vain the Paris proletariat, which immediately grasped the character of this National Assembly, attempted on May 15, a few days after it met, forcibly to negate its existence, to dissolve it, to disintegrate again into its constituent parts the organic form in which the proletariat was threatened by the reacting spirit of the nation. As is known, May 15 had no other result save that of removing Blanqui and his comrades, that is, the real leaders of the proletarian party, from the public stage for the entire duration of the cycle we are considering.

The *bourgeois monarchy* of Louis Philippe can be followed only by a *bourgeois republic*, that is to say, whereas a limited section of the bourgeoisie ruled in the name of the king, the whole of the bourgeoisie will now rule on behalf of the people. The demands of the Paris proletariat are utopian nonsense, to which an end must be put. To this declaration of the Constituent National Assembly the Paris proletariat replied with the *June Insurrection*, the most colossal event in the history of European civil wars. The bourgeois republic triumphed. On its side stood the aristocracy of finance, the industrial bourgeoisie, the middle class, the petty bourgeois, the army, the *lumpenproletariat* organized as the Mobile Guard, the intellectual lights, the clergy and the rural population. On the side of the Paris proletariat stood none but itself. More than three thousand insurgents were butchered after the victory, and fifteen thousand were transported without trial. With this defeat the proletariat passes into the *background* of the revolutionary stage. It attempts to press forward again on every occasion, as soon as the movement appears to make a fresh start, but with ever decreased expenditure of strength and always slighter results. As soon as one of the social strata situated above it gets into revolutionary ferment, the proletariat enters into an alliance with it and so shares all the defeats that the different parties suffer, one after another. But these subsequent blows become the weaker, the greater the surface of society over which they are distributed. The more important leaders of the proletariat in the Assembly and in the press successively fall victims to the courts, and ever more equivocal figures come to head it. In part it throws itself into *doctrinaire experiments, exchange banks and workers' associations, hence into a movement in which it renounces the revolutionizing of the old world by*

means of the latter's own great, combined resources, and seeks, rather, to achieve its salvation behind society's back, in private fashion, within its limited conditions of existence, and hence necessarily suffers shipwreck. It seems to be unable either to rediscover revolutionary greatness in itself or to win new energy from the connections newly entered into, until *all classes* with which it contended in June themselves lie prostrate beside it. But at least it succumbs with the honours of the great, world-historic struggle; not only France, but all Europe trembles at the June earthquake, while the ensuing defeats of the upper classes are so cheaply bought that they require bare-faced exaggeration by the victorious party to be able to pass for events at all, and become the more ignominious the further the defeated party is removed from the proletarian party.

The defeat of the June insurgents, to be sure, had now prepared, had levelled the ground on which the bourgeois republic could be founded and built up, but it had shown at the same time that in Europe the questions at issue are other than that of "republic or monarchy." It had revealed that here *bourgeois republic* signifies the unlimited despotism of one class over other classes. It had proved that in countries with an old civilization, with a developed formation of classes, with modern conditions of production and with an intellectual consciousness in which all traditional ideas have been dissolved by the work of centuries, *the republic* signifies *in general only the political form of revolution of bourgeois society* and not its *conservative form of life*, as, for example, in the United States of North America, where, though classes already exist, they have not yet become fixed, but continually change and interchange their elements in constant flux, where the modern means of production, instead of coinciding with a stagnant surplus population, rather compensate for the relative deficiency of heads and hands, and where, finally, the feverish, youthful movement of material production, which has to make a new world its own, has left neither time nor opportunity for abolishing the old spirit world.

During the June days all classes and parties had united in the *party of Order* against the proletarian class as the *party of Anarchy*, of socialism, of communism. They had "saved" society from "*the enemies of society.*" They had given out the watchwords of the old society, "*property, family, religion, order,*" to their army as passwords and had proclaimed to the counter-revolutionary cru-

saders: "In this sign thou shalt conquer!" From that moment, as soon as one of the numerous parties which had gathered under this sign against the June insurgents seeks to hold the revolutionary battlefield in its own class interest, it goes down before the cry: "Property, family, religion, order." Society is saved just as often as the circle of its rulers contracts, as a more exclusive interest is maintained against a wider one. Every demand of the simplest bourgeois financial reform, of the most ordinary liberalism, of the most formal republicanism, of the most shallow democracy, is simultaneously castigated as an "attempt on society" and stigmatized as "socialism." And, finally, the high priests of "the religion of order" themselves are driven with kicks from their Pythian tripods, hauled out of their beds in the darkness of night, put in prison-vans, thrown into dungeons or sent into exile; their temple is razed to the ground, their mouths are sealed, their pens broken, their law torn to pieces in the name of religion, of property, of the family, of order. Bourgeois fanatics for order are shot down on their balconies by mobs of drunken soldiers, their domestic sanctuaries profaned, their houses bombarded for amusement—in the name of property, of the family, of religion and of order. Finally, the scum of bourgeois society forms the *holy phalanx of order* and the hero Crapulinski¹ installs himself in the Tuileries as the "*saviour of society*."

II

Let us pick up the threads of the development once more.

The history of the *Constituent National Assembly* since the June days is the *history of the domination and the disintegration of the republican faction of the bourgeoisie*, of that faction which is known by the names of tricolour republicans, pure republicans, political republicans, formalist republicans, etc.

Under the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe it had formed the *official republican opposition* and consequently a recognized component part of the political world of the day. It had its representatives in the Chambers and a considerable sphere of in-

¹ *Crapulinski*: The hero of Heine's poem, *Two Knights*. In this character, Heine ridicules the spendthrift Polish noblemen ("Crapulinski" comes from the French word *crapule*—base scoundrel). Here Marx alludes to Louis Bonaparte.—Ed.

fluence in the press. Its Paris organ, the *National*,¹ was considered just as respectable in its way as the *Journal des Débats*. Its character corresponded to this position under the constitutional monarchy. It was not a faction of the bourgeoisie held together by great common interests and marked off by specific conditions of production. It was a clique of republican-minded bourgeois, writers, lawyers, officers and officials that owed its influence to the personal antipathies of the country against Louis Philippe, to memories of the old republic, to the republican faith of a number of enthusiasts, above all, however, to *French nationalism*, whose hatred of the Vienna treaties and of the alliance with England it stirred up perpetually. A large part of the following that the *National* had under Louis Philippe was due to this concealed imperialism, which could consequently confront it later, under the republic, as a deadly rival in the person of Louis Bonaparte. It fought the aristocracy of finance, as did all the rest of the bourgeois opposition. Polemics against the budget, which were closely connected in France with fighting the aristocracy of finance, procured popularity too cheaply and material for puritanical leading articles too plentifully, not to be exploited. The industrial bourgeoisie was grateful to it for its slavish defence of the French protectionist system, which it accepted, however, more on national grounds than on grounds of national economy; the bourgeoisie as a whole, for its vicious denunciation of communism and socialism. For the rest, the party of the *National* was *purely republican*, that is, it demanded a republican instead of a monarchist form of bourgeois rule and, above all, the lion's share of this rule. Concerning the conditions of this transformation it was by no means clear in its own mind. On the other hand, what was clear as daylight to it and was publicly acknowledged at the reform banquets in the last days of Louis Philippe, was its unpopularity with the democratic petty bourgeois and, in particular, with the revolutionary proletariat. These pure republicans, as is, indeed, the way with pure republicans, were already on the point of contenting themselves in the first instance with a regency of the Duchess of Orleans, when the February Revolution broke out and assigned their best-known representatives a place in the Provisional Government. From the start, they naturally had the confidence of the bourgeoisie and

¹ *National*: The organ of the Bourgeois-Republican Party published in Paris in 1830-1851.—Ed.

a majority in the Constituent National Assembly. The *socialist* elements of the Provisional Government were excluded forthwith from the Executive Commission which the National Assembly formed when it met, and the party of the *National* took advantage of the outbreak of the June insurrection to discharge the *Executive Commission* also, and therewith to get rid of its closest rivals, the *petty-bourgeois*, or *democratic, republicans* (Ledru-Rollin, etc.). Cavaignac, the general of the bourgeois republican party who commanded the June massacre, took the place of the Executive Commission with sort of dictatorial powers. Marrast, former editor-in-chief of the *National*, became the perpetual president of the Constituent National Assembly, and the ministries, as well as all other important posts, fell to the portion of the pure republicans.

The republican bourgeois faction, which had long regarded itself as the legitimate heir of the July monarchy, thus found its fondest hopes exceeded; it attained power, however, not as it had dreamed under Louis Philippe, through a liberal revolt of the bourgeoisie against the throne, but through a rising of the proletariat against capital, a rising laid low with grape-shot. What it had pictured to itself as the *most revolutionary* event turned out in reality to be the *most counter-revolutionary*. The fruit fell into its lap, but it fell from the tree of knowledge, not from the tree of life.

The exclusive *rule of the bourgeois republicans* lasted only from June 24 to December 10, 1848. It is summed up in the *drafting of a republican constitution* and in the *state of siege of Paris*.

The new *Constitution* was at bottom only the republicanized edition of the constitutional Charter of 1830. The narrow electoral qualification of the July monarchy, which excluded even a large part of the bourgeoisie from political rule, was incompatible with the existence of the bourgeois republic. In lieu of this qualification, the February Revolution had at once proclaimed direct universal suffrage. The bourgeois republicans could not undo this event. They had to content themselves with adding the limiting proviso of a six months' residence in the constituency. The old organization of the administration, of the municipal system, of the judicial system, of the army, etc., continued to exist inviolate, or, where the Constitution changed them, the change concerned the table of contents, not the contents; the name, not the subject matter.

The inevitable general staff of the liberties of 1848, personal liberty, liberty of the press, of speech, of association, of assembly, of education and religion, etc., received a constitutional uniform, which made them invulnerable. For each of these liberties is proclaimed as the *absolute* right of the French *citoyen*, but always with the marginal note that it is unlimited so far as it is not limited by the "*equal rights of others* and the *public safety*" or by "laws" which are intended to mediate just this harmony of the individual liberties with one another and with the public safety. For example: "The citizens have the right of association, of peaceful and unarmed assembly, of petition and of expressing their opinions, whether in the press or in any other way. *The enjoyment of these rights has no limit save the equal rights of others and the public safety.*" (Chapter II of the French Constitution, §8.)—"Education is free. Freedom of education shall be *enjoyed* under the conditions fixed by law and under the supreme control of the state." (*Ibidem*, §9.)—"The home of every citizen is inviolable *except* in the forms prescribed by law." (Chapter II, §3.) Etc., etc.—The Constitution, therefore, constantly refers to future *organic* laws which are to put into effect those marginal notes and regulate the enjoyment of these unrestricted liberties in such manner that they will collide neither with one another nor with the public safety. And later, these organic laws were brought into being by the friends of order and all those liberties regulated in such manner that the bourgeoisie in its enjoyment of them finds itself unhindered by the equal rights of the other classes. Where it forbids these liberties entirely to "the others" or permits enjoyment of them under conditions that are just so many police traps, this always happens solely in the interest of "*public safety*," that is, the safety of the bourgeoisie, as the Constitution prescribes. In the sequel, both sides accordingly appeal with complete justice to the Constitution: the friends of order, who abrogated all these liberties, as well as the democrats, who demanded all of them. For each paragraph of the Constitution contains its own antithesis, its own Upper and Lower House, namely, liberty in the general phrase, abrogation of liberty in the marginal note. Thus, so long as the *name* of freedom was respected and only its actual realization prevented, of course in a legal way, the constitutional existence of liberty remained intact, inviolate, however mortal the blows dealt to its existence *in actual life*.

This Constitution, made inviolable in so ingenious a manner, was nevertheless, like Achilles, vulnerable in one point, not in the heel, but in the head, or rather in the two heads in which it wound up—the *Legislative Assembly*, on the one hand, the *President*, on the other. Glance through the Constitution and you will find that only the paragraphs in which the relationship of the President to the Legislative Assembly is defined are absolute, positive, non-contradictory, incapable of distortion. For here it was a question of the bourgeois republicans safeguarding themselves. §§45-70 of the Constitution are so worded that the National Assembly can remove the President constitutionally, whereas the President can remove the National Assembly only unconstitutionally, only by setting aside the Constitution itself. Here, therefore, it challenges its forcible destruction. It not only sanctifies the division of powers, like the Charter of 1830, it widens it into an intolerable contradiction. The *play of the constitutional powers*, as Guizot termed the parliamentary squabble between the legislative and executive power, is in the Constitution of 1848 continually played *va-banque*.¹ On one side are seven hundred and fifty representatives of the people, elected by universal suffrage and eligible for re-election; they form an uncontrollable, indissoluble, indivisible National Assembly, a National Assembly that enjoys legislative omnipotence, decides in the last instance on war, peace and commercial treaties, alone possesses the right of amnesty and, by its permanence, perpetually holds the front of the stage. On the other side is the President, with all the attributes of royal power, with authority to appoint and dismiss his ministers independently of the National Assembly, with all the resources of the executive power in his hands, bestowing all posts and disposing thereby in France of the livelihoods of at least a million and a half people, for so many depend on the five hundred thousand officials and officers of every rank. He has the whole of the armed forces behind him. He enjoys the privilege of pardoning individual criminals, of suspending National Guards, of discharging, with the concurrence of the Council of State, general, cantonal and municipal councils elected by the citizens themselves. Initiative and direction are reserved to him in all treaties with foreign countries. While the Assembly constantly performs on the boards and is exposed to daily public criticism, he leads a secluded life in

¹ *Va-banque*: Staking one's all.—*Ed.*

the Elysian Fields, and that with Article 45 of the Constitution before his eyes and in his heart, crying to him daily: "*Frère, il faut mourir!*"¹ Your power ceases on the second Sunday of the lovely month of May in the fourth year after your election! Then your glory is at an end, the piece is not played twice and if you have debts, look to it betimes that you pay them off with the six hundred thousand francs granted you by the Constitution, unless, perchance, you should prefer to go to Clichy on the second Monday of the lovely month of May!--Thus, whereas the Constitution assigns actual power to the President, it seeks to secure moral power for the National Assembly. Apart from the fact that it is impossible to create a moral power by paragraphs of law, the Constitution here abrogates itself once more by having the President elected by all Frenchmen through direct suffrage. While the votes of France are split up among the seven hundred and fifty members of the National Assembly, they are here, on the contrary, concentrated on a single individual. While each separate representative of the people represents only this or that party, this or that town, this or that bridge-head, or even only the mere necessity of electing some one of the seven hundred and fifty, in which neither the cause nor the man is closely examined, *he* is the elect of the nation and the act of his election is the trump that the sovereign people plays once every four years. The elected National Assembly stands in a metaphysical relation, but the elected President in a personal relation, to the nation. The National Assembly, indeed, exhibits in its individual representatives the manifold aspects of the national spirit, but in the President this national spirit finds its incarnation. As against the Assembly, he possesses a sort of divine right; he is President by the grace of the people.

Thetis, the sea goddess, had prophesied to Achilles that he would die in the bloom of youth. The Constitution, which, like Achilles, had its weak spot, had also, like Achilles, its presentiment that it must go to an early death. It was sufficient for the constitution-making pure republicans to cast a glance from the lofty heaven of their ideal republic at the profane world to perceive how the arrogance of the royalists, the Bonapartists, the Democrats, the Communists as well as their own discredit grew daily in the same measure as they approached the completion

¹ "Brother, you must die!"—*Ed.*

of their great legislative work of art, without Thetis on this account having to leave the sea and communicate the secret to them. They sought to cheat destiny by a catch in the Constitution, through §III of it, according to which every motion for a *revision of the Constitution* must be supported by at least three-quarters of the votes, cast in three successive debates between which an entire month must always lie, with the added proviso that not less than five hundred members of the National Assembly must vote. Thereby they merely made the impotent attempt still to exercise, when only a parliamentary minority, as which they already saw themselves prophetically in their mind's eye, a power which at the present moment, when they commanded a parliamentary majority and all the resources of governmental authority, was slipping daily more and more from their feeble hands.

Finally the Constitution, in a melodramatic paragraph, entrusts itself "to the vigilance and the patriotism of the whole French people and every single Frenchman," after it had previously entrusted in another paragraph the "vigilant" and "patriotic" to the tender, most painstaking care of the High Court of Justice, the "*haute cour*," invented by it for the purpose.

Such was the Constitution of 1848, which on December 2, 1851, was not overthrown by a head, but fell down at the touch of a mere hat; this hat, to be sure, was a three-cornered Napoleonic hat.

While the bourgeois republicans in the Assembly were busy devising, discussing and voting this Constitution, Cavaignac outside the Assembly maintained the *state of siege of Paris*. The state of siege of Paris was the midwife of the Constituent Assembly in its travail of republican creation. If the Constitution is subsequently put out of existence by bayonets, it must not be forgotten that it was likewise by bayonets, and these turned against the people, that it had to be protected in its mother's womb and by bayonets that it had to be brought into existence. The forefathers of the "respectable republicans" had sent their symbol, the tricolour, on a tour round Europe. They themselves in turn produced an invention that of itself made its way over the whole Continent, but returned to France with ever renewed love until it has now become naturalized in half her Departments—the *state of siege*. A splendid invention, periodically employed in

every ensuing crisis in the course of the French Revolution. But barrack and bivouac, which were thus periodically laid on French society's head to compress its brain and render it quiet; sabre and musket, which were periodically allowed to act as judges and administrators, as guardians and censors, to play policeman and do night watchman's duty; moustache and uniform, which were periodically trumpeted forth as the highest wisdom of society and as its rector—were not barrack and bivouac, sabre and musket, moustache and uniform finally bound to hit upon the idea of rather saving society once and for all by proclaiming their own regime as the highest and freeing civil society completely from the trouble of governing itself? Barrack and bivouac, sabre and musket, moustache and uniform were bound to hit upon this idea all the more as they might then also expect better cash payment for their higher services, whereas from the merely periodical state of siege and the transient rescues of society at the bidding of this or that bourgeois faction little of substance was gleaned save some killed and wounded and some friendly bourgeois grimaces. Should not the military at last one day play state of siege in their own interest and for their own benefit, and at the same time besiege the citizens' purses? Moreover, he it noted in passing, one must not forget that *Colonel Bernard*, the same military commission president who under Cavaignac had 15,000 insurgents deported without trial, is at this moment again at the head of the military commissions active in Paris.

Whereas, with the state of siege in Paris, the respectable, the pure republicans planted the nursery in which the pretorians¹ of December 2, 1851 were to grow up, they on the other hand deserve praise for the reason that, instead of exaggerating the national sentiment as under Louis Philippe, they now, when they had command of the national power, crawled before foreign countries, and, instead of setting Italy free, let her be reconquered by Austrians and Neapolitans. Louis Bonaparte's election as President on December 10, 1848, put an end to the dictatorship of Cavaignac and to the Constituent Assembly.

In §44 of the Constitution it is stated: "The President of the French Republic must never have lost his status of a French citizen." The first President of the French republic, L. N. Bona-

¹ *Pretorians*: In ancient Rome the life-guards of the general or emperor, maintained by him and enjoying various privileges.—*Ed.*

parte, had not merely lost his status of a French citizen, had not only been an English special constable, he was even a naturalized Swiss.

I have worked out elsewhere the significance of the election of December 10. I will not revert to it here. It is sufficient to remark here that it was a *reaction of the peasants*, who had had to pay the costs of the February Revolution, against the remaining classes of the nation, a *reaction of the country against the town*. It met with great approval in the army, for which the republicans of the *National* had provided neither glory nor additional pay, among the big bourgeoisie, which hailed Bonaparte as a bridge to monarchy, among the proletarians and petty bourgeois, who hailed him as a scourge for Cavaignac. I shall have an opportunity later of going more closely into the relationship of the peasants to the French Revolution.

The period from December 20, 1848, until the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, in May 1849, comprises the history of the downfall of the bourgeois republicans. After having founded a republic for the bourgeoisie, driven the revolutionary proletariat out of the field and reduced the democratic petty bourgeoisie to silence for the time being, they are themselves thrust aside by the mass of the bourgeoisie, which justly impounds this republic as *its property*. This bourgeois mass was, however, *royalist*. One section of it, the large landowners, had ruled during the *Restoration* and was accordingly *Legitimist*. The other, the aristocrats of finance and big industrialists, had ruled during the *July Monarchy* and was consequently *Orleanist*. The high dignitaries of the army, the university, the church, the bar, the academy and of the press were to be found on either side, though in various proportions. Here, in the bourgeois republic, which bore neither the name *Bourbon* nor the name *Orleans*, but the name *Capital*, they had found the form of state in which they could rule *conjointly*. The June Insurrection had already united them in the "party of Order." Now it was necessary, in the first place, to remove the coterie of bourgeois republicans who still occupied the seats of the National Assembly. Just as brutal as those pure republicans had been in their misuse of physical force against the people, just as cowardly, mealy-mouthed, broken-spirited and incapable of fighting were they now in their retreat, when it was a question of maintaining their republicanism and their legislative rights against the executive power and the royalists. I need

not relate here the ignominious history of their dissolution. They did not succumb; they passed out of existence. Their history has come to an end forever, and, both inside and outside the Assembly, they figure in the following period only as memories, memories that seem to regain life whenever the mere name of Republic is once more the issue and as often as the revolutionary conflict threatens to sink down to the lowest level. I may remark in passing that the journal which gave its name to this party, the *National*, was converted to socialism in the following period.

Before we finish with this period we must still cast a retrospective glance at the two powers, one of which annihilated the other on December 2, 1851, whereas from December 20, 1848, until the exit of the Constituent Assembly, they had lived in conjugal relations. We mean Louis Bonaparte, on the one hand, and the party of the coalesced royalists, the party of Order, of the big bourgeoisie, on the other. On acceding to the presidency, Bonaparte at once formed a ministry of the party of Order, at the head of which he placed Odilon Barrot, the old leader, *nota bene*, of the most liberal faction of the parliamentary bourgeoisie. M. Barrot had at last secured the ministerial portfolio, the spectre of which had haunted him since 1830, and what is more, the premiership in the ministry; but not, as he had imagined under Louis Philippe, as the most advanced leader of the parliamentary opposition, but with the task of putting a parliament to death, and as the confederate of all his arch-enemies, Jesuits and Legitimists. He brought the bride home at last, but only after she had been prostituted. Bonaparte seemed to efface himself completely. This party acted for him.

The very first meeting of the council of ministers resolved on the expedition to Rome, which, it was agreed, should be undertaken behind the back of the National Assembly and the means for which were to be wrested from it by false pretences. Thus they began by swindling the National Assembly and secretly conspiring with the absolutist powers abroad against the revolutionary Roman republic. In the same manner and with the same manoeuvres Bonaparte prepared his *coup* of December 2 against the royalist Legislative Assembly and its constitutional republic. Let us not forget that the same party which formed Bonaparte's ministry on December 20, 1848, formed the majority of the Legislative National Assembly on December 2, 1851.

In August the Constituent Assembly had decided to dissolve only after it had worked out and promulgated a whole series of organic laws that were to supplement the Constitution. On January 6, 1849, the party of Order had a deputy named Râteau move that the Assembly should let the organic laws go and rather decide on its *own dissolution*. Not only the ministry, with Odilon Barrot at its head, but all the royalist members of the National Assembly told it in bullying accents then that its dissolution was necessary for the restoration of credit, for the consolidation of order, for putting an end to the indefinite provisional arrangements and for establishing a definitive state of affairs; that it hampered the productivity of the new government and sought to prolong its existence merely out of malice; that the country was tired of it. Bonaparte took note of all this invective against the legislative power, learnt it by heart and proved to the parliamentary royalists, on December 2, 1851, that he had learnt from them. He reiterated their own catchwords against them.

The Barrot ministry and the party of Order went further. They caused *petitions to the National Assembly* to be made throughout France, in which this body was politely requested to decamp. They thus led the unorganized popular masses into the fire of battle against the National Assembly, the constitutionally organized expression of the people. They taught Bonaparte to appeal against the parliamentary assemblies to the people. At length, on January 29, 1849, the day had come on which the Constituent Assembly was to decide concerning its own dissolution. The National Assembly found the building where its sessions were held occupied by the military; Changarnier, the general of the party of Order, in whose hands the supreme command of the National Guard and troops of the line had been united, held a great military review in Paris, as if a battle were impending, and the royalists in coalition threateningly declared to the Constituent Assembly that force would be employed if it should prove unwilling. It was willing, and got only the very short extra term of life it bargained for. What was January 29 but the *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851, only carried out by the royalists with Bonaparte against the republican National Assembly? The gentlemen did not observe, or did not wish to observe, that Bonaparte availed himself of January 29, 1849, to have a portion of the troops march past him in front of the Tuileries, and seized with avidity on just this first public summoning of the military power against

the parliamentary power to foreshadow Caligula. They, to be sure, saw only their Changarnier.

A motive that particularly actuated the party of Order in forcibly cutting short the duration of the Constituent Assembly's life was the *organic* laws supplementing the Constitution, such as the education law, the law on religious worship, etc. To the royalists in coalition it was most important that they themselves should make these laws and not let them be made by the republicans, who had grown mistrustful. Among these organic laws, however, was also a law on the responsibility of the President of the republic. In 1851 the Legislative Assembly was occupied with the drafting of just such a law, when Bonaparte anticipated this *coup* with the *coup* of December 2. What would the royalists in coalition not have given in their parliamentary winter campaign of 1851 to have found the Responsibility Law ready to hand, and drawn up, at that, by a mistrustful, hostile, republican Assembly!

After the Constituent Assembly had itself shattered its last weapon on January 29, 1849, the Barrot ministry and the friends of order hounded it to death, left nothing undone that could humiliate it and wrested from the impotent, self-despairing Assembly laws that cost it the last remnant of respect in the eyes of the public. Bonaparte, occupied with his fixed Napoleonic idea, was brazen enough to exploit publicly this degradation of the parliamentary power. For when on May 8, 1849, the National Assembly passed a vote of censure of the ministry because of the occupation of Civitavecchia by Oudinot, and ordered it to bring back the Roman expedition to its alleged purpose, Bonaparte published the same evening in the *Moniteur* a letter to Oudinot, in which he congratulated him on his heroic exploits and, in contrast to the ink-slinging parliamentarians, already posed as the generous protector of the army. The royalists smiled at this. They regarded him simply as their dupe. Finally, when Marrast, the President of the Constituent Assembly, believed for a moment that the safety of the National Assembly was endangered and, relying on the Constitution, requisitioned a colonel and his regiment, the colonel declined, cited discipline in his support and referred Marrast to Changarnier, who scornfully refused him with the remark that he did not like *baïonnettes intelligentes*.¹ In November

¹ Intellectual bayonets.—Ed.

1851, when the royalists in coalition wanted to begin the decisive struggle with Bonaparte, they sought to put through in their notorious *Questors' Bill* the principle of the direct requisition of troops by the President of the National Assembly. One of their generals, Le Flô, had signed the bill. In vain did Changarnier vote for it and Thiers pay homage to the far-sighted wisdom of the former Constituent Assembly. The *War Minister, Saint-Arnaud*, answered him as Changarnier had answered Marrast—and to the acclamation of the *Montagne!*

Thus the *party of Order*, when it was not yet the National Assembly, when it was still only the ministry, had itself stigmatized the *parliamentary regime*. And it makes an outcry when December 2, 1851 banished this regime from France!

We wish it a happy journey.

III

On May 28, 1849,¹ the Legislative National Assembly met. On December 2, 1851, it was dispersed. This period covers the span of life of the *constitutional, or parliamentary, republic*.

In the first French Revolution the rule of the *Constitutionalists* is followed by the rule of the *Girondins* and the rule of the *Girondins* by the rule of the *Jacobins*. Each of these parties relies on the more progressive party for support. As soon as it has brought the revolution far enough to be unable to follow it further, still less to go ahead of it, it is thrust aside by the bolder ally that stands behind it and sent to the guillotine. The revolution thus moves along an ascending line.

It is the reverse with the Revolution of 1848. The proletarian party appears as an appendage of the petty-bourgeois-democratic party. It is betrayed and dropped by the latter on April 16, May 15, and in the June days. The democratic party, in its turn, leans on the shoulders of the bourgeois-republican party. The bourgeois-republicans no sooner believe themselves well established than they shake off the troublesome comrade and support themselves on the shoulders of the party of Order. The party of Order hunches its shoulders, lets the bourgeois-republicans tumble and

¹ May 29 was given erroneously in the first and subsequent publications of *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Actually the Legislative Assembly was opened on May 28, 1849.—Ed.

throws itself on the shoulders of armed force. It fancies it is still sitting on its shoulders when, one fine morning, it perceives that the shoulders have transformed themselves into bayonets. Each party kicks back at the one behind, which presses upon it, and leans against the one in front, which pushes backwards. No wonder that in this ridiculous posture it loses its balance and, having made the inevitable grimaces, collapses with curious capers. The revolution thus moves in a descending line. It finds itself in this state of retrogressive motion before the last February barricade has been cleared away and the first revolutionary authority constituted.

The period that we have before us comprises the most motley mixture of crying contradictions: constitutionalists who conspire openly against the Constitution; revolutionists who are confessedly constitutional; a National Assembly that wants to be omnipotent and always remains parliamentary; a *Montagne* that finds its vocation in patience and counters its present defeats by prophesying future victories; royalists who form the *patres conscripti*¹ of the republic and are forced by the situation to keep the hostile royal houses, to which they adhere, abroad, and the republic, which they hate, in France; an executive power that finds its strength in its very weakness and its respectability in the contempt that it calls forth; a republic that is nothing but the combined infamy of two monarchies, the Restoration and the July Monarchy, with an imperial label—alliances whose first proviso is separation; struggles whose first law is indecision; wild, inane agitation in the name of tranquillity, most solemn preaching of tranquillity in the name of revolution; passions without truth, truths without passion; heroes without heroic deeds, history without events; development, whose sole driving force seems to be the calendar, wearying with constant repetition of the same tensions and relaxations; antagonisms that periodically seem to work themselves up to a climax only to lose their sharpness and fall away without being able to resolve themselves; pretentiously paraded exertions and philistine terror at the danger of the world coming to an end, and at the same time the pettiest intrigues and court comedies played by the world redeemers, who in their *laisser aller*² remind us less of the Day of Judge-

¹ *Patres conscripti*: Senators.—Ed.

² *Laisser aller*: Letting things take their course.—Ed.

ment than of the times of the Fronde—the official collective genius of France brought to naught by the artful stupidity of a single individual; the collective will of the nation, as often as it speaks through universal suffrage, seeking its appropriate expression through the inveterate enemies of the interests of the masses, until at length it finds it in the self-will of a filibuster. If any section of history has been painted grey on grey, it is this. Men and events appear as inverted Schlemihls,¹ as shadows that have lost their bodies. The revolution itself paralyzes its own bearers and endows only its adversaries with passionate forcefulness. When the “red spectre,” continually conjured up and exorcised by the counter-revolutionaries, finally appears, it appears not with the Phrygian cap of anarchy on its head, but in the uniform of order, in *red breeches*.

We have seen that the ministry which Bonaparte installed on December 20, 1848, on his Ascension Day, was a ministry of the party of Order, of the Legitimist and Orleanist coalition. This Barrot-Falloux ministry had outlived the republican Constituent Assembly, whose term of life it had more or less violently cut short, and found itself still at the helm. Changarnier, the general of the allied royalists, continued to unite in his person the general command of the First Army Division and of the National Guard of Paris. Finally, the general elections had secured the party of Order a large majority in the National Assembly. Here the deputies and peers of Louis Philippe encountered a hollowed host of Legitimists, for whom many of the nation's ballots had become transformed into admission cards to the political stage. The Bonapartist representatives of the people were too sparse to be able to form an independent parliamentary party. They appeared merely as the *mauvaise queue*² of the party of Order. Thus the party of Order was in possession of the governmental power, the army and the legislative body, in short, of the whole of the state power; it had been morally strengthened by the general elections, which made its rule appear as the will of the people, and by the simultaneous triumph of the counter-revolution on the whole continent of Europe.

¹ *Schlemihl*: The hero of *Peter Schlemihl* by Adalbert von Chamisso. Peter Schlemihl sold his shadow for wealth, and then went seeking it all over the world.—*Ed.*

² *Mauvaise queue*: Evil appendage.—*Ed.*

Never did a party open its campaign with greater resources or under more favourable auspices.

The shipwrecked *pure republicans* found that they had melted down to a clique of about fifty men in the Legislative National Assembly, the African generals Cavaignac, Lamoricière and Bedeau at their head. The great opposition party, however, was formed by the *Montagne*. The *social-democratic* party had given itself this parliamentary baptismal name. It commanded more than two hundred of the seven hundred and fifty votes of the National Assembly and was consequently at least as powerful as any one of the three factions of the party of Order taken by itself. Its numerical inferiority compared with the entire royalist coalition seemed compensated by special circumstances. Not only did the elections in the Departments show that it had gained a considerable following among the rural population. It counted in its ranks almost all the deputies from Paris; the army had made a confession of democratic faith by the election of three non-commissioned officers, and the leader of the *Montagne*, Ledru-Rollin, in contradistinction to all the representatives of the party of Order, had been raised to the parliamentary peerage by five Departments, which had pooled their votes for him. In view of the inevitable clashes of the royalists among themselves and of the whole party of Order with Bonaparte, the *Montagne* thus seemed to have all the elements of success before it on May 28, 1849. A fortnight later it had lost everything, honour included.

Before we pursue parliamentary history further, some remarks are necessary to avoid common misconceptions regarding the whole character of the epoch that lies before us. Looked at with the eyes of democrats, the period of the Legislative National Assembly is concerned with what the period of the Constituent Assembly was concerned with: the simple struggle between republicans and royalists. The movement itself, however, they sum up in the one shibboleth: "*reaction*"—night, in which all cats are grey and which permits them to reel off their night watchman's commonplaces. And, to be sure, at first sight the party of Order reveals a maze of different royalist factions, which not only intrigue against each other—each seeking to elevate its own pretender to the throne and exclude the pretender of the opposing faction—but also all unite in common hatred of, and common onslaughts on, the "republic." In opposition to this royalist con-

spiracy the *Montagne*, for its part, appears as the representative of the "republic." The party of Order appears to be perpetually engaged in a "reaction," directed against press, association and the like, neither more nor less than in Prussia, and which, as in Prussia, is carried out in the form of brutal police intervention by the bureaucracy, the *gendarmierie* and the law courts. The "*Montagne*," for its part, is just as continually occupied in warding off these attacks and thus defending the "eternal rights of man" as every so-called people's party has done, more or less, for a century and a half. If one looks at the situation and the parties more closely, however, this superficial appearance, which veils the *class struggle* and the peculiar physiognomy of this period, disappears.

Legitimists and Orleanists, as we have said, formed the two great factions of the party of Order. Was that which held these factions fast to their pretenders and kept them apart from one another nothing but lily and tricolour, House of Bourbon and House of Orleans, different shades of royalism, was it at all the confession of faith of royalism? Under the Bourbons, *big landed property* had governed, with its priests and lackeys; under the Orleans, high finance, large-scale industry, large-scale trade, that is, *capital*, with its retinue of lawyers, professors and smooth-tongued orators. The Legitimate Monarchy was merely the political expression of the hereditary rule of the lords of the soil, as the July Monarchy was only the political expression of the usurped rule of the bourgeois *parvenus*. What kept the two factions apart, therefore, was not any so-called principles, it was their material conditions of existence, two different kinds of property, it was the old contrast between town and country, the rivalry between capital and landed property. That at the same time old memories, personal enmities, fears and hopes, prejudices and illusions, sympathies and antipathies, convictions, articles of faith and principles bound them to one or the other royal house, who is there that denies this? Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence, rises an entire superstructure of distinct and peculiarly formed sentiments, illusions, modes of thought and views of life. The entire class creates and forms them out of its material foundations and out of the corresponding social relations. The single individual, who derives them through tradition and upbringing, may imagine that they form the real motives and the starting-point of his activity.

While Orleanists and Legitimists, while each faction sought to make itself and the other believe that it was loyalty to their two royal houses which separated them, facts later proved that it was rather their divided interests which forbade the uniting of the two royal houses. And as in private life one differentiates between what a man thinks and says of himself and what he really is and does, so in historical struggles one must distinguish still more the phrases and fancies of parties from their real organism and their real interests, their conception of themselves from their reality. Orleanists and Legitimists found themselves side by side in the republic, with equal claims. If each side wished to effect the *restoration* of its *own* royal house against the other, that merely signified that each of the *two great interests* into which the *bourgeoisie* is split—landed property and capital—sought to restore its own supremacy and the subordination of the other. We speak of two interests of the bourgeoisie, for large landed property, despite its feudal coquetry and pride of race, has been rendered thoroughly bourgeois by the development of modern society. Thus the Tories in England long imagined that they were enthusiastic about monarchy, the church and the beauties of the old English Constitution, until the day of danger wrung from them the confession that they are enthusiastic only about *ground rent*.

The royalists in coalition carried on their intrigues against one another in the press, in Ems, in Claremont, outside parliament. Behind the scenes they donned their old Orleanist and Legitimist liveries again and once more engaged in their old tourneys. But on the public stage, in their grand performances of state, as a great parliamentary party, they put off their respective royal houses with mere obeisances and adjourn the restoration of the monarchy *ad infinitum*.¹ They do their real business as the *party of Order*, that is, under a *social*, not under a *political* title; as representatives of the bourgeois world-order, not as knights of errant princesses; as the bourgeois class against other classes, not as royalists against the republicans. And as the party of Order they exercised more unrestricted and sterner domination over the other classes of society than ever previously under the Restoration or under the July Monarchy, a domination which, in general, was only possible under the form of the parliamentary

¹ To infinity.—*Ed.*

republic, for only under this form could the two great divisions of the French bourgeoisie unite, and thus put the rule of their class instead of the regime of a privileged faction of it on the order of the day. If, nevertheless, they, as the party of Order, also insulted the republic and expressed their repugnance to it, this happened not merely from royalist memories. Instinct taught them that the republic, true enough, makes their political rule complete, but at the same time undermines its social foundation, since they must now confront the subjugated classes and contend against them without mediation, without the concealment afforded by the crown, without being able to divert the national interest by their subordinate struggles among themselves and with the monarchy. It was a feeling of weakness that caused them to recoil from the pure conditions of their own class rule and to yearn for the former more incomplete, more undeveloped and precisely on that account less dangerous forms of this rule. On the other hand, every time the royalists in coalition come in conflict with the pretender that confronts them, with Bonaparte, every time they believe their parliamentary omnipotence endangered by the executive power, every time, therefore, that they must produce their political title to their rule, they come forward as *republicans* and not as *royalists*, from the Orleanist Thiers, who warns the National Assembly that the republic divides them least, to the Legitimist Berryer, who, on December 2, 1851, as a tribune swathed in a tricoloured sash, harangues the people assembled before the town hall of the tenth *arrondissement* in the name of the republic. To be sure, a mocking echo calls back to him: Henry V! Henry V!

As against the coalesced bourgeoisie, a coalition between petty bourgeois and workers had been formed, the so-called *social-democratic* party. The petty bourgeois saw that they were badly rewarded after the June days of 1848, that their material interests were imperilled and that the democratic guarantees which were to ensure the effectuation of these interests were called in question by the counter-revolution. Accordingly, they came closer to the workers. On the other hand, their parliamentary representation, the *Montagne*, thrust aside during the dictatorship of the bourgeois republicans, had in the last half of the life of the Constituent Assembly reconquered its lost popularity through the struggle with Bonaparte and the royalist ministers. It had concluded an alliance with the socialist leaders. In February 1849,

banquets celebrated the reconciliation. A joint programme was drafted, joint election committees were set up and joint candidates put forward. From the social demands of the proletariat the revolutionary point was broken off and a democratic turn given to them; from the democratic claims of the petty bourgeoisie the purely political form was stripped off and their socialist point thrust forward. Thus arose the Social-Democracy. The new *Montagne*, the result of this combination, contained, apart from some supernumeraries from the working class and some socialist sectarians, the same elements as the old *Montagne*, only numerically stronger. However, in the course of development, it had changed with the class that it represented. The peculiar character of the Social-Democracy is epitomized in the fact that democratic-republican institutions are demanded as a means, not of doing away with two extremes, capital and wage labour, but of weakening their antagonism and transforming it into harmony. However different the means proposed for the attainment of this end may be, however much it may be trimmed with more or less revolutionary notions, the content remains the same. This content is the transformation of society in a democratic way, but a transformation within the bounds of the petty bourgeoisie. Only one must not form the narrow-minded notion that the petty bourgeoisie, on principle, wishes to enforce an egoistic class interest. Rather, it believes that the *special* conditions of its emancipation are the *general* conditions within the frame of which alone modern society can be saved and the class struggle avoided. Just as little must one imagine that the democratic representatives are indeed all shopkeepers or enthusiastic champions of shopkeepers. According to their education and their individual position they may be as far apart as heaven from earth. What makes them representatives of the petty bourgeoisie is the fact that in their minds they do not get beyond the limits which the latter do not get beyond in life, that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same problems and solutions to which material interest and social position drive the latter practically. This is, in general, the relationship between the *political* and *literary representatives* of a class and the class they represent.

After the analysis given, it is obvious that if the *Montagne* continually contends with the party of Order for the republic and the so-called rights of man, neither the republic nor the rights of man are its final end, any more than an army which one wants

to deprive of its weapons and which resists has taken the field in order to remain in possession of its own weapons.

Immediately, as soon as the National Assembly met, the party of Order provoked the *Montagne*. The bourgeoisie now felt the necessity of making an end of the democratic petty bourgeois, just as a year before it had realized the necessity of settling with the revolutionary proletariat. Only the situation of the adversary was different. The strength of the proletarian party lay in the streets, that of the petty bourgeois in the National Assembly itself. It was therefore a question of decoying them out of the National Assembly into the streets and causing them to smash their parliamentary power themselves, before time and circumstances could consolidate it. The *Montagne* rushed headlong into the trap.

The bombardment of Rome by the French troops¹ was the bait that was thrown to it. It violated Article V of the Constitution which forbids the French republic to employ its military forces against the freedom of another people. In addition to this, Article 54 prohibited any declaration of war on the part of the executive power without the assent of the National Assembly, and by its resolution of May 8, the Constituent Assembly had disapproved of the Roman expedition. On these grounds Ledru-Rollin brought in a bill of impeachment against Bonaparte and his ministers on June 11, 1849. Exasperated by the wasp stings of Thiers, he actually let himself be carried away to the point of threatening that he would defend the Constitution by every means, even with arms in hand. The *Montagne* rose to a man and repeated this call to arms. On June 12, the National Assembly rejected the bill of impeachment, and the *Montagne* left the parliament. The events of June 13 are known: the proclamation issued by a section of the *Montagne*, declaring Bonaparte and his ministers "outside the Constitution"; the street procession of the democratic National Guards, who, unarmed as they were, dispersed on encountering the troops of Changarnier, etc., etc. A part of the *Montagne* fled abroad; another part was arraigned before the High Court at Bourges, and a parliamentary regulation subjected the remainder to the schoolmasterly surveillance of the Pres-

¹ French troops were sent to Italy in April 1849 to suppress the Italian Revolution. They bombarded revolutionary Rome in flagrant violation of the French Constitution.—*Ed.*

ident of the National Assembly. Paris was again declared in a state of siege and the democratic part of its National Guard dissolved. Thus the influence of the *Montagne* in parliament and the power of the petty bourgeois in Paris were broken.

Lyons, where June 13 had given the signal for a bloody insurrection of the workers, was, along with the five surrounding Departments, likewise declared in a state of siege, a condition that has continued up to the present moment.

The bulk of the *Montagne* had left its vanguard in the lurch, having refused to subscribe to its proclamation. The press had deserted, only two journals having dared to publish the *pronunciamento*. The petty bourgeois betrayed their representatives, in that the National Guards either stayed away or, where they appeared, hindered the erection of barricades. The representatives had duped the petty bourgeois, in that the alleged allies from the army were nowhere to be seen. Finally, instead of gaining an accession of strength from it, the democratic party had infected the proletariat with its own weakness and, as is usual with the great deeds of democrats, the leaders had the satisfaction of being able to charge their "people" with desertion, and the people the satisfaction of being able to charge its leaders with humbugging it.

Seldom had an action been announced with more noise than the impending campaign of the *Montagne*, seldom had an event been trumpeted with greater certainty or longer in advance than the inevitable victory of the democracy. Most assuredly, the democrats believe in the trumpets before whose blasts the walls of Jericho fell down. And as often as they stand before the ramparts of despotism, they seek to imitate the miracle. If the *Montagne* wished to triumph in parliament, it should not have called to arms. If it called to arms in parliament, it should not have acted in parliamentary fashion in the streets. If the peaceful demonstration was meant seriously, then it was folly not to foresee that it would be given a war-like reception. If a real struggle was intended, then it was a queer idea to lay down the weapons with which it would have to be waged. But the revolutionary threats of the petty bourgeois and their democratic representatives are mere attempts to intimidate the antagonist. And when they have run into a blind alley, when they have sufficiently compromised themselves to make it necessary to give effect to their threats, then this is done in an ambiguous fashion that avoids nothing so much as the

means to the end and tries to find excuses for succumbing. The blaring overture that announced the contest dies away in a pusillanimous snarl as soon as the struggle has to begin, the actors cease to take themselves *au sérieux*, and the action collapses completely, like a pricked bubble.

No party exaggerates its means more than the democratic, none deludes itself more light-mindedly over the situation. Since a section of the army had voted for it, the *Montagne* was now convinced that the army would revolt for it. And on what occasion? On an occasion which, from the standpoint of the troops, had no other meaning than that the revolutionists took the side of the Roman soldiers against the French soldiers. On the other hand, the recollections of June 1848 were still too fresh to allow of anything but a profound aversion on the part of the proletariat towards the National Guard and a thoroughgoing mistrust of the democratic chiefs on the part of the chiefs of the secret societies. To iron out these differences, it was necessary for great, common interests to be at stake. The violation of an abstract paragraph of the Constitution could not provide these interests. Had not the Constitution been repeatedly violated, according to the assurance of the democrats themselves? Had not the most popular journals branded it as counter-revolutionary botch-work? But the democrat, because he represents the petty bourgeoisie, that is, a *transition class*, in which the interests of two classes are simultaneously mutually blunted, imagines himself elevated above class antagonism generally. The democrats concede that a privileged class confronts them, but they, along with all the rest of the nation, form the *people*. What they represent is the *people's rights*; what interests them is the *people's interests*. Accordingly, when a struggle is impending, they do not need to examine the interests and positions of the different classes. They do not need to weigh their own resources too critically. They have merely to give the signal and the *people*, with all its inexhaustible resources, will fall upon the *oppressors*. Now, if in the performance their interests prove to be uninteresting and their potency impotence, then either the fault lies with pernicious sophists, who split the *indivisible people* into different hostile camps, or the army was too brutalized and blinded to comprehend that the pure aims of democracy are the best thing for it itself, or the whole thing has been wrecked by a detail in its execution, or else an unforeseen accident has this time spoilt the game. In any case, the democrat comes out of the

most disgraceful defeat just as immaculate as he was innocent when he went into it, with the newly-won conviction that he is bound to win, not that he himself and his party have to give up the old standpoint, but, on the contrary, that conditions have to ripen to suit him.

Accordingly, one must not imagine the *Montagne*, decimated and broken though it was, and humiliated by the new parliamentary regulation, as being particularly miserable. If June 13 had removed its chiefs, it made room, on the other hand, for men of lesser calibre, whom this new position flattered. If their impotence in parliament could no longer be doubted, they were entitled now to confine their actions to outbursts of moral indignation and blustering declamation. If the party of Order affected to see embodied in them, as the last official representatives of the revolution, all the terrors of anarchy, they could in reality be all the more insipid and modest. They consoled themselves, however, for June 13 with the profound utterance: But if they dare to attack universal suffrage, well then—then we'll show them what we are made of! *Nous verrons!*¹

So far as the *Montagnards* who fled abroad are concerned, it is sufficient to remark here that Ledru-Rollin, because in barely a fortnight he had succeeded in ruining irretrievably the powerful party at whose head he stood, now found himself called upon to form a French government *in partibus*; that to the extent that the level of the revolution sank and the official bigwigs of official France became more dwarf-like, his figure in the distance, removed from the scene of action, seemed to grow in stature; that he could figure as the republican pretender for 1852, and that he issued periodical circulars to the Wallachians and other peoples, in which the despots of the Continent are threatened with the deeds of himself and his confederates. Was Proudhon altogether wrong when he cried to these gentlemen: "*Vous n'êtes que des blagueurs*"?²

On June 13, the party of Order had not only broken the *Montagne*, it had effected the *subordination of the Constitution to the majority decisions of the National Assembly*. And it understood the republic thus: that the bourgeoisie rules here in parliamentary forms, without, as in a monarchy, encountering any barrier such

¹ We shall see.—*Ed.*

² "You are nothing but windbags."—*Ed.*

as the veto power of the executive or the right to dissolve parliament. This was a *parliamentary republic*, as Thiers termed it. But whereas on June 13 the bourgeoisie secured its omnipotence within the house of parliament, did it not afflict parliament itself, as against the executive authority and the people, with incurable weakness by expelling its most popular part? By surrendering numerous deputies without further ado on the demand of the courts, it abolished its own parliamentary immunity. The humiliating regulations to which it subjected the *Montagne* exalted the President of the republic in the same measure as it degraded the individual representatives of the people. By branding an insurrection for the protection of the constitutional charter an anarchic act aiming at the subversion of society, it precluded the possibility of its appealing to insurrection should the executive authority violate the Constitution in relation to it. And by the irony of history, the general who on Bonaparte's instructions bombarded Rome and thus provided the immediate occasion for the constitutional revolt of June 13, that very *Oudinot* had to be the man offered by the party of Order imploringly and unavailingly to the people as general on behalf of the Constitution against Bonaparte on December 2, 1851. Another hero of June 13, *Vieyra*, who was lauded from the tribune of the National Assembly for the brutalities that he had committed in the democratic newspaper offices at the head of a gang of National Guards belonging to high finance circles—this same Vieyra had been initiated into Bonaparte's conspiracy and he essentially contributed to depriving the National Assembly in the hour of its death of any protection by the National Guard.

June 13 had still another meaning. The *Montagne* had wanted to force the impeachment of Bonaparte. Its defeat was therefore a direct victory for Bonaparte, his personal triumph over his democratic enemies. The party of Order gained the victory; Bonaparte had only to cash in on it. He did so. On June 14 a proclamation could be read on the walls of Paris in which the President, reluctantly, against his will, as it were, compelled by the sheer force of events, comes forth from his cloistered seclusion and, posing as misunderstood virtue, complains of the calumnies of his opponents and, while he seems to identify his person with the cause of order, rather identifies the cause of order with his person. Moreover, the National Assembly had, it is true, subsequently approved the expedition against Rome, but Bonaparte had taken the initiative in the matter. After having re-installed the High Priest

Samuel in the Vatican, he could hope to enter the Tuileries as King David. He had won the priests over to his side.

The revolt of June 13 was confined, as we have seen, to a peaceful street procession. No war laurels were, therefore, to be won against it. Nevertheless, at a time as poor as this in heroes and events, the party of Order transformed this bloodless battle into a second Austerlitz. Platform and press praised the army as the power of order, in contrast to the popular masses, representing the impotence of anarchy, and extolled Changarnier as the "bulwark of society," a deception in which he himself finally came to believe. Surreptitiously, however, the corps that seemed doubtful were transferred from Paris, the regiments which had shown at the elections the most democratical sentiments were banished from France to Algiers, the turbulent spirits among the troops were relegated to penal detachments, and finally the isolation of the press from the barracks and of the barracks from bourgeois society was systematically carried out.

Here we have reached the decisive turning-point in the history of the French National Guard. In 1830 it was decisive in the overthrow of the Restoration. Under Louis Philippe every rebellion miscarried in which the National Guard stood on the side of the troops. When in the February days of 1848 it evinced a passive attitude towards the insurrection and an equivocal one towards Louis Philippe, he gave himself up for lost and actually was lost. Thus the conviction took root that the revolution could not be victorious *without* the National Guard, nor the army *against* it. This was the superstition of the army in regard to civilian omnipotence. The June days of 1848, when the entire National Guard, with the troops of the line, put down the insurrection, had strengthened the superstition. After Bonaparte's assumption of office, the position of the National Guard was to some extent weakened by the unconstitutional union, in the person of Changarnier, of the command of its forces with the command of the First Army Division.

Just as the command of the National Guard appeared here as an attribute of the military commander-in-chief, so the National Guard itself appeared as only an appendage of the troops of the line. Finally, on June 13 its power was broken, and not only by its partial disbandment, which from this time on was periodically repeated all over France, until mere fragments of it were left behind. The demonstration of June 13 was, above all, a demonstration of the democratic National Guards. They had not, to be

sure, borne their arms, but worn their uniforms against the army; precisely in this uniform, however, lay the talisman. The army convinced itself that this uniform was a piece of woollen cloth like any other. The spell was broken. In the June days of 1848, bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie had united as the National Guard with the army against the proletariat; on June 13, 1849, the bourgeoisie let the petty-bourgeois National Guard be dispersed by the army; on December 2, 1851, the National Guard of the bourgeoisie itself had vanished, and Bonaparte merely registered this fact when he subsequently signed the decree for its disbandment. Thus the bourgeoisie had itself smashed its last weapon against the army, but it had to smash it the moment the petty bourgeoisie no longer stood behind it as a vassal, but before it as a rebel, as in general it was bound to destroy all its means of defence against absolutism with its own hand as soon as it had itself become absolute.

Meanwhile, the party of Order celebrated the reconquest of a power that seemed lost in 1848 only to be found again, freed from its restraints, in 1849, celebrated by means of invectives against the republic and the Constitution, of curses on all future, present and past revolutions, including that which its own leaders had made, and in laws by which the press was muzzled, association destroyed and the state of siege regulated as an organic institution. The National Assembly then adjourned from the middle of August to the middle of October, after having appointed a permanent commission for the period of its absence. During this recess the Legitimists intrigued with Ems, the Orleanists—with Claremont, Bonaparte—by means of princely tours, and the Departmental Council—in deliberations on a revision of the Constitution: incidents which regularly recur in the periodic recesses of the National Assembly and which I propose to discuss only when they become events. Here it may merely be remarked, in addition, that it was impolitic for the National Assembly to disappear for considerable intervals from the stage and leave only a single, albeit a sorry, figure to be seen at the head of the republic, that of Louis Bonaparte, while to the scandal of the public the party of Order fell asunder into its royalist component parts and followed its conflicting desires for Restoration. As often as the confused noise of *parliament* grew silent during these recesses and its body dissolved in the nation, it became unmistakably clear that only one thing was still wanting to complete the true form of this re-

public: to make the *former's* recess permanent and replace the *latter's* inscription: Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité by the unambiguous words: Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery!

IV

In the middle of October 1849, the National Assembly met once more. On November 1, Bonaparte surprised it with a message in which he announced the dismissal of the Barrot-Falloux ministry and the formation of a new ministry. No one has ever sacked lackeys with less ceremony than Bonaparte his ministers. The kicks that were intended for the National Assembly were given in the meantime to Barrot and Co.

The Barrot ministry, as we have seen, had been composed of Legitimists and Orleanists, a ministry of the party of Order. Bonaparte had needed it to dissolve the republican Constituent Assembly, to bring about the expedition against Rome and to break the democratic party. Behind this ministry he had seemingly effaced himself, surrendered governmental power into the hands of the party of Order and donned the modest character mask that the responsible editor of a newspaper wore under Louis Philippe, the mask of the *homme de paille*.¹ He now threw off a mask which was no longer the light veil behind which he could hide his physiognomy, but an iron mask which prevented him from displaying a physiognomy of his own. He had appointed the Barrot ministry in order to blast the republican National Assembly in the name of the party of Order; he dismissed it in order to declare his own name independent of the National Assembly of the party of Order.

Plausible pretexts for this dismissal were not lacking. The Barrot ministry neglected even the decencies that would have let the President of the republic appear as a power side by side with the National Assembly. During the recess of the National Assembly Bonaparte published a letter to Edgar Ney in which he seemed to disapprove of the illiberal attitude of the Pope, just as in opposition to the Constituent Assembly he had published a letter in which he commended Oudinot for the attack on the Roman republic. When the National Assembly now voted the budget for the Roman expedition, Victor Hugo, out of alleged liberalism,

¹ *Homme de paille*: Man of straw.—Ed.

brought up this letter for discussion. The party of Order with scornfully incredulous outcries stifled the idea that Bonaparte's ideas could have any political importance. Not one of the ministers took up the gauntlet for him. On another occasion Barrot, with his well-known hollow rhetoric, let fall from the platform words of indignation concerning the "abominable intrigues" that, according to his assertion, went on in the immediate entourage of the President. Finally, while the ministry obtained from the National Assembly a widow's pension for the Duchess of Orleans it rejected any proposal to increase the Civil List of the President. And in Bonaparte the imperial pretender was so intimately bound up with the adventurer down on his luck that the one great idea, that he was called to restore the empire, was always supplemented by the other, that it was the mission of the French people to pay his debts.

The Barrot-Falloux ministry was the first and last *parliamentary ministry* that Bonaparte brought into being. Its dismissal forms, accordingly, a decisive turning-point. With it the party of Order lost, never to reconquer it, an indispensable post for the maintenance of the parliamentary regime, the lever of executive power. It is immediately obvious that in a country like France, where the executive power commands an army of officials numbering more than half a million individuals and therefore constantly maintains an immense mass of interests and livelihoods in the most absolute dependence; where the state enmeshes, controls, regulates, superintends and tutors civil society from its most comprehensive manifestations of life down to its most insignificant stirrings, from its most general modes of being to the private existence of individuals; where through the most extraordinary centralization this parasitic body acquires a ubiquity, an omniscience, a capacity for accelerated mobility and an elasticity which finds a counterpart only in the helpless dependence, in the loose shapelessness of the actual body politic—it is obvious that in such a country the National Assembly forfeits all real influence when it loses command of the ministerial posts, if it does not at the same time simplify the administration of the state, reduce the army of officials as far as possible and, finally, let civil society and public opinion create organs of their own, independent of the governmental power. But it is precisely with the maintenance of that extensive state machine in its numerous ramifications that the *material interests* of the French bourgeoisie are interwoven in the

closest fashion. Here it finds posts for its surplus population and makes up in the form of state salaries for what it cannot pocket in the form of profit, interest, rents and honorariums. On the other hand, its *political interests* compelled it to increase daily the repressive measures and therefore the resources and the personnel of the state power, while at the same time it had to wage an uninterrupted war against public opinion and mistrustfully mutilate, cripple, the independent organs of the social movement, where it did not succeed in amputating them entirely. Thus the French bourgeoisie was compelled by its class position to annihilate, on the one hand, the vital conditions of all parliamentary power, and therefore, likewise, of its own, and to render irresistible, on the other hand, the executive power hostile to it.

The new ministry was called the d'Hautpoul ministry. Not in the sense that General d'Hautpoul had received the rank of Prime Minister. Rather, simultaneously with Barrot's dismissal, Bonaparte abolished this dignity, which, true enough, condemned the President of the republic to the status of the legal nonentity of a constitutional monarch, but of a constitutional monarch without throne or crown, without sceptre or sword, without irresponsibility, without imprescriptible possession of the highest state dignity, and, worst of all, without a Civil List. The d'Hautpoul ministry contained only one man of parliamentary standing, the money-lender *Fould*, one of the most notorious of the high financiers. To his lot fell the ministry of finance. Look up the quotations on the Paris *bourse* and you will find that from November 1, 1849, onwards the French *fonds*¹ rise and fall with the rise and fall of Bonapartist stocks. While Bonaparte had thus found his ally in the *bourse*, he at the same time took possession of the police by appointing Carlier Police Prefect of Paris.

Only in the course of development, however, could the consequences of the change of ministers come to light. To begin with, Bonaparte had taken a step forward only to be driven backward all the more conspicuously. His brusque message was followed by the most servile declaration of allegiance to the National Assembly. As often as the ministers dared to make a diffident attempt to introduce his personal fads as legislative proposals, they themselves seemed to carry out, against their will only and compelled by their position, comical commissions of whose fruitless-

¹ *Fonds*: Government securities.—*Ed.*

ness they were persuaded in advance. As often as Bonaparte blurted out his intentions behind the ministers' backs and played with his "*idées napoléoniennes*," his own ministers disavowed him from the tribune of the National Assembly. His usurpatory longings seemed to make themselves heard only in order that the malicious laughter of his opponents might not be muted. He behaved like an unrecognized genius, whom all the world takes for a simpleton. Never did he enjoy the contempt of all classes in fuller measure than during this period. Never did the bourgeoisie rule more absolutely, never did it display more ostentatiously the insignia of domination.

I have not here to write the history of its legislative activity, which is summarized during this period in two laws: in the law re-establishing the *wine tax* and the *education law* abolishing unbelief. If wine drinking was made harder for the French, they were presented all the more plentifully with the water of true life. If in the law on the wine tax the bourgeoisie declared the old, hateful French tax system to be inviolable, it sought through the education law to ensure among the masses the old state of mind that put up with the tax system. One is astonished to see the Orleanists, the liberal bourgeois, these old apostles of Voltairianism and eclectic philosophy, entrust to their hereditary enemies, the Jesuits, the superintendence of the French mind. However, in regard to the pretenders to the throne, Orleanists and Legitimists could part company, they understood that to secure their united rule necessitated the uniting of the means of repression of two epochs, that the means of subjugation of the July Monarchy had to be supplemented and strengthened by the means of subjugation of the Restoration.

The peasants, disappointed in all their hopes, crushed more than ever by the low level of grain prices on the one hand, and by the growing burden of taxes and mortgage debts on the other, began to bestir themselves in the Departments. They were answered by a drive against the schoolmasters, who were made subject to the clergy, by a drive against the *maires*,¹ who were made subject to the prefects, and by a system of espionage, to which all were made subject. In Paris and the large towns reaction itself has the physiognomy of its epoch and challenges more than it strikes down. In the countryside it becomes dull, coarse, petty,

¹ *Maires*: Mayors.—*Ed.*

tiresome and vexatious, in a word, the *gendarme*. One comprehends how three years of the regime of the *gendarme*, consecrated by the regime of the priest, were bound to demoralize immature masses.

Whatever amount of passion and declamation might be employed by the party of Order against the minority from the tribune of the National Assembly, its speech remained as monosyllabic as that of the Christians, whose words were to be: Yea, yea; nay, nay! As monosyllabic on the platform as in the press. Flat as a riddle whose answer is known in advance. Whether it was a question of the right of petition or the tax on wine, freedom of the press or free trade, the clubs or the municipal charter, protection of personal liberty or regulation of the state budget, the watchword constantly recurs, the theme remains always the same, the verdict is ever ready and invariably reads: "*Socialism!*" Even bourgeois liberalism is declared *socialistic*, bourgeois enlightenment *socialistic*, bourgeois financial reform *socialistic*. It was *socialistic* to build a railway, where a canal already existed, and it was *socialistic* to defend oneself with a cane when one was attacked with a rapier.

This was not merely a figure of speech, fashion or party tactics. The bourgeoisie had a true insight into the fact that all the weapons which it had forged against feudalism turned their points against itself, that all the means of education which it had produced rebelled against its own civilization, that all the gods which it had created had fallen away from it. It understood that all the so-called bourgeois liberties and organs of progress attacked and menaced its *class rule* at its social foundation and its political summit simultaneously, and had therefore become "*socialistic*." In this menace and this attack it rightly discerned the secret of socialism, whose import and tendency it judges more correctly than so-called socialism knows how to judge itself; the latter can, accordingly, not comprehend why the bourgeoisie callously hardens its heart against it, whether it sentimentally bewails the sufferings of mankind, or in Christian spirit prophesies the millenium and universal brotherly love, or in humanistic style twaddles about mind, education and freedom, or in doctrinaire fashion excogitates a system for the conciliation and welfare of all classes. What the bourgeoisie did not grasp, however, was the logical conclusion that its *own parliamentary regime*, that its *political rule* in general, was now also bound to meet with the

general verdict of condemnation as being *socialistic*. As long as the rule of the bourgeois class had not been organized completely, as long as it had not acquired its pure political expression, the antagonism of the other classes, likewise, could not appear in its pure form, and where it did appear could not take the dangerous turn that transforms every struggle against the state power into a struggle against capital. If in every stirring of life in society it saw "tranquillity" imperilled, how could it want to maintain at the head of society a *regime of unrest*, its own regime, the *parliamentary regime*, this regime that, according to the expression of one of its spokesmen, lives in struggle and by struggle? The parliamentary regime lives by discussion; how shall it forbid discussion? Every interest, every social institution, is here transformed into general ideas, debated as ideas; how shall any interest, any institution, sustain itself above thought and impose itself as an article of faith? The struggle of the orators on the platform evokes the struggle of the scribblers of the press; the debating club in parliament is necessarily supplemented by debating clubs in the salons and the pothouses; the representatives, who constantly appeal to public opinion, give public opinion the right to speak its real mind in petitions. The parliamentary regime leaves everything to the decision of majorities; how shall the great majorities outside parliament not want to decide? When you play the fiddle at the top of the state, what else is to be expected but that those down below dance?

Thus, by now stigmatizing as "*socialistic*" what it had previously extolled as "*liberal*," the bourgeoisie confesses that its own interests dictate that it should be delivered from the danger of its *own rule*; that, in order to restore tranquillity in the country, its bourgeois parliament must, first of all, be given its quietus; that in order to preserve its social power intact, its political power must be broken; that the individual bourgeois can continue to exploit the other classes and to enjoy undisturbed property, family, religion and order only on condition that their class be condemned along with the other classes to like political nullity; that in order to save its purse, it must forfeit the crown, and the sword that is to safeguard it must at the same time be hung over its own head as a sword of Damocles.

In the domain of the interests of the general citizenry, the National Assembly showed itself so unproductive that, for example, the discussions on the Paris-Avignon railway, which

began in the winter of 1850, were still not ripe for conclusion on December 2, 1851. Where it did not repress or pursue a reactionary course it was stricken with incurable barrenness.

While Bonaparte's ministry partly took the initiative in framing laws in the spirit of the party of Order, and partly even outdid that party's harshness in their execution and administration, he, on the other hand, by childish silly proposals sought to win popularity, to bring out his opposition to the National Assembly, and to hint at a secret reserve that was only temporarily prevented by conditions from making its hidden treasures available to the French people. Such was the proposal to decree an increase in pay of four sous a day to the non-commissioned officers. Such was the proposal of an honour system loan bank for the workers. Money as a gift and money as a loan, it was with prospects such as these that he hoped to allure the masses. Donations and loans—the financial science of the *lumpenproletariat*, whether of high degree or low, is restricted to this. Such were the only springs which Bonaparte knew how to set in action. Never has a pretender speculated more stupidly on the stupidity of the masses.

The National Assembly flared up repeatedly over these unmistakable attempts to gain popularity at its expense, over the growing danger that this adventurer, whom his debts spurred on and no established reputation held back, would venture a desperate *coup*. The discord between the party of Order and the President had taken on a threatening character when an unexpected event threw him back repentant into its arms. We mean the *by-elections of March 10, 1850*. These elections were held for the purpose of filling the representatives' seats that after June 13 had been rendered vacant by imprisonment or exile. Paris elected only social-democratic candidates. It even concentrated most of the votes on an insurgent of June 1848, on Defflotte. Thus did the Parisian petty bourgeoisie, in alliance with the proletariat, revenge itself for its defeat on June 13, 1849. It seemed to have disappeared from the battlefield at the moment of danger only to reappear there on a more propitious occasion with more numerous fighting forces and with a bolder battle cry. One circumstance seemed to heighten the peril of this election victory. The army voted in Paris for the June insurgent against La Hitte, a minister of Bonaparte's, and in the Departments largely for the *Montagnards*,

who here, too, though indeed not so decisively as in Paris, maintained the ascendancy over their adversaries.

Bonaparte saw himself suddenly confronted with revolution once more. As on January 29, 1849, as on June 13, 1849, so on March 10, 1850, he disappeared behind the party of Order. He made obeisance, he pusillanimously begged pardon, he offered to appoint any ministry it pleased at the behest of the parliamentary majority, he even implored the Orleanist and Legitimist party leaders, the Thiers, the Berryers, the Broglies, the Molés, in brief, the so-called burgraves,¹ to take the helm of state themselves. The party of Order proved unable to take advantage of this opportunity that would never return. Instead of boldly possessing itself of the power offered, it did not even compel Bonaparte to reinstate the ministry dismissed on November 1; it contented itself with humiliating him by its forgiveness and adjoining *M. Baroche* to the d'Hautpoul ministry. As public prosecutor this Baroche had stormed and raged before the High Court at Bourges, the first time against the revolutionists of May 15, the second time against the democrats of June 13, both times because of an attempt on the life of the National Assembly. None of Bonaparte's ministers subsequently contributed more to the degradation of the National Assembly, and after December 2, 1851, we meet him once more as the comfortably installed and highly paid Vice-President of the Senate. He had spat in the revolutionists' soup in order that Bonaparte might eat it up.

The social-democratic party, for its part, seemed only to try to find pretexts for putting its own victory once again in doubt and for blunting its point. Vidal, one of the newly elected representatives of Paris, had been elected simultaneously in Strasbourg. He was induced to decline the election for Paris and accept it for Strasbourg. And so, instead of making its victory at the polls conclusive and thereby compelling the party of Order at once to contest it in parliament, instead of thus forcing the adversary to fight at the moment of popular enthusiasm and favourable mood in the army, the democratic party wearied Paris during the months of March and April with a new election

¹ *Burgraves*: The ironical name for members of the bureau of deputies of the party of Order in the Legislative Assembly to show the helpless ambitions and feudal aspirations of the Monarchists; this name has been taken from the title of Victor Hugo's drama.—*Ed.*

campaign, let the aroused popular passions wear themselves out in this repeated provisional election game, let the revolutionary energy satiate itself with constitutional successes, dissipate itself in petty intrigues, hollow declamations and sham movements, let the bourgeoisie rally and make its preparations, and, lastly, weakened the significance of the March elections by a sentimental commentary in the April by-election, that of Eugène Sue. In a word, it made an April Fool of March 10.

The parliamentary majority understood the weakness of its antagonist. Its seventeen burgraves—for Bonaparte had left to it the direction of and responsibility for the attack—drew up a new electoral law, the introduction of which was entrusted to M. Faucher, who solicited this honour for himself. On May 8 he introduced the law by which universal suffrage was to be abolished, a residence of three years in the locality of the election to be imposed as a condition on the electors and, finally, the proof of this residence made dependent in the case of workers on a certificate from their employers.

Just as the democrats had, in revolutionary fashion, agitated the minds and raged during the constitutional election contest, so now, when it was requisite to prove the serious nature of that victory arms in hand, did they in constitutional fashion preach order, majestic calm (*calme majestueux*), lawful action, that is to say, blind subjection to the will of the counter-revolution, which imposed itself as the law. During the debate the Mountain put the party of Order to shame by asserting, against the latter's revolutionary passionateness, the dispassionate attitude of the philistine who keeps within the law, and by felling that party to earth with the fearful reproach that it proceeded in a revolutionary manner. Even the newly elected deputies were at pains to prove by their decorous and discreet action what a misconception it was to decry them as anarchists and construe their election as a victory for revolution. On May 31, the new electoral law went through. The *Montagne* contented itself with smuggling a protest into the pocket of the President. The electoral law was followed by a new press law, by which the revolutionary newspaper press was entirely suppressed. It had deserved its fate. The *National* and *La Presse*,¹ two bourgeois organs, were left behind after this deluge as the most advanced outposts of the revolution.

¹ *La Presse*: A daily newspaper published in Paris from 1836.—*Ed.*

We have seen how during March and April the democratic leaders had done everything to embroil the people of Paris in a sham fight, how after May 8 they did everything to restrain them from a real fight. In addition to this, we must not forget that the year 1850 was one of the most splendid years of industrial and commercial prosperity, and the Paris proletariat was therefore fully employed. But the election law of May 31, 1850, excluded it from any participation in political power. It cut it off from the very arena of the struggle. It threw the workers back into the position of pariahs which they had occupied before the February Revolution. By letting themselves be led by the democrats in face of such an event and forgetting the revolutionary interests of their class for momentary ease and comfort, they renounced the honour of being a conquering power, surrendered to their fate, proved that the defeat of June 1848 had put them out of the fight for years and that the historical process would for the present again have to go on *over* their heads. So far as the petty-bourgeois democracy is concerned, which on June 13 had cried: "But if once universal suffrage is attacked, then we'll show them!", it now consoled itself with the contention that the counter-revolutionary blow which had struck it was no blow and the law of May 31 no law. On the second Sunday in May 1852, every Frenchman would appear at the polling place with ballot in one hand and sword in the other. With this prophecy it rested content. Lastly, the army was disciplined by its superior officers for the elections of March and April 1850, just as it had been disciplined for those of May 28, 1849. This time, however, it said decidedly: "The revolution shall not dupe us a third time."

The law of May 31, 1850, was the *coup d'état* of the bourgeoisie. All its conquests over the revolution hitherto had only a provisional character. They were endangered as soon as the existing National Assembly retired from the stage. They depended on the hazards of a new general election, and the history of elections since 1848 irrefutably proved that the bourgeoisie's moral sway over the mass of the people was lost in the same measure as its actual domination developed. On March 10, universal suffrage declared itself directly against the domination of the bourgeoisie; the bourgeoisie answered by outlawing universal suffrage. The law of May 31 was, therefore, one of the necessities of the class struggle. On the other hand, the Constitution required a minimum of two million votes to make an election of the President of the

republic valid. If none of the candidates for the presidency received this minimum, the National Assembly was to choose the President from among the three candidates to whom the largest number of votes would fall. At the time when the Constituent Assembly made this law, ten million electors were registered on the rolls of voters. In its view, therefore, a fifth of the people entitled to vote was sufficient to make the presidential election valid. The law of May 31 struck at least three million votes off the electoral rolls, reduced the number of people entitled to vote to seven million and, nevertheless, retained the legal minimum of two million for the presidential election. It therefore raised the legal minimum from a fifth to nearly a third of the effective votes, that is, it did everything to smuggle the election of the President out of the hands of the people and into the hands of the National Assembly. Thus through the electoral law of May 31 the party of Order seemed to have made its rule doubly secure, by surrendering the election of the National Assembly and that of the President of the republic to the stationary section of society.

V

As soon as the revolutionary crisis had been weathered and universal suffrage abolished, the struggle between the National Assembly and Bonaparte broke out again.

The Constitution had fixed Bonaparte's salary at 600,000 francs. Barely six months after his installation he succeeded in increasing this sum to twice as much, for Odilon Barrot wrung from the Constituent National Assembly an extra allowance of 600,000 francs a year for so-called representation moneys. After June 13, Bonaparte had caused similar requests to be voiced, this time without eliciting response from Barrot. Now, after May 31, he at once availed himself of the favourable moment and caused his ministers to propose a Civil List of three millions in the National Assembly. A long life of adventurous vagabondage had endowed him with the most developed antennae for feeling out the weak moments when he might squeeze money from his bourgeois. He practised regular *chantage*.¹ The National Assembly had violated the sovereignty of the people with his assistance and

¹ *Chantage*; Blackmail.—Ed.

his cognizance. He threatened to denounce its crime to the tribunal of the people unless it loosened its purse-strings and purchased his silence with three million a year. It had robbed three million Frenchmen of their franchise. He demanded, for every Frenchman out of circulation, a franc in circulation, precisely three million francs. He, the elect of six millions, claimed damages for the votes out of which he said he had retrospectively been cheated. The Commission of the National Assembly refused the importunate one. The Bonapartist press threatened. Could the National Assembly break with the President of the republic at a moment when in principle it had definitely broken with the mass of the nation? It rejected the annual Civil List, it is true, but it granted, for this once, an extra allowance of two million one hundred and sixty thousand francs. It thus rendered itself guilty of the double weakness of granting the money and of showing at the same time by its vexation that it granted it unwillingly. We shall see later for what purpose Bonaparte needed the money. After this vexatious aftermath, which followed on the heels of the abolition of universal suffrage and in which Bonaparte exchanged his humble attitude during the crisis of March and April for challenging impudence to the usurpatory parliament, the National Assembly adjourned for three months, from August 11 to November 11. In its place it left behind a Permanent Commission of twenty-eight members, which contained no Bonapartists, but did contain some moderate republicans. The Permanent Commission of 1849 had included only Order men and Bonapartists. But at that time the party of Order declared itself in permanence against the revolution. This time the parliamentary republic declared itself in permanence against the President. After the law of May 31, this was the only rival that still confronted the party of Order.

When the National Assembly met once more in November 1850, it seemed that, instead of the petty skirmishes it had hitherto had with the President, a great and ruthless struggle, a life-and-death struggle between the two powers, had become inevitable.

As in 1849 so during this year's parliamentary recess, the party of Order had broken up into its separate factions, each occupied with its own Restoration intrigues, which had obtained fresh nutriment through the death of Louis Philippe. The Legitimist king, Henry V, had even nominated a formal ministry which resided in Paris and in which members of the Permanent Com-

mission held seats. Bonaparte, in his turn, was therefore entitled to make tours of the French Departments, and according to the disposition of the town that he favoured with his presence, now more or less covertly, now more or less overtly, to divulge his own restoration plans and canvass votes for himself. On these processions, which the great official *Moniteur* and the little private *Moniteurs* of Bonaparte naturally had to celebrate as triumphal processions, he was constantly accompanied by persons affiliated with the *Society of December 10*. This society dates from the year 1849. On the pretext of founding a benevolent society, the *lumpenproletariat* of Paris had been organized into secret sections, each section being led by Bonapartist agents, with a Bonapartist general at the head to the whole. Alongside decayed *roués* with dubious means of subsistence and of dubious origin, alongside ruined and adventurous offshoots of the bourgeoisie, were vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jailbirds, escaped galley slaves, swindlers, mountebanks, *lazzaroni*, pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, *maquereaus*,¹ brothel keepers, porters, *litterati*, organ-grinders, rag-pickers, knife-grinders, tinkers, beggars—in short, the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass, thrown hither and thither, which the French term *la bohème*; from this kindred element Bonaparte formed the core of the Society of December 10. A “benevolent society”—in so far as, like Bonaparte, all its members felt the need of benefiting themselves at the expense of the labouring nation. This Bonaparte, who constitutes himself *chief of the lumpenproletariat*, who here alone rediscovers in mass form the interests which he personally pursues, who recognizes in this scum, offal, refuse of all classes the only class upon which he can base himself unconditionally, is the real Bonaparte, the Bonaparte *sans phrase*. An old crafty *roué*, he conceives the historical life of the nations and their performances of state as comedy in the most vulgar sense, as a masquerade where the grand costumes, words and postures merely serve to mask the pettiest knavery. Thus on his expedition to Strasbourg, where a trained Swiss vulture had played the part of the Napoleonic eagle. For his irruption into Boulogne he puts some London lackeys into French uniforms. They represent the army.² In his Society of December 10, he

¹ *Maquereaus*: Procurers.—*Ed.*

² Louis Bonaparte's first unsuccessful attempt to execute a *coup d'état* was made at Strasbourg in 1836. His second attempt, also unsuccessful, was at Boulogne, where he landed in 1840 to proclaim himself emperor.—*Ed.*

assembles ten thousand rascally fellows, who are to play the part of the people, as Nick Bottom that of the lion.¹ At a moment when the bourgeoisie itself played the most complete comedy, but in the most serious manner in the world, without infringing any of the pedantic conditions of French dramatic etiquette, and was itself half deceived, half convinced of the solemnity of its own performance of state, the adventurer, who took the comedy as plain comedy, was bound to win. Only when he has eliminated his solemn opponent, when he himself now takes his imperial role seriously and under the Napoleonic mask imagines he is the real Napoleon, does he become the victim of his own conception of the world, the serious buffoon who no longer takes world history for a comedy but his comedy for world history. What the national *ateliers* were for the socialist workers, what the *Gardes mobiles* were for the bourgeois republicans, the Society of December 10, the party fighting force characteristic of Bonaparte, was for him. On his journeys the detachments of this society packing the railways had to improvise a public for him, stage public enthusiasm, roar *vive l'Empereur*, insult and thrash republicans, of course under the protection of the police. On his return journeys to Paris they had to form the advance guard, forestall counter-demonstrations or disperse them. The Society of December 10 belonged to him, it was *his* work, his very own idea. Whatever else he appropriates is put into his hands by the force of circumstances; whatever else he does, the circumstances do for him or he is content to copy from the deeds of others. But Bonaparte with official phrases about order, religion, family and property in public, before the citizens, and with the secret society of the Schufferles and Spiegelbergs,² the society of disorder, prostitution and theft, behind him—that is Bonaparte himself as original author, and the history of the Society of December 10 is his own history.

Now it had happened by way of exception that people's representatives belonging to the party of Order came under the cudgels of the Decembrists. Still more. Yon, the Police Commissioner assigned to the National Assembly and charged with watching over its safety, acting on the deposition of a certain Alais, advised the

¹ The reference is to Shakespeare's comedy, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*.—Ed.

² *Schufferle and Spiegelberg*: Characters in Schiller's drama, *The Robbers*.—Ed.

Permanent Commission that a section of the Decembrists had decided to assassinate General Changarnier and Dupin, the President of the National Assembly, and had already designated the individuals who were to perpetrate the deed. One comprehends the terror of M. Dupin. A parliamentary enquiry into the Society of December 10, that is, the profanation of the Bonapartist secret world, seemed inevitable. Just before the meeting of the National Assembly Bonaparte providently disbanded his society, naturally only on paper, for in a detailed memoir at the end of 1851 Police Prefect Carlier still sought in vain to move him to really break up the Decembrists.

The Society of December 10 was to remain the private army of Bonaparte until he succeeded in transforming the public army into a Society of December 10. Bonaparte made the first attempt at this shortly after the adjournment of the National Assembly, and precisely with the money just wrested from it. As a fatalist, he lives in the conviction that there are certain higher powers which man, and the soldier in particular, cannot withstand. Among these powers he counts, first and foremost, cigars and champagne, cold poultry and garlic sausage. Accordingly, to begin with, he treats officers and non-commissioned officers in his Elysée apartments to cigars and champagne, to cold poultry and garlic sausage. On October 3 he repeats this manoeuvre with the mass of the troops at the St. Maur review, and on October 10 the same manoeuvre on a still larger scale at the Satory army parade. The Uncle remembered the campaigns of Alexander in Asia, the Nephew the triumphal marches of Bacchus in the same land. Alexander was a demigod, to be sure, but Bacchus was a god and moreover the tutelary deity of the Society of December 10.

After the review of October 3, the Permanent Commission summoned War Minister d'Hautpoul. He promised that these breaches of discipline should not recur. We know how on October 10 Bonaparte kept d'Hautpoul's word. As Commander-in-Chief of the Paris army, Changarnier had commanded at both reviews. He, at once a member of the Permanent Commission, chief of the National Guard, the "saviour" of January 29 and June 13, the "bulwark of society," the candidate of the party of Order for presidential honours, the suspected Monk of two monarchies, had hitherto never acknowledged himself as the subordinate of the War Minister, had always openly derided the republican Constitution and had pursued Bonaparte with an ambiguous lordly protection.

Now he was consumed with zeal for discipline against the War Minister and for the Constitution against Bonaparte. While on October 10 a section of the cavalry raised the shout: "*Vive Napoléon! Vivent les saucissons!*"¹ Changarnier arranged that at least the infantry marching past under the command of his friend Neumayer should preserve an icy silence. As a punishment, the War Minister relieved General Neumayer of his post in Paris at Bonaparte's instigation, on the pretext of appointing him commanding general of the fourteenth and fifteenth military divisions. Neumayer refused this exchange of posts and so had to resign. Changarnier, for his part, published an order of the day on November 2, in which he forbade the troops to indulge in political outcries or demonstrations of any kind while under arms. The Elysée newspapers² attacked Changarnier; the papers of the party of Order attacked Bonaparte; the Permanent Commission held repeated secret sessions in which it was repeatedly proposed to declare the country in danger; the army seemed divided into two hostile camps, with two hostile general staffs, one in the Elysée, where Bonaparte resided, the other in the Tuileries, the quarters of Changarnier. It seemed that only the meeting of the National Assembly was needed to give the signal for battle. The French public judged this friction between Bonaparte and Changarnier like that English journalist who characterized it in the following words: "The political housemaids of France are sweeping away the glowing lava of the revolution with old brooms and wrangle with one another while they do their work."

Meanwhile, Bonaparte hastened to remove the War Minister, d'Hautpoul, to pack him off in all haste to Algiers and to appoint General Schramm War Minister in his place. On November 12, he sent to the National Assembly a message of American prolixity, overloaded with detail, redolent of order, desirous of reconciliation, constitutionally acquiescent, treating of all and sundry, but not of the *questions brûlantes*³ of the moment. As if in passing, he made the remark that according to the express provisions of the Constitution the President alone could dispose of the army. The message closed with the following words of great solemnity:

¹ "Hurrah for Napoleon! Hurrah for the sausages!"—*Ed.*

² *Elysée Newspapers*: Newspapers of the Bonapartist trend.—*Ed.*

³ *Questions brûlantes*: Burning questions.—*Ed.*

"Above all things, France demands tranquillity. . . . But bound by an oath, I shall keep within the narrow limits that it has set for me. . . . As far as I am concerned, elected by the people and owing my power to it alone, I shall always bow to its lawfully expressed will. Should you resolve at this session on a revision of the Constitution, a Constituent Assembly will regulate the position of the executive power. If not, then the people will solemnly pronounce its decision in 1852. But whatever the solutions of the future may be, let us come to an understanding, so that passion, surprise or violence may never decide the destiny of a great nation. . . . What occupies my attention, above all, is not who will rule France in 1852, but how to employ the time which remains at my disposal so that the intervening period may pass by without agitation or disturbance. I have opened my heart to you with sincerity; you will answer my frankness with your trust, my good endeavours with your co-operation, and God will do the rest."

The respectable, hypocritically moderate, virtuously commonplace language of the bourgeoisie reveals its deepest meaning in the mouth of the autocrat of the Society of December 10 and the picnic hero of St. Maur and Satory.

The burgraves of the party of Order did not delude themselves for a moment concerning the trust that this opening of the heart deserved. About oaths they had long been *blasé*; they numbered in their midst veterans and virtuosos of political perjury. Nor had they failed to hear the passage about the army. They observed with annoyance that in its discursive enumeration of lately enacted laws the message passed over the most important law, the electoral law, in studied silence, and moreover, in the event of there being no revision of the Constitution, left the election of the President in 1852 to the people. The electoral law was the leaden ball chained to the feet of the party of Order, which prevented it from walking and so much the more from storming forward! Moreover, by the official disbandment of the Society of December 10 and the dismissal of the War Minister d'Hautpoul, Bonaparte had with his own hand sacrificed the scapegoats on the altar of the country. He had blunted the edge of the expected collision. Finally, the party of Order itself anxiously sought to avoid, to mitigate, to gloss over any decisive conflict with the executive power. For fear of losing their conquests over the revolution, they allowed their rival to carry off the fruits thereof. "Above all

things, France demands tranquillity." This was what the party of Order had cried to the revolution since February,¹ this was what Bonaparte's message cried to the party of Order. "Above all things, France demands tranquillity." Bonaparte committed acts that aimed at usurpation, but the party of Order committed "unrest" if it raised a row about these acts and construed them hypochondriacally. The sausages of Satory were quiet as mice when no one spoke of them. "Above all things, France demands tranquillity." Bonaparte demanded, therefore, that he be left in peace to do as he liked and the parliamentary party was paralyzed by a double fear, by the fear of again evoking revolutionary unrest and by the fear of itself appearing as the instigator of unrest in the eyes of its own class, in the eyes of the bourgeoisie. Consequently, since France demanded tranquillity above all things, the party of Order dared not answer "war" after Bonaparte had talked "peace" in his message. The public, which had anticipated scenes of great scandal at the opening of the National Assembly, was cheated of its expectations. The opposition deputies, who demanded the submission of the Permanent Commission's minutes on the October events, were outvoted by the majority. On principle, all debates that might cause excitement were eschewed. The proceedings of the National Assembly during November and December 1850 were without interest.

At last, towards the end of December, guerilla warfare began over a number of prerogatives of parliament. The movement got bogged in petty squabbles regarding the prerogatives of the two powers, since the bourgeoisie had done away with the class struggle for the moment by abolishing universal suffrage.

A judgement for debt had been obtained from the court against Mauguin, one of the People's Representatives. In answer to the enquiry of the President of the Court, the Minister of Justice, Rouher, declared that a *capias* should be issued against the debtor without further ado. Mauguin was thus thrown into the debtors' jail. The National Assembly flared up when it learned of the assault. Not only did it order his immediate release, but it even had him fetched forcibly from Clichy the same evening, by its *greffier*.² In order, however, to confirm its faith in the sanctity of private property and with the idea at the back of its mind of opening, in

¹ 1848.—*Ed.*

² *Greffier*: Clerk.—*Ed.*

case of need, an asylum for *Montagnards* who had become troublesome, it declared imprisonment of People's Representatives for debt permissible after previously obtaining its consent. It forgot to decree that the President might also be locked up for debt. It destroyed the last semblance of the immunity that enveloped the members of its own body.

It will be remembered that, acting on the information given by a certain Alais, Police Commissioner Yon had denounced a section of the Decembrists for planning the murder of Dupin and Changarnier. In reference to this, at the very first sitting the questors made the proposal that parliament should form a police force of its own, paid out of the private budget of the National Assembly and absolutely independent of the police prefect. The Minister of the Interior, Baroche, protested against this invasion of his domain. A miserable compromise on this matter was concluded, according to which, true, the police commissioner of the Assembly was to be paid out of its private budget and to be appointed and dismissed by its questors, but only after previous agreement with the Minister of the Interior. Meanwhile criminal proceedings had been taken by the government against Alais, and here it was easy to represent his information as a hoax and through the mouth of the public prosecutor to cast ridicule upon Dupin, Changarnier, Yon and the whole National Assembly. Thereupon, on December 29, Minister Baroche writes a letter to Dupin in which he demands Yon's dismissal. The Bureau of the National Assembly decides to retain Yon in his position, but the National Assembly, alarmed by its violence in the Mauguin affair and accustomed when it has ventured a blow at the executive power to receive two blows from it in return, does not sanction this decision. It dismisses Yon as a reward for his official zeal and robs itself of a parliamentary prerogative indispensable against a man who does not decide by night in order to execute by day, but who decides by day and executes by night.

We have seen how on great and striking occasions during the months of November and December the National Assembly avoided or quashed the struggle with the executive power. Now we see it compelled to take it up on the pettiest occasions. In the Mauguin affair it confirms the principle of imprisoning People's Representatives for debt, but reserves the right to have it applied only to representatives obnoxious to itself and wrangles over this infamous privilege with the Minister of Justice. Instead of avail-

ing itself of the alleged murder plot to decree an enquiry into the Society of December 10 and irredeemably unmasking Bonaparte before France and Europe in his true character of chief of the Paris *lumpenproletariat*, it lets the conflict be degraded to a point where the only issue between it and the Minister of the Interior is which of them has the authority to appoint and dismiss a police commissioner. Thus, during the whole of this period, we see the party of Order compelled by its equivocal position to dissipate and disintegrate its struggle with the executive power in petty jurisdictional squabbles, petty-foggery, legalistic hairsplitting, and delimitational disputes, and to make the most ridiculous matters of form the substance of its activity. It does not dare to take up the conflict at the moment when this has significance from the standpoint of principle, when the executive power has really exposed itself and the cause of the National Assembly would be the cause of the nation. By so doing it would give the nation its marching orders, and it fears nothing more than that the nation should move. On such occasions it accordingly rejects the motions of the *Montagne* and proceeds to the order of the day. The question at issue in its larger aspects having thus been dropped, the executive power calmly bides the time when it can again take up the same question on petty and insignificant occasions, when this is, so to speak, of only local parliamentary interest. Then the repressed rage of the party of Order breaks out, then it tears away the curtain from the coulisses, then it denounces the President, then it declares the republic in danger, but then, also, its fervour appears absurd and the occasion for the struggle seems a hypocritical pretext or altogether not worth fighting about. The parliamentary storm becomes a storm in a teacup, the fight becomes an intrigue, the conflict a scandal. While the revolutionary classes gloat with malicious joy over the humiliation of the National Assembly, for they are just as enthusiastic about the parliamentary prerogatives of this Assembly as the latter is about the public liberties, the bourgeoisie outside parliament does not understand how the bourgeoisie inside parliament can waste time over such petty squabbles and imperil tranquillity by such pitiful rivalries with the President. It becomes confused by a strategy that makes peace at the moment when all the world is expecting battles, and attacks at the moment when all the world believes peace has been made.

On December 20, Pascal Duprat interpellated the Minister of the Interior concerning the Gold Bars Lottery. This lottery was a "daughter of Elysium." Bonaparte with his faithful followers had brought her into the world and Police Prefect Carlier had placed her under his official protection, although French law forbids all lotteries with the exception of raffles for charitable purposes. Seven million lottery tickets at a franc apiece, the profits ostensibly to be devoted to shipping Parisian vagabonds to California. On the one hand, golden dreams were to supplant the socialist dreams of the Paris proletariat; the seductive prospect of the first prize, the doctrinaire right to work. Naturally, the Paris workers did not recognize in the glitter of the California gold bars the inconspicuous francs that were enticed out of their pockets. In the main, however, the matter was nothing short of a downright swindle. The vagabonds who wanted to open California gold mines without troubling to leave Paris were Bonaparte himself and his debt-ridden Round Table. The three millions voted by the National Assembly had been squandered in riotous living; in one way or another the coffers had to be replenished. In vain had Bonaparte opened a national subscription for the building of so-called *cités ouvrières*,¹ and figured at the head of the list himself with a considerable sum. The hard-hearted bourgeois waited mistrustfully for him to pay up his share and since this, naturally, did not ensue, the speculation in socialist castles in the air fell straightway to the ground. The gold bars proved a better draw. Bonaparte & Co. were not content to pocket part of the excess of the seven millions over the bars to be allotted in prizes; they manufactured false lottery tickets; they issued ten, fifteen and even twenty tickets with the same number—a financial operation in the spirit of the Society of December 10! Here the National Assembly was confronted not with the fictitious President of the republic, but with Bonaparte in the flesh. Here it could catch him in the act, in conflict not with the Constitution but with the *Code pénal*. If on Duprat's interpellation it proceeded to the order of the day, this did not happen merely because Girardin's motion that it should declare itself "*satisfait*" reminded the party of Order of its own systematic corruption. The bourgeois and, above all, the bourgeois inflated into a statesman, supplements his practical meanness by theoretical extravagance. As a statesman he be-

¹ *Cités ouvrières*: Workers' settlements.—Ed.

comes, like the state power that confronts him, a higher being that can only be fought in a higher, consecrated fashion.

Bonaparte, who precisely because he was a Bohemian, a princely *lumpenproletarian*, had the advantage over a rascally bourgeois in that he could conduct the struggle meanly, now saw, after the Assembly had itself guided him with its own hand across the slippery ground of the military banquets, the reviews, the Society of December 10, and, finally, the *Code pénal*, that the moment had come when he could pass from an apparent defensive to the offensive. The minor defeats meanwhile sustained by the Minister of Justice, the Minister of War, the Minister of the Navy and the Minister of Finance, through which the National Assembly signified its snarling displeasure, troubled him little. He not only prevented the ministers from resigning and thus recognizing the sovereignty of parliament over the executive power, but could now consummate what he had begun during the recess of the National Assembly: the severance of the military power from parliament, the *removal of Changarnier*.

An Elysée paper published an order of the day alleged to have been addressed during the month of May to the First Military Division, and therefore proceeding from Changarnier, in which the officers were recommended, in the event of an insurrection, to give no quarter to the traitors in their own ranks, but to shoot them immediately and refuse the National Assembly the troops, should it requisition them. On January 3, 1851, the Cabinet was interpellated concerning this order of the day. For the investigation of this matter it requests a breathing space, first of three months, then of a week, finally of only twenty-four hours. The Assembly insists on an immediate explanation. Changarnier rises and declares that there never was such an order of the day. He adds that he will always hasten to comply with the demands of the National Assembly and that in case of a clash it can count on him. It receives his declaration with indescribable applause and passes a vote of confidence in him. It abdicates, it decrees its own impotence and the omnipotence of the army by placing itself under the private protection of a general; but the general deceives himself when he puts at its command against Bonaparte a power that he only holds as a fief from the same Bonaparte and when, in his turn, he expects to be protected by this parliament, by his own protégé in need of protection. Changarnier, however, believes in the mysterious power with which the bourgeoisie has endowed

him since January 29, 1849. He considers himself the third power, existing side by side with both the other state powers. He shares the fate of the rest of this epoch's heroes, or rather saints, whose greatness consists precisely in the biased great opinion of them that their party creates in its own interests and who shrink to everyday figures as soon as circumstances call on them to perform miracles. Unbelief is, in general, the mortal enemy of these reputed heroes and real saints. Hence their majestically moral indignation at the dearth of enthusiasm displayed by wits and scoffers.

The same evening, the ministers were summoned to the Elysée; Bonaparte insists on the dismissal of Changarnier; five ministers refuse to sign it; the *Moniteur* announces a ministerial crisis, and the press of the party of Order threatens to form a parliamentary army under Changarnier's command. The party of Order had constitutional authority to take this step. It merely had to appoint Changarnier President of the National Assembly and requisition any number of troops it pleased for its protection. It could do so all the more safely as Changarnier still actually stood at the head of the army and the Paris National Guard and was only waiting to be requisitioned together with the army. The Bonapartist press did not as yet even dare to question the right of the National Assembly directly to requisition troops, a legal scruple that in the given circumstances did not promise any success. That the army would have obeyed the orders of the National Assembly is probable when one bears in mind that Bonaparte had to search all Paris for eight days in order, finally, to find two generals—Baraguey d'Hilliers and Saint-Jean d'Angely—who declared themselves ready to countersign Changarnier's dismissal. That the party of Order, however, would have found in its own ranks and in parliament the necessary number of votes for such a resolution is more than doubtful, when one considers that eight days later two hundred and eighty-six votes detached themselves from the party and that in December 1851, at the last hour for decision, the *Montagne* still rejected a similar proposal. Nevertheless, the burgraves might, perhaps, still have succeeded in spurring the mass of their party to a heroism that consisted in feeling themselves secure behind a forest of bayonets and accepting the services of an army that had deserted to their camp. Instead of this, on the evening of January 6 Messrs. the Burgraves betook themselves to the Elysée in order to make Bonaparte desist from dis-

missing Changarnier by using statesmanlike phrases and urging considerations of state. Whomever one seeks to persuade, one acknowledges as master of the situation. On January 12, Bonaparte, assured by this step, appoints a new ministry in which the leaders of the old ministry, Fould and Baroche, remain. Saint-Jean d'Angely becomes War Minister, the *Moniteur* publishes the decree dismissing Changarnier, and his command is divided between Baraguey d'Hilliers, who receives the First Army Division, and Perrot, who receives the National Guard. The bulwark of society has been discharged, and while this does not cause any tiles to fall from the roofs, quotations on the *bourse* are, on the other hand, going up.

By repulsing the army, which places itself in the person of Changarnier at its disposal, and so surrendering the army irrevocably to the President, the party of Order declares that the bourgeoisie has forfeited its vocation to rule. A parliamentary ministry no longer existed. Having now indeed lost its grip on the army and National Guard, what forcible means remained to it with which simultaneously to maintain the usurped authority of parliament over the people and its constitutional authority against the President? None. Only the appeal to forceless principles remained to it now, to principles that it had itself always interpreted merely as general rules, which one prescribes for others in order to be able to move all the more freely oneself. The dismissal of Changarnier and the falling of the military power into Bonaparte's hands closes the first part of the period we are considering, the period of struggle between the party of Order and the executive power. War between the two powers has now been openly declared, is openly waged, but only after the party of Order has lost both arms and soldiers. Without the ministry, without the army, without the people, without public opinion, after its Electoral Law of May 31 no longer the representative of the sovereign nation, *sans eyes, sans ears, sans teeth, sans everything*, the National Assembly had undergone a gradual transformation into an *ancient French Parliament* that has to leave action to the government and content itself with growling remonstrances *post festum*.¹

The party of Order receives the new ministry with a storm of indignation. General Bedeau recalls to mind the mildness of the

¹ *Post festum*: After the feast, that is, belatedly.—*Ed.*

Permanent Commission during the recess, and the excessive consideration it had shown by waiving the publication of its minutes. The minister of the Interior now himself insists on the publication of these minutes, which by this time have naturally become as dull as ditchwater, disclose no fresh facts and have not the slightest effect on the *blasé* public. Upon Rémusat's proposal the National Assembly retires into its bureaux and appoints a "Committee for Extraordinary Measures." Paris departs the less from the rut of its everyday routine, since at this moment trade is prosperous, manufactories are busy, corn prices low, foodstuffs overflowing and the savings banks receive fresh deposits daily. The "extraordinary measures" that parliament has announced with so much noise fizzle out on January 18 in a no-confidence vote against the ministry without General Changarnier even being mentioned. The party of Order had been forced to frame its motion in this way in order to secure the votes of the republicans, as of all the measures of the ministry, Changarnier's dismissal is precisely the only one which the republicans approve of, while the party of Order is in fact not in a position to censure the other ministerial acts, which it had itself dictated.

The no-confidence vote of January 18 was passed by four hundred and fifteen votes to two hundred and eighty-six. Thus, it was carried only by a *coalition* of the extreme Legitimists and Orleanists with the pure republicans and the *Montagne*. Thus it proved that the party of Order had lost in conflicts with Bonaparte not only the ministry, not only the army, but also its independent parliamentary majority, that a squad of representatives had deserted from its camp, out of fanaticism for conciliation, out of fear of the struggle, out of lassitude, out of family regard for the state salaries so near and dear to them, out of speculation on ministerial posts becoming vacant (Odilon Barrot), out of sheer egoism, which makes the ordinary bourgeois always inclined to sacrifice the general interest of his class for this or that private motive. From the first, the Bonapartist representatives adhered to the party of Order only in the struggle against revolution. The leader of the Catholic party, Montalembert, had already at that time thrown his influence into the Bonapartist scale, since he despaired of the parliamentary party's prospects of life. Lastly, the leaders of this party, Thiers and Berryer, the Orleanist and the Legitimist, were compelled openly to proclaim themselves republicans, to confess that their hearts were royalist but their heads

republican, that the parliamentary republic was the sole possible form for the rule of the bourgeoisie as a whole. Thus they were compelled, before the eyes of the bourgeois class itself, to stigmatize the Restoration plans, which they continued indefatigably to pursue behind parliament's back as an intrigue as dangerous as it was brainless.

The no-confidence vote of January 18 hit the ministers and not the President. But it was not the ministry, it was the President who had dismissed Changarnier. Should the party of Order impeach Bonaparte himself? On account of his restoration desires? The latter merely supplemented their own. On account of his conspiracy in connection with the military reviews and the Society of December 10? They had buried these themes long since under simple orders of the day. On account of the dismissal of the hero of January 29 and June 13, the man who in May 1850 threatened to set fire to all four corners of Paris in the event of a rising? Their allies of the *Montagne* and Cavaignac did not even allow them to raise the fallen bulwark of society by means of an official attestation of sympathy. They themselves could not deny the President the constitutional authority to dismiss a general. They only raged because he made an unparliamentary use of his constitutional right. Had they not continually made an unconstitutional use of their parliamentary prerogative, particularly in regard to the abolition of universal suffrage? They were therefore reduced to moving within strictly parliamentary limits. And it took that peculiar malady which since 1848 has raged all over the Continent, *parliamentary cretinism*, which holds those infected by it fast in an imaginary world and robs them of all sense, all memory, all understanding of the rude external world—it took this parliamentary cretinism for those who had destroyed all the conditions of parliamentary power with their own hands, and were bound to destroy them in their struggle with the other classes, still to regard their parliamentary victories as victories and to believe they hit the President by striking at his ministers. They merely gave him the opportunity to humiliate the National Assembly afresh in the eyes of the nation. On January 20 the *Moniteur* announced that the resignation of the entire ministry had been accepted. On the pretext that no parliamentary party any longer had a majority, as the vote of January 18, this fruit of the coalition between *Montagne* and royalists, proved, and pending the formation of a new majority, Bonaparte appointed

a so-called transition ministry, not one member of which was a member of parliament, all being absolutely unknown and insignificant individuals, a ministry of mere clerks and copyists. The party of Order could now work to exhaustion playing with these marionettes; the executive power no longer thought it worth while to be seriously represented in the National Assembly. The more his ministers were pure dummies, the more manifestly Bonaparte concentrated the whole executive power in his own person and the more scope he had to exploit it for his own ends.

In coalition with the *Montagne*, the party of Order revenged itself by rejecting the grant to the President of one million eight hundred thousand francs, which the chief of the Society of December 10 had compelled his ministerial clerks to propose. This time a majority of only a hundred and two votes decided the matter; thus twenty-seven fresh votes had fallen away since January 18; the dissolution of the party of Order was making progress. At the same time, in order that there might not for a moment be any mistake about the meaning of its coalition with the *Montagne*, it scorned even to consider a proposal signed by a hundred and eighty-nine members of the *Montagne* calling for a general amnesty of political offenders. It sufficed for the Minister of the Interior, a certain Vaisse, to declare that the tranquillity was only apparent, that in secret great agitation prevailed, that in secret ubiquitous societies were being organized, the democratic papers were preparing to come out again, the reports from the Departments were unfavourable, the Geneva refugees were directing a conspiracy spreading by way of Lyons over all the south of France, France was on the verge of an industrial and commercial crisis, the manufacturers of Roubaix had reduced working hours, that the prisoners of Belle Isle¹ were in revolt—it sufficed for even a mere Vaisse to conjure up the red spectre and the party of Order rejected without discussion a motion that would certainly have won the National Assembly immense popularity and thrown Bonaparte back into its arms. Instead of letting itself be intimidated by the executive power with the prospect of fresh disturbances, it ought rather to have allowed the class struggle a little elbowroom, so as to keep the executive power dependent on itself. But it did not feel equal to the task of playing with fire.

¹ *Belle Isle*: An island off the Western coast of France on which revolutionists sentenced after 1848 were incarcerated.—Ed.

Meanwhile, the so-called transition ministry continued to vegetate until the middle of April. Bonaparte wearied and befuddled the National Assembly with continual new ministerial combinations. Now he seemed to want to form a republican ministry with Lamartine and Billault, now a parliamentary one with the inevitable Odilon Barrot, whose name may never be missing when a dupe is necessary, then a Legitimist ministry with Vatimesnil and Benoist d'Azy, and then again an Orleanist one with Maleville. While he thus kept the different factions of the party of Order in tension against one another and alarmed them as a whole by the prospect of a republican ministry and the consequent inevitable restoration of universal suffrage, he at the same time engendered in the bourgeoisie the conviction that his honest efforts to form a parliamentary ministry were being frustrated by the irreconcilability of the royalist factions. The bourgeoisie, however, cried out all the louder for a "strong government"; it found it all the more unpardonable to leave France "without administration," the more a general commercial crisis seemed now to be approaching and won recruits for socialism in the towns, just as the ruinously low price of corn did in the countryside. Trade became daily slacker, the unemployed hands increased perceptibly, ten thousand workers, at least, were breadless in Paris, innumerable factories stood idle in Rouen, Mulhouse, Lyons, Roubaix, Tourcoing, St. Etienne, Elbeuf, etc. Under these circumstances Bonaparte could venture, on April 11, to restore the ministry of January 18: Messrs. Rouher, Fould, Baroche, etc., reinforced by M. Léon Faucher, whom the Constituent Assembly during its last days had, with the exception of five votes cast by ministers, unanimously stigmatized by a vote of no-confidence for sending out false telegrams. The National Assembly had therefore gained a victory over the ministry on January 18, had struggled with Bonaparte for three months, only to have Fould and Baroche on April 11 admit the puritan Faucher as a third party into their ministerial alliance.

In November 1849, Bonaparte had contented himself with an *unparliamentary* ministry, in January 1851 with an *extra-parliamentary* one, and on April 11 he felt strong enough to form an *anti-parliamentary* ministry, which harmoniously combined in itself the no-confidence votes of both Assemblies, the Constituent and the Legislative, the republican and the royalist. This gradation of ministries was the thermometer with which parliament

could measure the decrease of its own vital heat. By the end of April the latter had fallen so low that Persigny, in a personal interview, could urge Changarnier to go over to the camp of the President. Bonaparte, he assured him, regarded the influence of the National Assembly as completely destroyed, and the proclamation was already prepared that was to be published after the *coup d'état*, which was kept steadily in view but was by chance again postponed. Changarnier informed the leaders of the party of Order of the obituary notice, but who believes that bedbug bites are fatal? And parliament, stricken, disintegrated and death-tainted as it was, could not prevail upon itself to see in its duel with the grotesque chief of the Society of December 10 anything but a duel with a bedbug. But Bonaparte answered the party of Order as Agesilaus did King Agis:

"I seem to thee an ant, but one day I shall be a lion."

VI

The coalition with the *Montagne* and the pure republicans, to which the party of Order saw itself condemned in its unavailing efforts to maintain possession of the military power and to reconquer supreme control of the executive power, proved incontrovertibly that it had forfeited its independent *parliamentary majority*. On May 28, the mere power of the calendar, of the hour hand of the clock, gave the signal for its complete disintegration. With May 28, the last year of the life of the National Assembly began. It had now to decide for continuing the Constitution unaltered or for revising it. But revision of the Constitution, that implied not only rule of the bourgeoisie or of the petty-bourgeois democracy, democracy or proletarian anarchy, parliamentary republic or Bonaparte, it implied at the same time Orleans or Bourbon! Thus fell in the midst of parliament the apple of discord that was bound to inflame openly the conflict of interests which split the party of Order into hostile factions. The party of Order was a combination of heterogeneous social substances. The question of revision generated a political temperature at which the product again decomposed into its original constituents.

The interest of the Bonapartists in a revision was simple. For them it was above all a question of abolishing Article 45, which forbade Bonaparte's re-election and the prorogation of his authority. No less simple appeared the position of the republicans. They

unconditionally rejected any revision; they saw in it a universal conspiracy against the republic. Since they commanded *more than a quarter of the votes* in the National Assembly and, according to the Constitution, three-quarters of the votes were required for a resolution for revision to be legally valid and for the convocation of a revising Assembly, they only needed to count their votes to be sure of victory. And they were sure of victory.

As against these clear positions, the party of Order found itself caught in inextricable contradictions. If it should reject revision, it would imperil the *status quo*, since it would leave Bonaparte only one way out, that of force, and since on the second Sunday in May 1852, at the decisive moment, it would be surrendering France to revolutionary anarchy, with a President who had lost his authority, with a parliament which for a long time had not possessed it and with a people that meant to reconquer it. If it voted for constitutional revision, it knew that it voted in vain and would be bound to fail constitutionally because of the veto of the republicans. If it unconstitutionally declared a simple majority vote to be binding, then it could hope to dominate the revolution only if it subordinated itself unconditionally to the sovereignty of the executive power, then it would make Bonaparte master of the Constitution, of its revision and of itself. Only a partial revision which would prolong the authority of the President would pave the way for imperial usurpation. A general revision which would shorten the existence of the republic would bring the dynastic claims into unavoidable conflict, for the conditions of a Bourbon and the conditions of an Orleanist Restoration were not only different, they were mutually exclusive.

The parliamentary republic was more than the neutral territory on which the two factions of the French bourgeoisie, Legitimists and Orleanists, large landed property and industry, could dwell side by side with equality of rights. It was the unavoidable condition of their *common* rule, the sole form of state in which their general class interest subjected to itself at the same time both the claims of their particular factions and all the remaining classes of society. As royalists they fell back into their old antagonism, into the struggle for the supremacy of landed property or of money, and the highest expression of this antagonism, its personification, was their kings themselves, their dynasties. Hence the resistance of the party of Order to the *recall of the Bourbons*.

The Orleanist and people's representative Creton had in 1849, 1850 and 1851 periodically introduced a motion for the revocation of the decree exiling the royal families. Just as regularly parliament presented the spectacle of an Assembly of royalists that obdurately barred the gates through which their exiled kings might return home. Richard III had murdered Henry VI, remarking that he was too good for this world and belonged in heaven. They declared France too bad to possess her kings again. Constrained by force of circumstances, they had become republicans and repeatedly sanctioned the popular decision that banished their kings from France.

A revision of the Constitution—and circumstances compelled taking it into consideration—called in question, along with the republic, the common rule of the two bourgeois factions, and revived, with the possibility of a monarchy, the rivalry of the interests which it had predominantly represented by turns, the struggle for the supremacy of one faction over the other. The diplomats of the party of Order believed they could settle the struggle by an amalgamation of the two dynasties, by a so-called *fusion* of the royalist parties and their royal houses. The real fusion of the Restoration and the July Monarchy was the parliamentary republic, in which Orleanist and Legitimist colours were obliterated and the various species of bourgeois disappeared in the bourgeois as such, in the bourgeois genus. Now, however, Orleanist was to become Legitimist and Legitimist Orleanist. Royalty, in which their antagonism was personified, was to embody their unity; the expression of their exclusive factional interests was to become the expression of their common class interest; the monarchy was to do that which only the abolition of two monarchies, the republic, could do and had done. This was the philosopher's stone, to produce which the doctors of the party of Order racked their brains. As if the Legitimist monarchy could ever become the monarchy of the industrial bourgeois or the bourgeois monarchy ever become the monarchy of the hereditary landed aristocracy. As if landed property and industry could fraternize under *one* crown, when the crown could only descend to one head, the head of the elder brother or of the younger. As if industry could come to terms with landed property at all, so long as landed property does not decide itself to become industrial. If Henry V should die tomorrow, the Count of Paris would not on that account become the king of the Legitimists unless he ceased

to be the king of the Orleanists. The philosophers of fusion, however, who became more vociferous in proportion as the question of revision came to the fore, who had provided themselves with an official daily organ in the *Assemblée Nationale*¹ and who are again at work even at this very moment (February 1852), considered the whole difficulty to be due to the opposition and rivalry of the two dynasties. The attempts to reconcile the Orleans family with Henry V, begun since the death of Louis Philippe, but, like the dynastic intrigues generally, played at only while the National Assembly was in recess, during the *entr'actes*, behind the scenes, sentimental coquetry with the old superstition rather than seriously-meant business, now became grand performances of state, enacted by the party of Order on the public stage, instead of in amateur theatricals, as hitherto. The couriers sped from Paris to Venice, from Venice to Claremont, from Claremont to Paris. The Count of Chambord issues a manifesto in which "with the help of all the members of his family" he announces not his, but the "national" Restoration. The Orleanist Salvandy throws himself at the feet of Henry V. The Legitimist chiefs, Berryer, Benoist d'Azy, Saint-Priest, travel to Claremont in order to persuade the Orleans set, but in vain. The fusionists perceive too late that the interests of the two bourgeois factions neither lose exclusiveness nor gain pliancy when they become accentuated in the form of family interests, the interests of two royal houses. If Henry V were to recognize the Count of Paris as his successor—the sole success that the fusion could achieve at best—the House of Orleans would not win any claim that the childlessness of Henry V had not already secured to it, but it would lose all claims that it had gained through the July Revolution. It would waive its original claims, all the titles that it had wrested from the older branch of the Bourbons in almost a hundred years of struggle; it would barter away its historical prerogative, the prerogative of the modern kingdom, for the prerogative of its genealogical tree. The fusion, therefore, would be nothing but a voluntary abdication of the House of Orleans, its resignation to Legitimacy, repentant withdrawal from the Protestant state church into the Catholic. A withdrawal, moreover, that would not even bring it to the throne which it had lost, but to the throne's steps, on which it had

¹ *Assemblée Nationale*: A daily Monarchist newspaper published in Paris from 1848 to 1857.—Ed.

been born. The old Orleanist ministers, Guizot, Duchâtel, etc., who likewise hastened to Claremont to advocate the fusion, in fact represented merely the *Katzenjammer*¹ over the July Revolution, the despair felt in regard to the bourgeois kingdom and the kingliness of the bourgeois, the superstitious belief in Legitimacy as the last charm against anarchy. Imagining themselves mediators between Orleans and Bourbon, they were in reality merely Orleanist renegades, and the prince of Joinville received them as such. On the other hand, the viable, bellicose section of the Orleanists, Thiers, Baze, etc., convinced Louis Philippe's family all the more easily that if any directly monarchist restoration presupposed the fusion of the two dynasties and if any such fusion, however, presupposed abdication of the House of Orleans, it was, on the contrary, wholly in accord with the tradition of their forefathers to recognize the republic for the moment and wait until events permitted the conversion of the presidential chair into a throne. Rumours of Joinville's candidature were circulated, public curiosity was kept in suspense and, a few months later, in September, after the rejection of revision, his candidature was publicly proclaimed.

The attempt at a royalist fusion of Orleanists with Legitimists had thus not only failed; it had destroyed their *parliamentary fusion*, their common republican form, and had broken up the party of Order into its original component parts; but the more the estrangement between Claremont and Venice grew, the more their settlement broke down and the Joinville agitation gained ground, so much the more eager and earnest became the negotiations between Bonaparte's minister Faucher and the Legitimists.

The disintegration of the party of Order did not stop at its original elements. Each of the two great factions, in its turn, underwent decomposition anew. It was as if all the old nuances that had formerly fought and jostled one another within each of the two circles, whether Legitimist or Orleanist, had thawed out again like dry infusoria on contact with water, as if they had acquired anew sufficient vital energy to form groups of their own and independent antagonisms. The Legitimists dreamed that they were back among the controversies between the Tuileries and the

¹ *Katzenjammer*: The "morning-after" feeling.—*Ed.*

Pavillon Marsan,¹ between Villèle and Polignac. The Orleanists relived the golden days of the tourneys between Guizot, Molé, Broglie, Thiers and Odilon Barrot.

That part of the party of Order which was eager for revision, but was divided again on the limits to revision, a section composed of the Legitimists led by Berryer and Falloux, on the one hand, and by La Rochejaquelein, on the other, and of the conflict-weary Orleanists led by Molé, Broglie, Montalembert and Odilon Barrot, agreed with the Bonapartist representatives on the following indefinite and broadly framed motion: "With the object of restoring to the nation the full exercise of its sovereignty, the undersigned Representatives move that the Constitution be revised." At the same time, however, they unanimously declared through their reporter Tocqueville that the National Assembly had not the right to move the *abolition of the republic*, that this right was vested solely in the Revising Chamber. For the rest, the Constitution might be revised only in a "*legal*" manner, hence only if the constitutionally prescribed three-quarters of the number of votes were cast in favour of revision. On July 19, after six days of stormy debate, revision was rejected, as was to be anticipated. Four hundred and forty-six votes were cast for it, but two hundred and seventy-eight against. The extreme Orleanists, Thiers, Changarnier, etc., voted with the republicans and the *Montagne*.

Thus the majority of parliament declared against the Constitution, but this Constitution itself declared for the minority and that its vote was binding. But had not the party of Order subordinated the Constitution to the parliamentary majority on May 31, 1850, and on June 13, 1849? Up to now, was not its whole policy based on the subordination of the paragraphs of the Constitution to the decisions of the parliamentary majority? Had it not left to the democrats the antediluvian superstitious belief in the letter of the law, and castigated the democrats for it? At the present moment, however, revision of the Constitution meant nothing but continuation of the presidential authority, just as continuation of the Constitution meant nothing but Bonaparte's deposition. Parliament had declared for him, but the Constitution

¹ This refers to the conflict during the Restoration period between Louis XVIII, who resided in the Palace of the Tuileries, and the Count d'Artois (afterwards King Charles X), Louis XVIII's brother, who lived in the Pavillon Marsan of the Palace.—*Ed.*

declared against parliament. He therefore acted in the sense of parliament when he tore up the Constitution, and he acted in the sense of the Constitution when he dispersed parliament.

Parliament had declared the Constitution and, with the latter, its own rule to be "beyond the majority"; by its vote it had abolished the Constitution and prorogued the presidential power, while declaring at the same time that neither can the one die nor the other live so long as it itself continues to exist. Those who were to bury it were standing at the door. While it debated on revision, Bonaparte removed General Baraguey d'Hilliers, who had proved irresolute, from the command of the First Army Division and appointed in his place General Magnan, the victor of Lyons, the hero of the December days, one of his creatures, who under Louis Philippe had already compromised himself more or less in Bonaparte's favour on the occasion of the Boulogne expedition.

The party of Order proved by its decision on revision that it knew neither how to rule nor how to serve; neither how to live nor how to die; neither how to suffer the republic nor how to overthrow it; neither how to uphold the Constitution nor how to throw it overboard; neither how to co-operate with the President nor how to break with him. To whom, then, did it look for the solution of all the contradictions? To the calendar, to the course of events. It ceased to presume to sway the events. It therefore challenged the events to assume sway over it, and thereby challenged the power to which in the struggle against the people it had surrendered one attribute after another until it itself stood impotent before this power. In order that the head of the executive power might be able the more undisturbedly to draw up his plan of campaign against it, strengthen his means of attack, select his tools and fortify his positions, it resolved precisely at this critical moment to retire from the stage and adjourn for three months, from August 10 to November 4.

The parliamentary party was not only dissolved into its two great factions, each of these factions was not only split up within itself, but the party of Order in parliament had fallen out with the party of Order *outside* parliament. The spokesmen and scribes of the bourgeoisie, its platform and its press, in short, the ideologists of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie itself, the representatives and the represented, faced one another in estrangement and no longer understood one another.

The Legitimists in the provinces, with their limited horizon and their unlimited enthusiasm, accused their parliamentary leaders, Berryer and Falloux, of deserting to the Bonapartist camp and of defection from Henry V. Their fleur-de-lis minds believed in the fall of man, but not in diplomacy.

Far more fateful and decisive was the breach of the commercial bourgeoisie with its politicians. It reproached them, not as the Legitimists reproached theirs, with having abandoned their principles, but, on the contrary, with clinging to principles that had become useless.

I have already indicated above that since Fould's entry into the ministry the section of the commercial bourgeoisie which had held the lion's share of power under Louis Philippe, namely, the *aristocracy of finance*, had become Bonapartist. Fould represented not only Bonaparte's interests in the *bourse*, he represented at the same time the interests of the *bourse* before Bonaparte. The position of the aristocracy of finance is most strikingly depicted in a passage from its European organ, the London *Economist*. In its number of February 1, 1851, its Paris correspondent writes: "Now we have it stated from numerous quarters that above all things France demands tranquillity. The President declares it in his message to the Legislative Assembly; it is echoed from the tribune; it is asserted in the journals; it is announced from the pulpit; *it is demonstrated by the sensitiveness of the public funds at the least prospect of disturbance, and their firmness the instant it is made manifest that the executive is victorious.*"

In its issue of November 29, 1851, *The Economist* declares in its own name: "*The President is the guardian of order, and is now recognized as such on every Stock Exchange of Europe.*" The aristocracy of finance, therefore, condemned the parliamentary struggle of the party of Order with the executive power as a *disturbance of order*, and celebrated every victory of the President over its ostensible representatives as a *victory of order*. By the aristocracy of finance must here be understood not merely the great loan promoters and speculators in public funds, in regard to whom it is immediately obvious that their interests coincide with the interests of the state power. All modern finance, the whole of the banking business, is interwoven in the closest fashion with public credit. A part of their business capital is necessarily invested and put out at interest in quickly convertible public funds. Their deposits, the capital placed at their disposal and distributed by

them among merchants and industrialists, are partly derived from the dividends of holders of government securities. If in every epoch the stability of the state power signified Moses and the prophets to the entire money market and to the priests of this money market, why not all the more so today, when every deluge threatens to sweep away the old states, and the old state debts with them?

The *industrial bourgeoisie*, too, in its fanaticism for order, was angered by the squabbles of the parliamentary party of Order with the executive power. After their vote of January 18 on the occasion of Changarnier's dismissal, Thiers, Anglas, Sainte-Beuve, etc., received from their constituents in precisely the industrial districts public reproofs in which particularly their coalition with the *Montagne* was scourged as high treason to order. If, as we have seen, the boastful taunts, the petty intrigues which marked the struggle of the party of Order with the President merited no better reception, then, on the other hand, this bourgeois party, which required its representatives to allow the military power to pass from its own parliament to an adventurous pretender without offering resistance, was not even worth the intrigues that were squandered in its interests. It proved that the struggle to maintain its *public* interests, its own *class interests*, its *political power*, only troubled and upset it, as it was a disturbance of private business.

With barely an exception, the bourgeois dignitaries of the Departmental towns, the municipal authorities, the judges of the Commercial Courts, etc., everywhere received Bonaparte on his tours in the most servile manner, even when, as in Dijon, he made an unrestrained attack on the National Assembly, and especially on the party of Order.

When trade was good, as it still was at the beginning of 1851, the commercial bourgeoisie raged against any parliamentary struggle, lest trade be put out of humour. When trade was bad, as it continually was from the end of February 1851, the commercial bourgeoisie accused the parliamentary struggles of being the cause of stagnation and cried out for them to stop in order that trade might start again. The revision debates came on just in this bad period. Since the question here was whether the existing form of state was to be or not to be, the bourgeoisie felt itself all the more justified in demanding from its Representatives the ending of this torturous provisional arrangement and at the same

time the maintenance of the *status quo*. There was no contradiction in this. By the end of the provisional arrangement it understood precisely its continuation, the postponement to a distant future of the moment when a decision had to be reached. The *status quo* could be maintained in only two ways: prolongation of Bonaparte's authority or his constitutional retirement and the election of Cavaignac. A section of the bourgeoisie desired the latter solution and knew no better advice to give its Representatives than to keep silent and leave the burning question untouched. They were of the opinion that if their Representatives did not speak, Bonaparte would not act. They wanted an ostrich parliament that would hide its head in order to remain unseen. Another section of the bourgeoisie desired, because Bonaparte was already in the presidential chair, to leave him sitting in it, so that everything might remain in the same old rut. They were indignant because their parliament did not openly infringe the Constitution and abdicate without ceremony.

The General Councils of the Departments, those provincial representative bodies of the big bourgeoisie, which met from August 25 on during the recess of the National Assembly, declared almost unanimously for revision, and thus against parliament and in favour of Bonaparte.

Still more unequivocally than in its falling out with its *parliamentary representatives* the bourgeoisie displayed its wrath against its literary representatives, its own press. The sentences to ruinous fines and shameless terms of imprisonment, on the verdicts of bourgeois juries, for every attack of bourgeois journalists on Bonaparte's usurpationist desires, for every attempt of the press to defend the political rights of the bourgeoisie against the executive power, astonished not merely France, but all Europe.

While the *parliamentary party of Order*, by its clamour for tranquillity, as I have shown, committed itself to quiescence, while it declared the political rule of the bourgeoisie to be incompatible with the safety and existence of the bourgeoisie, by destroying with its own hands in the struggle against the other classes of society all the conditions for its own regime, the parliamentary regime, the *extra-parliamentary mass of the bourgeoisie*, on the other hand, by its servility towards the President, by its vilification of parliament, by its brutal maltreatment of its own press, invited Bonaparte to suppress and annihilate its speaking

and writing section, its politicians and its *litterati*, its platform and its press, in order that it might then be able to pursue its private affairs with full confidence in the protection of a strong and unrestricted government. It declared unequivocally that it longed to get rid of its own political rule in order to get rid of the troubles and dangers of ruling.

And this extra-parliamentary bourgeoisie, which had already rebelled against the purely parliamentary and literary struggle for the rule of its own class and betrayed the leaders of this struggle, now dares after the event to indict the proletariat for not having risen in a bloody struggle, a life-and-death struggle on its behalf! This bourgeoisie, which every moment sacrificed its general class interests, that is, its political interests, to the narrowest and most sordid private interests, and demanded a similar sacrifice from its Representatives, now moans that the proletariat has sacrificed its [the bourgeoisie's] ideal political interests to its [the proletariat's] material interests. It poses as a lovely being that has been misunderstood and deserted in the decisive hour by the proletariat misled by Socialists. And it finds a general echo in the bourgeois world. Naturally, I do not speak here of German shyster politicians and riffraff of the same persuasion. I refer, for example, to the already quoted *Economist*, which as late as November 29, 1851, that is, four days prior to the *coup d'état*, had declared Bonaparte to be the "guardian of order," but the Thiers and Berryers to be "anarchists," and on December 27, 1851, after Bonaparte had quieted these anarchists, is already vociferous concerning the treason to "the skill, knowledge, discipline, mental influence, intellectual resources and moral weight of the middle and upper ranks" committed by the masses of "ignorant, untrained, and stupid *proletaires*." The stupid, ignorant and vulgar mass was none other than the bourgeois mass itself.

In the year 1851, France, to be sure, had passed through a kind of minor trade crisis. The end of February showed a decline in exports compared with 1850; in March trade suffered and factories closed down; in April the position of the industrial Departments appeared as desperate as after the February days; in May business had still not revived; as late as June 28 the holdings of the Bank of France showed, by the enormous growth of deposits and the equally great decrease in advances on bills of exchange, that production was at a standstill, and it was not

until the middle of October that a progressive improvement of business again set in. The French bourgeoisie attributed this trade stagnation to purely political causes, to the struggle between parliament and the executive power, to the precariousness of a merely provisional form of state, to the terrifying prospect of the second Sunday in May 1852. I will not deny that all these circumstances had a depressing effect on some branches of industry in Paris and the Departments. But in any case this influence of the political conditions was only local and inconsiderable. Does this require further proof than the fact that the improvement of trade set in towards the middle of October, at the very moment when the political situation grew worse, the political horizon darkened and a thunderbolt from Elysium was expected at any moment? For the rest, the French bourgeois, whose "skill, knowledge, spiritual insight and intellectual resources" reach no further than his nose, could throughout the period of the Industrial Exhibition in London have found the cause of his commercial misery right under his nose. While in France factories were closed down, in England commercial bankruptcies broke out. While in April and May the industrial panic reached a climax in France, in April and May the commercial panic reached a climax in England. Like the French woollen industry, so the English woollen industry suffered, and as French silk manufacture, so did English silk manufacture. True, the English cotton mills continued working, but no longer at the same profits as in 1849 and 1850. The only difference was that the crisis in France was industrial, in England commercial; that while in France the factories stood idle, in England they extended operations, but under less favourable conditions than in preceding years; that in France it was exports, in England imports which were hardest hit. The common cause, which is naturally not to be sought within the bounds of the French political horizon, was obvious. The years 1849 and 1850 were years of the greatest material prosperity and of an overproduction that appeared as such only in 1851. At the beginning of this year it was given a further special impetus by the prospect of the Industrial Exhibition. In addition there were the following special circumstances: first, the partial failure of the cotton crop in 1850 and 1851, then the certainty of a bigger cotton crop than had been expected; first the rise, then the sudden fall, in short, the fluctuations in the price of cotton. The crop of raw silk, in France at least, had turned out to be even below the average

yield. Woollen manufacture, finally, had expanded so much since 1848 that the production of wool could not keep pace with it and the price of raw wool rose out of all proportion to the price of woollen manufactures. Here, then, in the raw material of three industries for the world market, we have already threefold material for a stagnation in trade. Apart from these special circumstances, the apparent crisis of 1851 was nothing else but the halt which over-production and over-speculation invariably make in describing the industrial cycle, before they summon all their strength in order to rush feverishly through the final phase of this cycle and arrive once more at their starting-point, the *general trade crisis*. During such intervals in the history of trade commercial bankruptcies break out in England, while in France industry itself is reduced to idleness, being partly forced into retreat by the competition, just then becoming intolerable, of the English in all markets, and being partly singled out for attack as a luxury industry by every business stagnation. Thus, besides the general crisis, France goes through national trade crises of her own, which are nevertheless determined and conditioned far more by the general state of the world market than by French local influences. It will not be without interest to contrast the judgement of the English bourgeois with the prejudice of the French bourgeois. In its annual trade report for 1851, one of the largest Liverpool houses writes: "Few years have more thoroughly belied the anticipations formed at their commencement than the one just closed; instead of the great prosperity which was almost unanimously looked for it has proved one of the most discouraging that has been seen for the last quarter of a century—this, of course, refers to the mercantile, not to the manufacturing classes. And yet there certainly were grounds for anticipating the reverse at the beginning of the year—stocks of produce were moderate, money was abundant, and food was cheap, a plentiful harvest well secured, unbroken peace on the Continent, and no political or fiscal disturbances at home; indeed, the wings of commerce were never more unfettered. . . . To what source, then, is this disastrous result to be attributed? We believe to *over-trading* both in imports and exports. Unless our merchants will put more stringent limits to their freedom of action, nothing but a *triennial* panic can keep us in check."¹

¹ *The Economist*, January 10, 1852, pp. 29-30.—Ed.

Now picture to yourself the French bourgeois, how in the throes of this business panic his trade-crazy brain is tortured, set in a whirl and stunned by rumours of *coups d'état* and the restoration of universal suffrage, by the struggle between parliament and the executive power, by the Fronde war between Orleanists and Legitimists, by the communist conspiracies in the south of France, by alleged *Jacqueries* in the Departments of Nièvre and Cher, by the advertisements of the different candidates for the presidency, by the cheapjack slogans of the journals, by the threats of the republicans to uphold the Constitution and universal suffrage by force of arms, by the gospel-preaching émigré heroes *in partibus*, who announced that the world would come to an end on the second Sunday in May 1852—think of all this and you will comprehend why in this unspeakable, deafening chaos of fusion, revision, prorogation, constitution, conspiracy, coalition, emigration, usurpation and revolution, the bourgeois madly snorts at his parliamentary republic: "*Rather an end with terror than terror without end!*"

Bonaparte understood this cry. His power of comprehension was sharpened by the growing turbulence of creditors who, with each sunset which brought settling day, the second Sunday in May 1852, nearer, saw a movement of the stars protesting their earthly bills of exchange. They had become veritable astrologers. The National Assembly had blighted Bonaparte's hopes of a constitutional prorogation of his authority; the candidature of the Prince of Joinville forbade further vacillation.

If ever an event has, well in advance of its coming, cast its shadow before, it was Bonaparte's *coup d'état*. As early as January 29, 1849, barely a month after his election, he had made a proposal about it to Changarnier. In the summer of 1849 his own Prime Minister, Odilon Barrot, had covertly denounced the policy of *coups d'état*; in the winter of 1850 Thiers had openly done so. In May 1851, Persigny had sought once more to win Changarnier for the *coup*; the *Messenger de l'Assemblée*¹ had published an account of these negotiations. During every parliamentary storm, the Bonapartist journals threatened a *coup d'état*, and the nearer the crisis drew, the louder grew their tone. In the orgies that Bonaparte kept up every night with men and women of the "swell

¹ *Messenger de l'Assemblée*: Anti-Bonapartist daily issued in Paris in 1851.—Ed.

mob," as soon as the hour of midnight approached and copious potations had loosened tongues and fired imaginations, the *coup d'état* was fixed for the following morning. Swords were drawn, glasses clinked, the Representatives were thrown out of the window, the imperial mantle fell upon Bonaparte's shoulders, until the following morning banished the spook once more and astonished Paris learned, from vestals of little reticence and from indiscreet paladins, of the danger it had once again escaped. During the months of September and October rumours of a *coup d'état* followed fast one after the other. Simultaneously, the shadow took on colour, like a variegated daguerreotype. Look up the September and October copies of the organs of the European daily press and you will find, word for word, intimations like the following: "Paris is full of rumours of a *coup d'état*. The capital is to be filled with troops during the night, and the next morning is to bring decrees which will dissolve the National Assembly, declare the Department of the Seine in a state of siege, restore universal suffrage and appeal to the people. Bonaparte is said to be seeking ministers for the execution of these illegal decrees." The letters that bring these tidings always end with the fateful word "*postponed*." The *coup d'état* was ever the fixed idea of Bonaparte. With this idea he had again set foot on French soil. He was so obsessed by it that he continually betrayed it and blurted it out. He was so weak that, just as continually, he gave it up again. The shadow of the *coup d'état* had become so familiar to the Parisians as a spectre that they were not willing to believe in it when it finally appeared in the flesh. What allowed the *coup d'état* to succeed was, therefore, neither the reticent reserve of the chief of the Society of December 10 nor the fact that the National Assembly was caught unawares. If it succeeded, it succeeded despite *his* indiscretion and with *its* foreknowledge, a necessary, inevitable result of antecedent developments.

On October 10 Bonaparte announced to his ministers his decision to restore universal suffrage; on the sixteenth they handed in their resignations; on the twenty-sixth Paris learned of the formation of the Thorigny ministry. Police Prefect Carlier was simultaneously replaced by Maupas; the head of the First Military Division, Magnan, concentrated the most reliable regiments in the capital. On November 4, the National Assembly resumed its sittings. It had nothing better to do than to recapitulate

in a short, succinct form the course it had gone through and to prove that it was buried only after it had died.

The first post that it forfeited in the struggle with the executive power was the ministry. It had solemnly to admit this loss by accepting at full value the Thorigny ministry, a mere shadow cabinet. The Permanent Commission had received M. Giraud with laughter when he presented himself in the name of the new ministers. Such a weak ministry for such strong measures as the restoration of universal suffrage! Yet the precise object was to get nothing through *in* parliament, but everything *against* parliament.

On the very first day of its re-opening, the National Assembly received the message from Bonaparte in which he demanded the restoration of universal suffrage and the abolition of the law of May 31, 1850. The same day his ministers introduced a decree to this effect. The National Assembly at once rejected the ministry's motion of urgency and rejected the law itself on November 13 by three hundred and fifty-five votes to three hundred and forty-eight. Thus, it tore up its mandate once more; it once more confirmed the fact that it had transformed itself from the freely elected representatives of the people into the usurpatory parliament of a class; it acknowledged once more that it had itself cut in two the muscles which connected the parliamentary head with the body of the nation.

If by its motion to restore universal suffrage the executive power appealed from the National Assembly to the people, the legislative power appealed by its Questors' Bill from the people to the army. This Questors' Bill was to establish its right of directly requisitioning troops, of forming a parliamentary army. While it thus designated the army as the arbitrator between itself and the people, between itself and Bonaparte, while it recognized the army as the decisive state power, it had to confirm, on the other hand, the fact that it had long given up its claim to dominate this power. By debating its right to requisition troops, instead of requisitioning them at once, it betrayed its doubts about its own powers. By rejecting the Questors' Bill, it made public confession of its impotence. This bill was defeated, its proponents lacking 108 votes of a majority. The *Montagne* thus decided the issue. It found itself in the position of Buridan's ass, not, indeed, between two bundles of hay with the problem of deciding which was the more attractive, but between two showers of blows with the problem of

deciding which was the harder. On the one hand, there was the fear of Changarnier; on the other, the fear of Bonaparte. It must be confessed that the position was no heroic one.

On November 18, an amendment was moved to the law on municipal elections introduced by the party of Order, to the effect that instead of three years', one year's domicile should suffice for municipal electors. The amendment was lost by a single vote, but this one vote immediately proved to be a mistake. By splitting up into its hostile factions, the party of Order had long ago forfeited its independent parliamentary majority. It showed now that there was no longer any majority at all in parliament. The National Assembly had become *incapable of transacting business*. Its atomic constituents were no longer held together by any force of cohesion; it had drawn its last breath; it was dead.

Finally, a few days before the catastrophe, the extra-parliamentary mass of the bourgeoisie was solemnly to confirm once more its breach with the bourgeoisie in parliament. Thiers, as a parliamentary hero infected more than the rest with the incurable disease of parliamentary cretinism, had, after the death of parliament, hatched out, together with the Council of State, a new parliamentary intrigue, a Responsibility Law by which the President was to be firmly held within the limits of the Constitution. Just as, on laying the foundation stone of the new market halls in Paris on September 15, Bonaparte, like a second Masaniello, had enchanted the *dames des halles*, the fishwives—to be sure, one fishwife outweighed seventeen burgraves in real power; just as after the introduction of the Questors' Bill he enraptured the lieutenants he regaled in the Elysée, so now, on November 25, he swept off their feet the industrial bourgeoisie, which had gathered at the circus to receive at his hands prize medals for the London Industrial Exhibition. I shall give the significant portion of his speech as reported in the *Journal des Débats*: "With such unhoped-for successes, I am justified in reiterating how great the French republic would be if it were permitted to pursue its real interests and reform its institutions, instead of being constantly disturbed by demagogues, on the one hand, and by monarchist hallucinations, on the other. (Loud, stormy and repeated applause from every part of the amphitheatre.) The monarchist hallucinations hinder all progress and all important branches of industry. In place of progress nothing but struggle. One sees men who were formerly the most zealous supporters of the royal authority and

prerogative become partisans of a Convention merely in order to weaken the authority that has sprung from universal suffrage. (Loud and repeated applause.) We see men who have suffered most from the Revolution, and have deplored it most, provoke a new one, and merely in order to fetter the nation's will. . . . I promise you tranquillity for the future, etc., etc. (Bravo, bravo, a storm of bravos.)" Thus the industrial bourgeoisie applauds with servile bravos the *coup d'état* of December 2, the annihilation of parliament, the downfall of its own rule, the dictatorship of Bonaparte. The thunder of applause on November 25 had its answer in the thunder of cannon on December 4, and it was on the house of Monsieur Sallandrouze, who had clapped most, that they clapped most of the bombs.

Cromwell, when he dissolved the Long Parliament, went alone into its midst, drew out his watch in order that it should not continue to exist a minute after the time limit fixed by him, and drove out each one of the members of parliament with hilariously humorous taunts. Napoleon, smaller than his prototype, at least betook himself on the eighteenth Brumaire to the legislative body and read out to it, though in a faltering voice, its sentence of death. The second Bonaparte, who, moreover, found himself in possession of an executive power very different from that of Cromwell or Napoleon, sought his model not in the annals of world history, but in the annals of the Society of December 10, in the annals of the criminal courts. He robs the Bank of France of twenty-five million francs, buys General Magnan with a million, the soldiers with fifteen francs apiece and liquor, comes together with his accomplices secretly like a thief in the night, has the houses of the most dangerous parliamentary leaders broken into and Cavaignac, Lamoricière, Le Flô, Changarnier, Charras, Thiers, Baze, etc., dragged from their beds, the chief squares of Paris and the parliamentary building occupied by troops, and cheapjack placards posted early in the morning on all the walls, proclaiming the dissolution of the National Assembly and the Council of State, the restoration of universal suffrage and the placing of the Seine Department in a state of siege. In like manner, he inserted a little later in the *Moniteur* a false document which asserted that influential parliamentarians had grouped themselves round him and formed a state *consulta*.

The rump parliament, assembled in the *mairie* building of the tenth *arrondissement* and consisting mainly of Legitimists and

Orleanists, votes the deposition of Bonaparte amid repeated cries of "Long live the Republic," unavailingly harangues the gaping crowds before the building and is finally led off in the custody of African sharpshooters, first to the d'Orsay barracks, and later packed into prison vans and transported to the prisons of Mazas, Ham and Vincennes. Thus ended the party of Order, the Legislative Assembly and the February Revolution. Before hastening to close, let us briefly summarize the latter's history:

I. *First period.* From February 24 to May 4, 1848. February period. Prologue. Universal brotherhood swindle.

II. *Second period.* Period of constituting the republic and of the Constituent National Assembly.

1. May 4 to June 25, 1848. Struggle of all classes against the proletariat. Defeat of the proletariat in the June days.

2. June 25 to December 10, 1848. Dictatorship of the pure bourgeois-republicans. Drafting of the Constitution. Proclamation of a state of siege in Paris. The bourgeois dictatorship set aside on December 10 by the election of Bonaparte as President.

3. December 20, 1848 to May 28, 1849. Struggle of the Constituent Assembly with Bonaparte and with the party of Order in alliance with him. Passing of the Constituent Assembly. Fall of the republican bourgeoisie.

III. *Third period.* Period of the *constitutional republic* and of the *Legislative National Assembly*.

1. May 28, 1849 to June 13, 1849. Struggle of the petty bourgeoisie with the bourgeoisie and with Bonaparte. Defeat of the petty-bourgeois democracy.

2. June 13, 1849 to May 31, 1850. Parliamentary dictatorship of the party of Order. It completes its rule by abolishing universal suffrage, but loses the parliamentary ministry.

3. May 31, 1850 to December 2, 1851. Struggle between the parliamentary bourgeoisie and Bonaparte.

(a) May 31, 1850 to January 12, 1851. Parliament loses the supreme command of the army.

(b) January 12 to April 11, 1851. It is worsted in its attempts to regain the administrative power. The party of Order loses its independent parliamentary majority. Its coalition with the republicans and the *Montagne*.

(c) April 11, 1851 to October 9, 1851. Attempts at revision, fusion, prorogation. The party of Order decomposes into its separate constituents. The breach between the bourgeois par-

liament and press and the mass of the bourgeoisie becomes definite.

(d) October 9 to December 2, 1851. Open breach between parliament and the executive power. Parliament performs its dying act and succumbs, left in the lurch by its own class, by the army and by all the remaining classes. Passing of the parliamentary regime and of bourgeois rule. Victory of Bonaparte. Parody of restoration of empire.

VII

On the threshold of the February Revolution, the *social republic* appeared as a phrase, as a prophecy. In the June days of 1848, it was drowned in the blood of the *Paris proletariat*, but it haunts the subsequent acts of the drama like a ghost. The *democratic republic* announces its arrival. On June 13, 1849, it is dissipated together with its *petty bourgeois*, who have taken to their heels, but in its flight it blows its own trumpet with redoubled boastfulness. The *parliamentary republic*, together with the bourgeoisie, takes possession of the entire stage; it enjoys its existence to the full, but December 2, 1851 buries it to the accompaniment of the anguished cry of the royalists in coalition: "Long live the Republic!"

The French bourgeoisie balked at the domination of the working proletariat; it has brought the *lumpenproletariat* to domination, with the chief of the Society of December 10 at the head. The bourgeoisie kept France in breathless fear of the future terrors of red anarchy; Bonaparte discounted this future for it when, on December 4, he had the eminent bourgeois of the Boulevard Montmartre and the Boulevard des Italiens shot down at their windows by the liquor-inspired army of order. It apotheosized the sword; the sword rules it. It destroyed the revolutionary press; its own press has been destroyed. It placed popular meetings under police supervision; its salons are under the supervision of the police. It disbanded the democratic National Guards; its own National Guard is disbanded. It imposed a state of siege; a state of siege is imposed upon it. It supplanted the juries by military commissions; its juries are supplanted by military commissions. It subjected public education to the sway of the priests; the priests subject it to their own education. It transported people without trial; it is being transported without trial. It repressed every stirring in society by means of the state power; every stirring in its

society is suppressed by means of the state power. Out of enthusiasm for its purse, it rebelled against its own politicians and men of letters; its politicians and men of letters are swept aside, but its purse is being plundered now that its mouth has been gagged and its pen broken. The bourgeoisie never wearied of crying out to the revolution what Saint Arsenius cried out to the Christians: "*Fuge, tace, quiesce!* Flee, be silent, keep still!" Bonaparte cries to the bourgeoisie: "*Fuge, tace, quiesce!* Flee, be silent, keep still!"

The French bourgeoisie had long ago found the solution to Napoleon's dilemma: "*Dans cinquante ans l'Europe sera républicaine ou cosaque.*"¹ It had found the solution to it in the "*république cosaque.*" No Circe, by means of black magic, has distorted that work of art, the bourgeois republic, into a monstrous shape. That republic has lost nothing but the semblance of respectability. Present-day France was contained in a finished state within the parliamentary republic. It only required a bayonet thrust for the bubble to burst and the monster to spring forth before our eyes.

Why did the Paris proletariat not rise in revolt after December 2?

The overthrow of the bourgeoisie had as yet been only decreed; the decree had not been carried out. Any serious insurrection of the proletariat would at once have put fresh life into the bourgeoisie, would have reconciled it with the army and ensured a second June defeat for the workers.

On December 4 the proletariat was incited by bourgeois and *épicier* to fight. On the evening of that day several legions of the National Guard promised to appear, armed and uniformed, on the scene of battle. For the bourgeois and the *épicier* had got wind of the fact that in one of his decrees of December 2 Bonaparte abolished the secret ballot and enjoined them to record their "yes" or "no" in the official registers after their names. The resistance of December 4 intimidated Bonaparte. During the night he caused placards to be posted on all the street corners of Paris, announcing the restoration of the secret ballot. The bourgeois and the *épicier* believed that they had gained their end. Those who failed to appear next morning were the bourgeois and the *épicier*.

By a *coup de main* during the night of December 1 to 2, Bonaparte had robbed the Paris proletariat of its leaders, the barricade commanders. An army without officers, averse to fighting

¹ "In fifty years Europe will be republican or Cossack."—*Ed.*

under the banner of the *Montagnards* because of the memories of June 1848 and 1849 and May 1850, it left to its vanguard, the secret societies, the task of saving the insurrectionary honour of Paris, which the bourgeoisie had so unresistingly surrendered to the soldiery that, later on, Bonaparte could sneeringly give as his motive for disarming the National Guard—his fear that its arms would be turned against it itself by the anarchists!

*"C'est le triomphe complet et définitif du Socialisme!"*¹ Thus Guizot characterized December 2. But if the overthrow of the parliamentary republic contains within itself the germ of the triumph of the proletarian revolution, its immediate and palpable result was *the victory of Bonaparte over parliament, of the executive power over the legislative power, of force without phrases over the force of phrases*. In parliament the nation made its general will the law, that is, it made the law of the ruling class its general will. Before the executive power it renounces all will of its own and submits to the superior command of an alien will, to authority. The executive power, in contrast to the legislative power, expresses the heteronomy of a nation, in contrast to its autonomy. France, therefore, seems to have escaped the despotism of a class only to fall back beneath the despotism of an individual, and, what is more, beneath the authority of an individual without authority. The struggle seems to be settled in such a way that all classes, equally impotent and equally mute, fall on their knees before the rifle butt.

But the revolution is thoroughgoing. It is still journeying through purgatory. It does its work methodically. By December 2, 1851, it had completed one half of its preparatory work; it is now completing the other half. First it perfected the parliamentary power, in order to be able to overthrow it. Now that it has attained this, it perfects the *executive power*, reduces it to its purest expression, isolates it, sets it up against itself as the sole target, in order to concentrate all its forces of destruction against it. And when it has done this second half of its preliminary work, Europe will leap from its seat and exultantly exclaim: Well grubbed, old mole!

This executive power with its enormous bureaucratic and military organization, with its ingenious state machinery, embracing wide strata, with a host of officials numbering half a million,

¹ "This is the complete and final triumph of socialism!"—*Ed.*

besides an army of another half million, this appalling parasitic body, which enmeshes the body of French society like a net and chokes all its pores, sprang up in the days of the absolute monarchy, with the decay of the feudal system, which it helped to hasten. The seignorial privileges of the landowners and towns became transformed into so many attributes of the state power, the feudal dignitaries into paid officials and the motley pattern of conflicting medieval plenary powers into the regulated plan of a state authority whose work is divided and centralized as in a factory. The first French Revolution, with its task of breaking all separate local, territorial, urban and provincial powers in order to create the civil unity of the nation, was bound to develop what the absolute monarchy had begun: centralization, but at the same time the extent, the attributes and the agents of governmental power. Napoleon perfected this state machinery. The Legitimist monarchy and the July monarchy added nothing but a greater division of labour, growing in the same measure as the division of labour within bourgeois society created new groups of interests, and, therefore, new material for state administration. Every *common* interest was straightway severed from society, counterposed to it as a higher, *general* interest, snatched from the activity of society's members themselves and made an object of government activity, from a bridge, a schoolhouse and the communal property of a village community to the railways, the national wealth and the national university of France. Finally, in its struggle against the revolution, the parliamentary republic found itself compelled to strengthen, along with the repressive measures, the resources and centralization of governmental power. All revolutions perfected this machine instead of smashing it. The parties that contended in turn for domination regarded the possession of this huge state edifice as the principal spoils of the victor.

But under the absolute monarchy, during the first Revolution, under Napoleon, bureaucracy was only the means of preparing the class rule of the bourgeoisie. Under the Restoration, under Louis Philippe, under the parliamentary republic, it was the instrument of the ruling class, however much it strove for power of its own.

Only under the second Bonaparte does the state seem to have made itself completely independent. As against civil society, the state machine has consolidated its position so thoroughly that the chief of the Society of December 10 suffices for its head, an

adventurer blown in from abroad, raised on the shield by a drunken soldiery, which he has bought with liquor and sausages, and which he must continually ply with sausage anew. Hence the downcast despair, the feeling of most dreadful humiliation and degradation that oppresses the breast of France and makes her catch her breath. She feels dishonoured.

And yet the state power is not suspended in midair. Bonaparte represents a class, and the most numerous class of French society at that, the *small-holding* [*Parzellen*] *peasants*.

Just as the Bourbons were the dynasty of big landed property and just as the Orleans were the dynasty of money, so the Bonapartes are the dynasty of the peasants, that is, the mass of the French people. Not the Bonaparte who submitted to the bourgeois parliament, but the Bonaparte who dispersed the bourgeois parliament is the chosen of the peasantry. For three years the towns had succeeded in falsifying the meaning of the election of December 10 and in cheating the peasants out of the restoration of the empire. The election of December 10, 1848, has been consummated only by the *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851.

The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. The isolation is increased by France's bad means of communication and by the poverty of the peasants. Their field of production, the small holding, admits of no division of labour in its cultivation, no application of science and, therefore, no diversity of development, no variety of talent, no wealth of social relationships. Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient; it itself directly produces the major part of its consumption and thus acquires its means of life more through exchange with nature than in intercourse with society. A small holding, a peasant and his family; alongside them another small holding, another peasant and another family. A few score of these make up a village, and a few score of villages make up a Department. In this way, the great mass of the French nation is formed by simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes. In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so

far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organization among them, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power that protects them against the other classes and sends them rain and sunshine from above. The political influence of the small-holding peasants, therefore, finds its final expression in the executive power subordinating society to itself.

Historical tradition gave rise to the belief of the French peasants in the miracle that a man named Napoleon would bring all the glory back to them. And an individual turned up who gives himself out as the man because he bears the name of Napoleon, in consequence of the *Code Napoléon*, which lays down that *la recherche de la paternité est interdite*.¹ After a vagabondage of twenty years and after a series of grotesque adventures, the legend finds fulfilment and the man becomes Emperor of the French. The fixed idea of the Nephew was realized, because it coincided with the fixed idea of the most numerous class of the French people.

But, it may be objected, what about the peasant risings in half of France, the raids on the peasants by the army, the mass incarceration and transportation of peasants?

Since Louis XIV, France has experienced no similar persecution of the peasants "on account of demagogic practices."

But let there be no misunderstanding. The Bonaparte dynasty represents not the revolutionary, but the conservative peasant; not the peasant that strikes out beyond the condition of his social existence, the small holding, but rather the peasant who wants to consolidate this holding, not the country folk who, linked up with the towns, want to overthrow the old order through their own energies, but on the contrary those who, in stupefied seclusion within this old order, want to see themselves and their small holdings saved and favoured by the ghost of the empire. It represents not the enlightenment, but the superstition of the peasant; not his

¹ Inquiry into paternity is forbidden.—Ed.

judgement, but his prejudice; not his future, but his past; not his modern Cevennes, but his modern Vendée.¹

The three years' rigorous rule of the parliamentary republic had freed a part of the French peasants from the Napoleonic illusion and had revolutionized them, even if only superficially; but the bourgeoisie violently repressed them, as often as they set themselves in motion. Under the parliamentary republic the modern and the traditional consciousness of the French peasant contended for mastery. This progress took the form of an incessant struggle between the schoolmasters and the priests. The bourgeoisie struck down the schoolmasters. For the first time the peasants made efforts to behave independently in the face of the activity of the government. This was shown in the continual conflict between the *maires* and the prefects. The bourgeoisie deposed the *maires*. Finally, during the period of the parliamentary republic, the peasants of different localities rose against their own offspring, the army. The bourgeoisie punished them with states of siege and punitive expeditions. And this same bourgeoisie now cries out about the stupidity of the masses, the vile multitude, that has betrayed it to Bonaparte. It has itself forcibly strengthened the empire sentiments [*Imperialismus*] of the peasant class, it conserved the conditions that form the birthplace of this peasant religion. The bourgeoisie, to be sure, is bound to fear the stupidity of the masses as long as they remain conservative, and the insight of the masses as soon as they become revolutionary.

In the risings after the *coup d'état*, a part of the French peasants protested, arms in hand, against their own vote of December 10, 1848. The school they had gone through since 1848 had sharpened their wits. But they had made themselves over to the underworld of history; history held them to their word, and the majority was still so prejudiced that in precisely the reddest Departments the peasant population voted openly for Bonaparte. In its

¹ In *Cevennes*, a mountainous region of France, a large uprising of Protestant peasants (the so-called Camisards) took place in the beginning of the eighteenth century. Their watchwords were, "No Taxes!", "Freedom of Conscience!" The insurgents seized feudal castles, hid in the mountains, engaged in guerilla warfare. The struggle lasted almost three years.

Vendée: The region in France which was a seat of counter-revolution during the French Bourgeois Revolution of the end of the eighteenth century. In their fight against revolutionary France the counter-revolutionaries made use of the politically backward *Vendée* peasants, who were strongly influenced by the Catholic clergy.—*Ed.*

view, the National Assembly had hindered his progress. He had now merely broken the fetters that the towns had imposed on the will of the countryside. In some parts the peasants even entertained the grotesque notion of a convention side by side with Napoleon.

After the first revolution had transformed the peasants from semi-villeins into freeholders, Napoleon confirmed and regulated the conditions on which they could exploit undisturbed the soil of France which had only just fallen to their lot and slake their youthful passion for property. But what is now causing the ruin of the French peasant is his small holding itself, the division of the land, the form of property which Napoleon consolidated in France. It is precisely the material conditions which made the feudal peasant a small-holding peasant and Napoleon an emperor. Two generations have sufficed to produce the inevitable result: progressive deterioration of agriculture, progressive indebtedness of the agriculturist. The "Napoleonic" form of property, which at the beginning of the nineteenth century was the condition for the liberation and enrichment of the French country folk, has developed in the course of this century into the law of their enslavement and pauperization. And precisely this law is the first of the "*idées napoléoniennes*" which the second Bonaparte has to uphold. If he still shares with the peasants the illusion that the cause of their ruin is to be sought, not in this small-holding property itself, but outside it, in the influence of secondary circumstances, his experiments will burst like soap bubbles when they come in contact with the relations of production.

The economic development of small-holding property has radically changed the relation of the peasants to the other classes of society. Under Napoleon, the fragmentation of the land in the countryside supplemented free competition and the beginning of big industry in the towns. The peasant class was the ubiquitous protest against the landed aristocracy which had just been overthrown. The roots that small-holding property struck in French soil deprived feudalism of all nutriment. Its landmarks formed the natural fortifications of the bourgeoisie against any surprise attack on the part of its old overlords. But in the course of the nineteenth century the feudal lords were replaced by urban usurers; the feudal obligation that went with the land was replaced by the mortgage; aristocratic landed property was replaced by bourgeois capital. The small holding of the peasant is now only the pretext

that allows the capitalist to draw profits, interest and rent from the soil, while leaving it to the tiller of the soil himself to see how he can extract his wages. The mortgage debt burdening the soil of France imposes on the French peasantry payment of an amount of interest equal to the annual interest on the entire British national debt. Small-holding property, in this enslavement by capital to which its development inevitably pushes forward, has transformed the mass of the French nation into troglodytes. Sixteen million peasants (including women and children) dwell in hovels, a large number of which have but one opening, others only two and the most favoured only three. And windows are to a house what the five senses are to the head. The bourgeois order, which at the beginning of the century set the state to stand guard over the newly arisen small holding and manured it with laurels, has become a vampire that sucks out its blood and brains and throws them into the alchemistic cauldron of capital. The *Code Napoléon* is now nothing but a *codex* of distraints, forced sales and compulsory auctions. To the four million (including children, etc.) officially recognized paupers, vagabonds, criminals and prostitutes in France must be added five million who hover on the margin of existence and either have their haunts in the countryside itself or, with their rags and their children, continually desert the countryside for the towns and the towns for the countryside. The interests of the peasants, therefore, are no longer, as under Napoleon, in accord with, but in opposition to the interests of the bourgeoisie, to capital. Hence the peasants find their natural ally and leader in the *urban proletariat*, whose task is the overthrow of the bourgeois order. But *strong and unlimited government*—and this is the second “*idée napoléonienne*,” which the second Napoleon has to carry out—is called upon to defend this “material” order by force. This “*ordre matériel*” also serves as the catchword in all of Bonaparte’s proclamations against the rebellious peasants.

Besides the mortgage which capital imposes on it, the small holding is burdened by *taxes*. Taxes are the source of life for the bureaucracy, the army, the priests and the court, in short, for the whole apparatus of the executive power. Strong government and heavy taxes are identical. By its very nature, small-holding property forms a suitable basis for an all-powerful and innumerable bureaucracy. It creates a uniform level of relationships and persons over the whole surface of the land. Hence it also permits of uniform action from a supreme centre on all points of this uni-

form mass. It annihilates the aristocratic intermediate grades between the mass of the people and the state power. On all sides, therefore, it calls forth the direct interference of this state power and the interposition of its immediate organs. Finally, it produces an unemployed surplus population for which there is no place either on the land or in the towns, and which accordingly reaches out for state offices as a sort of respectable alms, and provokes the creation of state posts. By the new markets which he opened at the point of the bayonet, by the plundering of the Continent, Napoleon repaid the compulsory taxes with interest. These taxes were a spur to the industry of the peasant, whereas now they rob his industry of its last resources and complete his inability to resist pauperism. And an enormous bureaucracy, well-gallooned and well-fed, is the "*idée napoléonienne*" which is most congenial of all to the second Bonaparte. How could it be otherwise, seeing that alongside the actual classes of society he is forced to create an artificial caste, for which the maintenance of his regime becomes a bread-and-butter question? Accordingly, one of his first financial operations was the raising of officials' salaries to their old level and the creation of new sinecures.

Another "*idée napoléonienne*" is the domination of the *priests* as an instrument of government. But while in its accord with society, in its dependence on natural forces and its submission to the authority which protected it from above, the small holding that had newly come into being was naturally religious, the small holding that is ruined by debts, at odds with society and authority, and driven beyond its own limitations naturally becomes irreligious. Heaven was quite a pleasing accession to the narrow strip of land just won, more particularly as it makes the weather; it becomes an insult as soon as it is thrust forward as substitute for the small holding. The priest then appears as only the anointed bloodhound of the earthly police—another "*idée napoléonienne*." On the next occasion, the expedition against Rome will take place in France itself, but in a sense opposite to that of M. de Montalembert.

Lastly, the culminating point of the "*idées napoléoniennes*" is the preponderance of the *army*. The army was the *point d'honneur*¹ of the small-holding peasants, it was they themselves transformed into heroes, defending their new possessions against the outer

¹ Matter of honour, a point of special touch.—Ed.

world, glorifying their recently won nationhood, plundering and revolutionizing the world. The uniform was their own state dress; war was their poetry; the small holding, extended and rounded off in imagination, was their fatherland, and patriotism the ideal form of the sense of property. But the enemies against whom the French peasant has now to defend his property are not the Cossacks; they are the *huissiers*¹ and the tax collectors. The small holding lies no longer in the so-called fatherland, but in the register of mortgages. The army itself is no longer the flower of the peasant youth; it is the swamp-flower of the peasant *lumpenproletariat*. It consists in large measure of *remplaçants*, of substitutes, just as the second Bonaparte is himself only a *remplaçant*, the substitute for Napoleon. It now performs its deeds of valour by hounding the peasants in masses like chamois, by doing *gendarme* duty, and if the internal contradictions of his system chase the chief of the Society of December 10 over the French border, his army, after some acts of brigandage, will reap, not laurels, but thrashings.

One sees: all "idées napoléoniennes" are ideas of the undeveloped small holding in the freshness of its youth; for the small holding that has outlived its day they are an absurdity. They are only the hallucinations of its death struggle, words that are transformed into phrases, spirits transformed into ghosts. But the parody of the empire [*des Imperialismus*] was necessary to free the mass of the French nation from the weight of tradition and to work out in pure form the opposition between the state power and society. With the progressive undermining of small-holding property, the state structure erected upon it collapses. The centralization of the state that modern society requires arises only on the ruins of the military-bureaucratic government machinery which was forged in opposition to feudalism.²

The condition of the French peasants provides us with the answer to the riddle of the *general elections of December 20*

¹ *Huissiers*: Bailiffs.—Ed.

² In the 1852 edition this paragraph ended with the following lines, which Marx omitted in the 1869 edition: "The demolition of the state machine will not endanger centralization. Bureaucracy is only the low and brutal form of a centralization that is still afflicted with its opposite, with feudalism. When he is disappointed in the Napoleonic Restoration, the French peasant will part with his belief in his small holding, the entire state edifice erected on this small holding will fall to the ground and the proletarian revolution will obtain that chorus without which its solo song becomes a swan song in all peasant countries."—Ed.

and 21, which bore the second Bonaparte up Mount Sinai, not to receive laws, but to give them.

Manifestly, the bourgeoisie had now no choice but to elect Bonaparte. When the puritans at the Council of Constance complained of the dissolute lives of the popes and wailed about the necessity of moral reform, Cardinal Pierre d'Ailly thundered at them: "Only the devil in person can still save the Catholic Church, and you ask for angels." In like manner, after the *coup d'état*, the French bourgeoisie cried: Only the chief of the Society of December 10 can still save bourgeois society! Only theft can still save property; only perjury, religion; bastardy, the family; disorder, order!

As the executive authority which has made itself an independent power, Bonaparte feels it to be his mission to safeguard "bourgeois order." But the strength of this bourgeois order lies in the middle class. He looks on himself, therefore, as the representative of the middle class and issues decrees in this sense. Nevertheless, he is somebody solely due to the fact that he has broken the political power of this middle class and daily breaks it anew. Consequently, he looks on himself as the adversary of the political and literary power of the middle class. But by protecting its material power, he generates its political power anew. The cause must accordingly be kept alive; but the effect, where it manifests itself, must be done away with. But this cannot pass off without slight confusions of cause and effect, since in their interaction both lose their distinguishing features. New decrees that obliterate the border line. As against the bourgeoisie, Bonaparte looks on himself, at the same time, as the representative of the peasants and of the people in general, who wants to make the lower classes of the people happy within the frame of bourgeois society. New decrees that cheat the "True Socialists" of their statecraft in advance. But, above all, Bonaparte looks on himself as the chief of the Society of December 10, as the representative of the *lumpenproletariat* to which he himself, his *entourage*, his government and his army belong, and whose prime consideration is to benefit itself and draw California lottery prizes from the state treasury. And he vindicates his position as chief of the Society of December 10 with decrees, without decrees and despite decrees.

This contradictory task of the man explains the contradictions of his government, the confused groping about which seeks now

to win, now to humiliate first one class and then another and arrays all of them uniformly against him, whose practical uncertainty forms a highly comical contrast to the imperious, categorical style of the government decrees, a style which is faithfully copied from the Uncle.

Industry and trade, hence the business affairs of the middle class, are to prosper in hothouse fashion under the strong government. The grant of innumerable railway concessions. But the Bonapartist *lumpenproletariat* is to enrich itself. The initiated play *tripotage*¹ on the *bourse* with the railway concessions. But no capital is forthcoming for the railways. Obligation of the Bank to make advances on railway shares. But, at the same time, the Bank is to be exploited for personal ends and therefore must be cajoled. Release of the Bank from the obligation to publish its report weekly. Leonine agreement of the Bank with the government. The people are to be given employment. Initiation of public works. But the public works increase the obligations of the people in respect of taxes. Hence reduction of the taxes by an onslaught on the *rentiers*, by conversion of the five per cent bonds to four-and-a-half per cents. But, once more, the middle class must receive a *douceur*.² Therefore doubling of the wine tax for the people, who buy it *en détail*, and halving of the wine tax for the middle class, who drink it *en gros*. Dissolution of the actual workers' associations, but promises of miracles of association in the future. The peasants are to be helped. Mortgage banks that expedite their getting into debt and accelerate the concentration of property. But these banks are to be used to make money out of the confiscated estates of the House of Orleans. No capitalist wants to agree to this condition, which is not in the decree, and the mortgage bank remains a mere decree, etc., etc.

Bonaparte would like to appear as the patriarchal benefactor of all classes. But he cannot give to one class without taking from another. Just as at the time of the Fronde it was said of the Duke of Guise that he was the most *obligeant* man in France because he had turned all his estates into his partisans' obligations to him, so Bonaparte would fain be the most *obligeant* man in France and turn all the property, all the labour of France into a personal obligation to himself. He would like to steal the whole of France in order to be able to make a present of her to France

¹ *Tripotage*: Hanky-panky.—Ed.

² *Douceur*: Sop.—Ed.

or, rather, in order to be able to buy France anew with French money, for as the chief of the Society of December 10 he must needs buy what ought to belong to him. And all the state institutions, the Senate, the Council of State, the legislative body, the Legion of Honour, the soldiers' medals, the washhouses, the public works, the railways, the *état major*¹ of the National Guard to the exclusion of privates, and the confiscated estates of the House of Orleans—all become parts of the institution of purchase. Every place in the army and in the government machine becomes a means of purchase. But the most important feature of this process, whereby France is taken in order to give to her, is the percentages that find their way into the pockets of the head and the members of the Society of December 10 during the turnover. The witticism with which Countess L., the mistress of M. de Morny, characterized the confiscation of the Orleans estates: "*C'est le premier vol² de l'aigle*"³ is applicable to every flight of this eagle, which is more like a raven. He himself and his adherents call out to one another daily like that Italian Carthusian admonishing the miser who, with boastful display, counted up the goods on which he could yet live for years to come: "*Tu fai conto sopra i beni, bisogna prima far il conto sopra gli anni.*"⁴ Lest they make a mistake in the years, they count the minutes. A bunch of blokes push their way forward to the court, into the ministries, to the head of the administration and the army, a crowd of the best of whom it must be said that no one knows whence he comes, a noisy, disreputable, rapacious bohème that crawls into gallooned coats with the same grotesque dignity as the high dignitaries of Soulouque. One can visualize clearly this upper stratum of the Society of December 10, if one reflects that *Véron-Crevel*⁵ is its preacher of morals and *Granier de Cassagnac* its thinker. When Guizot, at the time of his ministry, utilized this Granier on a hole-and-corner newspaper against the dynastic opposition, he used to boast of him with the quip: "*C'est le roi des drôles,*" "he is the king of buffoons." One would do wrong to

¹ *Etat major*: General Staff.—Ed.

² *Vol* means flight and theft. [Note by Marx.]

³ "It is the first flight (theft) of the eagle."—Ed.

⁴ "Thou countest thy goods, thou shouldst first count thy years." [Note by Marx.]

⁵ In his work, *Cousine Bette*, Balzac delineates the thoroughly dissolute Parisian philistine in Crevel, a character which he draws after the model of Dr. Véron, the proprietor of the *Constitutionnel*. [Note by Marx.]

recall the Regency or Louis XV in connection with Louis Bonaparte's court and clique. For "often already, France has experienced a government of mistresses; but never before a government of *hommes entretenus*."¹

Driven by the contradictory demands of his situation and being at the same time, like a conjurer, under the necessity of keeping the public gaze fixed on himself, as Napoleon's substitute, by springing constant surprises, that is to say, under the necessity of executing a *coup d'état en miniature* every day, Bonaparte throws the entire bourgeois economy into confusion, violates everything that seemed inviolable to the Revolution of 1848, makes some tolerant of revolution, others desirous of revolution, and produces actual anarchy in the name of order, while at the same time stripping its halo from the entire state machine, profanes it and makes it at once loathsome and ridiculous. The cult of the Holy Tunic of Treves² he duplicates at Paris in the cult of the Napoleonic imperial mantle. But when the imperial mantle finally falls on the shoulders of Louis Bonaparte, the bronze statue of Napoleon will crash from the top of the Vendôme Column.

Written by Marx in December 1851
to March 1852

Printed according to the second
edition

Published in the magazine *Die
Revolution*, New York 1852

Translated from the German

The second edition, revised by Marx,
appeared as a separate book in
Hamburg in 1869

The third edition appeared in Ham-
burg in 1885 with a preface by
Engels

¹ The words quoted are those of Madame Girardin. [Note by Marx.] *Hommes entretenus*: Kept men.—Ed.

² One of the "sacred" relics ("the vestment of the Lord") exhibited in the Treves Cathedral in 1844 by the reactionary Catholic clergy.—Ed.

Karl Marx

THE BRITISH RULE IN INDIA

London, Friday, June 10, 1853

... Hindostan is an Italy of Asiatic dimensions, the Himalayas for the Alps, the Plains of Bengal for the Plains of Lombardy, the Deccan for the Appenines, and the Isle of Ceylon for the Island of Sicily. The same rich variety in the products of the soil, and the same dismemberment in the political configuration. Just as Italy has, from time to time, been compressed by the conqueror's sword into different national masses, so do we find Hindostan, when not under the pressure of the Mohammedan, or the Mogul, or the Briton, dissolved into as many independent and conflicting States as it numbered towns, or even villages. Yet, in a social point of view, Hindostan is not the Italy, but the Ireland of the East. And this strange combination of Italy and of Ireland, of a world of voluptuousness and of a world of woes, is anticipated in the ancient traditions of the religion of Hindostan. That religion is at once a religion of sensualist exuberance, and a religion of self-torturing asceticism; a religion of the Lingam¹ and of the Juggernaut;² the religion of the Monk, and of the Bayadere.

I share not the opinion of those who believe in a golden age of Hindostan, without recurring, however, like Sir Charles Wood, for the confirmation of my view, to the authority of Khuli-Khan. But take, for example, the times of Aurung-Zebe; or the epoch, when the Mogul appeared in the North, and the Portuguese in the South; or the age of Mohammedan invasion, and of the Heptarchy³

¹ *Lingam religion*: The cult of the deity Siva; particularly widespread among the Southern India sect of the Lingayat.—*Ed.*

² *Juggernaut*: One of the depictions of the god Vishnu, whose temple was located at Puri, in the Eastern part of India.—*Ed.*

³ *The Heptarchy* (Seven Governments): The conventional designation in English history of the seven Saxon Kingdoms (sixth to eighth century). Marx by analogy uses this term here to denote the feudal dismemberment of the Deccan before its conquest by the Mussulmans.—*Ed.*

in Southern India; or, if you will, go still more back to antiquity, take the mythological chronology of the Brahmin himself, who places the commencement of Indian misery in an epoch even more remote than the Christian creation of the world.

There cannot, however, remain any doubt but that the misery inflicted by the British on Hindostan is of an essentially different and infinitely more intensive kind than all Hindostan had to suffer before. I do not allude to European despotism, planted upon Asiatic despotism, by the British East India Company,¹ forming a more monstrous combination than any of the divine monsters startling us in the temple of Salsette.² This is no distinctive feature of British colonial rule, but only an imitation of the Dutch, and so much so that in order to characterise the working of the British East India Company, it is sufficient to literally repeat what Sir Stamford Raffles, the *English* Governor of Java, said of the old Dutch East India Company:

“The Dutch Company, actuated solely by the spirit of gain, and viewing their subjects with less regard or consideration than a West India planter formerly viewed a gang upon his estate, because the latter had paid the purchase money of human property, which the other had not, employed all the existing machinery of despotism to squeeze from the people their utmost mite of contribution, the last dregs of their labour, and thus aggravated the evils of a capricious and semi-barbarous Government, by working it with all the practiced ingenuity of politicians, and all the monopolizing selfishness of traders.”

All the civil wars, invasions, revolutions, conquests, famines, strangely complex, rapid and destructive as the successive action in Hindostan may appear, did not go deeper than its surface. England has broken down the entire framework of Indian society, without any symptoms of reconstitution yet appearing. This loss of his old world, with no gain of a new one, imparts a particular kind of melancholy to the present misery of the Hindoo, and

¹ The *British East India Company* was organized in 1600 for the purpose of carrying on a monopoly trade with India. Under cover of the Company's "trading" operations the English capitalists conquered the country and governed it for decades. After the Indian uprising of 1857 the Company was dissolved and the British Government began to rule India directly.—Ed.

² *Temple of Salsette*: A cave temple situated on the island of that name in the Bombay Presidency. It contains a huge number of carvings, chiselled in stone like the entire temple itself.—Ed.

separates Hindostan, ruled by Britain, from all its ancient traditions, and from the whole of its past history.

There have been in Asia, generally, from immemorial times, but three departments of Government: that of finance, or the plunder of the interior; that of War, or the plunder of the exterior; and, finally, the department of Public Works. Climate and territorial conditions, especially the vast tracts of desert, extending from the Sahara, through Anabia, Persia, India and Tartary, to the most elevated Asiatic highlands, constituted artificial irrigation by canals and waterworks the basis of Oriental agriculture. As in Egypt and India, inundations are used for fertilising the soil of Mesopotamia, Persia, etc.; advantage is taken of a high level for feeding irrigative canals. This prime necessity of an economical and common use of water, which, in the Occident, drove private enterprise to voluntary association, as in Flanders and Italy, necessitated, in the Orient where civilisation was too low and the territorial extent too vast to call into life voluntary association, the interference of the centralising power of Government. Hence an economical function devolved upon all Asiatic Governments the function of providing public works. This artificial fertilisation of the soil, dependent on a Central Government, and immediately decaying with the neglect of irrigation and drainage, explains the otherwise strange fact that we now find whole territories barren and desert that were once brilliantly cultivated, as Palmyra, Petra, the ruins in Yemen, and large provinces of Egypt, Persia and Hindostan; it also explains how a single war of devastation has been able to depopulate a country for centuries, and to strip it of all its civilisation.

Now, the British in East India accepted from their predecessors the department of finance and of war, but they have neglected entirely that of public works. Hence the deterioration of an agriculture which is not capable of being conducted on the British principle of free competition, of *laissez-faire* and *laissez-aller*.¹ But in Asiatic empires we are quite accustomed to see agriculture deteriorating under one government and reviving again under some other government. There the harvests correspond to good or bad government, as they change in Europe with good or bad

¹ *Laissez-faire* and *laissez-aller*: "Grant freedom of action," the motto of the liberal bourgeois economists, who insisted on free trade and non-interference by the state in the sphere of economic relations.—Ed.

seasons. Thus the oppression and neglect of agriculture, bad as it is, could not be looked upon as the final blow dealt to Indian society by the British intruder, had it not been attended by a circumstance of quite different importance, a novelty in the annals of the whole Asiatic world. However changing the political aspect of India's past must appear, its social condition has remained unaltered since its remotest antiquity, until the first decennium of the 19th century. The hand-loom and the spinning-wheel, producing their regular myriads of spinners and weavers, were the pivots of the structure of that society. From immemorial times, Europe received the admirable textures of Indian labour, sending in return for them her precious metals, and furnishing thereby his material to the goldsmith, that indispensable member of Indian society, whose love of finery is so great that even the lowest class, those who go about nearly naked, have commonly a pair of golden ear-rings and a gold ornament of some kind hung round their necks. Rings on the fingers and toes have also been common. Women as well as children frequently wore massive bracelets and anklets of gold or silver, and statuettes of divinities in gold and silver were met with in the households. It was the British intruder who broke up the Indian hand-loom and destroyed the spinning-wheel. England began with driving the Indian cottons from the European market; it then introduced twist into Hindostan and in the end inundated the very mother country of cotton with cottons. From 1818 to 1836 the export of twist from Great Britain to India rose in the proportion of 1 to 5,200. In 1824 the export of British muslins to India hardly amount to 1,000,000 yards, while in 1837 it surpassed 64,000,000 of yards. But at the same time the population of Dacca decreased from 150,000 inhabitants to 20,000. This decline of Indian towns celebrated for their fabrics was by no means the worst consequence. British steam and science uprooted, over the whole surface of Hindostan, the union between agricultural and manufacturing industry.

These two circumstances—the Hindoo, on the one hand, leaving, like all Oriental peoples, to the central government the care of the great public works, the prime condition of his agriculture and commerce, dispersed, on the other hand over the surface of the country, and agglomerated in small centres by the domestic union of agricultural and manufacturing pursuits—these two circumstances had brought about, since the remotest times, a social system of particular features—the so-called *village system*,

which gave to each of these small unions their independent organisation and distinct life. The peculiar character of this system may be judged from the following description, contained in an old official report of the British House of Commons on Indian affairs:

“A village, geographically considered, is a tract of country comprising some hundred or thousand acres of arable and waste lands; politically viewed it resembles a corporation or township. Its proper establishment of officers and servants consists of the following descriptions: The *potail*, or head inhabitant, who has generally the superintendence of the affairs of the village, settles the disputes of the inhabitants, attends to the police, and performs the duty of collecting the revenue within his village, a duty which his personal influence and minute acquaintance with the situation and concerns of the people render him the best qualified for this charge. The *kurnum* keeps the accounts of cultivation, and registers everything connected with it. The *tallier* and the *totie*, the duty of the former of which consists in gaining information of crimes and offences, and in escorting and protecting persons travelling from one village to another; the province of the latter appearing to be more immediately confined to the village, consisting, among other duties, in guarding the crops and assisting in measuring them. The *boundary man*, who preserves the limits of the village, or gives evidence respecting them in cases of dispute. The Superintendent of Tanks and Watercourses distributes the water for the purposes of agriculture. The Brahmin, who performs the village worship. The schoolmaster, who is seen teaching the children in a village to read and write in the sand. The calendar-Brahmin, or astrologer, etc. These officers and servants generally constitute the establishment of a village; but in some parts of the country it is of less extent; some of the duties and functions above described being united in the same person; in others it exceeds the above-named number of individuals. Under this simple form of municipal government, the inhabitants of the country have lived from time immemorial. The boundaries of the villages have been but seldom altered; and though the villages themselves have been sometimes injured, and even desolated by war, famine or disease, the same name, the same limits, the same interests, and even the same families, have continued for ages. The inhabitants gave themselves no trouble about the breaking up and divisions of kingdoms; while the village remains entire, they care not to

what power it is transferred, or to what sovereign it devolves; its internal economy remains unchanged. The potail is still the head inhabitant, and still acts as the petty judge or magistrate, and collector or rentor of the village."

These small stereotype forms of social organism have been to the greater part dissolved, and are disappearing, not so much through the brutal interference of the British tax-gatherer and the British soldier, as to the working of English steam and English free trade. Those family-communities were based on domestic industry, in that peculiar combination of hand-weaving, hand-spinning and hand-tilling agriculture which gave them self-supporting power. English interference having placed the spinner in Lancashire and the weaver in Bengal, or sweeping away both Hindoo spinner and weaver, dissolved these small semi-barbarian, semi-civilised communities, by blowing up their economical basis, and thus produced the greatest, and to speak the truth, the only *social* revolution ever heard of in Asia.

Now, sickening as it must be to human feeling to witness those myriads of industrious patriarchal and inoffensive social organisations disorganised and dissolved into their units, thrown into a sea of woes, and their individual members losing at the same time their ancient form of civilisation, and their hereditary means of subsistence, we must not forget that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies. We must not forget the barbarian egotism which, concentrating on some miserable patch of land, had quietly witnessed the ruin of empires, the perpetration of unspeakable cruelties, the massacre of the population of large towns, with no other consideration bestowed upon them than on natural events, itself the helpless prey of any aggressor who deigned to notice it at all. We must not forget that this undignified, stagnatory, and vegetative life, that this passive sort of existence evoked on the other part, in contradistinction, wild, aimless, unbounded forces of destruction and rendered murder itself a religious rite in Hindostan. We must not forget that these little communities were contaminated by distinctions of caste and by slavery, that they subjugated man to external circumstances instead of elevating man to be the

sovereign of circumstances, that they transformed a self-developing social state into never changing natural destiny, and thus brought about a brutalising worship of nature, exhibiting its degradation in the fact that man, the sovereign of nature, fell down on his knees in adoration of *Kanuman*, the monkey, and *Sabhala*, the cow.

England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindostan, was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution.

Then, whatever bitterness the spectacle of the crumbling of an ancient world may have for our personal feelings, we have the right, in point of history, to exclaim with Goethe:

“Sollte diese Qual uns quälen,
Da sie unsre Lust vermehrt,
Hat nicht Myriaden Seelen
Timur's Herrschaft aufgezehrt?”¹

Written by Marx on June 10, 1853
Printed in *The New York Daily
Tribune* of June 25, 1853

Printed according to the text of
the newspaper
Written in English

Should this torture then torment us
Since it brings us greater pleasure?
Were not through the rule of Timur
Souls devoured without measure?

From Goethe's *Westöstlicher Diwan. An Suleika.*

Karl Marx

**THE FUTURE RESULTS
OF BRITISH RULE IN INDIA**

London, Friday, July 22, 1853

... How came it that English supremacy was established in India? The paramount power of the Great Mogul¹ was broken by the Mogul Viceroys. The power of the Viceroys was broken by the Mahrattas.² The power of the Mahrattas was broken by the Afghans, and while all were struggling against all, the Briton rushed in and was enabled to subdue them all. A country not only divided between Mohammedan and Hindoo, but between tribe and tribe, between caste and caste; a society whose framework was based on a sort of equilibrium, resulting from a general repulsion and constitutional exclusiveness between all its members. Such a country and such a society, were they not the predestined prey of conquest? If we knew nothing of the past history of Hindostan, would there not be the one great and incontestable fact, that even at this moment India is held in English thralldom by an Indian army maintained at the cost of India? India, then, could not escape the fate of being conquered, and the whole of her past history, if it be anything, is the history of the successive conquests she has undergone. Indian society has no history at all, at least no known history. What we call its history, is but the history of the successive intruders who founded their empires on the passive basis of that unresisting and unchanging society. The question, therefore, is not whether the English had a right to conquer India, but whether we are to prefer India con-

¹ *Great Mogul*: The title of the Indian Mohammedan emperors of the Turkish Baber dynasty, which began to rule in 1526.—*Ed.*

² *Mahrattas*: A group of peoples in Central India which rose against the Mussulmans and in the beginning of the eighteenth century formed a confederation of feudal principedoms.—*Ed.*

quered by the Turk, by the Persian, by the Russian, to India conquered by the Briton.

England has to fulfil a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating—the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying the material foundations of Western society in Asia.

Arabs, Turks, Tartars, Moguls, who had successively overrun India, soon became *Hindooised*, the barbarian conquerors being, by an eternal law of history, conquered themselves by the superior civilisation of their subjects. The British were the first conquerors superior, and therefore, inaccessible to Hindoo civilisation. They destroyed it by breaking up the native communities, by uprooting the native industry, and by levelling all that was great and elevated in the native society. The historic pages of their rule in India report hardly anything beyond that destruction. The work of regeneration hardly transpires through a heap of ruins. Nevertheless it has begun.

The political unity of India, more consolidated, and extending farther than it ever did under the Great Moguls, was the first condition of its regeneration. That unity, imposed by the British sword, will now be strengthened and perpetuated by the electric telegraph. The native army, organised and trained by the British drill-sergeant, was the *sine qua non* of Indian self-emancipation, and of India ceasing to be the prey of the first foreign intruder. The free press, introduced for the first time into Asiatic society, and managed principally by the common offspring of Hindoo and Europeans, is a new and powerful agent of reconstruction. The *Zemindars*¹ and *Ryotwar*² themselves, abominable as they are, involve two distinct forms of private property in land—the great *desideratum* of Asiatic society. From the Indian natives, reluctantly and sparingly educated at Calcutta, under English superintendence, a fresh class is springing up, endowed with the requirements for government and imbued with European science. Steam has brought India into regular and rapid communication

¹ *Zemindars*: New big landowners who were established by the British from among former tax collectors and merchant-usurers through the expropriation of the Indian peasantry. The zemindar system was widespread in Northeast India.—*Ed.*

² *Ryotwar*: A system of renting land to peasants for an unlimited period of time. Introduced by the British in the South of India (Madras and Bombay Presidencies) it permitted the British authorities to let land to peasants on extremely onerous terms.—*Ed.*

with Europe, has connected its chief ports with those of the whole south-eastern ocean, and has revindicated it from the isolated position which was the prime law of its stagnation. The day is not far distant when, by a combination of railways and steam vessels, the distance between England and India, measured by time, will be shortened to eight days, and when that once fabulous country will thus be actually annexed to the Western world.

The ruling classes of Great Britain have had, till now, but an accidental, transitory and exceptional interest in the progress of India. The aristocracy wanted to conquer it, the moneyocracy to plunder it, and the millocracy to undersell it. But now the tables are turned. The millocracy have discovered that the transformation of India into a reproductive country has become of vital importance to them, and that, to that end, it is necessary, above all, to gift her with means of irrigation and of internal communication. They intend now drawing a net of railways over India. And they will do it. The results must be inappreciable.

It is notorious that the productive powers of India are paralysed by the utter want of means for conveying and exchanging its various produce. Nowhere, more than in India, do we meet with social destitution in the midst of natural plenty, for want of the means of exchange. It was proved before a Committee of the British House of Commons, which sat in 1848, that "when grain was selling from 6s. to 8s. a quarter at Kandeish, it was sold at 64s. to 70s. at Poonah, where the people were dying in the streets of famine, without the possibility of gaining supplies from Kandeish, because the clay-roads were impracticable."

The introduction of railways may be easily made to subserve agricultural purposes by the formation of tanks, where ground is required for embankment, and by the conveyance of water along the different lines. Thus irrigation, the *sine qua non* of farming in the East, might be greatly extended, and the frequently recurring local famines, arising from the want of water, would be averted. The general importance of railways, viewed under this head, must become evident, when we remember that irrigated lands, even in the districts near Ghauts, pay three times as much in taxes, afford ten or twelve times as much employment, and yield twelve or fifteen times as much profit, as the same area without irrigation.

Railways will afford the means of diminishing the amount and the cost of the military establishments. Col. Warren, Town Major of the Fort St. William, stated before a Select Committee of the House of Commons:

"The practicability of receiving intelligence from distant parts of the country in as many hours as at present it requires days and even weeks, and of sending instructions with troops and stores, in the more brief period are considerations which cannot be too highly estimated. Troops could be kept at more distant and healthier stations than at present, and much loss of life from sickness would by this means be spared. Stores could not to the same extent be required at the various dépôts, and the loss by decay, and the destruction incidental to the climate, would also be avoided. The number of troops might be diminished in direct proportion to their effectiveness."

We know that the municipal organisation and the economical basis of the village communities has been broken up, but their worst feature, the dissolution of society into stereotype and disconnected atoms, has survived their vitality. The village isolation produced the absence of roads in India, and the absence of roads perpetuated the village isolation. On this plan a community existed with a given scale of low conveniences, almost without intercourse with other villages, without the desires and efforts indispensable to social advance. The British having broken up this self-sufficient *inertia* of the villages, railways will provide the new want of communication and intercourse. Besides, "one of the effects of the railway system will be to bring into every village effected by it such knowledge of the contrivances and appliances of other countries, and such means of obtaining them, as will first put the hereditary and stipendiary village artisanship of India to full proof of its capabilities, and then supply its defects." (Chapman, *The Cotton and Commerce of India*.)

I know that the English millocracy intend to endow India with railways with the exclusive view of extracting at diminished expenses the cotton and other raw materials for their manufactures. But when you have once introduced machinery into the locomotion of a country, which possesses iron and coals, you are unable to withhold it from its fabrication. You cannot maintain a net of railways over an immense country without introducing all those industrial processes necessary to meet the

immediate and current wants of railway locomotion, and out of which there must grow the application of machinery to those branches of industry not immediately connected with railways. The railway-system will therefore become, in India, truly the forerunner of modern industry. This is the more certain as the Hindoos are allowed by British authorities themselves to possess particular aptitude for accommodating themselves to entirely new labour, and acquiring the requisite knowledge of machinery. Ample proof of this fact is afforded by the capacities and expertness of the native engineers in the Calcutta mint, where they have been for years employed in working the steam machinery, by the natives attached to the several steam engines in the Hurdwar coal districts, and by other instances. Mr. Campbell himself, greatly influenced as he is by the prejudices of the East India Company, is obliged to avow "that the great mass of the Indian people possesses a great *industrial energy*, is well fitted to accumulate capital, and remarkable for a mathematical clearness of head, and talent for figures and exact sciences." "Their intellects," he says, "are excellent." Modern industry, resulting from the railway-system, will dissolve the hereditary divisions of labour, upon which rest the Indian castes, those decisive impediments to Indian progress and Indian power.

All the English bourgeoisie may be forced to do will neither emancipate nor materially mend the social condition of the mass of the people, depending not only on the development of the productive powers, but of their appropriation by the people. But what they will not fail to do is to lay down the material premises for both. Has the bourgeoisie ever done more? Has it ever effected a progress without dragging individuals and peoples through blood and dirt, through misery and degradation?

The Indians will not reap the fruits of the new elements of society scattered among them by the British bourgeoisie, till in Great Britain itself the now ruling classes shall have been supplanted by the industrial proletariat, or till the Hindoos themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether. At all events, we may safely expect to see, at a more or less remote period, the regeneration of that great and interesting country, whose gentle natives are, to use the expression of Prince Soltykov, even in the most inferior classes,

"*plus fins et plus adroits que les Italiens,*"¹ whose submission even is counterbalanced by a certain calm nobility, who, notwithstanding their natural languor, have astonished the British officers by their bravery, whose country has been the source of our languages, our religions, and who represent the type of the ancient German in the *Jat*² and the type of the ancient Greek in the Brahmin.

I cannot part with the subject of India without some concluding remarks.

The profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilisation lies unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home, where it assumes respectable forms, to the colonies, where it goes naked. They are the defenders of property, but did any revolutionary party ever originate agrarian revolutions like those in Bengal, in Madras, and in Bombay? Did they not, in India, to borrow an expression of that great robber, Lord Clive himself, resort to atrocious extortion, when simple corruption could not keep pace with their rapacity? While they prated in Europe about the inviolable sanctity of the national debt, did they not confiscate in India the dividends of the *rayahs*, who had invested their private savings in the Company's own funds? While they combatted the French revolution under the pretext of defending "our holy religion," did they not forbid, at the same time, Christianity to be propagated in India, and did they not, in order to make money out of the pilgrims streaming to the temples of Orissa and Bengal, take up the trade in the murder and prostitution perpetrated in the temple of Juggernaut? These are the men of "Property, Order, Family, and Religion."

The devastating effects of English industry, when contemplated with regard to India, a country as vast as Europe, and containing 150 millions of acres, are palpable and confounding. But we must not forget that they are only the organic results of the whole system of production as it is now constituted. That production rests on the supreme rule of capital. The centralisation of capital is essential to the existence of capital as an independent power. The destructive influence of that centralisation upon the markets of the world does but reveal, in the most gigantic dimensions, the inherent organic laws of political economy

¹ Marx quotes from A. D. Soltykov's book *Lettres sur l'Inde*, Paris, 1848.—*Ed.*

² *Jats*. A tribe in Northwest India.—*Ed.*

now at work in every civilised town. The bourgeois period of history has to create the material basis of the new world—on the one hand the universal intercourse founded upon the mutual dependency of mankind, and the means of that intercourse; on the other hand the development of the productive powers of man and the transformation of material production into a scientific domination of natural agencies. Bourgeois industry and commerce create these material conditions of a new world in the same way as geological revolutions have created the surface of the earth. When a great social revolution shall have mastered the results of the bourgeois epoch, the market of the world and the modern powers of production, and subjected them to the common control of the most advanced peoples, then only will human progress cease to resemble that hideous pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain.

Written by Marx in English on
July 22, 1853

Printed according to the text of the
newspaper

Published in *The New York Daily
Tribune* of August 8, 1853

Karl Marx
SPEECH AT THE ANNIVERSARY
OF THE PEOPLE'S PAPER¹

The so-called Revolutions of 1848 were but poor incidents—small fractures and fissures in the dry crust of European society. However, they denounced the abyss. Beneath the apparently solid surface, they betrayed oceans of liquid matter, only needing expansion to rend into fragments continents of hard rock. Noisily and confusedly they proclaimed the emancipation of the Proletarian, *i.e.*, the secret of the nineteenth century, and of the revolution of that century. That social revolution, it is true, was no novelty invented in 1848. Steam, electricity, and the self-acting mule were revolutionists of a rather more dangerous character than even citizens Barbès, Raspail and Blanqui. But, although the atmosphere in which we live, weighs upon every one with a 20,000 lb. force, do you feel it? No more than European society before 1848 felt the revolutionary atmosphere enveloping and pressing it from all sides. There is one great fact, characteristic of this our nineteenth century, a fact which no party dares deny. On the one hand, there have started into life industrial and scientific forces, which no epoch of the former human history had ever suspected. On the other hand, there exist symptoms of decay, far surpassing the horrors recorded of the latter times of the Roman empire. In our days everything seems pregnant with its contrary. Machinery, gifted with the wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human labour, we behold starving and overworking it. The new-fangled sources of wealth, by some strange weird spell, are turned into sources of want. The victories of art seem bought by the loss of character. At the same pace that mankind masters nature, man seems to become enslaved to other men or to his own infamy. Even the pure light of science seems unable to shine but on the dark background of ignorance. All our invention and progress seem to result in

¹ The *People's Paper*, a Chartist newspaper, was published in London from 1852 to 1858. Marx wrote articles for it and sometimes assisted the editor, Ernest Jones, in the work of editing.—*Ed.*

endowing material forces with intellectual life, and in stultifying human life into a material force. This antagonism between modern industry and science on the one hand, modern misery and dissolution on the other hand; this antagonism between the productive powers, and the social relations of our epoch is a fact, palpable, overwhelming, and not to be controverted. Some parties may wait over it; others may wish to get rid of modern arts, in order to get rid of modern conflicts. Or they may imagine that so signal a progress in industry wants to be completed by as signal a regress in politics. On our part, we do not mistake the shape of the shrewd spirit that continues to mark all these contradictions. We know that to work well the new-fangled forces of society, they only want to be mastered by new-fangled men—and such are the working men. They are as much the invention of modern time as machinery itself. In the signs that bewilder the middle class, the aristocracy and the poor prophets of regression, we do recognise our brave friend, Robin Goodfellow,¹ the old mole that can work in the earth so fast, that worthy pioneer—the Revolution. The English working men are the first born sons of modern industry. They will then, certainly, not be the last in aiding the social revolution produced by that industry, a revolution, which means the emancipation of their own class all over the world, which is as universal as capital-rule and wages-slavery. I know the heroic struggles the English working class have gone through since the middle of the last century—struggles less glorious, because they are shrouded in obscurity, and burked by the middle class historian. To revenge the misdeeds of the ruling class, there existed in the middle ages, in Germany, a secret tribunal, called the “*Vehmgericht*.” If a red cross was seen marked on a house, people knew that its owner was doomed by the “*Vehm*.” All the houses of Europe are now marked with the mysterious red cross. History is the judge—its executioner, the proletarian.

Speech delivered in English by
Marx on April 14, 1856

Printed according to the text of the
newspaper

Published in the *People's Paper* of
April 19, 1856

¹ *Robin Goodfellow*: A sprite, who was popularly believed in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to lend people a helping hand. He is one of the chief characters in Shakespeare's comedy *A Midsummer Night's Dream*.—Ed.

Karl Marx

**PREFACE TO A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY**

I examine the system of bourgeois economics in the following order: *capital, landed property, wage labour; state, foreign trade, world market*. Under the first three headings, I investigate the economic conditions of life of the three great classes into which modern bourgeois society is divided; the interconnection of the three other headings is obvious at a glance. The first section of the first book, which deals with capital, consists of the following chapters: 1. Commodities; 2. Money, or simple circulation; 3. Capital in general. The first two chapters form the contents of the present part. The total material lies before me in the form of monographs, which were written at widely separated periods, for self-clarification, not for publication, and whose coherent elaboration according to the plan indicated will be dependent on external circumstances.

I am omitting a general introduction which I had jotted down because on closer reflection any anticipation of results still to be proved appears to me to be disturbing, and the reader who on the whole desires to follow me must be resolved to ascend from the particular to the general. A few indications concerning the course of my own politico-economic studies may, on the other hand, appear in place here.

I was taking up law, which discipline, however, I only pursued as a subordinate subject along with philosophy and history. In the year 1842-43, as editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*,¹ I experienced for the first time the embarrassment of having to take part in discussions on so-called material interests. The proceed-

¹ *Rheinische Zeitung* [*Rhenish Gazette*]: A daily radical newspaper published in Cologne in 1842-43; from October 15, 1842 to March 18, 1843, its editor was Marx.—Ed.

ings of the Rhenish Landtag on thefts of wood and parcelling of landed property, the official polemic which Herr von Schaper, then *Oberpräsident* of the Rhine Province, opened against the *Rheinische Zeitung* on the conditions of the Moselle peasantry, and finally debates on free trade and protective tariffs provided the first occasions for occupying myself with economic questions. On the other hand, at that time when the good will "to go further" greatly outweighed knowledge of the subject, a philosophically weakly tinged echo of French socialism and communism made itself audible in the *Rheinische Zeitung*. I declared myself against this amateurism, but frankly confessed at the same time in a controversy with the *Allgemeine Augsburger Zeitung*¹ that my previous studies did not permit me even to venture any judgement on the content of the French tendencies. Instead, I eagerly seized on the illusion of the managers of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, who thought that by a weaker attitude on the part of the paper they could secure a remission of the death sentence passed upon it, to withdraw from the public stage into the study.

The first work which I undertook for a solution of the doubts which assailed me was a critical review of the Hegelian philosophy of right, a work the introduction to which appeared in 1844 in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*,² published in Paris. My investigation led to the result that legal relations as well as forms of state are to be grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human mind, but rather have their roots in the material conditions of life, the sum total of which Hegel, following the example of the Englishmen and Frenchmen of the eighteenth century, combines under the name of "civil society," that, however, the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy. The investigation of the latter, which I began in Paris, I continued in Brussels, whither I had emigrated in consequence of an expulsion order of M. Guizot. The general result at which I arrived and which, once won, served as a guiding thread for my studies, can be briefly formulated as follows: In the social production of their life, men enter into def-

¹ Marx has in mind his article, "Der Kommunismus und die *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*" [Communism and the *Augsburg General Journal*], *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe*, Abt. I, B. I. Halbband I, Frankfurt a. M. 1927, S. 260-65.—Ed.

² *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* [*German-French Annuals*]: Organ of revolutionary and communist propaganda, published by Marx in Paris in 1844.—Ed.

inite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, esthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production. No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself. Therefore mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, it will always be found that the task itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation. In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society. The bourgeois relations of production are

the last antagonistic form of the social process of production—antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but of one arising from the social conditions of life of the individuals; at the same time the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism. This social formation brings, therefore, the prehistory of human society to a close.

Frederick Engels, with whom, since the appearance of his brilliant sketch on the criticism of the economic categories (in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*), I maintained a constant exchange of ideas by correspondence, had by another road (compare his *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*) arrived at the same result as I, and when in the spring of 1845 he also settled in Brussels, we resolved to work out in common the opposition of our view to the ideological view of German philosophy, in fact, to settle accounts with our erstwhile philosophical conscience. The resolve was carried out in the form of a criticism of post-Hegelian philosophy. The manuscript, two large octavo volumes,¹ had long reached its place of publication in Westphalia when we received the news that altered circumstances did not allow of its being printed. We abandoned the manuscript to the gnawing criticism of the mice all the more willingly as we had achieved our main purpose—self-clarification. Of the scattered works in which we put our views before the public at that time, now from one aspect, now from another, I will mention only the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, jointly written by Engels and myself, and *Discours sur le libre échange*² published by me. The decisive points of our view were first scientifically, although only polemically, indicated in my work published in 1847 and directed against Proudhon: *Misère de la Philosophie*,³ etc. A dissertation written in German on *Wage Labour*, in which I put together my lectures on this subject delivered in the Brussels German Workers' Society, was interrupted, while being printed, by the February Revolution and my consequent forcible removal from Belgium.

The editing of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in 1848 and 1849, and the subsequent events, interrupted my economic studies which could only be resumed in the year 1850 in London. The

¹ The reference is to *The German Ideology*.—Ed.

² *Discourse on Free Trade*.—Ed.

³ *The Poverty of Philosophy*.—Ed.

enormous material for the history of political economy which is accumulated in the British Museum, the favourable vantage point afforded by London for the observation of bourgeois society, and finally the new stage of development upon which the latter appeared to have entered with the discovery of gold in California and Australia, determined me to begin afresh from the very beginning and to work through the new material critically. These studies led partly of themselves into apparently quite remote subjects on which I had to dwell for a shorter or longer period. Especially, however, was the time at my disposal curtailed by the imperative necessity of earning my living. My contributions, during eight years now, to the first English-American newspaper, the *New York Tribune*,¹ compelled an extraordinary scattering of my studies, since I occupy myself with newspaper correspondence proper only in exceptional cases. However, articles on striking economic events in England and on the Continent constituted so considerable a part of my contributions that I was compelled to make myself familiar with practical details which lie outside the sphere of the actual science of political economy.

This sketch of the course of my studies in the sphere of political economy is intended only to show that my views, however they may be judged and however little they coincide with the interested prejudices of the ruling classes, are the result of conscientious investigation lasting many years. But at the entrance to science, as at the entrance to hell, the demand must be posted:

*Qui si convien lasciare ogni sospetto;
Ogni villà convien che qui sia morta.²*

Karl Marx

London, January 1859

Printed in Marx's book *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Berlin 1859

Printed according to the text of the book
Translated from the German

¹ *The New York Daily Tribune*: Democratic daily newspaper, which appeared in New York from 1841 to 1924 and to which Marx contributed from 1851 to 1862.—Ed.

² Here all mistrust must be abandoned.
And here must perish every craven thought.
[Dante, *The Divine Comedy*.]—Ed.

Frederick Engels

**KARL MARX, A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY**

I

In all scientific spheres, the Germans have long ago demonstrated their equality with, and in most of them their superiority over, the remaining civilized nations. Only one science did not count a single German among its leading lights, *viz.*, political economy. The reason is obvious. Political economy is the theoretical analysis of modern bourgeois society and therefore presupposes developed bourgeois conditions, conditions which in Germany, after the wars of the Reformation and the Peasant Wars, particularly after the Thirty Years' War, could not arise for centuries. The separation of Holland from the Empire forced Germany out of world trade and from the outset reduced its industrial development to the scantiest proportions; and while the Germans were so slowly and laboriously recovering from the devastation of the civil wars, while they were using up all their civil energy, which had never been very great, in fruitless struggle against the customs barriers and idiotic trade regulations which every petty princeling and imperial baron imposed on the industry of his subjects, while the imperial towns with their guild mummery and patricianism were falling into decay, Holland, England and France conquered the leading positions in world trade, founded colony after colony and developed the manufacturing industry to the highest pitch of prosperity, until finally England, owing to steam power which only then began to impart value to its coal and iron deposits, attained the foremost position in modern bourgeois development. So long, however, as a struggle had still to be waged against such ludicrously antiquated relics of the Middle Ages as up to 1830 laid fetters on the material bour-

geois development of Germany, no German political economy was possible. Only with the establishment of the Customs Union¹ did the Germans arrive at a position in which they could at least *understand* political economy. From this time, in fact, began the importation of English and French economics for the benefit of the German bourgeoisie. Presently the learned fraternity and the bureaucracy seized hold of the imported material and worked it up in a fashion not very creditable to the "German spirit." From the medley of high-class swindlers, merchants, schoolmasters and bureaucrats dabbling in authorship there arose thereupon a German economic literature which in its insipidity, shallowness, lack of thought, verbosity and plagiarism was paralleled only by the German novel. Among practically-minded people, the protectionist school of the industrialists was the first to establish itself; and its authority, List, is still the best that German bourgeois-economic literature has produced, although the whole of his glorious work is copied from the Frenchman Ferrier, the theoretical originator of the Continental System.² In opposition to this tendency there arose in the forties the free trade school of the merchants in the Baltic provinces, who, with childish but self-interested faith, echoed the arguments of the English free traders. Finally, among the schoolmasters and bureaucrats who had to deal with the theoretical side of the subject, there were to be found dried-up, uncritical herbarium collectors like Herr Rau, speculating wisecracks like Herr Stein, who translated foreign propositions into undigested Hegelian language, or literary gleaners in the "cultural historical" field, like Herr Riehl. The final outcome of this was *cameralistics*,³ a mush consisting of all sorts of extraneous matter, with a spattering of eclectic-economic sauce, such as would be useful knowledge for a state-employed law school graduate preparing for his final state board examination.

While thus the bourgeoisie, schoolmasters and bureaucracy in Germany were still labouring to learn by heart the first elements

¹ *Zollverein*: A German customs union was established on January 1, 1834, between Prussia and other German states. It did not include Austria.—*Ed.*

² The *Continental System* was the policy pursued by Napoleon I of prohibiting the import of English goods on the Continent. Decreed in 1806, it was adhered to by Spain, Naples and Holland, and later also Prussia, Denmark, Russia, Austria and other countries.—*Ed.*

³ *Cameralistic*: The curriculum of administrative and economic subjects taught at German universities.—*Ed.*

of English-French economics as unassailable dogmas and to attain some degree of clarity about them, the German proletarian party appeared on the scene. Its whole theoretical existence proceeded from the study of political economy; and scientific, independent *German economics* dates precisely from the moment of its appearance. This German economics is grounded essentially upon the *materialist conception of history*, the basic features of which are presented briefly in the preface to the above-named work. The main points of this preface¹ have already been printed in *Das Volk*,² for which reason we refer to it. Not only for economics, but for all historical sciences (and all sciences which are not natural sciences are historical) a revolutionizing discovery was made with this proposition, that "the mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general"; that all the social and political relations, all religious and legal systems, all the theoretical outlooks which emerge in history, are to be comprehended only when the material conditions of life of the respectively corresponding epochs are understood and the former are derived from these material conditions. "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but their social being that determines their consciousness." The proposition is so simple that it must be self-evident to anyone who is not bemused by idealist delusions. But it involves highly revolutionary consequences, not only for theory but also for practice: "At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of *social revolution*. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. . . . The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production—antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but of one arising from the social conditions of life of the

¹ See pp. 361-65 of this volume.—Ed.

² *Das Volk* [*The People*]: A German newspaper which, with Marx's close collaboration, appeared in London from May through August 1859.—Ed.

individuals; at the same time the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism." As we pursue our materialist thesis further and apply it to the present, the perspective of a tremendous revolution, indeed the most tremendous revolution of all time, therefore, immediately unfolds itself before us.

On closer consideration, it is, however, immediately evident that this apparently simple proposition, that the consciousness of men depends on their being and not *vice versa*, at once, and in its first consequences, runs directly counter to all idealism, even the most concealed. All traditional and customary outlooks on everything historical are negated by it. The whole traditional mode of political reasoning falls to the ground; patriotic noble-mindedness fights indignantly against such an unprincipled conception. The new mode of outlook, therefore, necessarily came into conflict, not only with the representatives of the bourgeoisie, but also with the mass of French Socialists who would fain shake the world in its foundations by means of the magic formula: *liberté, égalité, fraternité*. But above all it aroused great wrath among the German vulgar-democratic vociferators. All the same they have by preference attempted to exploit the new ideas in plagiaristic fashion, but with rare misunderstanding.

The development of the materialist conception even in regard to only a single historical example was a scientific work which would have demanded years of tranquil study, for it is obvious that nothing can be done here with mere phrases, that only a mass of critically sifted, completely mastered historical material can enable one to accomplish such a task. The February Revolution thrust our party on the political stage and thereby made it impossible for it to pursue purely scientific aims. Nevertheless, the basic outlook runs like a red thread through all the literary productions of the party. In all of them it is demonstrated in each particular case how every time the action originated from direct material impulses, and not from the phrases that accompanied the action, how, on the contrary, the political and juristic phrases were derived from the material impulses just as much as the political action and its results.

When, after the defeat of the Revolution of 1848-49, a period of time set in during which it became more and more impossible to influence Germany from without, our party surrendered the field of emigrational quarrels—for that remained the only pos-

sible action—to vulgar democracy. While the latter indulged in intrigues to its heart's content, and squabbled today in order to make up the day after, and the day after that again washed all its dirty linen in public—while vulgar democracy went begging through the whole of America in order immediately afterwards to stage new scandals over the division of the few pence garnered—our party was glad once again to have some leisure for study. It had the great advantage of having a new scientific outlook as its theoretical basis, the working out of which kept it fully occupied; for this reason alone it could never degenerate to such an extent as the “great men” among the emigrants.

The first fruit of these studies is the book under review.

II

In a publication like the one before us there can be no question of a merely desultory criticism of separate chapters taken from economics, of the isolated treatment of this or that disputed economic question. Rather it is from the outset constructed so as to be a systematic integration of the whole complex of economic science, to be an interconnected development of the laws of bourgeois production and bourgeois exchange. Since the economists are nothing but the interpreters of and apologists for these laws, this development is at the same time a criticism of the whole of economic literature.

Since Hegel's death hardly any attempt has been made to develop a science in its own inner interconnection. The official Hegelian school had appropriated from the dialectic of the master only the manipulation of the simplest of all tricks, which it applied to anything and everything, often even with ludicrous clumsiness. For it the entire heritage of Hegel was limited to a sheer pattern by the help of which every theme was devised, and to a compilation of words and turns of speech which now had no other purpose than to be at hand at the right time where thought and positive knowledge were lacking. Thus it came about that, as a Bonn professor said, these Hegelians understood nothing about anything, but could write about everything. And indeed, that's just what their stuff was like. Meanwhile, these gentlemen were, in spite of their sufficiency, so conscious of their weakness that they gave big problems the widest berth possible; the old pedantic science held the field by its superiority in positive knowl-

edge; and only when Feuerbach declared speculative conceptions untenable did Hegelianism gradually fall asleep; and it seemed as if the reign of the old metaphysics, with its fixed categories, had begun anew in science.

The thing had its natural cause. After the *régime* of the Hegelian Diadochi,¹ which had wound up with pure phrases, there naturally followed an epoch in which the positive content of science again outweighed its formal side. But at the same time Germany plunged into the natural sciences with quite extraordinary energy, which corresponded to the powerful bourgeois development after 1848; and as these sciences, in which the speculative tendency never assumed any kind of importance, became fashionable, there was a recrudescence of the old metaphysical manner of thinking, including the extreme platitudes of Wolff. Hegel fell into oblivion; and there developed the new natural-scientific materialism which is almost indistinguishable theoretically from that of the eighteenth century, and for the most part only enjoys the advantage of having a richer natural-scientific material at its disposal, particularly in chemistry and physiology. The narrow-minded philistine mode of thought of pre-Kantian times we find reproduced even to the most extreme triviality in Büchner and Vogt; and even Moleschott, who swears by Feuerbach, continually gets stuck in the most diverting fashion among the simplest of all categories. The lumbering cart horse of bourgeois workaday understanding naturally stops dead in confusion before the ditch which separates essence from appearance, cause from effect; but if one goes gaily hunting over such badly broken ground as that of abstract thinking, one must not ride cart horses.

Here, therefore, was another problem to be solved, one which had nothing to do with political economy as such. How was science to be treated? On the one hand, there was the Hegelian dialectics in the wholly abstract, "speculative" form in which Hegel had bequeathed it; on the other hand, there was the ordinary, essentially wolffian-metaphysical method, which had again become fashionable and in which the bourgeois economists too had written their fat, disjointed tomes. This latter method had

¹ *Diadochi*: Alexander of Macedon's successors, whose internecine warfare after his death led to the disintegration of the empire. Engels here applies this term ironically to the official representatives of the Hegelian school in the German universities.—*Ed.*

been so annihilated theoretically by Kant and particularly by Hegel that only lassitude and the lack of any *simple* alternative method could make possible its continued existence in practice. On the other hand, the Hegelian method was absolutely unusable in its *available* form. It was essentially idealistic, and the problem here was that of developing a world outlook more materialistic than any previous one. That method took pure thinking as its start, and here one ought to have started from the most stubborn facts. A method which, according to its own admission, "came from nothing through nothing to nothing" was by no means appropriate here in this form. Nevertheless, of all the available logical material, it was the only piece which could be used, at least as a starting-point. It had not been criticized, nor overcome; not one of the opponents of the great dialectician had been able to make a breach in its proud structure; it fell into oblivion, because the Hegelian school had not the slightest notion what to do with it. It was, therefore, above all necessary to subject the Hegelian method to thoroughgoing criticism.

What distinguished Hegel's mode of thought from that of all other philosophers was the tremendous sense of the historical upon which it was based. Abstract and idealist though it was in form, yet the development of his thoughts always proceeded parallel with the development of world history and the latter is really meant to be only the test of the former. If, thereby, the real relation was inverted and stood on its head, nevertheless, the real content entered everywhere into the philosophy; all the more so since Hegel—in contrast to his disciples—did not parade ignorance, but was one of the finest intellects of all time. He was the first who attempted to show a development, an inner coherence, in history; and while today much in his philosophy of history may seem peculiar to us, yet the grandeur of his fundamental outlook is admirable even today, whether one makes comparison with his predecessors or, to be sure, with anyone who, since his time, has indulged in general reflections concerning history. Everywhere, in his *Phenomenology*, *Esthetics*, *History of Philosophy*, this magnificent conception of history prevails, and everywhere the material is treated historically, in a definite, even if abstractly distorted, interconnection with history.

This epoch-making conception of history was the direct theoretical premise for the new materialist outlook, and this alone

provided a connecting point for the logical method, too. Since this forgotten dialectics had led to such results even from the standpoint of "pure thinking," and had, in addition, so easily settled accounts with all preceding logic and metaphysics, there must at any rate have been more to it than sophistry and hair-splitting. But the criticism of this method, which all official philosophy had fought shy of and still does, was no trifle.

Marx was, and is, the only one who could undertake the work of extracting from the Hegelian logic the kernel which comprises Hegel's real discoveries in this sphere, and to reconstruct the dialectical method, divested of its idealistic trappings, in the simple shape in which it becomes the only true form of development of thought. The working out of the method which forms the foundation of Marx's criticism of political economy we consider a result of hardly less importance than the basic materialist outlook itself.

The criticism of economics, even according to the method acquired, could still be exercised in two ways: historically or logically. Since in history, as in its literary reflection, development as a whole also proceeds from the most simple to the more complex relations, the historical development of the literature of political economy provided a natural guiding thread with which criticism could link up, and the economic categories as a whole would thereby appear in the same sequence as in the logical development. This form apparently has the advantage of greater clearness, since indeed it is the *actual* development that is followed, but as a matter of fact it would thereby at most become more popular. History often proceeds by leaps and zigzags and it would thus have to be followed up everywhere, whereby not only would much material of minor importance have to be incorporated, but there would be much interruption of the chain of thought; furthermore, the history of economics could not be written without that of bourgeois society and this would make the task endless, since all preliminary work is lacking. The logical method of treatment was, therefore, the only appropriate one. But this, as a matter of fact, is nothing else but the historical method, only divested of its historical form and disturbing fortuities. The chain of thought must begin with the same thing with which this history begins, and its further course will be nothing else but the reflection of the historical course in abstract and theoretically consistent form; a corrected reflection but corrected according to laws furnished by the real

course of history itself, in that each factor can be considered at the point of development of its full maturity, of its classic form.

In this method we proceed from the first and simplest relation that historically and in fact confronts us; here, therefore, from the first economic relation to be found. We analyze this relation. Being a *relation* of itself implies that it has two sides, *related to each other*. Each of these sides is considered by itself, which brings us to the way in which they behave to each other, their interaction. Contradictions will result which demand a solution. But as we are not considering here an abstract process of thought taking place solely in our heads, but a real process which actually took place at some particular time or is still taking place, these contradictions, too, will have developed in practice and will probably have found their solution. We shall trace the nature of this solution, and shall discover that it has been brought about by the establishment of a new relation whose two opposite sides we shall now have to develop, and so on.

Political economy begins with *commodities*, begins from the moment when products are exchanged for one another—whether by individuals or by primitive communities. The product that appears in exchange is a commodity. It is, however, a commodity solely because a *relation* between two persons or communities attaches to the *thing*, the product, the relation between producer and consumer who are here no longer united in the same person. Here at once we have an example of a peculiar fact, which runs through the whole of economics and which has caused utter confusion in the minds of the bourgeois economists: economics deals not with things but with relations between persons, and, in the last resort, between classes; these relations are, however, always *attached to things* and *appear as things*. This interconnection, which in isolated cases it is true has dawned upon this or that economist, was first discovered by Marx as obtaining for all economics, whereby he made the most difficult questions so simple and clear that now even the bourgeois economists will be able to grasp them.

If now we consider commodities from their various aspects, commodities, to be sure, in their complete development and not as they first laboriously developed in the primitive barter between two primitive communities, they present themselves to us from

the two points of view of use value and exchange value, and here we at once enter the sphere of economic dispute. Anyone who would like to have a striking illustration of the fact that the German dialectical method in its present state of elaboration is at least as superior to the old, shallow, garrulous metaphysical method as the railway is to the means of transport of the Middle Ages, should read in Adam Smith or any other official economist of reputation what a torment exchange value and use value were to these gentlemen, how difficult it was for them to keep them properly apart and comprehend each in its peculiar definiteness, and should then compare the clear and simple exposition in Marx.

After use value and exchange value have been explained, commodities are presented as the immediate unity of both, in the form in which they enter *the process of exchange*. What contradictions result here can afterwards be read on pp. 20 and 21.¹ We only note that these contradictions are not merely of theoretical, abstract interest, but at the same time reflect the difficulties which emerge from the nature of the direct exchange relations, of simple barter, reflect the impossibilities in which this first crude form of exchange necessarily terminates. The solution of these impossibilities is to be found in the fact that the property of representing the exchange value of all other commodities is transferred to a special commodity—*money*. Money, or simple circulation, is now explained in the second chapter, namely, 1) money as the *measure of value*, in which connection value measured in money, *price*, is precisely defined; 2) as *means of circulation*, and 3) as the unity of both definitions, as *real money*, as the representative of all material bourgeois wealth. This closes the development of the first part, reserving the passing of money into capital for the second.

It is seen that with this method the logical development is by no means compelled to keep to the purely abstract sphere. On the contrary, this method requires historical illustration, constant contact with reality. Such proofs are accordingly introduced in great variety, namely, references both to the actual course of history at various stages of social development and also to the economic literature in which the clear working out of definitions

¹ See Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Chicago 1911, pp. 43-45.—Ed.

of economic relations is pursued from the beginning. The criticism of particular, more or less one-sided or confused, modes of conception is, then, in essence already given in the logical development itself and can be formulated briefly.

In a third article we shall deal with the economic content of the book itself.¹

Written by Engels during the first
half of August 1859

Published in the newspaper *Das
Volk* of August 6 and 20, 1859

Unsigned

Printed according to the text
of the newspaper

Translated from the German

¹ This third article never appeared in print, and the ms. of it has not been found.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

**INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF THE WORKING MEN'S
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION**

ESTABLISHED SEPTEMBER 28, 1864 AT A PUBLIC MEETING
HELD AT ST. MARTIN'S HALL, LONG ACRE, LONDON

Working Men,

It is a great fact that the misery of the working masses has not diminished from 1848 to 1864, and yet this period is unrivalled for the development of its industry and the growth of its commerce. In 1850, a moderate organ of the British middle class, of more than average information, predicted that if the exports and imports of England were to rise 50 per cent, English pauperism would sink to zero. Alas! on April 7, 1864, the Chancellor of the Exchequer delighted his parliamentary audience by the statement that the total import and export trade of England had grown in 1863 "to £443,955,000! that astonishing sum about three times the trade of the comparatively recent epoch of 1843!" With all that, he was eloquent upon "poverty." "Think," he exclaimed, "of these who are on the border of that region," upon "wages . . . not increased"; upon "human life . . . in nine cases out of ten but a struggle of existence!" He did not speak of the people of Ireland, gradually replaced by machinery in the north, and by sheep-walks in the south, though even the sheep in that unhappy country are decreasing, it is true, not at so rapid a rate as the men. He did not repeat what then had been just betrayed by the highest representatives of the upper ten thousand in a sudden fit of terror. When the garotte¹ panic had reached a certain height, the House of Lords caused an inquiry to be made into, and a report to be

¹ *Garotters*: Street robbers whose attacks increased in London in the beginning of the sixties to such an extent that parliament was compelled to take up the matter.—*Ed.*

published upon, transportation and penal servitude. Out came the murder in the bulky Blue Book of 1863, and proved it was, by official facts and figures, that the worst of the convicted criminals, the penal serfs of England and Scotland, toiled much less and fared far better than the agricultural labourers of England and Scotland. But this was not all. When, consequent upon the Civil War in America, the operatives of Lancashire and Cheshire were thrown upon the streets, the same House of Lords sent to the manufacturing districts a physician commissioned to investigate into the smallest possible amount of carbon and nitrogen, to be administered in the cheapest and plainest form, which on an average might just suffice to "avert starvation diseases." Dr. Smith, the medical deputy, ascertained that 28,000 grains of carbon, and 1,330 grains of nitrogen were the weekly allowance that would keep an average adult . . . just over the level of starvation diseases, and he found furthermore that quantity pretty nearly to agree with the scanty nourishment to which the pressure of extreme distress had actually reduced the cotton operatives.¹ But now mark! The same learned Doctor was later on again deputed by the medical officer of the Privy Council to inquire into the nourishment of the poorer labouring classes. The results of his researches are embodied in the "Sixth Report on Public Health," published by order of Parliament in the course of the present year. What did the Doctor discover? That the silk weavers, the needle women, the kid glovers, the stocking weavers, and so forth, received, on an average, not even the distress pittance of the cotton operatives, not even the amount of carbon and nitrogen "just sufficient to avert starvation diseases."

"Moreover," we quote from the report, "as regards the examined families of the agricultural population, it appeared that more than a fifth were with less than the estimated sufficiency of carbonaceous food, that more than one-third were with less than the estimated sufficiency of nitrogenous food, and that in three counties (Berkshire, Oxfordshire and Somersetshire,) insufficiency of nitrogenous food was the average local diet." "It must be

¹ We need hardly remind the reader that, apart from the elements of water and certain inorganic substances, carbon and nitrogen form the raw materials of human food. However, to nourish the human system, those simple chemical constituents must be supplied in the form of vegetable or animal substances. Potatoes, for instance, contain mainly carbon, while wheaten bread contains carbonaceous and nitrogenous substances in a due proportion. [*Note by Marx.*]

remembered," adds the official report, "that privation of food is very reluctantly borne, and that, as a rule, great poorness of diet will only come when other privations have preceded it. . . . Even cleanliness will have been found costly or difficult, and if there still be self-respectful endeavours to maintain it, every such endeavour will represent additional pangs of hunger." "These are painful reflections, especially when it is remembered that the poverty to which they advert is not the deserved poverty of idleness; in all cases it is the poverty of working populations. Indeed, the work which obtains the scanty pittance of food is for the most part excessively prolonged." The report brings out the strange, and rather unexpected fact, "That of the divisions of the United Kingdom," England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, "the agricultural population of England," the richest division, "is considerably the worst fed"; but that even the agricultural labourers of Berkshire, Oxfordshire, and Somersetshire, fare better than great numbers of skilled indoor operatives of the East of London.

Such are the official statements published by order of Parliament in 1864, during the millennium of free trade, at a time when the Chancellor of the Exchequer told the House of Commons that "the average condition of the British labourer has improved in a degree we know to be extraordinary and unexampled in the history of any country or any age." Upon these official congratulations jars the dry remark of the official Public Health Report: "The public health of a country means the health of its masses, and the masses will scarcely be healthy unless, to their very base, they be at least moderately prosperous."

Dazzled by the "Progress of the Nation" statistics dancing before his eyes, the Chancellor of the Exchequer exclaims in wild ecstasy: "From 1842 to 1852 the taxable income of the country increased by 6 per cent; in the eight years from 1853 to 1861, it has increased from the basis taken in 1853 20 per cent! the fact is so astonishing as to be almost incredible! . . . This intoxicating augmentation of wealth and power," adds Mr. Gladstone, "is entirely confined to classes of property!"

If you want to know under what conditions of broken health, tainted morals and mental ruin, that "intoxicating augmentation of wealth and power entirely confined to classes of property" was, and is being produced by the classes of labour, look to the picture hung up in the last "Public Health Report" of the workshops of tailors, printers and dressmakers! Compare the "Report of the

Children's Employment Commission" of 1863, where it is stated, for instance, that: "The potters as a class, both men and women, represent a much degenerated population, both physically and mentally," that "the unhealthy child is an unhealthy parent in his turn," that "a progressive deterioration of the race must go on," and that "the degenerescence of the population of Staffordshire would be even greater were it not for the constant recruiting from the adjacent country, and the intermarriages with more healthy races." Glance at Mr. Tremenheere's Blue Book on the "Grievances complained of by the Journeymen Bakers!" And who has not shuddered at the paradoxical statement made by the inspectors of factories, all illustrated by the Registrar General, that the Lancashire operatives, while put upon the distress pittance of food, were actually improving in health, because of their temporary exclusion by the cotton famine from the cotton factory, and that the mortality of the children was decreasing, because their mothers were now at last allowed to give them, instead of Godfrey's cordial, their own breasts.

Again reverse the medal! The Income and Property Tax Returns laid before the House of Commons on July 20, 1864, teach us that the persons with yearly incomes, valued by the tax-gatherer at £50,000 and upwards, had, from April 5, 1862, to April 5, 1863, been joined by a dozen and one, their number having increased in that single year from 67 to 80. The same returns disclose the fact that about 3,000 persons divide amongst themselves a yearly income of about £25,000,000 sterling, rather more than the total revenue doled out annually to the whole mass of the agricultural labourers of England and Wales. Open the census of 1861, and you will find that the number of the male landed proprietors of England and Wales had decreased from 16,934 in 1851, to 15,066 in 1861, so that the concentration of land had grown in 10 years 11 per cent. If the concentration of the soil of the country in a few hands proceed at the same rate, the land question will become singularly simplified, as it had become in the Roman empire, when Nero grinned at the discovery that half the Province of Africa was owned by six gentlemen.

We have dwelt so long upon these "facts so astonishing to be almost incredible," because England heads the Europe of commerce and industry. It will be remembered that some months ago one of the refugee sons of Louis Philippe publicly congratulated the English agricultural labourer on the superiority of his lot

over that of his less florid comrade on the other side of the Channel. Indeed, with local colours changed, and on a scale somewhat contracted, the English facts reproduce themselves in all the industrious and progressive countries of the Continent. In all of them there has taken place, since 1848, an unheard-of development of industry, and an undreamed-of expansion of imports and exports. In all of them "the augmentation of wealth and power entirely confined to classes of property" was truly "intoxicating." In all of them, as in England, a minority of the working classes got their real wages somewhat advanced; while in most cases the monetary rise of wages denoted no more a real access of comforts than the inmate of the metropolitan poor-house or orphan asylum, for instance, was in the least benefited by his first necessities costing £9 15s. 8d. in 1861 against £7 7s. 4d. in 1852. Everywhere the great mass of the working classes were sinking down to a lower depth, at the same rate at least, that those above them were rising in the social scale. In all countries of Europe it has now become a truth demonstrable to every unprejudiced mind, and only denied by those, whose interest it is to hedge other people in a fool's paradise, that no improvement of machinery, no appliance of science to production, no contrivances of communication, no new colonies, no emigration, no opening of markets, no free trade, nor all these things put together, will do away with the miseries of the industrious masses; but that, on the present false base, every fresh development of the productive powers of labour must tend to deepen social contrasts and point social antagonisms. Death of starvation rose almost to the rank of an institution, during this intoxicating epoch of economical progress, in the metropolis of the British Empire. That epoch is marked in the annals of the world by the quickened return, the widening compass, and the deadlier effects of the social pest called a commercial and industrial crisis.

After the failure of the Revolutions of 1848, all party organisations and party journals of the working classes were, on the Continent, crushed by the iron hand of force, the most advanced sons of labour fled in despair to the Transatlantic Republic, and the short-lived dreams of emancipation vanished before an epoch of industrial fever, moral marasme, and political reaction. The defeat of the Continental working classes, partly owed to the diplomacy of the English Government, acting then as now in fraternal solidarity with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, soon spread its conta-

gious effects to this side of the Channel. While the rout of their Continental brethren unmanned the English working classes, and broke their faith in their own cause, it restored to the landlord and the money-lord their somewhat shaken confidence. They insolently withdrew concessions already advertised. The discoveries of new goldlands led to an immense exodus, leaving an irreparable void in the ranks of the British proletariat. Others of its formerly active members were caught by the temporary bribe of greater work and wages, and turned into "political blacks." All the efforts made at keeping up, or remodelling, the Chartist Movement, failed signally; the press organs of the working class died one by one of the apathy of the masses, and, in point of fact, never before seemed the English working class so thoroughly reconciled to a state of political nullity. If, then, there had been no solidarity of action between the British and the Continental working classes, there was, at all events, a solidarity of defeat.

And yet the period passed since the Revolutions of 1848 has not been without its compensating features. We shall here only point to two great facts.

After a thirty years' struggle, fought with most admirable perseverance, the English working classes, improving a momentaneous split between the landlords and money-lords, succeeded in carrying the Ten Hours' Bill. The immense physical, moral and intellectual benefits hence accruing to the factory operatives, half-yearly chronicled in the reports of the inspectors of factories, are now acknowledged on all sides. Most of the Continental governments had to accept the English Factory Act in more or less modified forms, and the English Parliament itself is every year compelled to enlarge its sphere of action. But besides its practical import, there was something else to exalt the marvellous success of this working men's measure. Through their most notorious organs of science, such as Dr. Ure, Professor Senior, and other sages of that stamp, the middle class had predicted, and to their heart's content proved, that any legal restriction of the hours of labour must sound the death knell of British industry, which, vampyre like, could but live by sucking blood, and children's blood, too. In olden times, child murder was a mysterious rite of the religion of Moloch, but it was practiced on some very solemn occasions only, once a year perhaps, and then Moloch had no exclusive bias for the children of the poor. This struggle about the legal restriction*of the hours of labour raged the more fiercely

since, apart from frightened avarice, it told indeed upon the great contest between the blind rule of the supply and demand laws which form the political economy of the middle class, and social production controlled by social foresight, which forms the political economy of the working class. Hence the Ten Hours' Bill was not only a great practical success; it was the victory of a principle; it was the first time that in broad daylight the political economy of the middle class succumbed to the political economy of the working class.

But there was in store a still greater victory of the political economy of labour over the political economy of property. We speak of the co-operative movement, especially the co-operative factories raised by the unassisted efforts of a few bold "hands." The value of these great social experiments cannot be over-rated. By deed, instead of by argument, they have shown that production on a large scale, and in accord with the behests of modern science, may be carried on without the existence of a class of masters employing a class of hands; that to bear fruit, the means of labour need not be monopolised as a means of dominion over, and of extortion against, the labouring man himself; and that, like slave labour, like serf labour, hired labour is but a transitory and inferior form, destined to disappear before associated labour plying its toil with a willing hand, a ready mind, and a joyous heart. In England, the seeds of the co-operative system were sown by Robert Owen; the working men's experiments, tried on the Continent, were, in fact, the practical upshot of the theories, not invented, but loudly proclaimed, in 1848.

At the same time, the experience of the period from 1848 to 1864 has proved beyond doubt that, however excellent in principle, and however useful in practice, co-operative labour, if kept within the narrow circle of the casual efforts of private workmen, will never be able to arrest the growth in geometrical progression of monopoly, to free the masses, nor even to perceptibly lighten the burden of their miseries. It is perhaps for this very reason that plausible noblemen, philanthropic middle-class spouters, and even keen political economists, have all at once turned nauseously complimentary to the very co-operative labour system they had vainly tried to nip in the bud by deriding it as the Utopia of the dreamer, or stigmatising it as the sacrilege of the Socialist. To save the industrious masses, co-operative labour ought to be developed to national dimensions, and, consequently, to be fostered

by national means. Yet, the lords of land and the lords of capital will always use their political privileges for the defence and perpetuation of their economical monopolies. So far from promoting, they will continue to lay every possible impediment in the way of the emancipation of labour. Remember the sneer with which, last session, Lord Palmerston put down the advocates of the Irish Tenants' Right Bill. The House of Commons, cried he, is a house of landed proprietors. To conquer political power has therefore become the great duty of the working classes. They seem to have comprehended this, for in England, Germany, Italy, and France there have taken place simultaneous revivals, and simultaneous efforts are being made at the political reorganisation of the working men's party.

One element of success they possess—numbers; but numbers weigh only in the balance, if united by combination and led by knowledge. Past experience has shown how disregard of that bond of brotherhood which ought to exist between the workmen of different countries, and incite them to stand firmly by each other in all their struggles for emancipation, will be chastised by the common discomfiture of their incoherent efforts. This thought prompted the working men of different countries assembled on September 28, 1864, in public meeting at St. Martin's Hall, to found the International Association.

Another conviction swayed that meeting.

If the emancipation of the working classes requires their fraternal concurrence, how are they to fulfil that great mission with a foreign policy in pursuit of criminal designs, playing upon national prejudices, and squandering in piratical wars the people's blood and treasure? It was not the wisdom of the ruling classes, but the heroic resistance to their criminal folly by the working classes of England that saved the West of Europe from plunging headlong into an infamous crusade for the perpetuation and propagation of slavery on the other side of the Atlantic. The shameless approval, mock sympathy, or idiotic indifference, with which the upper classes of Europe have witnessed the mountain fortress of the Caucasus falling a prey to, and heroic Poland being assassinated by, Russia; the immense and unresisted encroachments of that barbarous power, whose head is at St. Petersburg, and whose hands are in every cabinet of Europe, have taught the working classes the duty to master themselves the mysteries of international politics; to watch the diplomatic acts of their

respective Governments; to counteract them, if necessary, by all means in their power; when unable to prevent, to combine in simultaneous denunciations, and to vindicate the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations.

The fight for such a foreign policy forms part of the general struggle for the emancipation of the working classes.

Proletarians of all countries, Unite!

Written by Marx in October
21-27, 1864

Printed according to the text of the
English pamphlet

Published as a separate pamphlet
in English at London in November
1864, and, simultaneously, in Ger-
man in the newspaper *Social-
Demokrat* of December 21 and 30,
1864

Karl Marx

**GENERAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION¹**

CONSIDERING,

That the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves; that the struggle for the emancipation of the working classes means not a struggle for class privileges and monopolies, but for equal rights and duties, and the abolition of all class rule;

That the economical subjection of the man of labour to the monopolizer of the means of labour, that is, the sources of life, lies at the bottom of servitude in all its forms, of all social misery, mental degradation, and political dependence;

That the economical emancipation of the working classes is therefore the great end to which every political movement ought to be subordinate as a means;

That all efforts aiming at that great end have hitherto failed from the want of solidarity between the manifold divisions of labour in each country, and from the absence of a fraternal bond of union between the working classes of different countries;

That the emancipation of labour is neither a local nor a national, but a social problem, embracing all countries in which modern society exists, and depending for its solution on the concurrence, practical and theoretical, of the most advanced countries;

That the present revival of the working classes in the most industrious countries of Europe, while it raises a new hope, gives solemn warning against a relapse into the old errors, and calls for the immediate combination of the still disconnected movements;

¹ These Rules were adopted in September 1871, at the London Conference of the International Working Men's Association. They were based on the Provisional Rules drawn up by Marx in 1864, when the First International was founded.—*Ed.*

For These Reasons—

The International Working Men's Association has been founded. It declares:

That all societies and individuals adhering to it will acknowledge truth, justice, and morality, as the basis of their conduct towards each other and towards all men, without regard to colour, creed, or nationality;

That it acknowledges *no rights without duties, no duties without rights*;

And in this spirit the following rules have been drawn up.

1. This Association is established to afford a central medium of communication and co-operation between Working Men's Societies existing in different countries and aiming at the same end; *viz.*, the protection, advancement, and complete emancipation of the working classes.

2. The name of the Society shall be "The International Working Men's Association."

3. There shall annually meet a General Working Men's Congress, consisting of delegates of the branches of the Association. The Congress will have to proclaim the common aspirations of the working class, take the measures required for the successful working of the International Association, and appoint the General Council of the Society.

4. Each Congress appoints the time and place of meeting for the next Congress. The delegates assemble at the appointed time and place without any special invitation. The General Council may, in case of need, change the place, but has no power to postpone the time of meeting. The Congress appoints the seat and elects the members of the General Council annually. The General Council thus elected shall have power to add to the number of its members.

On its annual meetings, the General Congress shall receive a public account of the annual transactions of the General Council. The latter may, in cases of emergency, convoke the General Congress before the regular yearly term.

5. The General Council shall consist of working men from the different countries represented in the International Association. It shall from its own members elect the officers necessary for the transaction of business, such as a treasurer, a general secretary, corresponding secretaries for the different countries, &c.

6. The General Council shall form an international agency between the different national and local groups of the Association, so that the working men in one country be constantly informed of the movements of their class in every other country; that an inquiry into the social state of the different countries of Europe be made simultaneously, and under a common direction; that the questions of general interest mooted in one society be ventilated by all; and that when immediate practical steps should be needed—as, for instance, in case of international quarrels—the action of the associated societies be simultaneous and uniform. Whenever it seems opportune, the General Council shall take the initiative of proposals to be laid before the different national or local societies. To facilitate the communications, the General Council shall publish periodical reports.

7. Since the success of the working men's movement in each country cannot be secured but by the power of union and combination, while, on the other hand, the usefulness of the International General Council must greatly depend on the circumstance whether it has to deal with a few national centres of working men's associations, or with a great number of small and disconnected local societies; the members of the International Association shall use their utmost efforts to combine the disconnected working men's societies of their respective countries into national bodies, represented by central national organs. It is self-understood, however, that the appliance of this rule will depend upon the peculiar laws of each country, and that, apart from legal obstacles, no independent local society shall be precluded from directly corresponding with the General Council.

7a. In its struggle against the collective power of the possessing classes the proletariat can act as a class only by constituting itself a distinct political party, opposed to all the old parties formed by the possessing classes.

This constitution of the proletariat into a political party is indispensable to ensure the triumph of the social Revolution and of its ultimate goal: the abolition of classes.

The coalition of the forces of the working class, already achieved by the economic struggle, must also serve, in the hands of this class, as a lever in its struggle against the political power of its exploiters.

As the lords of the land and of capital always make use of their political privileges to defend and perpetuate their economic

monopolies and to enslave labour, the conquest of political power becomes the great duty of the proletariat.¹

8. Every section has the right to appoint its own secretary corresponding with the General Council.

9. Everybody who acknowledges and defends the principles of the International Working Men's Association is eligible to become a member. Every branch is responsible for the integrity of the members it admits.

10. Each member of the International Association, on removing his domicile from one country to another, will receive the fraternal support of the Associated Working Men.

11. While united in a perpetual bond of fraternal co-operation, the working men's societies joining the International Association will preserve their existent organizations intact.

12. The present rules may be revised by each Congress, provided that two-thirds of the delegates present are in favour of such revision.

13. Everything not provided for in the present rules will be supplied by special regulations, subject to the revision of every Congress.

The original text of the Rules was drawn up by Marx between October 21 and 27, 1864

The final text was published at London in 1871 in the form of a separate pamphlet

Printed according to the 1871 pamphlet written in English
Rule 7a is translated from the French

¹ Article 7a, which is an abridged exposition of the resolution of the London Conference of 1871, was included in the General Rules by amendment adopted at the Hague Congress of the First International (September 1872).—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

ON PROUDHON

(LETTER TO J. B. SCHWEITZER)

London, January 24, 1865

Dear Sir,

Yesterday I received a letter in which you request of me a detailed judgement of *Proudhon*. Lack of time prevents me from meeting your desire. Furthermore, I have *none* of his works by me. However, in order to show you my good will I am hastily jotting down a brief sketch. You can then supplement, add, omit—in short, do anything you like with it.

Proudhon's earliest efforts I no longer remember. His school work about a *Universal Language* shows how little he hesitated to attack problems for the solution of which he lacked even the rudiments of knowledge.

His first work, *What Is Property?*, is by all means his best work. It is epoch-making, if not for the newness of its content, then at least for the new and audacious way in which old things are said. In the works of the French Socialists and Communists whom he knew, "property" had, of course, been not only criticized in various ways but also "*abolished*" in the utopian manner. In this book Proudhon's relation to St. Simon and Fourier is about the same as that of Feuerbach to Hegel. Compared with Hegel, Feuerbach is exceedingly poor. All the same he was epoch-making *after* Hegel, because he laid stress on certain points which are disagreeable to the Christian consciousness while important for the progress of criticism, and which Hegel had left in mystic semi-obscurity.

In this book of Proudhon's there still prevails, if I may be allowed the expression, a strong muscular style. And its style is in my opinion its chief merit. One sees that even where he is only reproducing old stuff, Proudhon makes independent discoveries;

that what he is saying was new to him himself and ranks as new. Provocative defiance, laying hands on the economic "holy of holies," superb paradox which makes a mock of bourgeois common sense, withering criticism, bitter irony, and, betrayed here and there, a deep and genuine feeling of indignation at the infamy of what exists, revolutionary earnestness—because of all this *What Is Property?* had an electrifying effect and produced a great impression upon its first appearance. In a strictly scientific history of political economy the book would hardly be worth mentioning. But sensational works of this kind play their part in the sciences just as much as in polite literature. Take, for instance, Malthus' book *On Population*. In its first edition it was nothing but a "sensational pamphlet" and plagiarism from beginning to end into the bargain. And yet what a stimulus was produced by this *libel on the human race!*

If I had Proudhon's book before me I could easily give a few examples to illustrate his *first manner*. In the passages which he himself regarded as the most important he imitates Kant's treatment of the *antinomies*—Kant, at that time the only German philosopher with whom he was acquainted from translations—and leaves one under the strong impression that to him, as to Kant, the resolution of the antinomies is something "*beyond*" the human understanding, that is, something about which his own understanding remains in the dark.

But in spite of all his sham storming of heaven, one already finds in *What Is Property?* the contradiction that Proudhon, on the one hand, criticizes society from the standpoint and with the eyes of a French small-holding peasant (later petty bourgeois) and, on the other, applies the measuring rod he had inherited from the Socialists.

The deficiency of the book is indicated by its very title. The question was so erroneously posed that it could not be answered correctly. *Ancient "property relations"* found their doom in *feudal property relations*, and these in "*bourgeois*" property relations. Thus history itself had practised its criticism upon past *property relations*. With Proudhon the issue really was *modern-bourgeois property* as it exists today. The question of what this is could only be answered by a critical analysis of "*political economy*," embracing these *property relations* as a whole, not in their *legal* expression as *relations of volition* but in their real form, that is, as *relations of production*. But as Proudhon entangled the whole

of these economic relations in the general juristic conception of "*property*," he could not get beyond the answer which *Brissot*, in a similar work, had already, before 1789, given in the same words: "Property is theft."

The most that can be got out of this is that the bourgeois juristic conceptions of "*theft*" apply equally well to the "*honest*" gains of the bourgeois himself. On the other hand, since "*theft*" as a forcible violation of property *presupposes property*, Proudhon entangled himself in all sorts of figments of the imagination, obscure even to himself, about *true bourgeois property*.

During my stay in Paris in 1844 I came into personal contact with Proudhon. I mention this here because to a certain extent I am also to blame for his "*sophistication*," as the English call the adulteration of articles of commerce. In the course of lengthy debates, often lasting all night, I infected him to his great injury with Hegelianism, which, owing to his lack of German, he could not study properly. After my expulsion from Paris Herr *Karl Grün* continued what I had begun. As a teacher of German philosophy he had, besides, the advantage over me that he understood nothing about it himself.

Shortly before the appearance of Proudhon's second important work, *The Philosophy of Poverty, etc.*, he announced this to me himself in a very circumstantial letter in which he said, among other things: "I await your stern criticism." This soon fell upon him (in my *Poverty of Philosophy, etc., Paris 1847*) in a fashion which ended our friendship forever.

From what I have said here you will see that Proudhon's *Philosophy of Poverty or System of Economic Contradictions* first actually contained the answer to the question, "*What Is Property?*" In fact it was only after the publication of this work that he had begun his economic studies; he had discovered that the question he had raised could not be answered by *invective*, but only by an *analysis* of modern "*political economy*." At the same time he attempted to present the *system* of economic categories dialectically. In place of the insoluble *Kantian "antinomies"* the *Hegelian "contradiction"* was to be introduced as the means of development.

For an estimate of his book, which is in two fat tomes, I must refer you to the work I wrote as a reply. There I showed, among other things, how little he had penetrated into the secret of scientific dialectics; how, on the other hand, he shares the illusions of

speculative philosophy, for *instead of* conceiving the *economic categories as theoretical expressions of historical relations of production, corresponding to a particular stage of development of material production*, he garbles them into pre-existing, *eternal ideas*; and how in this roundabout way he arrives once more at the standpoint of bourgeois economy.¹

I also show further how absolutely deficient and in parts even schoolboyish his knowledge is of the "political economy" which he undertook to criticize, and how he and the utopians are hunting for a so-called "*science*" by which a formula for the "solution of the social question" is to be excogitated *a priori*, instead of deriving science from a critical knowledge of the historical movement, a movement which itself produces the *material conditions of emancipation*. But special mention is made of how confused, wrong and half-baked Proudhon's ideas remain with regard to the basis of the whole thing, *exchange value*, and how he even mistakes the utopian interpretation of *Ricardo's* theory of value for the basis of a new science. With regard to his general point of view I make the following comprehensive judgement:

"Every economic relation has a good and a bad side; this is the only point on which M. Proudhon does not give himself the lie. He sees the good side stressed by the economists; he sees the bad side denounced by the Socialists. From the economists he borrows the necessity of eternal relations; from the Socialists he borrows the illusion that in poverty there is nothing to be seen but poverty (instead of seeing in it the revolutionary, subversive aspect which will overthrow the old society). He agrees with them both in his attempts to cite the authority of science in his support. Science reduces itself for him to the slender proportions of a scientific formula; he is a hunter after formulae. M. Proudhon accordingly flatters himself that he has made a criticism both of political economy and of communism—he stands below both. Below the economists, because as a philosopher who has at his elbow a magic formula he thinks he can dispense with going into purely

¹ "When they say that present-day relations—the relations of bourgeois production—are *natural*, the economists imply that these are the relations in which wealth is created and productive forces developed in conformity with the laws of nature. Thus these relations are themselves *natural laws* independent of the influence of time. They are *eternal laws* which must always govern society. Thus there has been history, but there is no longer any." (P. 113 of my work.) [Note by Marx.]

economic details; below the Socialists, because he has neither enough courage nor enough insight to lift himself, if only speculatively, above the bourgeois horizon. He wants to soar as the man of science above the bourgeois and the proletarians; *he is nothing but the petty bourgeois* perpetually tossed about between capital and labour, between political economy and communism."¹

Severe though the above judgement sounds I must still endorse every word of it today. Simultaneously, however, it must be remembered that at the time when I declared his book to be the code of socialism of the petty bourgeois and proved this theoretically, Proudhon was still being branded as an ultra-arch-revolutionist alike by the political economists and by the Socialists. That is also the reason why I never joined in the outcry later on about his "*treason*" to the revolution. Originally misunderstood by others as well as by himself, it was not his fault if he disappointed unjustified hopes.

In *The Philosophy of Poverty* all the defects of Proudhon's method of presentation stand out very unfavourably in comparison with *What Is Property?* The style is often what the French call *ampoulé*.² High-sounding speculative jargon, supposed to be German-philosophical, appears regularly on the scene when his Gallic acumen fails him. A puffing, self-glorifying, boastful tone, and especially the twaddle about "*science*" and sham display of it, which are always so unedifying, are continually dinning in one's ears. Instead of the genuine warmth which glowed in his first piece of writing, here certain passages are systematically worked up by rhetoric into a momentary fever heat. Add to this the clumsy, repellent display of erudition of the self-taught, whose innate pride in original, independent thought has already been broken and who now, as a *parvenu* of science, deems it necessary to flaunt what he neither is nor has. Then the mentality of the petty bourgeois, who in an indecently brutal way—and neither poignantly nor profoundly nor yet correctly—attacks a man like *Cabet*, to be respected for his practical attitude towards the French proletariat, while being civil, on the other hand, to a man like *Dunoyer* (a State Councillor, to be sure); and yet the whole importance of this *Dunoyer* lay in the comic seriousness with which, throughout three bulging, unbearably boring volumes, he

¹ l.c.p. 119/20. [Note by Marx.]

² *Ampoulé*: bombastic.—Ed.

preached the rigourism characterized by Helvétius as follows: it is demanded that the unfortunate should be perfect.

The February Revolution certainly came at a very inconvenient moment for Proudhon, as he had irrefutably proved only a few weeks before that "*the era of revolutions*" was past for ever. His utterances in the National Assembly, however little insight they showed into existing conditions, were worthy of every praise. After the June insurrection they were an act of great courage. In addition they had the fortunate consequence that M. *Thiers*, by his speech opposing Proudhon's proposals, which was then issued as a special publication, proved to the whole of Europe what infantile catechism served this spiritual pillar of the French bourgeoisie as his pedestal. Indeed, compared to M. *Thiers*, Proudhon swelled until he was the size of an antediluvian colossus.

Proudhon's discovery of "free credit" and the "*people's bank*" based upon it were his last economic "deeds." In my book, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, part I, Berlin 1859* (pp. 59-64), may be found the proof that the theoretical basis of his idea arises from a failure to understand the first elements of bourgeois "political economy," namely, of the relation between *commodities* and *money*, while the practical superstructure was simply a reproduction of much older and far better developed schemes. That under definite economic and political circumstances the credit system can serve to hasten the emancipation of the working class, just as, for instance, at the beginning of the eighteenth, and again later, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, in England, it served to transfer the wealth of one class to another, is beyond the slightest doubt self-evident. But to regard *interest-bearing capital* as the *main form of capital*, but to want to make a special application of the credit system, the alleged abolition of interest, the basis for a transformation of society, is a thoroughly *philistine* fantasy. Hence this fantasy, eked out further, is in fact already to be found among the *economic spokesmen of the English lower middle class in the seventeenth century*. Proudhon's polemic with Bastiat (1850) about interest-bearing capital is on a far lower level than *The Philosophy of Poverty*. He contrives to get himself beaten even by Bastiat and breaks into burlesque bluster when his opponent drives his blows home.

A few years ago Proudhon—at the instance, I think, of the government of Lausanne—wrote a prize essay on “*Taxation.*” Here the last flicker of genius is extinguished. Nothing remains but the petty bourgeois pure and simple.

So far as his political and philosophical writings are concerned they all show the same contradictory, dual character as his economic works. Moreover their value is local, confined to France. Nevertheless his attacks on religion, the church, etc., were of great merit locally at a time when the French Socialists deemed fit to be superior in religiosity to the bourgeois Voltairianism of the eighteenth century and the German godlessness of the nineteenth. If Peter the Great defeated Russian barbarism by barbarity, Proudhon did his best to vanquish French phrasemongering by phrases.

His work on the “*coup d'état,*” in which he flirts with L. Bonaparte and, in fact, strives to make him palatable to the French workers, and his last work, written against *Poland*, in which for the greater glory of the tsar he indulges in the most imbecile cynicism, must be characterized as not merely bad but base productions; of a baseness which corresponds, however, to the petty-bourgeois point of view.

Proudhon has often been compared to *Rousseau*. Nothing could be more mistaken. He is more like *Nic. Linguet*, whose *Theory of Civil Law*, by the way, is a very brilliant book.

Proudhon had a natural inclination for dialectics. But as he never grasped really scientific dialectics he never got further than sophistry. In fact this hung together with his petty-bourgeois point of view. Like the historian *Raumer*, the petty bourgeois is composed of on-the-one-hand and on-the-other-hand. This is so in his economic interests and *therefore* in his politics, in his religious, scientific and artistic views. So in his morals, in everything. He is a living contradiction. If, like Proudhon, he is in addition a clever man, he will soon learn to play with his own contradictions and develop them according to circumstances into striking, spectacular, now scandalous, now brilliant paradoxes. Charlatanism in science and accommodation in politics are inseparable from such a point of view. There remains only one governing motive, the *vanity* of the subject, and the only question for him, as for all vain people, is the success of the moment, the sensation of the day. Thus the simple ethical tact, which always kept a *Rousseau*, for instance, far from even the semblance of

compromise with the powers-that-be, necessarily fades out of existence.

Perhaps posterity will epitomize the latest phase of French development by saying that Louis Bonaparte was its Napoleon and Proudhon its Rousseau-Voltaire.

You must now assume responsibility yourself for having saddled me, so soon after the man's death, with the rôle of post-mortem judge.

Yours very truly,

Karl Marx

Written by Marx on January 24,
1865

Published in the *Social-Demokrat*
of February 1, 3 and 5, 1865

Republished as a supplement to the
1885 German edition of Marx's

The Poverty of Philosophy

Edited by Engels

Printed according to the newspaper
text

Compared with the 1885 edition
Translated from the German

Karl Marx

WAGES, PRICE AND PROFIT

[PRELIMINARY]

CITIZENS,

Before entering into the subject-matter, allow me to make a few preliminary remarks.

There reigns now on the Continent a real epidemic of strikes, and a general clamour for a rise of wages. The question will turn up at our Congress. You, as the head of the International Association, ought to have settled convictions upon this paramount question. For my own part, I considered it, therefore, my duty to enter fully into the matter, even at the peril of putting your patience to a severe test.

Another preliminary remark I have to make in regard to Citizen Weston. He has not only proposed to you, but has publicly defended, in the interest of the working class, as he thinks, opinions he knows to be most unpopular with the working class.¹ Such an exhibition of moral courage all of us must highly honour. I hope that, despite the unvarnished style of my paper, at its conclusion he will find me agreeing with what appears to me the just idea lying at the bottom of his theses, which, however, in their present form, I cannot but consider theoretically false and practically dangerous.

I shall now at once proceed to the business before us.

¹ John Weston, an English worker, maintained the thesis in the General Council of the International Working Men's Association that higher wages cannot improve the condition of the workers and that the trade unions must be considered as having a harmful effect.—*Ed.*

I [PRODUCTION AND WAGES]

Citizen Weston's argument rested, in fact, upon two premises: firstly, that the *amount of national production* is a *fixed thing*, a *constant* quantity or magnitude, as the mathematicians would say; secondly, that the *amount of real wages*, that is to say, of wages as measured by the quantity of the commodities they can buy, is a *fixed* amount, a *constant* magnitude.

Now, his first assertion is evidently erroneous. Year after year you will find that the value and mass of production increase, that the productive powers of the national labour increase, and that the amount of money necessary to circulate this increasing production continuously changes. What is true at the end of the year, and for different years compared with each other, is true for every average day of the year. The amount or magnitude of national production changes continuously. It is not a *constant* but a *variable* magnitude, and apart from changes in population it must be so, because of the continuous change in the *accumulation of capital* and the *productive powers of labour*. It is perfectly true that if a *rise in the general rate of wages* should take place to-day, that rise, whatever its ulterior effects might be, would, *by itself*, not *immediately* change the amount of production. It would, in the first instance, proceed from the existing state of things. But if *before* the rise of wages the national production was *variable*, and not *fixed*, it will continue to be variable and not fixed *after* the rise of wages.

But suppose the amount of national production to be *constant* instead of *variable*. Even then, what our friend Weston considers a logical conclusion would still remain a gratuitous assertion. If I have a given number, say eight, the *absolute* limits of this number do not prevent its parts from changing their *relative* limits. If profits were six and wages two, wages might increase to six and profits decrease to two, and still the total amount remain eight. Thus the fixed amount of production would by no means prove the fixed amount of wages. How then does our friend Weston prove this fixity? By asserting it.

But even conceding him his assertion, it would cut both ways, while he presses it only in one direction. If the amount of wages is a constant magnitude, then it can be neither increased nor diminished. If then, in enforcing a temporary rise of wages, the working men act foolishly, the capitalists, in enforcing a temporary

fall of wages, would act not less foolishly. Our friend Weston does not deny that, under certain circumstances, the working men *can* enforce a rise of wages, but their amount being naturally fixed, there must follow a reaction. On the other hand, he knows also that the capitalists *can* enforce a fall of wages, and, indeed, continuously try to enforce it. According to the principle of the constancy of wages, a reaction ought to follow in this case not less than in the former. The working men, therefore, reacting against the attempt at, or the act of, lowering wages, would act rightly. They would, therefore, act rightly in enforcing *a rise of wages*, because every *reaction* against the lowering of wages is an *action* for raising wages. According to Citizen Weston's own principle of the *constancy* of *wages*, the working men ought, therefore, under certain circumstances, to combine and struggle for a rise of wages.

If he denies this conclusion, he must give up the premise from which it flows. He must not say that the amount of wages is a *constant quantity*, but that, although it cannot and must not *rise*, it can and must *fall*, whenever capital pleases to lower it. If the capitalist pleases to feed you upon potatoes instead of upon meat, and upon oats instead of upon wheat, you must accept his will as a law of political economy, and submit to it. If in one country the rate of wages is higher than in another, in the United States, for example, than in England, you must explain this difference in the rate of wages by difference between the will of the American capitalist and the will of the English capitalist, a method which would certainly very much simplify, not only the study of economic phenomena, but of all other phenomena.

But even then, we might ask, *why* the will of the American capitalist differs from the will of the English capitalist? And to answer the question you must go beyond the domain of *will*. A parson may tell me that God wills one thing in France, and another thing in England. If I summon him to explain this duality of will, he might have the brass to answer me that God wills to have one will in France and another will in England. But our friend Weston is certainly the last man to make an argument of such a complete negation of all reasoning.

The *will* of the capitalist is certainly to take as much as possible. What we have to do is not to talk about his *will*, but to inquire into his *power*, the *limits of that power*, and the *character of those limits*.

II [PRODUCTION, WAGES, PROFITS]

The address Citizen Weston read to us might have been compressed into a nutshell.

All his reasoning amounted to this: If the working class forces the capitalist class to pay five shillings instead of four shillings in the shape of money wages, the capitalist will return in the shape of commodities four shillings' worth instead of five shillings' worth. The working class would have to pay five shillings for what, before the rise of wages, they bought with four shillings. But why is this the case? Why does the capitalist only return four shillings' worth for five shillings? Because the amount of wages is fixed. But why is it fixed at four shillings' worth of commodities? Why not at three, or two, or any other sum? If the limit of the amount of wages is settled by an economic law, independent alike of the will of the capitalist and the will of the working man, the first thing Citizen Weston had to do was to state that law and prove it. He ought then, moreover, to have proved that the amount of wages actually paid at every given moment always corresponds exactly to the necessary amount of wages, and never deviates from it. If, on the other hand, the given limit of the amount of wages is founded on the *mere will* of the capitalist, or the limits of his avarice, it is an arbitrary limit. There is nothing necessary in it. It may be changed *by* the will of the capitalist, and may, therefore, be changed *against* his will.

Citizen Weston illustrated his theory by telling you that when a bowl contains a certain quantity of soup, to be eaten by a certain number of persons, an increase in the broadness of the spoons would not produce an increase in the amount of soup. He must allow me to find this illustration rather spoony. It reminded me somewhat of the simile employed by Menenius Agrippa. When the Roman plebeians struck against the Roman patricians, the patrician Agrippa told them that the patrician belly fed the plebeian members of the body politic. Agrippa failed to show that you feed the members of one man by filling the belly of another. Citizen Weston, on his part, has forgotten that the bowl from which the workmen eat is filled with the whole produce of the national labour, and that what prevents them fetching more out of it is neither the narrowness of the bowl nor the scantiness of its contents, but only the smallness of their spoons.

By what contrivance is the capitalist enabled to return four shillings' worth for five shillings? By raising the price of the commodity he sells. Now, does a rise and more generally a change in the prices of commodities, do the prices of commodities themselves, depend on the mere will of the capitalist? Or are, on the contrary, certain circumstances wanted to give effect to that will? If not, the ups and downs, the incessant fluctuations of market prices, become an insoluble riddle.

As we suppose that no change whatever has taken place either in the productive powers of labour, or in the amount of capital and labour employed, or in the value of the money wherein the values of products are estimated, but *only a change in the rate of wages*, how could that *rise of wages* affect the *prices of commodities*? Only by affecting the actual proportion between the demand for, and the supply of, these commodities.

It is perfectly true that, considered as a whole, the working class spends, and must spend, its income upon *necessaries*. A general rise in the rate of wages would, therefore, produce a rise in the demand for, and consequently in the *market prices of, necessaries*. The capitalists who produce these necessaries would be compensated for the risen wages by the rising market prices of their commodities. But how with the other capitalists, who do *not* produce necessaries? And you must not fancy them a small body. If you consider that two-thirds of the national produce are consumed by one-fifth of the population—a member of the House of Commons stated it recently to be but one-seventh of the population—you will understand what an immense proportion of the national produce must be produced in the shape of luxuries, or be *exchanged* for luxuries, and what an immense amount of the necessaries themselves must be wasted upon flunkeys, horses, cats, and so forth, a waste we know from experience to become always much limited with the rising prices of necessaries.

Well, what would be the position of those capitalists who do *not* produce necessaries? For the *fall in the rate of profit*, consequent upon the general rise of wages, they could not compensate themselves by a *rise in the price of their commodities*, because the demand for those commodities would not have increased. Their income would have decreased, and from this decreased income they would have to pay more for the same amount of higher-priced necessaries. But this would not be all. As their income had diminished they would have less to spend upon luxu-

ries, and therefore their mutual demand for their respective commodities would diminish. Consequent upon this diminished demand the prices of their commodities would fall. In these branches of industry, therefore, *the rate of profit would fall*, not only in simple proportion to the general rise in the rate of wages, but in the compound ratio of the general rise of wages, the rise in the prices of necessaries, and the fall in the prices of luxuries.

What would be the consequence of *this difference in the rates of profit* for capitals employed in the different branches of industry? Why, the consequence that generally obtains whenever, from whatever reason, the *average rate of profit* comes to differ in the different spheres of production. Capital and labour would be transferred from the less remunerative to the more remunerative branches; and this process of transfer would go on until the supply in the one department of industry would have risen proportionately to the increased demand, and would have sunk in the other departments according to the decreased demand. This change effected, the general rate of profit would again be *equalized* in the different branches. As the whole derangement originally arose from a mere change in the proportion of the demand for, and the supply of, different commodities, the cause ceasing, the effect would cease, and *prices* would return to their former level and equilibrium. Instead of being limited to some branches of industry, *the fall in the rate of profit* consequent upon the rise of wages would have become general. According to our supposition, there would have taken place no change in the productive powers of labour, nor in the aggregate amount of production, but *that given amount of production would have changed its form*. A greater part of the produce would exist in the shape of necessaries, a lesser part in the shape of luxuries, or what comes to the same, a lesser part would be exchanged for foreign luxuries, and be consumed in its original form, or, what again comes to the same, a greater part of the native produce would be exchanged for foreign necessaries instead of for luxuries. The general rise in the rate of wages would, therefore, after a temporary disturbance of market prices, only result in a general fall of the rate of profit without any permanent change in the prices of commodities.

If I am told that in the previous argument I assume the whole surplus wages to be spent upon necessaries, I answer that I have made the supposition most advantageous to the opinion of Citizen

Weston. If the surplus wages were spent upon articles formerly not entering into the consumption of the working men, the real increase of their purchasing power would need no proof. Being, however, only derived from an advance of wages, that increase of their purchasing power must exactly correspond to the decrease of the purchasing power of the capitalists. The *aggregate demand* for commodities would, therefore, not *increase*, but the constituent parts of that demand would *change*. The increasing demand on the one side would be counterbalanced by the decreasing demand on the other side. Thus the aggregate demand remaining stationary, no change whatever could take place in the market prices of commodities.

You arrive, therefore, at this dilemma: Either the surplus wages are equally spent upon all articles of consumption—then the expansion of demand on the part of the working class must be compensated by the contraction of demand on the part of the capitalist class—or the surplus wages are only spent upon some articles whose market prices will temporarily rise. Then the consequent rise in the rate of profit in some, and the consequent fall in the rate of profit in other branches of industry will produce a change in the distribution of capital and labour, going on until the supply is brought up to the increased demand in the one department of industry, and brought down to the diminished demand in the other departments of industry. On the one supposition there will occur no change in the prices of commodities. On the other supposition, after some fluctuations of market prices, the exchangeable values of commodities will subside to the former level. On both suppositions the general rise in the rate of wages will ultimately result in nothing else but a general fall in the rate of profit.

To stir up your powers of imagination Citizen Weston requested you to think of the difficulties which a general rise of English agricultural wages from nine shillings to eighteen shillings would produce. Think, he exclaimed, of the immense rise in the demand for necessaries, and the consequent fearful rise in their prices! Now, all of you know that the average wages of the American agricultural labourer amount to more than double that of the English agricultural labourer, although the prices of agricultural produce are lower in the United States than in the United Kingdom, although the general relations of capital and labour obtain in the United States the same as in England, and although

the annual amount of production is much smaller in the United States than in England. Why, then, does our friend ring this alarum bell? Simply to shift the real question before us. A sudden rise of wages from nine shillings to eighteen shillings would be a sudden rise to the amount of 100 per cent. Now, we are not at all discussing the question whether the general rate of wages in England could be suddenly increased by 100 per cent. We have nothing at all to do with the *magnitude* of the rise, which in every practical instance must depend on, and be suited to, given circumstances. We have only to inquire how a general rise in the rate of wages, even if restricted to one per cent., will act.

Dismissing friend Weston's fancy rise of 100 per cent., I propose calling your attention to the real rise of wages that took place in Great Britain from 1849 to 1859.

You are all aware of the Ten Hours Bill, or rather Ten-and-a-Half Hours Bill, introduced since 1848. This was one of the greatest economic changes we have witnessed. It was a sudden and compulsory rise of wages, not in some local trades, but in the leading industrial branches by which England sways the markets of the world. It was a rise of wages under circumstances singularly unpropitious. Dr. Ure, Professor Senior, and all the other official economical mouthpieces of the middle class, *proved*, and I must say upon much stronger grounds than those of our friend Weston, that it would sound the death-knell of English industry. They proved that it not only amounted to a simple rise of wages, but to a rise of wages initiated by, and based upon, a diminution of the quantity of labour employed. They asserted that the twelfth hour you wanted to take from the capitalist was exactly the only hour from which he derived his profit. They threatened a decrease of accumulation, rise of prices, loss of markets, stinting of production, consequent reaction upon wages, ultimate ruin. In fact, they declared Maximilian Robespierre's Maximum Laws¹ to be a small affair compared to it; and they were right in a certain sense. Well, what was the result? A rise in the money wages of the factory operatives, despite the curtailing of the working day, a great increase in the number of factory hands employed, a continuous fall in the prices of their products, a marvellous

¹ *Maximum Laws*: Introduced in 1793, during the French bourgeois revolution, by the Jacobin Convention. They fixed definite price limits for commodities and maximum wages.—*Ed.*

development in the productive powers of their labour, an unheard-of progressive expansion of the markets for their commodities. In Manchester, at the meeting, in 1860, of the Society for the Advancement of Science, I myself heard Mr. Newman confess that he, Dr. Ure, Senior, and all other official propounders of economic science had been wrong, while the instinct of the people had been right. I mention Mr. W. Newman,¹ not Professor Francis Newman, because he occupies an eminent position in economic science, as the contributor to, and editor of, Mr. Thomas Tooke's *History of Prices*, that magnificent work which traces the history of prices from 1793 to 1856. If our friend Weston's fixed idea of a fixed amount of wages, a fixed amount of production, a fixed degree of the productive power of labour, a fixed and permanent will of the capitalists, and all his other fixedness and finality were correct, Professor Senior's woeful forebodings would have been right, and Robert Owen, who already in 1816 proclaimed a general limitation of the working day the first preparatory step to the emancipation of the working class and actually in the teeth of the general prejudice inaugurated it on his own hook in his cotton factory at New Lanark, would have been wrong.

In the very same period during which the introduction of the Ten Hours Bill, and the rise of wages consequent upon it, occurred, there took place in Great Britain, for reasons which it would be out of place to enumerate here, a *general rise in agricultural wages*.

Although it is not required for my immediate purpose, in order not to mislead you, I shall make some preliminary remarks.

If a man got two shillings weekly wages, and if his wages rose to four shillings, the *rate of wages* would have risen by 100 per cent. This would seem a very magnificent thing if expressed as a rise in the *rate of wages*, although the *actual amount of wages*, four shillings weekly, would still remain a wretchedly small, a starvation pittance. You must not, therefore, allow yourselves to be carried away by the high-sounding per cents. in the *rate of wages*. You must always ask, What was the *original* amount?

Moreover, you will understand, that if there were ten men receiving each 2s. per week, five men receiving each 5s., and five men receiving 11s. weekly, the twenty men together would receive 100s., or £5, weekly. If then a rise, say by 20 per cent., upon the

¹ A slip on the part of Marx. He meant the British economist Newmarch.--Ed.

aggregate sum of their weekly wages took place, there would be an advance from £5 to £6. Taking the average, we might say that the *general rate of wages* had risen by 20 per cent., although, in fact, the wages of the ten men had remained stationary, the wages of the one lot of five men had risen from 5s. to 6s. only, and the wages of the other lot of five men from 55s. to 70s. One-half of the men would not have improved at all their position, one-quarter would have improved it in an imperceptible degree, and only one-quarter would have bettered it really. Still, reckoning by the *average*, the total amount of the wages of those twenty men would have increased by 20 per cent., and as far as the aggregate capital that employs them, and the prices of the commodities they produce, are concerned, it would be exactly the same as if all of them had equally shared in the average rise of wages. In the case of agricultural labour, the standard wages being very different in the different counties of England and Scotland, the rise affected them very unequally.

Lastly, during the period when that rise of wages took place counteracting influences were at work, such as the new taxes consequent upon the Russian war, the extensive demolition of the dwelling-houses of the agricultural labourers, and so forth.

Having premised so much, I proceed to state that from 1849 to 1859 there took place a *rise of about 40 per cent.*, in the average rate of the agricultural wages of Great Britain. I could give you ample details in proof of my assertion, but for the present purpose think it sufficient to refer you to the conscientious and critical paper read in 1860 by the late Mr. John C. Morton at the London Society of Arts on *The Forces Used in Agriculture*. Mr. Morton gives the returns, from bills and other authentic documents, which he had collected from about one hundred farmers, residing in twelve Scotch and thirty-five English counties.

According to our friend Weston's opinion, and taken together with the simultaneous rise in the wages of the factory operatives, there ought to have occurred a tremendous rise in the prices of agricultural produce during the period 1849 to 1859. But what is the fact? Despite the Russian war, and the consecutive unfavourable harvests from 1854 to 1856, the average price of wheat, which is the leading agricultural produce of England, fell from about £3 per quarter for the years 1838 to 1848 to about £2 10s. per quarter for the years 1849 to 1859. This constitutes a fall in the price of wheat of more than 16 per cent. simultaneously with

an average rise of agricultural wages of 40 per cent. During the same period, if we compare its end with its beginning, 1859 with 1849, there was a decrease of official pauperism from 934,419 to 860,470, the difference being 73,949; a very small decrease, I grant, and which in the following years was again lost, but still a decrease.

It might be said that, consequent upon the abolition of the Corn Laws, the import of foreign corn was more than doubled during the period from 1849 to 1859, as compared with the period from 1838 to 1848. And what of that? From Citizen Weston's standpoint one would have expected that this sudden, immense, and continuously increasing demand upon foreign markets must have sent up the prices of agricultural produce there to a frightful height, the effect of increased demand remaining the same, whether it comes from without or from within. What was the fact? Apart from some years of failing harvests, during all that period the ruinous fall in the price of corn formed a standing theme of declamation in France; the Americans were again and again compelled to burn their surplus of produce; and Russia, if we are to believe Mr. Urquhart, prompted the Civil War in the United States because her agricultural exports were crippled by the Yankee competition in the markets of Europe.

Reduced to its abstract form, Citizen Weston's argument would come to this: Every rise in demand occurs always on the basis of a given amount of production. It can, therefore, *never increase the supply of the articles demanded, but can only enhance their money prices*. Now the most common observation shows that an increased demand will, in some instances, leave the market prices of commodities altogether unchanged, and will, in other instances, cause a temporary rise of market prices followed by an increased supply, followed by a reduction of the prices to their original level, and in many cases *below* their original level. Whether the rise of demand springs from surplus wages, or from any other cause, does not at all change the conditions of the problem. From Citizen Weston's standpoint the general phenomenon was as difficult to explain as the phenomenon occurring under the exceptional circumstances of a rise of wages. His argument had, therefore, no peculiar bearing whatever upon the subject we treat. It only expressed his perplexity at accounting for the laws by which an increase of demand produces an increase of supply, instead of an ultimate rise of market prices.

III [WAGES AND CURRENCY]

On the second day of the debate our friend Weston clothed his old assertions in new forms. He said: Consequent upon a general rise in money wages, more currency will be wanted to pay the same wages. The currency being *fixed*, how can you pay with this fixed currency increased money wages? First the difficulty arose from the fixed amount of commodities accruing to the working man, despite his increase of money wages; now it arises from the increased money wages, despite the fixed amount of commodities. Of course, if you reject his original dogma, his secondary grievance will disappear.

However, I shall show that this currency question has nothing at all to do with the subject before us.

In your country the mechanism of payments is much more perfected than in any other country of Europe. Thanks to the extent and concentration of the banking system, much less currency is wanted to circulate the same amount of values, and to transact the same or a greater amount of business. For example, as far as wages are concerned, the English factory operative pays his wages weekly to the shopkeeper, who sends them weekly to the banker, who returns them weekly to the manufacturer, who again pays them away to his working men, and so forth. By this contrivance the yearly wages of an operative, say of £52, may be paid by one single sovereign turning round every week in the same circle. Even in England the mechanism is less perfect than in Scotland, and is not everywhere equally perfect; and therefore we find, for example, that in some agricultural districts, as compared with the mere factory districts, much more currency is wanted to circulate a much smaller amount of values.

If you cross the Channel, you will find that the *money wages* are much lower than in England, but that they are circulated in Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and France by a *much larger amount of currency*. The same sovereign will not be so quickly intercepted by the banker or returned to the industrial capitalist; and, therefore, instead of one sovereign circulating £52 yearly, you want, perhaps, three sovereigns to circulate yearly wages to the amount of £25. Thus, by comparing continental countries with England, you will see at once that low money wages may require a much larger currency for their circulation than high money

wages, and that this is, in fact, a merely technical point, quite foreign to our subject.

According to the best calculations I know, the yearly income of the working class of this country may be estimated at £250,000,000. This immense sum is circulated by about £3,000,000. Suppose a rise of wages of 50 per cent. to take place. Then, instead of £3,000,000 of currency, £4,500,000 would be wanted. As a very considerable part of the working man's daily expenses is laid out in silver and copper, that is to say, in mere tokens, whose relative value to gold is arbitrarily fixed by law, like that of inconvertible money paper, a rise of money wages by 50 per cent. would, in the extreme case, require an additional circulation of sovereigns, say to the amount of one million. One million, now dormant, in the shape of bullion or coin, in the cellars of the Bank of England, or of private bankers, would circulate. But even the trifling expense resulting from the additional minting or the additional wear and tear of that million might be spared, and would actually be spared, if any friction should arise from the want of the additional currency. All of you know that the currency of this country is divided into two great departments. One sort, supplied by bank-notes of different descriptions, is used in the transactions between dealers and dealers, and the larger payments from consumers to dealers, while another sort of currency, metallic coin, circulates in the retail trade. Although distinct, these two sorts of currency interwork with each other. Thus gold coin, to a very great extent, circulates even in larger payments for all the odd sums under £5. If tomorrow £4 notes, or £3 notes, or £2 notes were issued, the gold filling these channels of circulation would at once be driven out of them, and flow into those channels where they would be needed from the increase of money wages. Thus the additional million required by an advance of wages by 50 per cent. would be supplied without the addition of one single sovereign. The same effect might be produced, without one additional bank-note, by an additional bill circulation, as was the case in Lancashire for a very considerable time.

If a general rise in the rate of wages, for example, of 100 per cent., as Citizen Weston supposed it to take place in agricultural wages, would produce a great rise in the prices of necessaries, and, according to his views, require an additional amount of currency not to be procured, *a general fall in wages* must pro-

duce the same effect, on the same scale, in an opposite direction. Well! All of you know that the years 1858 to 1860 were the most prosperous years for the cotton industry, and that peculiarly the year 1860 stands in that respect unrivaled in the annals of commerce, while at the same time all other branches of industry were most flourishing. The wages of the cotton operatives and of all the other working men connected with their trade stood, in 1860, higher than ever before. The American crisis came, and those aggregate wages were suddenly reduced to about one-fourth of their former amount. This would have been in the opposite direction a rise of 300 per cent. If wages rise from five to twenty, we say that they rise by 300 per cent.; if they fall from twenty to five, we say that they fall by 75 per cent., but the amount of rise in the one and the amount of fall in the other case would be the same, namely, fifteen shillings. This, then, was a sudden change in the rate of wages unprecedented, and at the same time extending over a number of operatives which, if we count all the operatives not only directly engaged in but indirectly dependent upon the cotton trade, was larger by one-half than the number of agricultural labourers. Did the price of wheat fall? It *rose* from the annual average of 47s. 8d. per quarter during the three years of 1858-60 to the annual average of 55s. 10d. per quarter during the three years 1861-1863. As to the currency, there were coined in the mint in 1861 £8,673,232, against £3,378,102 in 1860. That is to say, there were coined £5,295,130 more in 1861 than in 1860. It is true the bank-note circulation was in 1861 less by £1,319,000 than in 1860. Take this off. There remains still an overplus of currency for the year 1861, as compared with the prosperity year, 1860, to the amount of £3,976,130, or about £4,000,000; but the bullion reserve in the Bank of England had simultaneously decreased, not quite to the same, but in an approximating proportion.

Compare the year 1862 with 1842. Apart from the immense increase in the value and amount of commodities circulated, in 1862 the capital paid in regular transactions for shares, loans, etc., for the railways in England and Wales amounted alone to £320,000,000, a sum that would have appeared fabulous in 1842. Still, the aggregate amounts in currency in 1862 and 1842 were pretty nearly equal, and generally you will find a tendency to a progressive diminution of currency in the face of an enormously increasing value, not only of commodities, but of monetary

transactions generally. From our friend Weston's standpoint this is an unsolvable riddle.

Looking somewhat deeper into this matter, he would have found that, quite apart from wages, and supposing them to be fixed, the value and mass of the commodities to be circulated, and generally the amount of monetary transactions to be settled, vary daily; that the amount of bank-notes issued varies daily; that the amount of payments realized without the intervention of any money, by the instrumentality of bills, checks, book-credits, clearing houses, varies daily; that, as far as actual metallic currency is required, the proportion between the coin in circulation and the coin and bullion in reserve or sleeping in the cellars of banks varies daily; that the amount of bullion absorbed by the national circulation and the amount being sent abroad for international circulation vary daily. He would have found that his dogma of a fixed currency is a monstrous error, incompatible with the every-day movement. He would have inquired into the laws which enable a currency to adapt itself to circumstances so continually changing, instead of turning his misconception of the laws of currency into an argument against a rise of wages.

IV [SUPPLY AND DEMAND]

Our friend Weston accepts the Latin proverb that *repetitio est mater studiorum*, that is to say, that repetition is the mother of study, and consequently he repeated his original dogma again under the new form that the contraction of currency, resulting from an enhancement of wages, would produce a diminution of capital, and so forth. Having already dealt with his currency crotchet, I consider it quite useless to enter upon the imaginary consequences he fancies to flow from his imaginary currency mishap. I shall proceed to at once reduce his *one and the same dogma*, repeated in so many different shapes, to its simplest theoretical form.

The uncritical way in which he has treated his subject will become evident from one single remark. He pleads against a rise of wages or against high wages as the result of such a rise. Now, I ask him, What are high wages and what are low wages? Why constitute, for example, five shillings weekly low, and twenty shillings weekly high wages? If five is low as compared with

twenty, twenty is still lower as compared with two hundred. If a man was to lecture on the thermometer, and commenced by declaiming on high and low degrees, he would impart no knowledge whatever. He must first tell me how the freezing-point is found out, and how the boiling-point, and how these standard points are settled by natural laws, not by the fancy of the sellers or makers of thermometers. Now, in regard to wages and profits, Citizen Weston has not only failed to deduce such standard points from economical laws, but he has not even felt the necessity to look after them. He satisfied himself with the acceptance of the popular slang terms of low and high as something having a fixed meaning, although it is self-evident that wages can only be said to be high or low as compared with a standard by which to measure their magnitudes.

He will be unable to tell me why a certain amount of money is given for a certain amount of labour. If he should answer me, "This was settled by the law of supply and demand," I should ask him, in the first instance, by what law supply and demand are themselves regulated. And such an answer would at once put him out of court. The relations between the supply and demand of labour undergo perpetual change, and with them the market prices of labour. If the demand overshoots the supply wages rise; if the supply overshoots the demand wages sink, although it might in such circumstances be necessary to *test* the real state of demand and supply by a strike, for example, or any other method. But if you accept supply and demand as the law regulating wages, it would be as childish as useless to declaim against a rise of wages, because, according to the supreme law you appeal to, a periodical rise of wages is quite as necessary and legitimate as a periodical fall of wages. If you do *not* accept supply and demand as the law regulating wages, I again repeat the question, why a certain amount of money is given for a certain amount of labour?

But to consider matters more broadly: You would be altogether mistaken in fancying that the value of labour or any other commodity whatever is ultimately fixed by supply and demand. Supply and demand regulate nothing but the temporary *fluctuations* of market prices. They will explain to you why the market price of a commodity rises above or sinks below its *value*, but they can never account for that *value* itself. Suppose supply and demand to equilibrate, or, as the economists call it, to cover each

other. Why, the very moment these opposite forces become equal they paralyze each other, and cease to work in the one or the other direction. At the moment when supply and demand equilibrate each other, and therefore cease to act, the *market* price of a commodity coincides with its *real value*, with the standard price round which its market prices oscillate. In inquiring into the nature of that *value*, we have, therefore, nothing at all to do with the temporary effects on market prices of supply and demand. The same holds true of wages and of the prices of all other commodities.

V [WAGES AND PRICES]

Reduced to their simplest theoretical expression, all our friend's arguments resolve themselves into this one single dogma: "*The prices of commodities are determined or regulated by wages.*"

I might appeal to practical observation to bear witness against this antiquated and exploded fallacy. I might tell you that the English factory operatives, miners, shipbuilders, and so forth, whose labour is relatively high-priced, undersell by the cheapness of their produce all other nations; while the English agricultural labourer, for example, whose labour is relatively low-priced, is undersold by almost every other nation because of the dearness of his produce. By comparing article with article in the same country, and the commodities of different countries, I might show, apart from some exceptions more apparent than real, that on an average the high-priced labour produces the low-priced, and the low-priced labour produces the high-priced commodities. This, of course, would not prove that the high price of labour in the one, and its low price in the other instance, are the respective causes of those diametrically opposed effects, but at all events it would prove that the prices of commodities are not ruled by the prices of labour. However, it is quite superfluous for us to employ this empirical method.

It might, perhaps, be denied that Citizen Weston has put forward the dogma: "*The prices of commodities are determined or regulated by wages.*" In point of fact, he has never formulated it. He said, on the contrary, that profit and rent form also constituent parts of the prices of commodities, because it is out of the prices of commodities that not only the working man's wages,

but also the capitalist's profits and the landlord's rents must be paid. But how, in his idea, are prices formed? First by wages. Then an additional percentage is joined to the price on behalf of the capitalist, and another additional percentage on behalf of the landlord. Suppose the wages of the labour employed in the production of a commodity to be ten. If the rate of profit was 100 per cent., to the wages advanced the capitalist would add ten, and if the rate of rent was also 100 per cent. upon the wages, there would be added ten more, and the aggregate price of the commodity would amount to thirty. But such a determination of prices would be simply their determination by wages. If wages in the above case rose to twenty, the price of the commodity would rise to sixty, and so forth. Consequently all the superannuated writers on political economy who propounded the dogma that wages regulate prices, have tried to prove it by treating profit and rent *as mere additional percentages upon wages*. None of them were, of course, able to reduce the limits of those percentages to any economic law. They seem, on the contrary, to think profits settled by tradition, custom, the will of the capitalist, or by some other equally arbitrary and inexplicable method. If they assert that they are settled by the competition between the capitalists, they say nothing. That competition is sure to equalize the different rates of profit in different trades, or reduce them to one average level, but it can never determine the level itself, or the general rate of profit.

What do we mean by saying that the prices of the commodities are determined by wages? Wages being but a name for the price of labour, we mean that the prices of commodities are regulated by the price of labour. As "*price*" is exchangeable value—and in speaking of value I speak always of exchangeable value—is exchangeable *value expressed in money*, the proposition comes to this, that "*the value of commodities is determined by the value of labour,*" or that "*the value of labour is the general measure of value.*"

But how, then, is the "*value of labour*" itself determined? Here we come to a standstill. Of course, to a standstill if we try reasoning logically. Yet the propounders of that doctrine make short work of logical scruples. Take our friend Weston, for example. First he told us that wages regulate the price of commodities and that consequently when wages rise prices must rise. Then he turned round to show us that a rise of wages will be no good

because the prices of commodities had risen, and because wages were indeed measured by the prices of the commodities upon which they are spent. Thus we begin by saying that the value of labour determines the value of commodities, and we wind up by saying that the value of commodities determines the value of labour. Thus we move to and fro in the most vicious circle, and arrive at no conclusion at all.

On the whole it is evident that by making the value of one commodity, say labour, corn, or any other commodity, the general measure and regulator of value, we only shift the difficulty, since we determine one value by another, which on its side wants to be determined.

The dogma that "wages determine the prices of commodities," expressed in its most abstract terms, comes to this, that "value is determined by value," and this tautology means that, in fact, we know nothing at all about value. Accepting this premise, all reasoning about the general laws of political economy turns into mere twaddle. It was, therefore, the great merit of Ricardo that in his work on *The Principles of Political Economy*, published in 1817, he fundamentally destroyed the old, popular, and worn-out fallacy that "wages determine prices," a fallacy which Adam Smith and his French predecessors had spurned in the really scientific parts of their researches, but which they reproduced in their more exoterical and vulgarizing chapters.

VI [VALUE AND LABOUR]

Citizens, I have now arrived at a point where I must enter upon the real development of the question. I cannot promise to do this in a very satisfactory way, because to do so I should be obliged to go over the whole field of political economy. I can, as the French would say, but effleurer la question, touch upon the main points.

The first question we have to put is: What is the *value* of a commodity? How is it determined?

At first sight it would seem that the value of a commodity is a thing quite *relative*, and not to be settled without considering one commodity in its relations to all other commodities. In fact, in speaking of the value, the value in exchange of a commodity, we mean the proportional quantities in which it exchanges with

all other commodities. But then arises the question: How are the proportions in which commodities exchange with each other regulated?

We know from experience that these proportions vary infinitely. Taking one single commodity, wheat, for instance, we shall find that a quarter of wheat exchanges in almost countless variations of proportion with different commodities. Yet, *its value remaining always the same*, whether expressed in silk, gold, or any other commodity, it must be something distinct from, and independent of these *different rates of exchange* with different articles. It must be possible to express, in a very different form, these various equations with various commodities.

Besides, if I say a quarter of wheat exchanges with iron in a certain proportion, or the value of a quarter of wheat is expressed in a certain amount of iron, I say that the value of wheat and its equivalent in iron are equal to *some third thing*, which is neither wheat nor iron, because I suppose them to express the same magnitude in two different shapes. Either of them, the wheat or the iron, must, therefore, independently of the other, be reducible to this third thing which is their common measure.

To elucidate this point I shall recur to a very simple geometrical illustration. In comparing the areas of triangles of all possible forms and magnitudes, or comparing triangles with rectangles, or any other rectilinear figure, how do we proceed? We reduce the area of any triangle whatever to an expression quite different from its visible form. Having found from the nature of the triangle that its area is equal to half the product of its base by its height, we can then compare the different values of all sorts of triangles, and of all rectilinear figures whatever, because all of them may be resolved into a certain number of triangles.

The same mode of procedure must obtain with the values of commodities. We must be able to reduce all of them to an expression common to all, and distinguishing them only by the proportions in which they contain that identical measure.

As the *exchangeable values* of commodities are only *social functions* of those things, and have nothing at all to do with their *natural* qualities, we must first ask, What is the common *social substance* of all commodities? It is *Labour*. To produce a commodity a certain amount of labour must be bestowed upon it, or worked up in it. And I say not only *Labour*, but *social Labour*. A man who produces an article for his own immediate use, to

consume it himself, creates a *product*, but not a *commodity*. As a self-sustaining producer he has nothing to do with society. But to produce a *commodity*, a man must not only produce an article satisfying some *social* want, but his labour itself must form part and parcel of the total sum of labour expended by society. It must be subordinate to the *Division of Labour within Society*. It is nothing without the other divisions of labour, and on its part is required to *integrate* them.

If we consider *commodities as values*, we consider them exclusively under the single aspect of *realized, fixed*, or, if you like, *crystallized social labour*. In this respect they can *differ* only by representing greater or smaller quantities of labour, as, for example, a greater amount of labour may be worked up in a silken handkerchief than in a brick. But how does one measure *quantities of labour*? By the *time the labour lasts*, in measuring the labour by the hour, the day, etc. Of course, to apply this measure, all sorts of labour are reduced to average or simple labour as their unit.

We arrive, therefore, at this conclusion. A commodity has a *value*, because it is a *crystallization of social labour*. The *greatness* of its value, of its *relative* value, depends upon the greater or less amount of that social substance contained in it; that is to say, on the relative mass of labour necessary for its production. The *relative values of commodities* are, therefore, determined by the *respective quantities or amounts of labour, worked up, realized, fixed in them*. The *correlative* quantities of commodities which can be produced in the *same time of labour* are *equal*. Or the value of one commodity is to the value of another commodity as the quantity of labour fixed in the one is to the quantity of labour fixed in the other.

I suspect that many of you will ask, Does then, indeed, there exist such a vast, or any difference whatever, between determining the values of commodities by *wages*, and determining them by the *relative quantities of labour* necessary for their production? You must, however, be aware that the *reward* for labour, and *quantity* of labour, are quite disparate things. Suppose, for example, *equal quantities of labour* to be fixed in one quarter of wheat and one ounce of gold. I resort to the example because it was used by Benjamin Franklin in his first Essay published in 1729, and entitled, *A Modest Enquiry into the Nature and Necessity of a Paper Currency*, where he, one of the first, hit upon the true

nature of value. Well. We suppose, then, that one quarter of wheat and one ounce of gold are *equal values* or *equivalents*, because they are *crystallizations of equal amounts of average labour*, of so many days' or so many weeks' labour respectively fixed in them. In thus determining the relative values of gold and corn, do we refer in any way whatever to the *wages* of the agricultural labourer and the miner? Not a bit. We leave it quite *indeterminate how* their day's or week's labour was paid, or even whether wages labour was employed at all. If it was, wages may have been very unequal. The labourer whose labour is realized in the quarter of wheat may receive two bushels only, and the labourer employed in mining may receive one-half of the ounce of gold. Or, supposing their wages to be equal, they may deviate in all possible proportions from the values of the commodities produced by them. They may amount to one-half, one-third, one-fourth, one-fifth, or any other proportional part of the one quarter of corn or the one ounce of gold. Their *wages* can, of course, not *exceed*, not be *more* than the values of the commodities they produced, but they can be *less* in every possible degree. Their *wages* will be *limited* by the *values* of the products, but the *values of their products* will not be limited by the wages. And above all, the values, the relative values of corn and gold, for example, will have been settled without any regard whatever to the value of the labour employed, that is to say, to *wages*. To determine the values of commodities by the *relative quantities of labour fixed in them*, is, therefore, a thing quite different from the tautological method of determining the values of commodities by the value of labour, or by *wages*. This point, however, will be further elucidated in the progress of our inquiry.

In calculating the exchangeable value of a commodity we must add to the quantity of labour *last* employed the quantity of labour *previously* worked up in the raw material of the commodity, and the labour bestowed on the implements, tools, machinery, and buildings, with which such labour is assisted. For example, the value of a certain amount of cotton-yarn is the crystallization of the quantity of labour added to the cotton during the spinning process, the quantity of labour previously realized in the cotton itself, the quantity of labour realized in the coal, oil, and other auxiliary substances used, the quantity of labour fixed in the steam-engine, the spindles, the factory building, and so forth. Instruments of production properly so-called, such as tools, machinery,

buildings, serve again and again for a longer or shorter period during repeated processes of production. If they were used up at once, like the raw material, their whole value would at once be transferred to the commodities they assist in producing. But as a spindle, for example, is but gradually used up, an average calculation is made, based upon the average time it lasts, and its average waste of wear and tear during a certain period, say a day. In this way we calculate how much of the value of the spindle is transferred to the yarn daily spun, and how much, therefore, of the total amount of labour realized in a pound of yarn, for example, is due to the quantity of labour previously realized in the spindle. For our present purpose it is not necessary to dwell any longer upon this point.

It might seem that if the value of a commodity is determined by the *quantity of labour bestowed upon its production*, the lazier a man, or the clumsier a man, the more valuable his commodity, because the greater the time of labour required for finishing the commodity. This, however, would be a sad mistake. You will recollect that I used the word "*Social labour*," and many points are involved in this qualification of "*Social*." In saying that the value of a commodity is determined by the *quantity of labour* worked up or crystallized in it, we mean *the quantity of labour necessary* for its production in a given state of society, under certain social average conditions of production, with a given social average intensity, and average skill of the labour employed. When, in England, the power-loom came to compete with the hand-loom, only one-half the former time of labour was wanted to convert a given amount of yarn into a yard of cotton or cloth. The poor hand-loom weaver now worked seventeen or eighteen hours daily, instead of the nine or ten hours he had worked before. Still the product of twenty hours of his labour represented now only ten social hours of labour, or ten hours of labour socially necessary for the conversion of a certain amount of yarn into textile stuffs. His product of twenty hours had, therefore, no more value than his former product of ten hours.

If then the quantity of socially necessary labour realized in commodities regulates their exchangeable values, every increase in the quantity of labour wanted for the production of a commodity must augment its value, as every diminution must lower it.

If the respective quantities of labour necessary for the production of the respective commodities remained constant, their rel-

ative values also would be constant. But such is not the case. The quantity of labour necessary for the production of a commodity changes continuously with the changes in the productive powers of the labour employed. The greater the productive powers of labour, the more produce is finished in a given time of labour and the smaller the productive powers of labour, the less produce is finished in the same time. If, for example, in the progress of population it should become necessary to cultivate less fertile soils, the same amount of produce would be only attainable by a greater amount of labour spent, and the value of agricultural produce would consequently rise. On the other hand, if with the modern means of production, a single spinner converts into yarn, during one working day, many thousand times the amount of cotton which he could have spun during the same time with the spinning wheel, it is evident that every single pound of cotton will absorb many thousand times less of spinning labour than it did before, and, consequently, the value added by spinning to every single pound of cotton will be a thousand times less than before. The value of yarn will sink accordingly.

Apart from the different natural energies and acquired working abilities of different peoples, the productive powers of labour must principally depend:

Firstly. Upon the *natural* conditions of labour, such as fertility of soil, mines, and so forth;

Secondly. Upon the progressive improvement of the *Social Powers of Labour*, such as are derived from production on a grand scale, concentration of capital and combination of labour, subdivision of labour, machinery, improved methods, appliance of chemical and other natural agencies, shortening of time and space by means of communication and transport, and every other contrivance by which science presses natural agencies into the service of labour, and by which the social or co-operative character of labour is developed. The greater the productive powers of labour, the less labour is bestowed upon a given amount of produce; hence the smaller the value of this produce. The smaller the productive powers of labour, the more labour is bestowed upon the same amount of produce; hence the greater its value. As a general law we may, therefore, set it down that:—

The values of commodities are directly as the times of labour employed in their production, and are inversely as the productive powers of the labour employed.

Having till now only spoken of *Value*, I shall add a few words about *Price*, which is a peculiar form assumed by value.

Price, taken by itself, is nothing but the *monetary expression of value*. The values of all commodities of this country, for example, are expressed in gold prices, while on the Continent they are mainly expressed in silver prices. The value of gold or silver, like that of all other commodities, is regulated by the quantity of labour necessary for getting them. You exchange a certain amount of your national products, in which a certain amount of your national labour is crystallized, for the produce of the gold and silver producing countries, in which a certain quantity of *their* labour is crystallized. It is in this way, in fact by barter, that you learn to express in gold and silver the values of all commodities, that is, the respective quantities of labour bestowed upon them. Looking somewhat closer into the *monetary expression of value*, or what comes to the same, the conversion of value into price, you will find that it is a process by which you give to the *values* of all commodities an *independent and homogeneous form*, or by which you express them as quantities of equal social labour. So far as it is but the monetary expression of value, price has been called *natural price* by Adam Smith, "*prix nécessaire*" by the French physiocrats.

What then is the relation between *value* and *market prices*, or between *natural prices* and *market prices*? You all know that the *market price* is the *same* for all commodities of the same kind, however the conditions of production may differ for the individual producers. The market price expresses only the *average amount of social labour* necessary, under the average conditions of production, to supply the market with a certain mass of a certain article. It is calculated upon the whole lot of a commodity of a certain description.

So far the *market price* of a commodity coincides with its *value*. On the other hand, the oscillations of market prices, rising now over, sinking now under the value or natural price, depend upon the fluctuations of supply and demand. The deviations of market prices from values are continual, but as Adam Smith says: "The natural price . . . is the central price, to which the prices of all commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents may sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes force them down even somewhat below it. But

whatever may be the obstacles which hinder them from settling in this centre of repose and continuance they are constantly tending towards it."¹

I cannot now sift this matter. It suffices to say that *if* supply and demand equilibrate each other, the market prices of commodities will correspond with their natural prices, that is to say, with their values, as determined by the respective quantities of labour required for their production. But supply and demand *must* constantly tend to equilibrate each other, although they do so only by compensating one fluctuation by another, a rise by a fall, and *vice versa*. If instead of considering only the daily fluctuations you analyze the movement of market prices for longer periods, as Mr. Tooke, for example, has done in his *History of Prices*, you will find that the fluctuations of market prices, their deviations from values, their ups and downs, paralyze and compensate each other; so that apart from the effect of monopolies and some other modifications I must now pass by, all descriptions of commodities are, on the average, sold at their respective *values* or natural prices. The average periods during which the fluctuations of market prices compensate each other are different kinds of commodities, because with one kind it is easier to adapt supply to demand than with the other.

If then, speaking broadly, and embracing somewhat longer periods, all descriptions of commodities sell at their respective values, it is nonsense to suppose that profit, not in individual cases, but that the constant and usual profits of different trades spring from *surcharging* the prices of commodities, or selling them at a price over and above their *value*. The absurdity of this notion becomes evident if it is generalized. What a man would constantly win as a seller he would as constantly lose as a purchaser. It would not do to say that there are men who are buyers without being sellers, or consumers without being producers. What these people pay to the producers, they must first get from them for nothing. If a man first takes your money and afterwards returns that money in buying your commodities, you will never enrich yourselves by selling your commodities too dear to that same man. This sort of transaction might diminish a loss, but would never help in realizing a profit.

¹ Adam Smith: *The Wealth of Nations*, Book I, Chap. VII, p. 57, New York 1931.—Ed.

To explain, therefore, the *general nature of profits*, you must start from the theorem that, on an average, commodities are *sold at their real value*, and that *profits are derived from selling them at their values*, that is, in proportion to the quantity of labour realized in them. If you cannot explain profit upon this supposition, you cannot explain it at all. This seems paradox and contrary to every-day observation. It is also paradox that the earth moves round the sun, and that water consists of two highly inflammable gases. Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by every-day experience, which catches only the delusive appearance of things.

VII LABOURING POWER¹

Having now, as far as it could be done in such a cursory manner, analyzed the nature of *Value*, of the *Value of any commodity whatever*, we must turn our attention to the specific *Value of Labour*. And here, again, I must startle you by a seeming paradox. All of you feel sure that what they daily sell is their Labour; that, therefore, Labour has a Price, and that, the price of a commodity being only the monetary expression of its value, there must certainly exist such a thing as the *Value of Labour*. However, there exists no such thing as the *Value of Labour* in the common acceptance of the word. We have seen that the amount of necessary labour crystallized in a commodity constitutes its value. Now, applying this notion of value, how could we define, say, the value of a ten hours working day? How much labour is contained in that day? Ten hours' labour. To say that the value of a ten hours working day is equal to ten hours' labour, or the quantity of labour contained in it, would be a tautological and, moreover, a nonsensical expression. Of course, having once found out the true but hidden sense of the expression "*Value of Labour*," we shall be able to interpret this irrational, and seemingly impossible application of value, in the same way that, having once made sure of the real movement of the celestial bodies, we shall be able to explain their apparent or merely phenomenal movements.

What the working man sells is not directly his *Labour*, but his *Labouring Power*, the temporary disposal of which he makes

¹ "Labour Power" in the authorized English translation of *Capital*.—Ed.

over to the capitalist. This is so much the case that I do not know whether by the English laws, but certainly by some Continental Laws, the *maximum time* is fixed for which a man is allowed to sell his labouring power. If allowed to do so for any indefinite period whatever, slavery would be immediately restored. Such a sale, if it comprised his lifetime, for example, would make him at once the lifelong slave of his employer.

One of the oldest economists and most original philosophers of England—Thomas Hobbes—has already, in his *Leviathan*, instinctively hit upon this point overlooked by all his successors. He says: "*The value or worth of a man* is, as in all other things, his *price*: that is, so much as would be given for the *Use of his Power*."

Proceeding from this basis, we shall be able to determine the *Value of Labour* as that of all other commodities.

But before doing so, we might ask, how does this strange phenomenon arise, that we find on the market a set of buyers, possessed of land, machinery, raw material, and the means of subsistence, all of them, save land in its crude state, the *products of labour*, and on the other hand, a set of sellers who have nothing to sell except their labouring power, their working arms and brains? That the one set buys continually in order to make a profit and enrich themselves, while the other set continually sells in order to earn their livelihood? The inquiry into this question would be an inquiry into what the economists call "*Previous, or Original Accumulation*," but which ought to be called *Original Expropriation*. We should find that this so-called *Original Accumulation* means nothing but a series of historical processes, resulting in a *Decomposition of the Original union* existing between the Labouring Man and his Instruments of Labour. Such an inquiry, however, lies beyond the pale of my present subject. The *Separation* between the Man of Labour and the Instruments of Labour once established, such a state of things will maintain itself and reproduce itself upon a constantly increasing scale, until a new and fundamental revolution in the mode of production should again overturn it, and restore the original union in a new historical form.

What, then, is the *Value of Labouring Power*?

Like that of every other commodity, its value is determined by the quantity of labour necessary to produce it. The labouring power of a man exists only in his living individuality. A certain

mass of necessaries must be consumed by a man to grow up and maintain his life. But the man, like the machine, will wear out, and must be replaced by another man. Beside the mass of necessaries required for *his own* maintenance, he wants another amount of necessaries to bring up a certain quota of children that are to replace him on the labour market and to perpetuate the race of labourers. Moreover, to develop his labouring power, and acquire a given skill, another amount of values must be spent. For our purpose it suffices to consider only *average* labour, the costs of whose education and development are vanishing magnitudes. Still I must seize upon this occasion to state that, as the costs of producing labouring powers of different quality differ, so must differ the values of the labouring powers employed in different trades. The cry for an *equality of wages* rests, therefore, upon a mistake, is an *insane* wish never to be fulfilled. It is an offspring of that false and superficial radicalism that accepts premises and tries to evade conclusions. Upon the basis of the wages system the value of labouring power is settled like that of every other commodity; and as different kinds of labouring power have different values, or require different quantities of labour for their production, they *must* fetch different prices in the labour market. To clamour for *equal or even equitable retribution* on the basis of the wages system is the same as to clamour for *freedom* on the basis of the slavery system. What you think just or equitable is out of the question. The question is: What is necessary and unavoidable with a given system of production?

After what has been said, it will be seen that the *value of labouring power* is determined by the *value of the necessaries* required to produce, develop, maintain, and perpetuate the labouring power.

VIII PRODUCTION OF SURPLUS VALUE

Now suppose that the average amount of the daily necessities of a labouring man require *six hours of average labour* for their production. Suppose, moreover, six hours of average labour to be also realized in a quantity of gold equal to 3s. Then 3s. would be the *Price*, or the monetary expression of the *Daily Value* of that man's *Labouring Power*. If he worked daily six

hours he would daily produce a value sufficient to buy the average amount of his daily necessaries, or to maintain himself as a labouring man.

But our man is a wages labourer. He must, therefore, sell his labouring power to a capitalist. If he sells it at 3s. daily, or 18s. weekly, he sells it at its value. Suppose him to be a spinner. If he works six hours daily he will add to the cotton a value of 3s. daily. This value, daily added by him, would be an exact equivalent for the wages, or the price of his labouring power, received daily. But in that case *no surplus value* or *surplus produce* whatever would go to the capitalist. Here, then, we come to the rub.

In buying the labouring power of the workman, and paying its value, the capitalist, like every other purchaser, has acquired the right to consume or use the commodity bought. You consume or use the labouring power of a man by making him work, as you consume or use a machine by making it run. By paying the daily or weekly value of the labouring power of the workman, the capitalist has, therefore, acquired the right to use or make that labouring power work during the *whole day or week*. The working day or the working week has, of course, certain limits, but those we shall afterwards look more closely at.

For the present I want to turn your attention to one decisive point.

The *value* of the labouring power is determined by the quantity of labour necessary to maintain or reproduce it, but the *use* of that labouring power is only limited by the active energies and physical strength of the labourer. The daily or weekly *value* of the labouring power is quite distinct from the daily or weekly exercise of that power, the same as the food a horse wants and the time it can carry the horseman are quite distinct. The quantity of labour by which the *value* of the workman's labouring power is limited forms by no means a limit to the quantity of labour which his labouring power is apt to perform. Take the example of our spinner. We have seen that, to daily reproduce his labouring power, he must daily reproduce a value of three shillings, which he will do by working six hours daily. But this does not disable him from working ten or twelve or more hours a day. But by paying the daily or weekly *value* of the spinner's labouring power, the capitalist has acquired the right of using that labouring power during *the whole day or week*. He will.

therefore, make him work say, daily, *twelve* hours. *Over and above* the six hours required to replace his wages, or the value of his labouring power, he will, therefore, have to work *six other hours*, which I shall call hours of *surplus labour*, which surplus labour will realize itself in a *surplus value* and a *surplus produce*. If our spinner, for example, by his daily labour of six hours, added three shillings' value to the cotton, a value forming an exact equivalent to his wages, he will, in twelve hours, add six shillings' worth to the cotton, and produce a *proportional surplus of yarn*. As he has sold his labouring power to the capitalist, the whole value or produce created by him belongs to the capitalist, the owner *pro tem.* of his labouring power. By advancing three shillings, the capitalist will, therefore, realize a value of six shillings, because, advancing a value in which six hours of labour are crystallized, he will receive in return a value in which twelve hours of labour are crystallized. By repeating this same process daily, the capitalist will daily advance three shillings and daily pocket six shillings, one-half of which will go to pay wages anew, and the other half of which will form *surplus value*, for which the capitalist pays no equivalent. It is this *sort of exchange between capital and labour* upon which capitalistic production, or the wages system, is founded, and which must constantly result in reproducing the working man as a working man, and the capitalist as a capitalist.

The rate of surplus value, all other circumstances remaining the same, will depend on the proportion between that part of the working day necessary to reproduce the value of the labouring power and the *surplus time* or *surplus labour* performed for the capitalist. It will, therefore, depend on the *ratio in which the working day is prolonged over and above that extent*, by working which the working man would only reproduce the value of his labouring power, or replace his wages.

IX VALUE OF LABOUR

We must now return to the expression, "*Value, or Price of Labour.*"

We have seen that, in fact, it is only the value of the labouring power, measured by the values of commodities necessary for its maintenance. But since the workman receives his wages

after his labour is performed, and knows, moreover, that what he actually gives to the capitalist is his labour, the value or price of his labouring power necessarily appears to him as the *price or value of his labour itself*. If the price of his labouring power is three shillings, in which six hours of labour are realized, and if he works twelve hours, he necessarily considers these three shillings as the value or price of twelve hours of labour, although these twelve hours of labour realize themselves in a value of six shillings. A double consequence flows from this.

Firstly. *The value or price of the labouring power* takes the semblance of the *price or value of labour itself*, although, strictly speaking, value and price of labour are senseless terms.

Secondly. Although one part only of the workman's daily labour is *paid*, while the other part is *unpaid*, and while that unpaid or surplus labour constitutes exactly the fund out of which *surplus value* or *profit* is formed, it seems as if the aggregate labour was paid labour.

This false appearance distinguishes *wages labour* from other *historical* forms of labour. On the basis of the wages system even the *unpaid* labour seems to be *paid* labour. With the *slave*, on the contrary, even that part of his labour which is paid appears to be unpaid. Of course, in order to work the slave must live, and one part of his working day goes to replace the value of his own maintenance. But since no bargain is struck between him and his master, and no acts of selling and buying are going on between the two parties, all his labour seems to be given away for nothing.

Take, on the other hand, the peasant serf, such as he, I might say, until yesterday existed in the whole East of Europe. This peasant worked, for example, three days for himself on his own field or the field allotted to him, and the three subsequent days he performed compulsory and gratuitous labour on the estate of his lord. Here, then, the paid and unpaid parts of labour were sensibly separated, separated in time and space; and our Liberals overflowed with moral indignation at the preposterous notion of making a man work for nothing.

In point of fact, however, whether a man works three days of the week for himself on his own field and three days for nothing on the estate of his lord, or whether he works in the factory or the workshop six hours daily for himself and six for his employer, comes to the same, although in the latter case

the paid and unpaid portions of labour are inseparably mixed up with each other, and the nature of the whole transaction is completely masked by the *intervention of a contract* and the *pay* received at the end of the week. The gratuitous labour appears to be voluntarily given in the one instance, and to be compulsory in the other. That makes all the difference.

In using the word "*value of labour*," I shall only use it as a popular slang term for "*value of labouring power*."

X PROFIT IS MADE BY SELLING A COMMODITY AT ITS VALUE

Suppose an average hour of labour to be realized in a value equal to sixpence, or twelve average hours of labour to be realized in six shillings. Suppose, further, the value of labour to be three shillings or the produce of six hours' labour. If, then, in the raw material, machinery, and so forth, used up in a commodity, twenty-four hours of average labour were realized, its value would amount to twelve shillings. If, moreover, the workman employed by the capitalist added twelve hours of labour to those means of production, these twelve hours would be realized in an additional value of six shillings. The *total value of the product* would, therefore, amount to thirty-six hours of realized labour, and be equal to eighteen shillings. But as the value of labour, or the wages paid to the workman, would be three shillings only, no equivalent would have been paid by the capitalist for the six hours of surplus labour worked by the workman, and realized in the value of the commodity. By selling this commodity at its value for eighteen shillings, the capitalist would, therefore, realize a value of three shillings, for which he had paid no equivalent. These three shillings would constitute the surplus value or profit pocketed by him. The capitalist would consequently realize the profit of three shillings, not by selling his commodity at a price *over and above* its value, but by selling it *at its real value*.

The value of a commodity is determined by the *total quantity of labour* contained in it. But part of that quantity of labour is realized in a value, for which an equivalent has been paid in the form of wages; part of it is realized in a value for which *no* equivalent has been paid. Part of the labour contained in the

commodity is *paid* labour; part is *unpaid* labour. By selling, therefore, the commodity *at its value*, that is, as the crystallization of the *total quantity of labour* bestowed upon it, the capitalist must necessarily sell it at a profit. He sells not only what has cost him an equivalent, but he sells also what has cost him nothing, although it has cost his workman labour. The cost of the commodity to the capitalist and its real cost are different things. I repeat, therefore, that normal and average profits are made by selling commodities not *above* but *at their real values*.

XI THE DIFFERENT PARTS INTO WHICH SURPLUS VALUE IS DECOMPOSED

The *surplus value*, or that part of the total value of the commodity in which the *surplus labour* or *unpaid labour* of the working man is realized, I call *Profit*. The whole of that profit is not pocketed by the employing capitalist. The monopoly of land enables the landlord to take one part of that *surplus value*, under the name of *rent*, whether the land is used for agriculture, buildings or railways, or for any other productive purpose. On the other hand, the very fact that the possession of the *instruments of labour* enables the employing capitalist to produce a *surplus value*, or, what comes to the same, to *appropriate to himself a certain amount of unpaid labour*, enables the owner of the means of labour, which he lends wholly or partly to the employing capitalist—enables, in one word, the money-lending capitalist to claim for himself under the name of *interest* another part of that surplus value, so that there remains to the employing capitalist *as such* only what is called *industrial* or *commercial profit*.

By what laws this division of the total amount of surplus value amongst the three categories of people is regulated is a question quite foreign to our subject. This much, however, results from what has been stated.

Rent, Interest, and Industrial Profit are only *different names for different parts of the surplus value* of the commodity, or the *unpaid labour enclosed in it*, and they are *equally derived from this source, and from this source alone*. They are not derived from *land* as such or from *capital* as such, but land and capital

enable their owners to get their respective shares out of the surplus value extracted by the employing capitalist from the labourer. For the labourer himself it is a matter of subordinate importance whether that surplus value, the result of his surplus labour, or unpaid labour, is altogether pocketed by the employing capitalist, or whether the latter is obliged to pay portions of it, under the name of rent and interest, away to third parties. Suppose the employing capitalist to use only his own capital and to be his own landlord, then the whole surplus value would go into his pocket.

It is the employing capitalist who immediately extracts from the labourer this surplus value, whatever part of it he may ultimately be able to keep for himself. Upon this relation, therefore, between the employing capitalist and the wages labourer the whole wages system and the whole present system of production hinge. Some of the citizens who took part in our debate were, therefore, wrong in trying to mince matters, and to treat this fundamental relation between the employing capitalist and the working man as a secondary question, although they were right in stating that, under given circumstances, a rise of prices might affect in very unequal degrees the employing capitalist, the landlord, the moneyed capitalist, and, if you please, the taxgatherer.

Another consequence follows from what has been stated.

That part of the value of the commodity which represents only the value of the raw materials, the machinery, in one word, the value of the means of production used up, forms *no revenue* at all, but replaces *only capital*. But, apart from this, it is false that the other part of the value of the commodity *which forms revenue*, or may be spent in the form of wages, profits, rent, interest, is *constituted* by the value of wages, the value of rent, the value of profits, and so forth. We shall, in the first instance, discard wages, and only treat industrial profits, interest, and rent. We have just seen that the *surplus value* contained in the commodity or that part of its value in which *unpaid labour* is realized, resolves itself into different fractions, bearing three different names. But it would be quite the reverse of the truth to say that its value is *composed* of, or *formed* by, the *addition* of the *independent values of these three constituents*.

If one hour of labour realizes itself in a value of sixpence, if the working day of the labourer comprises twelve hours, if half of this time is unpaid labour, that surplus labour will add to the

commodity a *surplus value* of three shillings, that is, of value for which no equivalent has been paid. This surplus value of three shillings constitutes the *whole fund* which the employing capitalist may divide, in whatever proportions, with the landlord and the money-lender. The value of these three shillings constitutes the limit of the value they have to divide amongst them. But it is not the employing capitalist who adds to the value of the commodity an arbitrary value for his profit, to which another value is added for the landlord, and so forth, so that the addition of these arbitrarily fixed values would constitute the total value. You see, therefore, the fallacy of the popular notion, which confounds the *decomposition of a given value* into three parts, with the *formation* of that value by the addition of three *independent* values, thus converting the aggregate value, from which rent, profit, and interest are derived, into an arbitrary magnitude.

If the total profit realized by a capitalist be equal to £100, we call this sum, considered as *absolute* magnitude, the *amount of profit*. But if we calculate the ratio which those £100 bear to the capital advanced, we call this *relative* magnitude, the *rate of profit*. It is evident that this rate of profit may be expressed in a double way.

Suppose £100 to be the capital *advanced in wages*. If the surplus value created is also £100—and this would show us that half the working day of the labourer consists of *unpaid* labour—and if we measured this profit by the value of the capital advanced in wages, we should say that the *rate of profit* amounted to one hundred per cent., because the value advanced would be one hundred and the value realized would be two hundred.

If, on the other hand, we should not only consider the *capital advanced in wages*, but the *total capital* advanced, say, for example, £500, of which £400 represented the value of raw materials, machinery, and so forth, we should say that the *rate of profit* amounted only to twenty per cent., because the profit of one hundred would be but the fifth part of the *total* capital advanced.

The first mode of expressing the rate of profit is the only one which shows you the real ratio between paid and unpaid labour, the real degree of the *exploitation* (you must allow me this French word) *of labour*. The other mode of expression is that in common use, and is, indeed, appropriate for certain purposes.

At all events, it is very useful for concealing the degree in which the capitalist extracts gratuitous labour from the workman.

In the remarks I have still to make I shall use the word *Profit* for the whole amount of the surplus value extracted by the capitalist without any regard to the division of that surplus value between different parties, and in using the words *Rate of Profit*, I shall always measure profits by the value of the capital advanced in wages.

XII GENERAL RELATION OF PROFITS, WAGES AND PRICES

Deduct from the value of a commodity the value replacing the value of the raw materials and other means of production used upon it, that is to say, deduct the value representing the *past* labour contained in it, and the remainder of its value will resolve into the quantity of labour added by the working man *last* employed. If that working man works twelve hours daily, if twelve hours of average labour crystallize themselves in an amount of gold equal to six shillings, this additional value of six shillings is the *only* value his labour will have created. This given value, determined by the time of his labour, is the only fund from which both he and the capitalist have to draw their respective shares or dividends, the only value to be divided into wages and profits. It is evident that this value itself will not be altered by the variable proportions in which it may be divided amongst the two parties. There will also be nothing changed if in the place of one working man you put the whole working population, twelve million working days, for example, instead of one.

Since the capitalist and workman have only, to divide, this limited value, that is, the value measured by the total labour of the working man, the more the one gets the less will the other get, and *vice versa*. Whenever a quantity is given, one part of it will increase inversely as the other decreases. If the wages change, profits will change in an opposite direction. If wages fall, profits will rise; and if wages rise, profits will fall. If the working man, on our former supposition, gets three shillings, equal to one half of the value he has created, or if his whole

working day consists half of paid, half of unpaid labour, the *rate of profit* will be 100 per cent., because the capitalist would also get three shillings. If the working man receives only two shillings, or works only one-third of the whole day for himself, the capitalist will get four shillings, and the rate of profit will be 200 per cent. If the working man receives four shillings, the capitalist will only receive two, and the rate of profit would sink to 50 per cent., but all these variations will not affect the value of the commodity. A general rise of wages would, therefore, result in a fall of the general rate of profit, but not affect values.

But although the values of commodities, which must ultimately regulate their market prices, are exclusively determined by the total quantities of labour fixed in them, and not by the division of that quantity into paid and unpaid labour, it by no means follows that the values of the single commodities, or lots of commodities, produced during twelve hours, for example, will remain constant. The *number* or mass of commodities produced in a given time of labour, or by a given quantity of labour, depends upon the *productive power* of the labour employed, and not upon its *extent* or length. With one degree of the productive power of spinning labour, for example, a working day of twelve hours may produce twelve pounds of yarn, with a lesser degree of productive power only two pounds. If then twelve hours' average labour were realized in the value of six shillings in the one case, the twelve pounds of yarn would cost six shillings, in the other case the two pounds of yarn would also cost six shillings. One pound of yarn would, therefore, cost sixpence in the one case, and three shillings in the other. This difference of price would result from the difference in the productive powers of the labour employed. One hour of labour would be realized in one pound of yarn with the greater productive power, while with the smaller productive power, six hours of labour would be realized in one pound of yarn. The price of a pound of yarn would, in the one instance, be only sixpence, although wages were relatively high and the rate of profit low; it would be three shillings in the other instance, although wages were low and the rate of profit high. This would be so because the price of the pound of yarn is regulated by the *total amount of labour worked up in it*, and not by the *proportional division of that total amount into paid and unpaid labour*. The fact I have before

mentioned that high-priced labour may produce cheap, and low-priced labour may produce dear commodities, loses, therefore, its paradoxical appearance. It is only the expression of the general law that the value of a commodity is regulated by the quantity of labour worked up in it, and that the quantity of labour worked up in it depends altogether upon the productive powers of the labour employed, and will, therefore, vary with every variation in the productivity of labour.

XIII MAIN CASES OF ATTEMPTS AT RAISING WAGES OR RESISTING THEIR FALL

Let us now seriously consider the main cases in which a rise of wages is attempted or a reduction of wages resisted.

1. We have seen that the *value of the labouring power*, or in more popular parlance, the *value of labour*, is determined by the value of necessaries, or the quantity of labour required to produce them. If, then, in a given country the value of the daily average necessaries of the labourer represented six hours of labour expressed in three shillings, the labourer would have to work six hours daily to produce an equivalent for his daily maintenance. If the whole working day was twelve hours, the capitalist would pay him the value of his labour by paying him three shillings. Half the working day would be unpaid labour, and the rate of profit would amount to 100 per cent. But now suppose that, consequent upon a decrease of productivity, more labour should be wanted to produce, say, the same amount of agricultural produce, so that the price of the average daily necessaries should rise from three to four shillings. In that case the *value of labour* would rise by one third, or $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. Eight hours of the working day would be required to produce an equivalent for the daily maintenance of the labourer, according to his old standard of living. The surplus labour would therefore sink from six hours to four, and the rate of profit from 100 to 50 per cent. But in insisting upon a rise of wages, the labourer would only insist upon getting the *increased value of his labour*, like every other seller of a commodity, who, the costs of his commodities having increased, tries to get its increased value paid. If wages did not rise, or not sufficiently rise, to compensate for the increased values of necessaries, the *price of labour* would sink below the

value of labour, and the labourer's standard of life would deteriorate.

But a change might also take place in an opposite direction. By virtue of the increased productivity of labour, the same amount of the average daily necessaries might sink from three to two shillings, or only four hours out of the working day, instead of six, be wanted to reproduce an equivalent for the value of the daily necessaries. The working man would now be able to buy with two shillings as many necessaries as he did before with three shillings. Indeed, the *value of labour* would have sunk, but that diminished value would command the same amount of commodities as before. Then profits would rise from three to four shillings, and, the rate of profit from 100 to 200 per cent. Although the labourer's absolute standard of life would have remained the same, his *relative wages*, and therewith his *relative social position*, as compared with that of the capitalist, would have been lowered. If the working man should resist that reduction of relative wages, he would only try to get some share in the increased productive powers of his own labour, and to maintain his former relative position in the social scale. Thus, after the abolition of the Corn Laws, and in flagrant violation of the most solemn pledges given during the anti-corn law agitation, the English factory lords generally reduced wages ten per cent. The resistance of the workmen was at first baffled, but, consequent upon circumstances I cannot now enter upon, the ten per cent. lost were afterwards regained.

2. The *values of necessaries*, and consequently the *value of labour*, might remain the same, but a change might occur in their *money prices*, consequent upon a previous change in the *value of money*.

By the discovery of more fertile mines and so forth, two ounces of gold might, for example, cost no more labour to produce than one ounce did before. The *value* of gold would then be depreciated by one half, or fifty per cent. As the *values* of all other commodities would then be expressed in twice their former *money prices*, so also the same with the *value of labour*. Twelve hours of labour, formerly expressed in six shillings, would now be expressed in twelve shillings. If the working man's wages should remain three shillings, instead of rising to six shillings, the *money price of his labour* would only be equal to *half the value of his labour*, and his standard of life would fearfully deteriorate. This would also

happen in a greater or lesser degree if his wages should rise, but not proportionately to the fall in the value of gold. In such a case nothing would have been changed, either in the productive powers of labour, or in supply and demand, or in values. Nothing could have changed except the money *names* of those values. To say that in such a case the workman ought not to insist upon a proportionate rise of wages, is to say that he must be content to be paid with names, instead of with things. All past history proves that whenever such a depreciation of money occurs, the capitalists are on the alert to seize this opportunity for defrauding the workman. A very large school of political economists assert that, consequent upon the new discoveries of gold lands, the better working of silver mines, and the cheaper supply of quicksilver, the value of precious metals has been again depreciated. This would explain the general and simultaneous attempts on the Continent at a rise of wages.

3. We have till now supposed that the *working day* has given limits. The working day, however, has, by itself, no constant limits. It is the constant tendency of capital to stretch it to its utmost physically possible length, because in the same degree surplus labour, and consequently the profit resulting therefrom, will be increased. The more capital succeeds in prolonging the working day, the greater the amount of other people's labour it will appropriate. During the seventeenth and even the first two-thirds of the eighteenth century a ten hours working day was the normal working day all over England. During the anti-Jacobin war, which was in fact a war waged by the British barons against the British working masses, capital celebrated its bacchanalia, and prolonged the working day from ten to twelve, fourteen, eighteen hours. Malthus, by no means a man whom you would suspect of a maudlin sentimentalism, declared in a pamphlet, published about 1815, that if this sort of thing was to go on the life of the nation would be attacked at its very source. A few years before the general introduction of the newly-invented machinery, about 1765, a pamphlet appeared in England under the title, *An Essay on Trade*. The anonymous author, an avowed enemy of the working-classes, declaims on the necessity of expanding the limits of the working day. Amongst other means to this end, he proposes *working houses*, which, he says, ought to be "Houses of Terror." And what is the length of the working day he prescribes for these "Houses of Terror"? *Twelve hours*, the very same time which in

1832 was declared by capitalists, political economists, and ministers to be not only the existing but the necessary time of labour for a child under twelve years.

By selling his labouring power, and he must do so under the present system, the working man makes over to the capitalist the consumption of that power, but within certain rational limits. He sells his labouring power in order to maintain it, apart from its natural wear and tear, but not to destroy it. In selling his labouring power at its daily or weekly value, it is understood that in one day or one week that labouring power shall not be submitted to two days' or two weeks' waste or wear and tear. Take a machine worth £1,000. If it is used up in ten years it will add to the value of the commodities in whose production it assists £100 yearly. If it be used up in five years it would add £200 yearly, or the value of its annual wear and tear is in inverse ratio to the time in which it is consumed. But this distinguishes the working man from the machine. Machinery does not wear out exactly in the same ratio in which it is used. Man, on the contrary, decays in a greater ratio than would be visible from the mere numerical addition of work.

In their attempts at reducing the working day to its former rational dimensions, or, where they cannot enforce a legal fixation of a normal working day, at checking overwork by a rise of wages, a rise not only in proportion to the surplus time exacted, but in a greater proportion, working men fulfil only a duty to themselves and their race. They only set limits to the tyrannical usurpations of capital. Time is the room of human development. A man who has no free time to dispose of, whose whole lifetime, apart from the mere physical interruptions by sleep, meals, and so forth, is absorbed by his labour for the capitalist, is less than a beast of burden. He is a mere machine for producing Foreign Wealth, broken in body and brutalized in mind. Yet the whole history of modern industry shows that capital, if not checked, will recklessly and ruthlessly work to cast down the whole working class to this utmost state of degradation.

In prolonging the working day the capitalist may pay *higher wages* and still lower the *value of labour*, if the rise of wages does not correspond to the greater amount of labour extracted, and the quicker decay of the labouring power thus caused. This may be done in another way. Your middle-class statisticians will tell you, for instance, that the average wages of factory families in Lanca-

shire have risen. They forget that instead of the labour of the man, the head of the family, his wife and perhaps three or four children are now thrown under the Juggernaut wheels of capital, and that the rise of the aggregate wages does not correspond to the aggregate surplus labour extracted from the family.

Even with given limits of the working day, such as they now exist in all branches of industry subjected to the factory laws, a rise of wages may become necessary, if only to keep up the old standard *value of labour*. By increasing the *intensity* of labour, a man may be made to expend as much vital force in one hour as he formerly did in two. This has, to a certain degree, been effected in the trades, placed under the Factory Acts, by the acceleration of machinery, and the greater number of working machines which a single individual has now to superintend. If the increase in the intensity of labour or the mass of labour spent in an hour keeps some fair proportion to the decrease in the extent of the working day, the working man will still be the winner. If this limit is overshot, he loses in one form what he has gained in another, and ten hours of labour may then become as ruinous as twelve hours were before. In checking this tendency of capital, by struggling for a rise of wages corresponding to the rising intensity of labour, the working man only resists the depreciation of his labour and the deterioration of his race.

4. All of you know that, from reasons I have not now to explain, capitalistic production moves through certain periodical cycles. It moves through a state of quiescence, growing animation, prosperity, overtrade, crisis, and stagnation. The market prices of commodities, and the market rates of profit, follow these phases, now sinking below their averages, now rising above them. Considering the whole cycle, you will find that one deviation of the market price is being compensated by the other, and that, taking the average of the cycle, the market prices of commodities are regulated by their values. Well! During the phase of sinking market prices and the phases of crisis and stagnation, the working man, if not thrown out of employment altogether, is sure to have his wages lowered. Not to be defrauded, he must, even with such a fall of market prices, debate with the capitalist in what proportional degree a fall of wages has become necessary. If, during the phases of prosperity, when extra profits are made, he did not battle for a rise of wages, he would, taking the average of one industrial cycle, not even receive his *average wages*, or

the *value* of his labour. It is the utmost height of folly to demand that while his wages are necessarily affected by the adverse phases of the cycle, he should exclude himself from compensation during the prosperous phases of the cycle. Generally, the *values* of all commodities are only realized by the compensation of the continuously changing market prices, springing from the continuous fluctuations of demand and supply. On the basis of the present system labour is only a commodity like others. It must, therefore, pass through the same fluctuations to fetch an average price corresponding to its value. It would be absurd to treat it on the one hand as a commodity, and to want on the other hand to exempt it from the laws which regulate the prices of commodities. The slave receives a permanent and fixed amount of maintenance; the wages labourer does not. He must try to get a rise of wages in the one instance, if only to compensate for a fall of wages in the other. If he resigned himself to accept the will, the dictates of the capitalist as a permanent economical law, he would share in all the miseries of the slave, without the security of the slave.

5. In all the cases I have considered, and they form ninety-nine out of a hundred, you have seen that a struggle for a rise of wages follows only in the track of *previous* changes, and is the necessary offspring of previous changes in the amount of production, the productive powers of labour, the value of labour, the value of money, the extent or the intensity of labour extracted, the fluctuations of market prices, dependent upon the fluctuations of demand and supply, and consistent with the different phases of the industrial cycle; in one word, as reactions of labour against the previous action of capital. By treating the struggle for a rise of wages independently of all these circumstances, by looking only upon the change of wages, and overlooking all the other changes from which they emanate, you proceed from a false premise in order to arrive at false conclusions.

XIV THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN CAPITAL AND LABOUR AND ITS RESULTS

1. Having shown that the periodical resistance on the part of the working men against a reduction of wages, and their periodical attempts at getting a rise of wages, are inseparable from the

wages system, and dictated by the very fact of labour being assimilated to commodities, and therefore subject to the laws regulating the general movement of prices; having, furthermore, shown that a general rise of wages would result in a fall in the general rate of profit, but not affect the average prices of commodities, or their values, the question now ultimately arises, how far, in this incessant struggle between capital and labour, the latter is likely to prove successful.

I might answer by a generalization, and say that, as with all other commodities, so with labour, its *market price* will, in the long run, adapt itself to its *value*; that, therefore, despite all the ups and downs, and do what he may, the working man will, on an average, only receive the value of his labour, which resolves into the value of his labouring power, which is determined by the value of the necessaries required for its maintenance and reproduction, which value of necessaries finally is regulated by the quantity of labour wanted to produce them.

But there are some peculiar features which distinguish the *value of the labouring power*, or the *value of labour*, from the values of all other commodities. The value of the labouring power is formed by two elements—the one merely physical, the other historical or social. Its *ultimate limit* is determined by the *physical* element, that is to say, to maintain and reproduce itself, to perpetuate its physical existence, the working class must receive the necessaries absolutely indispensable for living and multiplying. The *value* of those indispensable necessaries forms, therefore, the ultimate limit of the *value of labour*. On the other hand, the length of the working day is also limited by ultimate, although very elastic boundaries. Its ultimate limit is given by the physical force of the labouring man. If the daily exhaustion of his vital forces exceeds a certain degree, it cannot be exerted anew, day by day. However, as I said, this limit is very elastic. A quick succession of unhealthy and short-lived generations will keep the labour market as well supplied as a series of vigorous and long-lived generations.

Besides this mere physical element, the value of labour is in every country determined by a *traditional standard of life*. It is not mere physical life, but it is the satisfaction of certain wants springing from the social conditions in which people are placed and reared up. The English standard of life may be reduced to the Irish standard; the standard of life of a German peasant to that of

a Livonian peasant. The important part which historical tradition and social habitude play in this respect, you may learn from Mr. Thornton's work on *Over-population*, where he shows that the average wages in different agricultural districts of England still nowadays differ more or less according to the more or less favourable circumstances under which the districts have emerged from the state of serfdom.

This historical or social element, entering into the value of labour, may be expanded, or contracted, or altogether extinguished, so that nothing remains but the *physical limit*. During the time of the anti-Jacobin war, undertaken, as the incorrigible tax-eater and sinecurist, old George Rose, used to say, to save the comforts of our holy religion from the inroads of the French infidels, the honest English farmers, so tenderly handled in a former chapter of ours, depressed the wages of the agricultural labourers even beneath that *mere physical minimum*, but made up by Poor Laws the remainder necessary for the physical perpetuation of the race. This was a glorious way to convert the wages labourer into a slave, and Shakespeare's proud yeoman into a pauper.

By comparing the standard wages or values of labour in different countries, and by comparing them in different historical epochs of the same country, you will find that the *value of labour* itself is not a fixed but a variable magnitude, even supposing the values of all other commodities to remain constant.

A similar comparison would prove that not only the *market rates* of profit change, but its *average* rates.

But as to *profits*, there exists no law which determines their *minimum*. We cannot say what is the ultimate limit of their decrease. And why cannot we fix that limit? Because, although we can fix the *minimum* of wages, we cannot fix their *maximum*. We can only say that, the limits of the working day being given, the *maximum* of profit corresponds to the *physical minimum of wages*; and that wages being given, the *maximum of profit* corresponds to such a prolongation of the working day as is compatible with the physical forces of the labourer. The maximum of profit is, therefore, limited by the physical minimum of wages and the physical maximum of the working day. It is evident that between the two limits of this *maximum rate of profit* an immense scale of variations is possible. The fixation of its actual degree is only settled by the continuous struggle between capital and

labour, the capitalist constantly tending to reduce wages to their physical minimum, and to extend the working day to its physical maximum, while the working man constantly presses in the opposite direction.

The matter resolves itself into a question of the respective powers of the combatants.

2. As to the *limitation of the working day* in England, as in all other countries, it has never been settled except by *legislative interference*. Without the working men's continuous pressure from without that interference would never have taken place. But at all events, the result was not to be attained by private settlement between the working men and the capitalists. This very necessity of *general political action* affords the proof that in its merely economic action capital is the stronger side.

As to the *limits of the value of labour*, its actual settlement always depends upon supply and demand, I mean the demand for labour on the part of capital, and the supply of labour by the working men. In colonial countries the law of supply and demand favours the working man. Hence the relatively high standard of wages in the United States. Capital may there try its utmost. It cannot prevent the labour market from being continuously emptied by the continuous conversion of wages labourers into independent, self-sustaining peasants. The position of wages labourer is for a very large part of the American people but a probational state, which they are sure to leave within a longer or shorter term.¹ To mend this colonial state of things, the paternal British Government accepted for some time what is called the modern colonization theory, which consists in putting an artificial high price upon colonial land, in order to prevent the too quick conversion of the wages labourer into the independent peasant.

But let us now come to old civilized countries, in which capital domineers over the whole process of production. Take, for example, the rise in England of agricultural wages from 1849 to 1859. What was its consequence? The farmers could not, as our

¹ See *Capital*, Vol. I, Chap. XXXIII, p. 765, note 1): "We treat here of real Colonies, virgin soils, colonized by free immigrants. The United States are, speaking economically, still only a Colony of Europe. Besides, to this category belong also such old plantations as those in which the abolition of slavery has completely altered the earlier conditions." As the land in colonial countries has everywhere been forcibly converted into private property, wage workers there have been deprived of the possibility of becoming self-sustaining producers.—*Ed.*

friend Weston would have advised them, raise the value of wheat, nor even its market prices. They had, on the contrary, to submit to their fall. But during these eleven years they introduced machinery of all sorts, adopted more scientific methods, converted part of arable land into pasture, increased the size of farms, and with this the scale of production, and by these and other processes diminishing the demand for labour by increasing its productive power, made the agricultural population again relatively redundant. This is the general method in which a reaction, quicker or slower, of capital against a rise of wages takes place in old, settled countries. Ricardo has justly remarked that machinery is in constant competition with labour, and can often be only introduced when the price of labour has reached a certain height, but the appliance of machinery is but one of the many methods for increasing the productive powers of labour. This very same development which makes common labour relatively redundant simplifies on the other hand skilled labour, and thus depreciates it.

The same law obtains in another form. With the development of the productive powers of labour the accumulation of capital will be accelerated, even despite a relatively high rate of wages. Hence, one might infer, as Adam Smith, in whose days modern industry was still in its infancy, did infer, that the accelerated accumulation of capital must turn the balance in favour of the working man, by securing a growing demand for his labour. From this same standpoint many contemporary writers have wondered that English capital having grown in the last twenty years so much quicker than English population, wages should not have been more enhanced. But simultaneously with the progress of accumulation there takes place a *progressive change* in the *composition of capital*. That part of the aggregate capital which consists of fixed capital, machinery, raw materials, means of production in all possible forms, progressively increases as compared with the other part of capital, which is laid out in wages or in the purchase of labour. This law has been stated in a more or less accurate manner by Mr. Barton, Ricardo, Sismondi, Professor Richard Jones, Professor Ramsay, Cherbuliez, and others

If the proportion of these two elements of capital was originally one to one, it will, in the progress of industry, become five to one, and so forth. If of a total capital of 600, 300 is laid out in

instruments, raw materials, and so forth, and 300 in wages, the total capital wants only to be doubled to create a demand for 600 working men instead of for 300. But if of a capital of 600, 500 is laid out in machinery, materials, and so forth, and 100 only in wages, the same capital must increase from 600 to 3,600 in order to create a demand for 600 workmen instead of 300. In the progress of industry the demand for labour keeps, therefore, no pace with accumulation of capital. It will still increase, but increase in a constantly diminishing ratio as compared with the increase of capital.

These few hints will suffice to show that the very development of modern industry must progressively turn the scale in favour of the capitalist against the working man, and that consequently the general tendency of capitalistic production is not to raise, but to sink the average standard of wages, or to push the *value of labour* more or less to its *minimum limit*. Such being the tendency of *things* in this system, is this saying that the working class ought to renounce their resistance against the encroachments of capital, and abandon their attempts at making the best of the occasional chances for their temporary improvement? If they did, they would be degraded to one level mass of broken wretches past salvation. I think I have shown that their struggles for the standard of wages are incidents inseparable from the whole wages system, that in 99 cases out of 100 their efforts at raising wages are only efforts at maintaining the given value of labour, and that the necessity of debating their price with the capitalist is inherent in their condition of having to sell themselves as commodities. By cowardly giving way in their every-day conflict with capital, they would certainly disqualify themselves for the initiating of any larger movement.

At the same time, and quite apart from the general servitude involved in the wages system, the working class ought not to exaggerate to themselves the ultimate working of these every-day struggles. They ought not to forget that they are fighting with effects, but not with the causes of those effects; that they are retarding the downward movement, but not changing its direction; that they are applying palliatives, not curing the malady. They ought, therefore, not to be exclusively absorbed in these unavoidable guerilla fights incessantly springing up from the never-ceasing encroachments of capital or changes of the market. They ought to understand that, with all the miseries it

imposes upon them, the present system simultaneously engenders the *material conditions* and the *social forms* necessary for an economical reconstruction of society. Instead of the *conservative* motto, "A fair day's wage for a fair day's work!" they ought to inscribe on their banner the *revolutionary* watchword, "Abolition of the wages system!"

After this very long and, I fear, tedious exposition which I was obliged to enter into to do some justice to the subject-matter, I shall conclude by proposing the following resolutions:

Firstly. A general rise in the rate of wages would result in a fall of the general rate of profit, but, broadly speaking, not affect the prices of commodities.

Secondly. The general tendency of capitalist production is not to raise, but to sink the average standard of wages.

Thirdly. Trades Unions work well as centres of resistance against the encroachments of capital. They fail partially from an injudicious use of their power. They fail generally from limiting themselves to a guerilla war against the effects of the existing system, instead of simultaneously trying to change it, instead of using their organized forces as a lever for the final emancipation of the working class, that is to say, the ultimate abolition of the wages system.

An address delivered by Marx on June 20 and 27, 1865 at two sittings of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association

Originally published as a separate pamphlet entitled *Value, Price and Profit* in London in 1898¹

Printed according to the text of the English edition

Compared with the rough draft of the Address in Marx's handwriting
Written in English

¹ In the present edition the Address is published under the title generally accepted in Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute publications.—Ed.

Karl Marx

**PREFACE TO THE FIRST GERMAN EDITION
OF THE FIRST VOLUME OF *CAPITAL***

The work, the first volume of which I now submit to the public, forms the continuation of my "*Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie*" (A contribution to the criticism of Political Economy) published in 1859. The long pause between the first part and the continuation is due to an illness of many years' duration that again and again interrupted my work.

The substance of that earlier work is summarised in the first three chapters of this volume. This is done not merely for the sake of connection and completeness. The presentation of the subject-matter is improved. As far as circumstances in any way permit, many points only hinted at in the earlier book are here worked out more fully, whilst, conversely, points worked out fully there are only touched upon in this volume. The sections on the history of the theories of value and of money are now, of course, left out altogether. The reader of the earlier work will find, however, in the notes to the first chapter additional sources of reference relative to the history of those theories.

Every beginning is difficult, holds in all sciences. To understand the first chapter, especially the section that contains the analysis of commodities, will, therefore, present the greatest difficulty. That which concerns more especially the analysis of the substance of value and the magnitude of value, I have, as much as it was possible, popularised.¹ The value-form, whose fully developed shape is the money-form, is very elementary and

¹ This is the more necessary, as even the section of Ferdinand Lassalle's work against Schulze-Delitzsch, in which he professes to give "the intellectual quintessence" of my explanations on these subjects, contains important mistakes. If Ferdinand Lassalle has borrowed almost literally from my writ-

simple. Nevertheless, the human mind has for more than 2,000 years sought in vain to get to the bottom of it, whilst on the other hand, to the successful analysis of much more composite and complex forms, there has been at least an approximation. Why? Because the body, as an organic whole, is more easy of study than are the cells of that body. In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both. But in bourgeois society the commodity-form of the product of labour—or the value-form of the commodity—is the economic cell-form. To the superficial observer, the analysis of these forms seems to turn upon minutiae. It does in fact deal with minutiae, but they are of the same order as those dealt with in microscopic anatomy.

With the exception of the section on value-form, therefore, this volume cannot stand accused on the score of difficulty. I presuppose, of course, a reader who is willing to learn something new and therefore to think for himself.

The physicist either observes physical phenomena where they occur in their most typical form and most free from disturbing influence, or, wherever possible, he makes experiments under conditions that assure the occurrence of the phenomenon in its normality. In this work I have to examine the capitalist mode of production, and the conditions of production and exchange corresponding to that mode. Up to the present time, their classic ground is England. That is the reason why England is used as the chief illustration in the development of my theoretical ideas. If, however, the German reader shrugs his shoulders at the condition of the English industrial and agricultural labourers, or in optimist fashion comforts himself with the thought that in Germany things are not nearly so bad; I must plainly tell him: "*De te fabula narratur!*"¹

Intrinsically, it is not a question of the higher or lower degree of development of the social antagonisms that result from the natural laws of capitalist production. It is a question of these

ings, and without any acknowledgment, all the general theoretical propositions in his economic works, *e.g.*, those on the historical character of capital, on connection between the conditions of production and the mode of production, &c., &c., even to the terminology created by me, this may perhaps be due to purposes of propaganda. I am here, of course, not speaking of his detailed working out and application of these propositions, with which I have nothing to do. [*Note by Marx.*]

¹ "It is of you that the story is told!"—*Ed.*

laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results. The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.

But apart from this. Where capitalist production is fully naturalised among the Germans (for instance, in the factories proper) the condition of things is much worse than in England, because the counterpoise of the Factory Acts is wanting. In all other spheres, we, like all the rest of Continental Western Europe, suffer not only from the development of capitalist production, but also from the incompleteness of that development. Alongside of modern evils, a whole series of inherited evils oppress us, arising from the passive survival of antiquated modes of production, with their inevitable train of social and political anachronisms. We suffer not only from the living, but from the dead. *Le mort saisit le vif!*¹

The social statistics of Germany and the rest of Continental Western Europe are, in comparison with those of England, wretchedly compiled. But they raise the veil just enough to let us catch a glimpse of the Medusa head behind it. We should be appalled at the state of things at home, if, as in England, our governments and parliaments appointed periodically commissions of enquiry into economic conditions; if these commissions were armed with the same plenary powers to get at the truth; if it was possible to find for this purpose men as competent, as free from partisanship and respect of persons as are the English factory-inspectors, her medical reporters on public health, her commissioners of enquiry into the exploitation of women and children, into housing and food. Perseus wore a magic cap that the monsters he hunted down might not see him. We draw the magic cap down over eyes and ears as a make-believe that there are no monsters.

Let us not deceive ourselves on this. As in the 18th century, the American war of independence sounded the tocsin for the European middle-class, so in the 19th century, the American civil war sounded it for the European working-class. In England the progress of social disintegration is palpable. When it has reached a certain point, it must re-act on the continent. There it will take a form more brutal or more humane, according to the degree of

¹ *The dead holds the living in his grasp!*

development of the working-class itself. Apart from higher motives, therefore, their own most important interests dictate to the classes that are for the nonce the ruling ones, the removal of all legally removable hindrances to the free development of the working-class. For this reason, as well as others, I have given so large a space in this volume to the history, the details, and the results of English factory legislation. One nation can and should learn from others. And even when a society has got upon the right track for the discovery of the natural laws of its movement—and it is the ultimate aim of this work, to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society—it can neither clear by bold leaps, nor remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered by the successive phases of its normal development. But it can shorten and lessen the birth-pangs.

To prevent possible misunderstanding, a word. I paint the capitalist and the landlord in no sense *couleur de rose*. But here individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class-relations and class-interests. My stand-point, from which the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them.

In the domain of Political Economy, free scientific enquiry meets not merely the same enemies as in all other domains. The peculiar nature of the material it deals with, summons as foes into the field of battle the most violent, mean and malignant passions of the human breast, the Furies of private interest. The English Established Church, *e.g.*, will more readily pardon an attack on 38 of its 39 articles than on 1/39 of its income. Now-days atheism itself is *culpa levis*,¹ as compared with criticism of existing property relations. Nevertheless, there is an unmistakable advance. I refer, *e.g.*, to the blue-book published within the last few weeks: "Correspondence with Her Majesty's Missions Abroad, regarding Industrial Questions and Trades' Unions." The representatives of the English Crown in foreign countries there declare in so many words that in Germany, in France, to be brief, in all the civilised states of the European continent, a radical

¹ Light offence.—*Ed.*

change in the existing relations between capital and labour is as evident and inevitable as in England. At the same time, on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, Mr. Wade, Vice-President of the United States, declared in public meetings that, after the abolition of slavery, a radical change of the relations of capital and of property in land is next upon the order of the day. These are signs of the times, not to be hidden by purple mantels or black cassocks. They do not signify that to-morrow a miracle will happen. They show that, within the ruling-classes themselves, a foreboding is dawning, that the present society is no solid crystal, but an organism capable of change, and is constantly changing.

The second volume of this work will treat of the process of the circulation of capital (Book II.), and of the varied forms assumed by capital in the course of its development (Book III.), the third and last volume (Book IV.), the history of the theory.

Every opinion based on scientific criticism I welcome. As to the prejudices of so-called public opinion, to which I have never made concessions, now as aforesaid the maxim of the great Florentine is mine:

*"Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti."*¹

Karl Marx

London, July 25, 1867

Published in Marx's *Capital*,
Hamburg 1867

Printed according to the
English edition, London 1887
Edited by Engels

¹ "Follow your own course, and let people talk." (Dante.)—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

**FROM THE AFTERWORD
TO THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION
OF THE FIRST VOLUME OF *CAPITAL*¹**

That the method employed in "Das Kapital" has been little understood, is shown by the various conceptions, contradictory one to another, that have been formed of it.

Thus the Paris *Revue Positiviste* reproaches me in that, on the one hand, I treat economics metaphysically, and on the other hand—imagine!—confine myself to the mere critical analysis of actual facts, instead of writing receipts (Comtist ones?) for the cook-shops of the future. In answer to the reproach *in re* metaphysics, Professor Sieber has it: "In so far as it deals with actual theory, the method of Marx is the deductive method of the whole English school, a school whose failings and virtues are common to the best theoretic economists."² M. Block—"Les théoriciens du socialisme en Allemagne. Extrait du Journal des Economistes, Juillet et Août 1872"—makes the discovery that my method is analytic and says: "Par cet ouvrage M. Marx se classe parmi les esprits analytiques les plus éminents."³ German reviews, of course, shriek out at "Hegelian sophistries." The *European Messenger*⁴ of St. Petersburg, in an article dealing exclusively with the method of "Das Kapital" (May number, 1872, pp. 427-436)⁵ finds my method of inquiry

¹ This title corresponds to that of the second German edition of *Capital*. This afterword was given as a preface to the English edition of 1887.—*Ed.*

² Зибер Н., Теория ценности и капитала Д. Рикардо. Киев, 1871, стр. 170.—*Ed.*

³ "This work classes Mr. Marx among the most eminent analytical minds."—*Ed.*

⁴ Вестник Европы.—*Ed.*

⁵ The reference is to an article written by I. I. Kaufman, a professor at St. Petersburg University, entitled "Точка зрения политико-экономической критики у К. Маркса."—*Ed.*

severely realistic, but my method of presentation, unfortunately, German-dialectical. It says: "At first sight, if the judgment is based on the external form of the presentation of the subject, Marx is the most ideal of ideal philosophers, always in the German, *i.e.*, the bad sense of the word. But in point of fact he is infinitely more realistic than all his fore-runners in the work of economic criticism. He can in no sense be called an idealist." I cannot answer the writer better than by aid of a few extracts from his own criticism, which may interest some of my readers to whom the Russian original is inaccessible.

After a quotation from the preface to my *Criticism of Political Economy*, Berlin, 1859, pp. 4-7,¹ where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on: "The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connection within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, *i.e.*, of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connections into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. . . . If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material

¹ See pp. 361-65 of this volume.—*Ed.*

phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own. . . . As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, etc. Marx, *e.g.*, denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. . . . With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has."

Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own applica-

tion of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?

Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to trace out their inner connection. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction.

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, *i.e.*, the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.

The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of "Das Kapital," it was the good pleasure of the peevisish, arrogant, mediocre *Επίγονοι*¹ who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in the same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing's time treated Spinoza, *i.e.*, as a "dead dog." I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.

In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of

¹ *Επίγονοι*.—*Ed.*

the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.

The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle, through which modern industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis. That crisis is once again approaching, although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality of its theatre and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso-German empire.

Karl Marx

London, January 24, 1873

Originally published in the second
edition of Marx's *Capital*

Printed according to the
English edition, London 1887
Edited by Engels

Karl Marx

**HISTORICAL TENDENCY OF CAPITALIST
ACCUMULATION**

CHAPTER XXXII OF THE FIRST VOLUME OF *CAPITAL*

What does the primitive accumulation of capital, *i.e.*, its historical genesis, resolve itself into? In so far as it is not immediate transformation of slaves and serfs into wage-labourers, and therefore a mere change of form, it only means the expropriation of the immediate producers, *i.e.*, the dissolution of private property based on the labour of its owner. Private property, as the antithesis to social, collective property, exists only where the means of labour and the external conditions of labour belong to private individuals. But according as these private individuals are labourers or not labourers, private property has a different character. The numberless shades, that it at first sight presents, correspond to the intermediate stages lying between these two extremes. The private property of the labourer in his means of production is the foundation of petty industry, whether agricultural, manufacturing, or both; petty industry, again, is an essential condition for the development of social production and of the free individuality of the labourer himself. Of course, this petty mode of production exists also under slavery, serfdom, and other states of dependence. But it flourishes, it lets loose its whole energy, it attains its adequate classical form, only where the labourer is the private owner of his own means of labour set in action by himself: the peasant of the land which he cultivates, the artisan of the tool which he handles as a virtuoso. This mode of production pre-supposes parcelling of the soil, and scattering of the other means of production. As it excludes the concentration of these means of production, so also it excludes co-operation, division of

labour within each separate process of production, the control over, and the productive application of the forces of Nature by society, and the free development of the social productive powers. It is compatible only with a system of production, and a society, moving within narrow and more or less primitive bounds. To perpetuate it would be, as Pecqueur rightly says, "to decree universal mediocrity." At a certain stage of development it brings forth the material agencies for its own dissolution. From that moment new forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society; but the old social organisation fetters them and keeps them down. It must be annihilated; it is annihilated. Its annihilation, the transformation of the individualised and scattered means of production into socially concentrated ones, of the pigmy property of the many into the huge property of the few, the expropriation of the great mass of the people from the soil, from the means of subsistence, and from the means of labour, this fearful and painful expropriation of the mass of the people forms the prelude to the history of capital. It comprises a series of forcible methods, of which we have passed in review only those that have been epoch-making as methods of the primitive accumulation of capital. The expropriation of the immediate producers was accomplished with merciless Vandalism, and under the stimulus of passions the most infamous, the most sordid, the pettiest, the most meanly odious. Self-earned private property, that is based, so to say, on the fusing together of the isolated, independent labouring-individual with the conditions of his labour, is supplanted by capitalistic private property, which rests on exploitation of the nominally free labour of others, *i.e.*, on wages-labour.¹

As soon as this process of transformation has sufficiently decomposed the old society from top to bottom, as soon as the labourers are turned into proletarians, their means of labour into capital, as soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its own feet, then the further socialisation of labour and further

¹ "We are in a situation that is entirely new for society... we endeavour to separate every form of property from every form of labour." Sismondi, *Nouveaux Principes de l'Economie Politique*, Vol. II, p. 434. [Note by Marx.]

Marx here refers to the second edition of the book, S. Sismondi, *Nouveaux principes d'économie politique, ou de la richesse dans ses rapports avec la population* [*New Principles of Political Economy, or Wealth in its Relations with the Population*] Vols. I-II, Paris 1827.—Ed.

transformation of the land and other means of production into socially exploited and, therefore, common means of production, as well as the further expropriation of private proprietors, takes a new form. That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the labourer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many labourers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the centralisation of capital. One capitalist always kills many. Hand in hand with this centralisation, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever-extending scale, the co-operative form of the labour-process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labour into instruments of labour only usable in common, the economising of all means of production by their use as the means of production of combined, socialised labour, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world-market, and with this, the international character of the capitalistic régime. Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working-class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organised by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.

The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era: *i.e.*, on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production.

The transformation of scattered private property, arising from individual labour, into capitalist private property is, naturally, a process, incomparably more protracted, violent, and difficult, than the transformation of capitalistic private property, already practically resting on socialised production, into socialised property. In the former case, we had the expropriation of the mass of the people by a few usurpers; in the latter, we have the expropriation of a few usurpers by the mass of the people.¹

Published in Marx's *Capital*,
Hamburg 1867

Printed according to the
English edition, London 1887
Edited by Engels

¹ The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet, the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable. . . . Of all the classes, that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie to-day, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes perish and disappear in the face of Modern Industry, the proletariat is its special and essential product. . . . The lower middle-classes, the small manufacturers, the shopkeepers, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle-class. . . . they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. [*Note by Marx.*]

Marx took this quotation from the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*.— See pp. 45 and 44 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Frederick Engels

MARX'S CAPITAL

I

As long as there have been capitalists and workers on earth no book has appeared which is of as much importance for the workers as the one before us. The relation between capital and labour, the axis on which our entire present system of society turns, is here treated scientifically for the first time, and at that with a thoroughness and acuity such as was possible only for a German. Valuable as the writings of an Owen, Saint-Simon or Fourier are and will remain—it was reserved for a German to climb to the height from which the whole field of modern social relations can be seen clearly and in full view just as the lower mountain scenery is seen by an observer standing on the top-most peak.

Political economy up to now has taught us that labour is the source of all wealth and the measure of all values, so that two objects whose production has cost the same labour time possess the same value and must also be taken in exchange for each other, since on the average only equal values are exchangeable for one another. At the same time, however, it teaches that there exists a kind of stored-up labour, which it calls capital; that this capital, owing to the auxiliary sources contained in it, raises the productivity of living labour a hundred and a thousand fold, and in return claims a certain compensation which is termed profit or gain. As we all know, this occurs in reality in such a way that the profits of stored-up, dead labour become ever more massive, the capitals of the capitalists become ever more colossal, while the wages of living labour become constantly less and the mass of the workers living solely on wages becomes ever more numer-

ous and poverty-stricken. How is this contradiction to be solved? How can there remain a profit for the capitalist if the worker receives in compensation the full value of the labour he adds to his product? Yet this ought to be the case, since only equal values are exchanged. On the other hand, how can equal values be exchanged, how can the worker receive the full value of his product, if, as is admitted by many economists, this product is divided between him and the capitalists? Economics up to now has been helpless in the face of the contradiction, and writes or stutters embarrassed phrases which say nothing. Even the previous socialist critics of economics have not been able to do more than to emphasize the contradiction; no one resolved it, until now at last Marx has traced the process by which this profit arises right to its birthplace and has thereby made everything clear.

In tracing the development of capital, Marx starts out from the simple, notoriously obvious fact that the capitalists increase the value of their capital through exchange: they buy commodities for their money and afterwards sell them for more money than they cost them. For example, a capitalist buys cotton for 1,000 talers and resells it for 1,100, thus "earning" 100 talers. This excess of 100 talers over the original capital Marx calls *surplus value*. What is the origin of this surplus value? According to the economists' assumption, only equal values are exchanged and in the sphere of abstract theory this, of course, is correct. Hence the purchase of cotton and its resale can just as little yield surplus value as the exchange of a silver taler for thirty silver groschen and the re-exchange of the small coins for a silver taler, a process by which one becomes neither richer nor poorer. But surplus value can just as little arise from sellers selling commodities above their value, or purchasers buying them below their value, because each one is in turn buyer and seller and things would therefore again balance. Just as little can it arise from buyers and sellers reciprocally overreaching each other, for this would create no new or surplus value, but only divide the existing capital differently among the capitalists. In spite of the fact that the capitalist buys the commodities at their value and sells them at their value, he gets more value out than he puts in. How does this happen?

The capitalist finds on the commodity market under present social conditions a *commodity* which has the peculiar property

that *its use is a source of new value, is a creation of new value*, and this commodity is *labour power*.

What is the value of labour power? The value of every commodity is measured by the labour required for its production. Labour power exists in the form of the living worker who requires a definite amount of means of subsistence for his existence as well as for the maintenance of his family, which ensures the continuance of labour power also after his death. The labour time necessary for producing these means of subsistence represents, therefore, the value of the labour power. The capitalist pays this value weekly and purchases for that the use of one week's labour of the worker. So far messieurs the economists will be pretty well in agreement with us as to the value of labour power.

The capitalist now sets his worker to work. In a certain period of time the worker will have performed as much labour as was represented by his weekly wages. Supposing that the weekly wage of a worker represents three workdays, then if the worker begins on Monday, he has by Wednesday evening *replaced* to the capitalist the *full value of the wage paid*. But does he then stop working? Not at all. The capitalist has bought his *week's* labour and the worker must go on working also during the last three week days. This *surplus labour* of the worker, over and above the time necessary to replace his wages, is the *source of surplus value*, of profit, of the steadily growing increase of capital.

Do not say it is an arbitrary assumption that the worker works off in three days the wages he has received, and works the remaining three days for the capitalist. Whether he takes exactly three days to replace his wages, or two or four, is to be sure quite immaterial here and hence varies according to circumstances; the main point is that the capitalist, besides the labour he pays for, also extracts labour that he *does not pay for*, and this is no arbitrary assumption, for the day the capitalist extracts from the worker in the long run only as much labour as he paid him in wages, on that day he will shut down his workshop, since indeed his whole profit would come to nought.

Here we have the solution of all those contradictions. The origin of surplus value (of which the capitalists' profit forms an important part) is now quite clear and natural. The value of the labour power is paid for, but this value is far less than that which the capitalist manages to extract from the labour power,

and it is just the difference, the *unpaid labour*, which constitutes the share of the capitalist, or, more accurately, of the capitalist class. For even the profit that the cotton dealer made on his cotton in the above example must consist of unpaid labour, if cotton prices did not rise. The trader must have sold to a cotton manufacturer, who is able to extract a profit for himself from his product besides the 100 talers, and therefore shares with him the unpaid labour he has pocketed. In general it is this unpaid labour which maintains all the non-working members of society. The state and municipal taxes, as far as they affect the capitalist class, as also the ground rent of the land owners, etc., are paid from it. On it rests the whole existing social system.

It would, however, be absurd to assume that unpaid labour arose only under present conditions where production is carried on by capitalists on the one hand and wage-workers on the other. On the contrary, the oppressed class at all times has had to perform unpaid labour. During the whole long period when slavery was the prevailing form of the organization of labour, the slaves had to perform much more labour than was returned to them in the form of means of subsistence. The same was the case under the rule of serfdom and right up to the abolition of peasant *corvée* labour; here in fact the difference stands out palpably between the time during which the peasant works for his own maintenance and the surplus labour for the lord of the manor, precisely because the latter is carried out separately from the former. The form has now been changed, but the substance remains and as long as "a part of society possesses the monopoly of the means of production, the labourer, free or not free, must add to the working-time necessary for his own maintenance an extra working-time in order to produce the means of subsistence for the owners of the means of production." (*Marx*, S. 202.)¹

II

In the previous article we saw that every worker employed by a capitalist performs two kinds of labour: during one part of his working time he replaces the wages advanced to him by the capitalist, and this part of his labour Marx terms the *necessary*

¹ Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow 1954, p. 235.—Ed.

labour. But afterwards he has to go on working and during that time he produces *surplus value* for the capitalist, an important part of which constitutes profit. That part of the labour is called surplus labour.

Let us assume that the worker works three days of the week to replace his wages and three days to produce surplus value for the capitalist. Putting it otherwise, it means that, with a twelve-hour working day, he works six hours daily for his wages and six hours for the production of surplus value. One can get only six days out of the week, or at most seven even by including Sunday, but one can extract six, eight, ten, twelve, fifteen or even more hours of work out of every single day. The worker sells the capitalist a working day for his day's wages. But, *what is a working day?* Eight hours or eighteen?

It is to the capitalist's interest to make the working day as long as possible. The longer it is, the more surplus value it produces. The worker correctly feels that every hour of labour which he performs over and above the replacement of the wage is unjustly taken from him; he learns from bitter personal experience what it means to work excessive hours. The capitalist fights for his profit, the worker for his health, for a few hours of daily rest, to be able to engage in other human activities as well, besides working, sleeping and eating. It may be remarked in passing that it does not depend at all upon the good will of the individual capitalists whether they desire to embark on this struggle or not, since competition compels even the most philanthropic among them to join his colleagues and to make a working time as long as theirs the rule.

The struggle for the fixing of the working day has lasted from the first appearance of free workers in the arena of history down to the present day. In various trades various traditional working days prevail; but in reality they are seldom adhered to. Only where the law fixes the working day and supervises its observance can one really say that there exists a normal working day. And up to now this is the case almost solely in the factory districts of England. Here the ten-hour working day (ten and a half hours on five days, seven and a half hours on Saturday) has been fixed for all women and for youths of thirteen to eighteen, and since the men cannot work without them, they also come under the ten-hour working day. This law has been won by English factory workers by years of endurance, by the most persistent, stub-

born struggle with the factory owners, by freedom of the press, the right of association and assembly, as well as by adroit utilization of the splits in the ruling class itself. It has become the palladium of the English workers, it has gradually been extended to all important branches of industry and last year¹ to almost *all trades*, at least to all those employing women and children. The present work contains most exhaustive material on the history of this legislative regulation of the working day in England. The next North German Reichstag will also have factory regulations to discuss and in connection therewith the regulation of factory labour. We expect that none of the deputies that have been elected by German workers will proceed to discuss this bill without previously making themselves thoroughly conversant with *Marx's* book. *There is much to be achieved here.* The splits within the ruling classes are more favourable to the workers than they ever were in England, because *universal suffrage compels the ruling classes to court the favour of the workers.* Under these circumstances, four or five representatives of the proletariat are *a power*, if they know how to use their position, if above all they know what is at issue, which the bourgeois do not know. And for this purpose, *Marx's* book gives them all the material in ready form.

We will pass over a number of further very fine investigations of more theoretical interest and will halt only at the final chapter which deals with the accumulation of capital. Here it is first shown that the capitalist mode of production, that is, that effected by capitalists on the one hand and wage-workers on the other, not only continually produces anew for the capitalist his capital, but at the same time also continually produces anew the poverty of the workers; thereby it is provided for that there always exist anew, on the one hand, capitalists who are the owners of all means of subsistence, all raw materials and all instruments of labour, and, on the other hand, the great mass of the workers, who are compelled to sell their labour power to these capitalists for an amount of the means of subsistence which at best just suffices to keep them able-bodied and to bring up a new generation of able-bodied proletarians. But capital does not merely reproduce itself: it is continually increased and multiplied—and thereby its power over the propertyless class of workers. And just as it

¹ That is, in 1867.—*Ed.*

itself is reproduced on an ever greater scale, so the modern capitalist mode of production reproduces the class of propertyless workers also on an ever greater scale and in ever greater numbers. "... accumulation of capital reproduces the capital-relation on a progressive scale, more capitalists or larger capitalists at this pole, more wage-workers at that. . . . *Accumulation of capital is, therefore, increase of the proletariat.*" (S. 600.)¹ Since, however, owing to the progress of machinery, owing to improved agriculture, etc., fewer and fewer workers are necessary in order to produce the same quantity of products, since this perfecting, that is, this making the workers superfluous, grows more rapidly than even the growing capital, what becomes of this ever-increasing number of workers? They form an industrial reserve army, which, when business is bad or middling, is paid *below* the value of its labour and is irregularly employed or is left to be cared for by public charity, but which is indispensable to the capitalist class at times when business is especially lively, as is palpably evident in England—but which *under all circumstances* serves to break the power of resistance of the regularly employed workers and to keep their wages down. "The greater the social wealth . . . the greater is the relative surplus-population, or industrial reserve-army. But the greater this reserve-army in proportion to the active (regularly employed) labour-army, the greater is the mass of a consolidated (permanent) surplus-population, or strata of workers, whose misery is in inverse ratio to its torment of labour. The more extensive, finally, the lazarus-layers of the working-class, and the industrial reserve-army, the greater is official pauperism. This is the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation" (S. 631).²

These, strictly scientifically proved—and the official economists take great care not to make even an attempt at a refutation—are some of the chief laws of the modern, capitalist, social system. But does this tell the whole story? By no means. Marx sharply stresses the bad sides of capitalist production but with equal emphasis clearly proves that this social form was necessary to develop the productive forces of society to a level which will make possible an equal development worthy of human beings for *all* members of society. All earlier forms of society were too poor

¹ Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow 1954, pp. 613-14.—Ed.

² *Ibid.*, p. 644.

for this. Capitalist production is the first to create the wealth and the productive forces necessary for this, but at the same time it also creates, in the numerous and oppressed workers, the social class which is compelled more and more to take possession of this wealth and these productive forces in order to utilize them for the whole of society—instead of their being utilized, as they are today, for a monopolist class.

Written by Engels March 1-13, 1868
Published in the *Demokratisches
Wochenblatt* of March 21 and 28,
1868
Unsigned

Printed according to the text
of the Journal
Translated from the German

Frederick Engels

**FROM THE PREFACE
TO THE SECOND VOLUME OF *CAPITAL***

What, then, did Marx say about surplus value that is new? How is it that Marx's theory of surplus value struck home like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky, and that in all civilized countries, too, while the theories of all his socialist predecessors, including Rodbertus, vanished without effect?

The history of chemistry offers an illustration which explains this:

Until almost the end of last century, the phlogistic theory prevailed, as we know, according to which the essence of all combustion consisted in the separation from the burning substance of another, hypothetical substance, an absolute combustible, named phlogiston. This theory sufficed for the explanation of most of the chemical phenomena then known, although not without forcing in many cases. But in 1774, Priestley produced a kind of air "which he found to be so pure, or so free from phlogiston, that common air seemed adulterated in comparison with it." He called it dephlogisticated air. Shortly after him, Scheele obtained the same kind of air in Sweden, and demonstrated its presence in the atmosphere. He also found that this air disappeared, whenever a substance was burned in it or in ordinary air, and therefore he called it fire-air. "From these facts he drew the conclusion that the compound arising from the union of phlogiston with one of the components of the air" (that is to say, in combustion) "was nothing but fire or heat, which escaped through the glass."¹

Priestley and Scheele had produced oxygen, but did not know what it was. They "remained entangled in the" phlogistic "categories as they found them." The element, which was to upset

¹ Roscoe-Schorlemmer: *Ausführliches Lehrbuch der Chemie*. Braunschweig 1877, I, pp. 13, 18. [Note by Engels.]

the whole phlogistic concept and to revolutionize chemistry, remained barren in their hands. But Priestley had immediately communicated his discovery to Lavoisier in Paris, and Lavoisier, by means of this new fact, now examined all phlogistic chemistry. He first discovered that the new kind of air was a new chemical element, and that in combustion it was not a case of the mysterious phlogiston *departing* from the burning substance, but of this new element *combining* with the substance. Thus he was the first to place on its feet all chemistry, which in its phlogistic form had stood on its head. And even though he did not produce oxygen at the same time as the others and independently of them, as he claimed later on, he nevertheless is the real *discoverer* of oxygen *vis-à-vis* the other two, who had merely *produced* it without any suspicion of *what* it was they had produced.

Marx stands in the same relation to his predecessors in the theory of surplus value as Lavoisier to Priestley and Scheele. The *existence* of that part of product's value which we now call surplus value had been ascertained long before Marx. What it consists of had also been stated, more or less distinctly, namely, of the product of labour for which its appropriator has not paid any equivalent. But one got no further. The one group—the classical bourgeois economists—investigated at most the proportion in which the product of labour is divided between the labourer and the owner of the means of production. The other group—the Socialists—found this division unjust and looked for utopian means of abolishing this injustice. Both remained in thrall to the economic categories as they had found them.

Then Marx came forward. And he did so in direct opposition to all his predecessors. Where they had seen a *solution*, he saw only a *problem*. He saw that here there was neither dephlogisticated air, nor fire-air, but oxygen, that here it was not a matter of simply recording an economic fact or of the conflict of this fact with eternal justice and true morality, but that it concerned a fact destined to revolutionize all economics and offering a key to the understanding of all capitalist production—to him who knew how to use it. With this fact as his starting-point he examined all the categories he found at hand, just as Lavoisier, with oxygen as his starting-point, had examined the categories of phlogistic chemistry he had found at hand. In order to know what surplus value was, he had to know what value was. Ricardo's theory of value itself had to be subjected to criticism first of all. Thus

Marx investigated labour in regard to its value-creating quality, and for the first time established *what* labour produces value, and why and how it does this, and that value is really nothing but coagulated labour of *this* kind—a point which Rodbertus never grasped to the end of his days. Marx then examined the relation of commodities to money, demonstrating how and why, thanks to their immanent property of value, commodities and commodity exchange must produce the antithesis of commodities and money. His theory of money, founded on this basis, is the first exhaustive, and now tacitly generally accepted one. He investigated the transformation of money into capital, proving that this transformation is based on the purchase and sale of labour power. By substituting labour power, the value-producing property, for labour, he solved with one stroke one of the difficulties upon which the Ricardian school was wrecked: the impossibility of harmonizing the mutual exchange of capital and labour with the Ricardian law of value determination by labour. By establishing the distinction between constant and variable capital, he was the first able to trace the real course of the process of surplus value formation down to the minutest detail, and hence to explain it—something which none of his predecessors had accomplished. Thus he established a distinction within capital itself with which neither Rodbertus nor the bourgeois economists had been able to do anything whatever, which, nevertheless, furnishes the key for the solution of the most complicated economic problems, as is most strikingly proved once again by Volume II, and still more by Volume III, as will be shown. He analyzed surplus value itself further, finding its two forms, absolute and relative surplus value, and showed the different but in each case decisive roles that they had played in the historical development of capitalist production. On the basis of surplus value he developed the first rational theory we have of wages, and gave for the first time the basic features of a history of capitalist accumulation and a portrayal of its historical tendency.

Written by Engels on May 5, 1885
for the second volume of *Capital*,
Hamburg 1885

Printed according to the text
of the book
Translated from the German

Karl Marx

THE CIVIL WAR IN FRANCE

INTRODUCTION by FREDERICK ENGELS

I did not anticipate that I would be asked to prepare a new edition of the Address of the General Council of the International on *The Civil War in France*, and to write an introduction to it. Therefore I can only touch briefly here on the most important points.

I am prefacing the longer work mentioned above by the two shorter Addresses of the General Council on the Franco-Prussian War. In the first place, because the second of these, which itself cannot be fully understood in full without the first, is referred to in *The Civil War*. But also because these two Addresses, likewise drafted by Marx, are, no less than *The Civil War*, outstanding examples of the author's remarkable gift, first proved in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, for grasping clearly the character, the import and the necessary consequences of great historical events, at a time when these events are still in progress before our eyes or have only just taken place. And, finally, because today we in Germany are still having to endure the consequences which Marx predicted would follow from these events.

Has that which was declared in the first Address not come to pass: that if Germany's defensive war against Louis Bonaparte degenerated into a war of conquest against the French people, all the misfortunes which befell Germany after the so-called wars of liberation¹ would revive again with renewed intensity? Have we not had a further twenty years of Bismarck's rule, the Exceptional Law and Socialist-baiting taking the place of the prosecutions of demagogues, with the same arbitrary action of the police and with literally the same staggering interpretations of the law?

¹ The wars against Napoleon I in 1813-15.—*Ed.*

And has not the prediction been proved to the letter, that the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine would "force France into the arms of Russia," and that after this annexation Germany must either become the avowed servant of Russia, or must, after some short respite, arm for a new war, and, moreover, "a race war against the combined Slavonic and Roman races"? Has not the annexation of the French provinces driven France into the arms of Russia? Has not Bismarck for fully twenty years vainly wooed the favour of the tsar, wooed it with services even more lowly than those which little Prussia, before it became the "first Power in Europe," was wont to lay at Holy Russia's feet? And is there not every day still hanging over our heads the Damocles' sword of war, on the first day of which all the chartered covenants of princes will be scattered like chaff; a war of which nothing is certain but the absolute uncertainty of its outcome; a race war which will subject the whole of Europe to devastation by fifteen or twenty million armed men, and which is not raging already only because even the strongest of the great military states shrinks before the absolute incalculability of its final result?

All the more is it our duty to make again accessible to the German workers these brilliant proofs, now half-forgotten, of the farsightedness of international working-class policy in 1870.

What is true of these two Addresses is also true of *The Civil War in France*. On May 28, the last fighters of the Commune succumbed to superior forces on the slopes of Belleville; and only two days later, on May 30, Marx read to the General Council the work in which the historical significance of the Paris Commune is delineated in short, powerful strokes, but with such trenchancy, and above all such truth as has never again been attained in all the mass of literature on this subject.

Thanks to the economic and political development of France since 1789, Paris has been placed for the last fifty years in such a position that no revolution could break out there without assuming a proletarian character, that is to say, without the proletariat, which had bought victory with its blood, advancing its own demands after victory. These demands were more or less unclear and even confused, corresponding to the state of development reached by the workers of Paris at the particular period, but in the last resort they all amounted to the abolition of the class antagonism between capitalists and workers. It is true that no one knew how this was to be brought about. But the demand itself,

however indefinitely it still was couched, contained a threat to the existing order of society; the workers who put it forward were still armed; therefore, the disarming of the workers was the first commandment for the bourgeois, who were at the helm of the state. Hence, after every revolution won by the workers, a new struggle, ending with the defeat of the workers.

This happened for the first time in 1848. The liberal bourgeois of the parliamentary opposition held banquets for securing a reform of the franchise, which was to ensure supremacy for their party. Forced more and more, in their struggle with the government, to appeal to the people, they had gradually to yield precedence to the radical and republican strata of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. But behind these stood the revolutionary workers, and since 1830 these had acquired far more political independence than the bourgeois, and even the republicans, suspected. At the moment of the crisis between the government and the opposition, the workers began street-fighting; Louis Philippe vanished, and with him the franchise reform; and in its place arose the republic, and indeed one which the victorious workers themselves designated as a "social" republic. No one, however, was clear as to what this social republic was to imply; not even the workers themselves. But they now had arms and were a power in the state. Therefore, as soon as the bourgeois republicans in control felt something like firm ground under their feet, their first aim was to disarm the workers. This took place by driving them into the insurrection of June 1848 by direct breach of faith, by open defiance and the attempt to banish the unemployed to a distant province. The government had taken care to have an overwhelming superiority of force. After five days' heroic struggle, the workers were defeated. And then followed a blood-bath among the defenceless prisoners, the like of which has not been seen since the days of the civil wars which ushered in the downfall of the Roman republic. It was the first time that the bourgeoisie showed to what insane cruelties of revenge it will be goaded the moment the proletariat dares to take its stand against the bourgeoisie as a separate class, with its own interests and demands. And yet 1848 was only child's play compared with the frenzy of the bourgeoisie in 1871.

Punishment followed hard at heel. If the proletariat was not yet able to rule France, the bourgeoisie could no longer do so. At least not at that period, when the greater part of it was still

monarchically inclined, and it was divided into three dynastic parties and a fourth, republican party. Its internal dissensions allowed the adventurer Louis Bonaparte to take possession of all the commanding points—army, police, administrative machinery—and, on December 2, 1851, to explode the last stronghold of the bourgeoisie, the National Assembly. The Second Empire began—the exploitation of France by a gang of political and financial adventurers, but at the same time also an industrial development such as had never been possible under the narrow-minded and timorous system of Louis Philippe, with the exclusive domination of only a small section of the big bourgeoisie. Louis Bonaparte took the political power from the capitalists under the pretext of protecting them, the bourgeois, from the workers, and on the other hand the workers from them; but in return his rule encouraged speculation and industrial activity—in a word, the upsurge and enrichment of the whole bourgeoisie to an extent hitherto unknown. To an even greater extent, it is true, corruption and mass thievery developed, clustering around the imperial court, and drawing their heavy percentages from this enrichment.

But the Second Empire was the appeal to French chauvinism, was the demand for the restoration of the frontiers of the First Empire, which had been lost in 1814, or at least those of the First Republic. A French empire within the frontiers of the old monarchy and, in fact, within the even more amputated frontiers of 1815—such a thing was impossible for any length of time. Hence the necessity for occasional wars and extensions of frontiers. But no extension of frontiers was so dazzling to the imagination of the French chauvinists as the extension to the German left bank of the Rhine. One square mile on the Rhine was more to them than ten in the Alps or anywhere else. Given the Second Empire, the demand for the restoration of the left bank of the Rhine, either all at once or piecemeal, was merely a question of time. The time came with the Austro-Prussian War of 1866; cheated of the anticipated “territorial compensation” by Bismarck and by his own over-cunning, hesitant policy, there was now nothing left for Napoleon but war, which broke out in 1870 and drove him first to Sedan, and thence to Wilhelmshöhe.¹

¹ At Sedan, on September 2, 1870, the French army was defeated and captured together with the emperor.—*Ed.*

The necessary consequence was the Paris Revolution of September 4, 1870. The empire collapsed like a house of cards, and the republic was again proclaimed. But the enemy was standing at the gates; the armies of the empire were either hopelessly encircled at Metz or held captive in Germany. In this emergency the people allowed the Paris deputies to the former legislative body to constitute themselves into a "Government of National Defence." This was the more readily conceded, since, for the purposes of defence, all Parisians capable of bearing arms had enrolled in the National Guard and were armed, so that now the workers constituted a great majority. But very soon the antagonism between the almost completely bourgeois government and the armed proletariat broke into open conflict. On October 31, workers' battalions stormed the town hall and captured part of the membership of the government. Treachery, the government's direct breach of its undertakings, and the intervention of some petty-bourgeois battalions set them free again, and in order not to occasion the outbreak of civil war inside a city besieged by a foreign military power, the former government was left in office.

At last, on January 28, 1871, starved Paris capitulated. But with honours unprecedented in the history of war. The forts were surrendered, the city wall stripped of guns, the weapons of the regiments of the line and of the Mobile Guard were handed over, and they themselves considered prisoners of war. But the National Guard kept its weapons and guns, and only entered into an armistice with the victors. And these did not dare enter Paris in triumph. They only dared to occupy a tiny corner of Paris, which, into the bargain, consisted partly of public parks, and even this they only occupied for a few days! And during this time they, who had maintained their encirclement of Paris for 131 days, were themselves encircled by the armed workers of Paris, who kept a sharp watch that no "Prussian" should overstep the narrow bounds of the corner ceded to the foreign conqueror. Such was the respect which the Paris workers inspired in the army before which all the armies of the empire had laid down their arms; and the Prussian *junkers*, who had come to take revenge at the home of the revolution, were compelled to stand by respectfully, and salute precisely this armed revolution!

During the war the Paris workers had confined themselves to demanding the vigorous prosecution of the fight. But now, when peace had come after the capitulation of Paris, now Thiers, the

new supreme head of the government, was compelled to realize that the rule of the propertied classes—big landowners and capitalists—was in constant danger so long as the workers of Paris had arms in their hands. His first action was an attempt to disarm them. On March 18, he sent troops of the line with orders to rob the National Guard of the artillery belonging to it, which had been constructed during the siege of Paris and had been paid for by public subscription. The attempt failed; Paris mobilized as one man for resistance, and war between Paris and the French Government sitting at Versailles was declared. On March 26 the Paris Commune was elected and on March 28 it was proclaimed. The Central Committee of the National Guard, which up to then had carried on the government, handed in its resignation to the Commune after it had first decreed the abolition of the scandalous Paris "Morality Police." On March 30 the Commune abolished conscription and the standing army, and declared the sole armed force to be the National Guard, in which all citizens capable of bearing arms were to be enrolled. It remitted all payments of rent for dwelling houses from October 1870 until April, the amounts already paid to be booked as future rent payments, and stopped all sales of articles pledged in the municipal loan office. On the same day the foreigners elected to the Commune were confirmed in office, because "the flag of the Commune is the flag of the World Republic." On April 1 it was decided that the highest salary to be received by any employee of the Commune, and therefore also by its members themselves, was not to exceed 6,000 francs (4,800 marks). On the following day the Commune decreed the separation of the church from the state, and the abolition of all state payments for religious purposes as well as the transformation of all church property into national property; as a result of which, on April 8, the exclusion from the schools of all religious symbols, pictures, dogmas, prayers—in a word, "of all that belongs to the sphere of the individual's conscience"—was ordered and gradually put into effect. On the 5th, in reply to the shooting, day after day, of captured Commune fighters by the Versailles troops, a decree was issued for the imprisonment of hostages, but it was never carried into execution. On the 6th, the guillotine was brought out by the 137th battalion of the National Guard, and publicly burnt, amid great popular rejoicing. On the 12th, the Commune decided that the Victory Column on the *Place Vendôme*, which had been cast from captured guns by Napoleon

after the war of 1809, should be demolished as a symbol of chauvinism and incitement to national hatred. This was carried out on May 16. On April 16 it ordered a statistical tabulation of factories which had been closed down by the manufacturers, and the working out of plans for the operation of these factories by the workers formerly employed in them, who were to be organized in co-operative societies, and also plans for the organization of these co-operatives in one great union. On the 20th it abolished night work for bakers, and also the employment offices, which since the Second Empire had been run as a monopoly by creatures appointed by the police—labour exploiters of the first rank; these offices were transferred to the mayoralties of the twenty *arrondissements* of Paris. On April 30 it ordered the closing of the pawnshops, on the ground that they were a private exploitation of the workers, and were in contradiction with the right of the workers to their instruments of labour and to credit. On May 5 it ordered the razing of the Chapel of Atonement, which had been built in expiation of the execution of Louis XVI.

Thus from March 18 onwards the class character of the Paris movement, which had previously been pushed into the background by the fight against the foreign invaders, emerged sharply and clearly. As almost only workers, or recognized representatives of the workers, sat in the Commune, its decisions bore a decidedly proletarian character. Either these decisions decreed reforms which the republican bourgeoisie had failed to pass solely out of cowardice, but which provided a necessary basis for the free activity of the working class—such as the realization of the principle that *in relation to the state*, religion is a purely private matter—or the Commune promulgated decrees which were in the direct interest of the working class and in part cut deeply into the old order of society. In a beleaguered city, however, it was possible to make at most a start in the realization of all this. And from the beginning of May onwards all their energies were taken up by the fight against the armies assembled by the Versailles government in ever-growing numbers.

On April 7 the Versailles troops had captured the Seine crossing at Neuilly, on the western front of Paris; on the other hand, in an attack on the southern front on the 11th they were repulsed with heavy losses by General Eudes. Paris was continually bombarded and, moreover, by the very people who had stigmatized as a sacrilege the bombardment of the same city by the Prussians.

These same people now begged the Prussian government for the hasty return of the French soldiers taken prisoner at Sedan and Metz, in order that they might recapture Paris for them. From the beginning of May the gradual arrival of these troops gave the Versailles forces a decided superiority. This already became evident when, on April 23, Thiers broke off the negotiations for the exchange, proposed by the Commune, of the Archbishop of Paris and a whole number of other priests held as hostages in Paris, for only one man, Blanqui, who had twice been elected to the Commune but was a prisoner in Clairvaux. And even more from the changed language of Thiers; previously procrastinating and equivocal, he now suddenly became insolent, threatening, brutal. The Versailles forces took the redoubt of Moulin Saquet on the southern front, on May 3; on the 9th, Fort Issy, which had been completely reduced to ruins by gunfire; on the 14th, Fort Vanves. On the western front they advanced gradually, capturing the numerous villages and buildings which extended up to the city wall, until they reached the main defences; on the 21st, thanks to treachery and the carelessness of the National Guards stationed there, they succeeded in forcing their way into the city. The Prussians, who held the northern and eastern forts, allowed the Versailles troops to advance across the land north of the city, which was forbidden ground to them under the armistice, and thus to march forward, attacking on a wide front, which the Parisians naturally thought covered by the armistice, and therefore held only weakly. As a result of this, only a weak resistance was put up in the western half of Paris, in the luxury city proper; it grew stronger and more tenacious the nearer the incoming troops approached the eastern half, the working-class city proper. It was only after eight days' fighting that the last defenders of the Commune succumbed on the heights of Belleville and Menilmontant; and then the massacre of defenceless men, women and children, which had been raging all through the week on an increasing scale, reached its zenith. The breechloaders could no longer kill fast enough; the vanquished were shot down in hundreds by *mitrailleuse* fire. The "Wall of the Federals"¹ at the Père Lachaise cemetery, where the final mass murder was consummated, is still standing today, a mute but eloquent testimony to the frenzy of which the ruling class is capable as soon as the working class dares to stand up for its rights.

¹ Now usually called The Wall of the Communards.—*Ed.*

Then, when the slaughter of them all proved to be impossible, came the mass arrests, the shooting of victims arbitrarily selected from the prisoners' ranks, and the removal of the rest to great camps where they awaited trial by courts-martial. The Prussian troops surrounding the northeastern half of Paris had orders not to allow any fugitives to pass; but the officers often shut their eyes when the soldiers paid more obedience to the dictates of humanity than to those of the Supreme Command; particular honour is due to the Saxon army corps, which behaved very humanely and let through many who were obviously fighters for the Commune.

* * *

If today, after twenty years, we look back at the activity and historical significance of the Paris Commune of 1871, we shall find it necessary to make a few additions to the account given in *The Civil War in France*.

The members of the Commune were divided into a majority, the Blanquists, who had also been predominant in the Central Committee of the National Guard; and a minority, members of the International Working Men's Association, chiefly consisting of adherents of the Proudhon school of socialism. The great majority of the Blanquists were at that time Socialists only by revolutionary, proletarian instinct; only a few had attained greater clarity on principles, through Vaillant, who was familiar with German scientific socialism. It is therefore comprehensible that in the economic sphere much was left undone which, according to our view today, the Commune ought to have done. The hardest thing to understand is certainly the holy awe with which they remained standing respectfully outside the gates of the Bank of France. This was also a serious political mistake. The bank in the hands of the Commune—this would have been worth more than ten thousand hostages. It would have meant the pressure of the whole of the French bourgeoisie on the Versailles government in favour of peace with the Commune. But what is still more wonderful is the correctness of much that nevertheless was done by the Commune, composed as it was of Blanquists and Proudhonists. Naturally, the Proudhonists were chiefly responsible for the economic decrees of the Commune, both for their praiseworthy and their unpraiseworthy aspects; as the Blanquists were for its political commissions and omissions. And in both cases the irony of

history willed—as is usual when doctrinaires come to the helm—that both did the opposite of what the doctrines of their school prescribed.

Proudhon, the Socialist of the small peasant and master-craftsman, regarded association with positive hatred. He said of it that there was more bad than good in it; that it was by nature sterile, even harmful, because it was a fetter on the freedom of the worker; that it was a pure dogma, unproductive and burdensome, in conflict as much with the freedom of the worker as with economy of labour; that its disadvantages multiplied more swiftly than its advantages; that, as compared with it, competition, division of labour and private property were economic forces. Only in the exceptional cases—as Proudhon called them—of large-scale industry and large establishments, such as railways, was the association of workers in place. (See *General Idea of the Revolution, 3rd sketch.*)

By 1871, large-scale industry had already so much ceased to be an exceptional case even in Paris, the centre of artistic handicrafts, that by far the most important decree of the Commune instituted an organization of large-scale industry and even of manufacture which was not only to be based on the association of the workers in each factory, but also to combine all these associations in one great union; in short, an organization which, as Marx quite rightly says in *The Civil War*, must necessarily have led in the end to communism, that is to say, the direct opposite of the Proudhon doctrine. And, therefore, the Commune was the grave of the Proudhon school of socialism. Today this school has vanished from French working-class circles; here, among the Possibilists¹ no less than among the “Marxists,” Marx’s theory now rules unchallenged. Only among the “radical” bourgeoisie are there still Proudhonists.

The Blanquists fared no better. Brought up in the school of conspiracy, and held together by the strict discipline which went with it, they started out from the viewpoint that a relatively small number of resolute, well-organized men would be able, at a given favourable moment, not only to seize the helm of state, but also by a display of great, ruthless energy, to maintain power until they succeeded in sweeping the mass of the people into the revo-

¹ *Possibilism*: The opportunist trend in the French labour movement at the end of the nineteenth century.—*Ed.*

lution and ranging them round the small band of leaders. This involved, above all, the strictest, dictatorial centralization of all power in the hands of the new revolutionary government. And what did the Commune, with its majority of these same Blanquists, actually do? In all its proclamations to the French in the provinces, it appealed to them to form a free federation of all French Communes with Paris, a national organization which for the first time was really to be created by the nation itself. It was precisely the oppressing power of the former centralized government, army, political police, bureaucracy, which Napoleon had created in 1798 and which since then had been taken over by every new government as a welcome instrument and used against its opponents—it was precisely this power which was to fall everywhere, just as it had already fallen in Paris.

From the very outset the Commune was compelled to recognize that the working class, once come to power, could not go on managing with the old state machine; that in order not to lose again its only just conquered supremacy, this working class must, on the one hand, do away with all the old repressive machinery previously used against it itself, and, on the other, safeguard itself against its own deputies and officials, by declaring them all, without exception, subject to recall at any moment. What had been the characteristic attribute of the former state? Society had created its own organs to look after its common interests, originally through simple division of labour. But these organs, at whose head was the state power, had in the course of time, in pursuance of their own special interests, transformed themselves from the servants of society into the masters of society. This can be seen, for example, not only in the hereditary monarchy, but equally so in the democratic republic. Nowhere do "politicians" form a more separate and powerful section of the nation than precisely in North America. There, each of the two major parties which alternately succeed each other in power is itself in turn controlled by people who make a business of politics, who speculate on seats in the legislative assemblies of the Union as well as of the separate states, or who make a living by carrying on agitation for their party and on its victory are rewarded with positions. It is well known how the Americans have been trying for thirty years to shake off this yoke, which has become intolerable, and how in spite of it all they continue to sink ever deeper in this swamp of corruption. It is precisely in America that we see best how there takes

place this process of the state power making itself independent in relation to society, whose mere instrument it was originally intended to be. Here there exists no dynasty, no nobility, no standing army, beyond the few men keeping watch on the Indians, no bureaucracy with permanent posts or the right to pensions. And nevertheless we find here two great gangs of political speculators, who alternately take possession of the state power and exploit it by the most corrupt means and for the most corrupt ends—and the nation is powerless against these two great cartels of politicians, who are ostensibly its servants, but in reality dominate and plunder it.

Against this transformation of the state and the organs of the state from servants of society into masters of society—an inevitable transformation in all previous states—the Commune made use of two infallible means. In the first place, it filled all posts—administrative, judicial and educational—by election on the basis of universal suffrage of all concerned, subject to the right of recall at any time by the same electors. And, in the second place, all officials, high or low, were paid only the wages received by other workers. The highest salary paid by the Commune to anyone was 6,000 francs. In this way an effective barrier to place-hunting and careerism was set up, even apart from the binding mandates to delegates to representative bodies which were added besides.

This shattering [*Sprengung*] of the former state power and its replacement by a new and truly democratic one is described in detail in the third section of *The Civil War*. But it was necessary to dwell briefly here once more on some of its features, because in Germany particularly the superstitious belief in the state has been carried over from philosophy into the general consciousness of the bourgeoisie and even of many workers. According to the philosophical conception, the state is the “realization of the idea,” or the Kingdom of God on earth, translated into philosophical terms, the sphere in which eternal truth and justice is or should be realized. And from this follows a superstitious reverence for the state and everything connected with it, which takes root the more readily since people are accustomed from childhood to imagine that the affairs and interests common to the whole of society could not be looked after otherwise than as they have been looked after in the past, that is, through the state and its lucratively positioned officials. And people think they have taken quite an ex-

traordinarily bold step forward when they have rid themselves of belief in hereditary monarchy and swear by the democratic republic. In reality, however, the state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another, and indeed in the democratic republic no less than in the monarchy; and at best an evil inherited by the proletariat after its victorious struggle for class supremacy, whose worst sides the victorious proletariat, just like the Commune, cannot avoid having to lop off at once as much as possible until such time as a generation reared in new, free social conditions is able to throw the entire lumber of the state on the scrap heap.

Of late, the Social-Democratic philistine has once more been filled with wholesome terror at the words: Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Well and good, gentlemen, do you want to know what this dictatorship looks like? Look at the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

F. Engels

London, on the twentieth anniversary of the Paris Commune, March 18, 1891

Written by Engels for the separate edition of Marx's *The Civil War in France*, Berlin 1891

Printed according to the text of the book
Translated from the German

FIRST ADDRESS OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL
OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S
ASSOCIATION
ON THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S
ASSOCIATION
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

In the Inaugural Address of the *International Working Men's Association*, of November, 1864, we said:—"If the emancipation of the working classes requires their fraternal concurrence, how are they to fulfil that great mission with a foreign policy in pursuit of criminal designs, playing upon national prejudices and squandering in piratical wars the people's blood and treasure?" We defined the foreign policy aimed at by the International in these words: "Vindicate the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the laws paramount of the intercourse of nations."

No wonder that Louis Bonaparte, who usurped his power by exploiting the war of classes in France, and perpetuated it by periodical wars abroad, should from the first have treated the International as a dangerous foe. On the eve of the plebiscite¹ he ordered a raid on the members of the Administrative Committees of the International Working Men's Association throughout France, at Paris, Lyons, Rouen, Marseilles, Brest, etc., on the pretext that the International was a secret society dabbling in a complot for his assassination, a pretext soon after exposed in its full ab-

¹ The plebiscite was conducted by Napoleon III in May 1870 for the alleged purpose of ascertaining the attitude of the popular masses to the empire. The questions were so worded that it was impossible to express one's disapproval of his policy without at the same time declaring against all democratic reforms. The sections of the First International in France exposed this demagogic manoeuvre and instructed its members to abstain from voting.—*Ed.*

surdity by his own judges. What was the real crime of the French branches of the International? They told the French people publicly and emphatically that voting the plebiscite was voting despotism at home and war abroad. It has been, in fact, their work that in all the great towns, in all the industrial centres of France, the working class rose like one man to reject the plebiscite. Unfortunately the balance was turned by the heavy ignorance of the rural districts. The Stock Exchanges, the Cabinets, the ruling classes and the press of Europe celebrated the plebiscite as a signal victory of the French Emperor over the French working class; and it was the signal for the assassination, not of an individual, but of nations.

The war plot of July, 1870,¹ is but an amended edition of the *coup d'état* of December, 1851. At first view the thing seemed so absurd that France would not believe in its real good earnest. It rather believed the deputy denouncing the ministerial war talk as a mere stock jobbing trick. When, on July 15th, war was at last officially announced to the *Corps Législatif*, the whole opposition refused to vote the preliminary subsidies, even Thiers branded it as "detestable"; all the independent journals of Paris condemned it, and, wonderful to relate, the provincial press joined in almost unanimously.

Meanwhile, the Paris members of the International had again set to work. In the *Réveil*² of July 12th they published their manifesto "to the workmen of all nations," from which we extract the following few passages:

"Once more," they say, "on the pretext of the European equilibrium, of national honour, the peace of the world is menaced by political ambitions. French, German, Spanish workmen! let our voices unite in one cry of reprobation against war! . . . War for a question of preponderance or a dynasty, can, in the eyes of workmen, be nothing but a criminal absurdity. In answer to the war-like proclamations of those who exempt themselves from the impost of blood, and find in public misfortunes a source of fresh speculations, we protest, we who want peace, labour and liberty! . . . Brothers of Germany! Our division would only result in the complete triumph of *despotism* on both sides of the Rhine. . . . Workmen of all countries! whatever may for the present become

¹ The Franco-Prussian War began on July 19, 1870.—*Ed.*

² *Réveil* [*Reveille*]: Left-republican newspaper founded by Charles Delécluze. It appeared in Paris from 1868 to January 1871.—*Ed.*

of our common efforts, we, the members of the International Working Men's Association, who know of no frontiers, we send you as a pledge of indissoluble solidarity the good wishes and the salutations of the workmen of France."

This manifesto of our Paris section was followed by numerous similar French addresses, of which we can here only quote the declaration of Neuilly-sur-Seine, published in the *Marseillaise*¹ of July 22nd: "The war, is it just?—No! The war, is it national?—No! It is merely dynastic. In the name of humanity, of democracy, and the true interests of France, we adhere completely and energetically to the protestation of the International against the war."

These protestations expressed the true sentiments of the French working people, as was soon shown by a curious incident. *The Band of the 10th of December*,² first organized under the presidency of Louis Bonaparte, having been masqueraded into *blouses* and let loose on the streets of Paris, there to perform the contortions of war fever, the real workmen of the Faubourgs came forward with public peace demonstrations so overwhelming that Pietri, the Prefect of Police, thought it prudent to at once stop all further street politics, on the plea that the feal Paris people had given sufficient vent to their pent up patriotism and exuberant war enthusiasm.

Whatever may be the incidents of Louis Bonaparte's war with Prussia, the death knell of the Second Empire has already sounded at Paris. It will end as it began, by a parody. But let us not forget that it is the Governments and the ruling classes of Europe who enabled Louis Bonaparte to play during eighteen years the ferocious farce of the *Restored Empire*.

On the German side, the war is a war of defence, but who put Germany to the necessity of defending herself? Who enabled Louis Bonaparte to wage war upon her? *Prussia!* It was Bismarck who conspired with that very same Louis Bonaparte for the purpose of crushing popular opposition at home, and annexing Germany to the Hohenzollern dynasty. If the battle of Sadowa³ had been lost instead of being won, French battalions would have overrun

¹ *Marseillaise*: Left-republican newspaper published in Paris by Henri Rochefort from December 1869 to September 9, 1870.—*Ed.*

² See pp. 294-97 of this volume.—*Ed.*

³ The battle of Sadowa (in Bohemia) was decisive in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, from which Prussia emerged victorious.—*Ed.*

Germany as the allies of Prussia. After her victory did Prussia dream one moment of opposing a free Germany to an enslaved France? Just the contrary. While carefully preserving all the native beauties of her old system, she superadded all the tricks of the Second Empire, its real despotism and its mock democratism, its political shams and its financial jobs, its high-flown talk and its low *legerdemains*. The Bonapartist regime, which till then only flourished on one side of the Rhine, had now got its counterfeit on the other. From such a state of things, what else could result but *war*?

If the German working class allow the present war to lose its strictly defensive character and to degenerate into a war against the French people, victory or defeat will prove alike disastrous. All the miseries that befell Germany after her war of independence will revive with accumulated intensity.

The principles of the International are, however, too widely spread and too firmly rooted amongst the German working class to apprehend such a sad consummation. The voices of the French workmen have re-echoed from Germany. A mass meeting of workmen, held at Brunswick on July 16th, expressed its full concurrence with the Paris manifesto, spurned the idea of national antagonism to France, and wound up its resolutions with these words:—"We are enemies of all wars, but above all of dynastic wars. . . . With deep sorrow and grief we are forced to undergo a defensive war as an unavoidable evil; but we call, at the same time, upon the whole German working class to render the recurrence of such an immense social misfortune impossible by vindicating for the peoples themselves the power to decide on peace and war, and making them masters of their own destinies."

At Chemnitz, a meeting of delegates representing 50,000 Saxon workers adopted unanimously a resolution to this effect:—"In the name of the German Democracy, and especially of the workmen forming the Democratic Socialist party, we declare the present war to be exclusively dynastic. . . . We are happy to grasp the fraternal hand stretched out to us by the workmen of France. . . . Mindful of the watchword of the International Working Men's Association: *Proletarians of all countries, unite*, we shall never forget that the workmen of *all* countries are our *friends* and the despots of *all* countries our *enemies*." The Berlin branch of the International has also replied to the Paris manifesto:—"We," they say, "join with heart and hand your protestation. . . .

Solemnly we promise that neither the sound of the trumpet, nor the roar of the cannon, neither victory nor defeat shall divert us from our common work for the union of the children of toil of all countries."

Be it so!

In the background of this suicidal strife looms the dark figure of Russia. It is an ominous sign that the signal for the present war should have been given at the moment when the Moscovite Government had just finished its strategical lines of railway and was already massing troops in the direction of the Pruth. Whatever sympathy the Germans may justly claim in a war of defence against Bonapartist aggression, they would forfeit at once by allowing the Prussian Government to call for, or accept, the help of the Cossack. Let them remember that, after their war of independence against the first Napoleon, Germany lay for generations prostrate at the feet of the Czar.

The English working class stretch the hand of fellowship to the French and German working people. They feel deeply convinced that whatever turn the impending horrid war may take, the alliance of the working classes of all countries will ultimately kill war. The very fact that while official France and Germany are rushing into a fratricidal feud, the workmen of France and Germany send each other messages of peace and goodwill; this great fact, unparalleled in the history of the past, opens the vista of a brighter future. It proves that in contrast to old society, with its economical miseries and its political delirium, a new society is springing up, whose International rule will be *Peace*, because its national ruler will be everywhere the same—*Labour!* The Pioneer of that new society is the International Working Men's Association.

[London], July 23, 1870

Written by Marx and endorsed at a session of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association held on July 23, 1870

Printed forthwith, in the form of leaflets, in English, German and French

Printed according to the text of the English leaflet

SECOND ADDRESS OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL
OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S
ASSOCIATION
ON THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S
ASSOCIATION
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

In our first Manifesto of the 23rd of July we said:—"The death knell of the Second Empire has already sounded at Paris. It will end as it began, by a parody. But let us not forget that it is the Governments and the ruling classes of Europe who enabled Louis Napoleon to play during eighteen years the ferocious farce of the *Restored Empire*."

Thus, even before war operations had actually set in, we treated the Bonapartist bubble as a thing of the past.

If we were not mistaken as to the vitality of the Second Empire, we were not wrong in our apprehension lest the German war should "lose its strictly defensive character and degenerate into a war against the French people." The war of defence ended, in point of fact, with the surrender of Louis Bonaparte, the Sedan capitulation, and the proclamation of the Republic at Paris. But long before these events, the very moment that the utter rottenness of the Imperialist arms became evident, the Prussian military *camarilla* had resolved upon conquest. There lay an ugly obstacle in their way—*King William's own proclamations at the commencement of the war*. In his speech from the throne to the North German Diet, he had solemnly declared to make war upon the emperor of the French, and not upon the French people. On the 11th of August he had issued a manifesto to the French nation, where he said: "The Emperor Napoleon having made, by land and sea, an attack on the German nation, which desired and

still desires to live in peace with the French people, I have assumed the command of the German armies *to repel his aggression*, and I have been led by *military events to cross the frontiers of France*." Not content to assert the defensive character of the war by the statement that he only assumed the command of the German armies "*to repel aggression*," he added that he was only "led by military events" to cross the frontiers of France. A defensive war does, of course, not exclude offensive operations, dictated by "military events."

Thus this pious king stood pledged before France and the world to a strictly defensive war. How to release him from his solemn pledge? The stage-managers had to exhibit him as giving, reluctantly, way to the irresistible behest of the German nation. They at once gave the cue to the liberal German middle class, with its professors, its capitalists, its aldermen, and its penmen. That middle class which in its struggle for civil liberty had, from 1846 to 1870, been exhibiting an unexampled spectacle of irresolution, incapacity, and cowardice, felt, of course, highly delighted to bestride the European scene as the roaring lion of German patriotism. It re-vindicated its civic independence by affecting to force upon the Prussian Government the secret designs of that same government. It does penance for its long-continued and almost religious faith in Louis Bonaparte's infallibility, by shouting for the dismemberment of the French Republic. Let us for a moment listen to the special pleadings of those stout-hearted patriots!

They dare not pretend that the people of Alsace and Lorraine pant for the German embrace; quite the contrary. To punish their French patriotism, Strasburg, a town with an independent citadel commanding it, has for six days been wantonly and fiendishly bombarded by "German" explosive shells, setting it on fire, and killing great numbers of its defenceless inhabitants! Yet, the soil of those provinces once upon a time belonged to the whilom German Empire. Hence, it seems, the soil and the human beings grown on it must be confiscated as imprescriptible German property. If the map of Europe is to be remade in the antiquary's vein, let us by no means forget that the Elector of Brandenburg, for his Prussian dominions, was the vassal of the Polish Republic.

The more knowing patriots, however, require Alsace and the German-speaking part of Lorraine as a "material guarantee" against French aggression. As this contemptible plea has bewil-

dered many weak-minded people, we are bound to enter more fully upon it.

There is no doubt that the general configuration of Alsace, as compared with the opposite bank of the Rhine, and the presence of a large fortified town like Strasburg, about halfway between Basle and Germersheim, very much favour a French invasion of South Germany, while they offer peculiar difficulties to an invasion of France from South Germany. There is, further, no doubt that the addition of Alsace and German-speaking Lorraine would give South Germany a much stronger frontier, inasmuch as she would then be master of the crest of the Vosges mountains in its whole length, and of the fortresses which cover its northern passes. If Metz were annexed as well, France would certainly for the moment be deprived of her two principal bases of operation against Germany, but that would not prevent her from constructing a fresh one at Nancy or Verdun. While Germany owns Coblenz, Mainz, Germersheim, Rastadt, and Ulm, all bases of operation against France, and plentifully made use of in this war, with what show of fair play can she begrudge France Strasburg and Metz, the only two fortresses of any importance she has on that side? Moreover, Strasburg endangers South Germany only while South Germany is a separate power from North Germany. From 1792-95 South Germany was never invaded from that direction, because Prussia was a party to the war against the French Revolution; but as soon as Prussia made a peace of her own in 1795, and left the South to shift for itself, the invasions of South Germany with Strasburg for a base, began, and continued till 1809. The fact is, a *united* Germany can always render Strasburg and any French army in Alsace innocuous by concentrating all her troops, as was done in the present war, between Saarlouis and Landau, and advancing, or accepting battle, on the line of road between Mainz and Metz. While the mass of the German troops is stationed there, any French army advancing from Strasburg into South Germany would be outflanked, and have its communications threatened. If the present campaign has proved anything, it is the facility of invading France from Germany.

But, in good faith, is it not altogether an absurdity and an anachronism to make military considerations the principle by which the boundaries of nations are to be fixed? If this rule were to prevail, Austria would still be entitled to Venetia and the line of the Mincio, and France to the line of the Rhine, in order to

protect Paris, which lies certainly more open to an attack from the North East than Berlin does from the South West. If limits are to be fixed by military interests, there will be no end to claims, because every military line is necessarily faulty, and may be improved by annexing some more outlying territory; and, moreover, they can never be fixed finally and fairly, because they always must be imposed by the conqueror upon the conquered, and consequently carry within them the seed of fresh wars.

Such is the lesson of all history. Thus with nations as with individuals. To deprive them of the power of offence, you must deprive them of the means of defence. You must not only garrotte but murder. If ever conqueror took "material guarantees" for breaking the sinews of a nation, the first Napoleon did so by the Tilsit treaty,¹ and the way he executed it against Prussia and the rest of Germany. Yet, a few years later, his gigantic power split like a rotten reed upon the German people. What are the "material guarantees" Prussia, in her wildest dreams, can, or dare impose upon France, compared to the "material guarantees" the first Napoleon had wrenched from herself? The result will not prove the less disastrous. History will measure its retribution, not by the extent of the square miles conquered from France, but by the intensity of the crime of reviving, in the second half of the 19th century, *the policy of conquest!*

But, say the mouth pieces of Teutonic patriotism, you must not confound Germans with Frenchmen. What we want is not glory, but safety. The Germans are an essentially peaceful people. In their sober guardianship, conquest itself changes from a condition of future war into a pledge of perpetual peace. Of course, it is not Germans that invaded France in 1792, for the sublime purpose of bayonetting the revolution of the 18th century. It is not Germans that befouled their hands by the subjugation of Italy, the oppression of Hungary, and the dismemberment of Poland. Their present military system, which divides the whole adult male population into two parts,—one standing army on service, and another standing army on furlough, both equally bound in passive obedience to rulers by divine right,—such a military system is, of course, a "material guarantee" for keeping the peace, and the ultimate goal of civilizing tendencies! In Germany, as every-

¹ The Treaty of Tilsit was concluded in 1807 between France and Russia after the military defeat of Prussia by the troops of Napoleon I.—*Ed.*

where else, the sycophants of the powers that be poison the popular mind by the incense of mendacious self-praise.

Indignant as they pretend to be at the sight of French fortresses in Metz and Strasburg, those German patriots see no harm in the vast system of Moscovite fortifications at Warsaw, Modlin, and Ivangorod. While gloating at the terrors of imperialist invasion, they blink at the infamy of autocratic tutelage.

As in 1865 promises were exchanged between Louis Bonaparte and Bismarck, so in 1870 promises have been exchanged between Gorchakov and Bismarck. As Louis Bonaparte flattered himself that the War of 1866, resulting in the common exhaustion of Austria and Prussia, would make him the supreme arbiter of Germany, so Alexander flattered himself that the War of 1870, resulting in the common exhaustion of Germany and France, would make him the supreme arbiter of the Western Continent. As the Second Empire thought the North German Confederation incompatible with its existence, so autocratic Russia must think herself endangered by a German empire under Prussian leadership. Such is the law of the old political system. Within its pale the gain of one state is the loss of the other. The Czar's paramount influence over Europe roots in his traditional hold on Germany. At a moment when in Russia herself volcanic social agencies threaten to shake the very base of autocracy, could the Czar afford to bear with such a loss of foreign prestige? Already the Moscovite journals repeat the language of the Bonapartist journals after the war of 1866. Do the Teuton patriots really believe that liberty and peace will be guaranteed to Germany by forcing France into the arms of Russia? If the fortune of her arms, the arrogance of success, and dynastic intrigue lead Germany to a dismemberment of France, there will then only remain two courses open to her. She must at all risks become the *avowed* tool of Russian aggrandisement, or, after some short respite, make again ready for another "defensive" war, not one of those new-fangled "localized" wars, but a *war of races*—a war with the combined Slavonian and Roman races.

The German working class has resolutely supported the war, which it was not in their power to prevent, as a war for German independence and the liberation of France and Europe from that pestilential incubus, the Second Empire. It was the German workmen who, together with the rural labourers, furnished the sinews and muscles of heroic hosts, leaving behind their half-starved

families. Decimated by the battles abroad, they will be once more decimated by misery at home. In their turn they are now coming forward to ask for "guarantees,"—guarantees that their immense sacrifices have not been brought in vain, that they have conquered liberty, that the victory over the Imperialist armies will not, as in 1815, be turned into the defeat of the German people; and, as the first of these guarantees, they claim an *honourable peace for France*, and the *recognition of the French Republic*.

The Central Committee of the German Socialist-Democratic Workmen's Party issued, on the 5th of September, a manifesto, energetically insisting upon these guarantees. "We," they say, "we protest against the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine. And we are conscious of speaking in the name of the German working class. In the common interest of France and Germany, in the interest of peace and liberty, in the interest of Western civilization against Eastern barbarism, the German workmen will not patiently tolerate the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine. . . . We shall faithfully stand by our fellow-workmen in all countries for the common international cause of the Proletariat!"

Unfortunately, we cannot feel sanguine of their immediate success. If the French workmen amidst peace failed to stop the aggressor, are the German workmen more likely to stop the victor amidst the clangour of arms? The German workmen's manifesto demands the extradition of Louis Bonaparte as a common felon to the French Republic. Their rulers are, on the contrary, already trying hard to restore him to the Tuileries as the best man to ruin France. However that may be, history will prove that the German working class are not made of the same malleable stuff as the German middle class. They will do their duty.

Like them, we hail the advent of the Republic in France, but at the same time we labour under misgivings which we hope will prove groundless. That Republic has not subverted the throne, but only taken its place become vacant. It has been proclaimed, not as a social conquest, but as a national measure of defence. It is in the hands of a Provisional Government composed partly of notorious Orleanists, partly of middle-class Republicans, upon some of whom the insurrection of June, 1848, has left its indelible stigma. The division of labour amongst the members of that Government looks awkward. The Orleanists have seized the strongholds of the army and the police, while to the professed Republicans have fallen the talking departments. Some of their first acts

go far to show that they have inherited from the Empire, not only ruins, but also its dread of the working class. If eventual impossibilities are in wild phraseology demanded from the Republic, is it not with a view to prepare the cry for a "possible" government? Is the Republic, by some of its middle-class managers, not intended to serve as a mere stopgap and bridge over an Orleanist Restoration?

The French working class moves, therefore, under circumstances of extreme difficulty. Any attempt at upsetting the new Government in the present crisis, when the enemy is almost knocking at the doors of Paris, would be a desperate folly. The French workmen must perform their duties as citizens; but, at the same time, they must not allow themselves to be deluded by the national *souvenirs*¹ of 1792, as the French peasants allowed themselves to be deluded by the national *souvenirs* of the First Empire. They have not to recapitulate the past, but to build up the future. Let them calmly and resolutely improve the opportunities of Republican liberty, for the work of their own class organization. It will gift them with fresh Herculean powers for the regeneration of France, and our common task—the emancipation of labour. Upon their energies and wisdom hinges the fate of the Republic.

The English workmen have already taken measures to overcome, by a wholesome pressure from without, the reluctance of their Government to recognize the French Republic.² The present dilatoriness of the British Government is probably intended to atone for the Anti-Jacobin war and its former indecent haste in sanctioning the *coup d'état*. The English workmen call also upon their Government to oppose by all its power the dismemberment of France, which part of the English press is so shameless enough to howl for. It is the same press that for twenty years deified Louis Bonaparte as the providence of Europe, that frantically cheered on the slaveholders' rebellion.³ Now, as then, it drudges for the slaveholder.

¹ Remembrances.—*Ed.*

² An allusion to the great campaign of meetings, which developed in England among the workers on the initiative of Marx and the General Council of the First International, for securing recognition of the French Republic.—*Ed.*

³ During the Civil War in the U.S.A. (1861-65) between the industrial North and the South, which upheld the system of slave plantations, the English bourgeois press supported the South, that is, slavery.—*Ed.*

Let the sections of the *International Working Men's Association* in every country stir the working classes to action. If they forsake their duty, if they remain passive, the present tremendous war will be but the harbinger of still deadlier international feuds, and lead in every nation to a renewed triumph over the workman by the lords of the sword, of the soil, and of capital.

Vive la République.

Written by Marx and endorsed at a session of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association held on September 9, 1870

Printed at once, in the form of leaflets, in English, German and French

Printed according to the text of the English leaflet

ADDRESS OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL
OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S
ASSOCIATION
ON THE CIVIL WAR IN FRANCE, 1871

TO ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

I

On the 4th of September, 1870, when the working men of Paris proclaimed the Republic, which was almost instantaneously acclaimed throughout France, without a single voice of dissent, a cabal of place-hunting barristers, with Thiers for their statesman and Trochu for their general, took hold of the Hôtel de Ville. At that time they were imbued with so fanatical a faith in the mission of Paris to represent France in all epochs of historical crisis, that, to legitimate their usurped titles as governors of France, they thought it quite sufficient to produce their lapsed mandates as representatives of Paris. In our second address on the late war, five days after the rise of these men, we told you who they were. Yet, in the turmoil of surprise, with the real leaders of the working class still shut up in Bonapartist prisons and the Prussians already marching upon Paris, Paris bore with their assumption of power, on the express condition that it was to be wielded for the single purpose of national defence. Paris, however, was not to be defended without arming its working class, organizing them into an effective force, and training their ranks by the war itself. But Paris armed was the Revolution armed. A victory of Paris over the Prussian aggressor would have been a victory of the French workman over the French capitalist and his State parasites. In this conflict between national duty and class interest, the Government of National Defence did not hesitate one moment to turn into a Government of National Defection.

The first step they took was to send Thiers on a roving tour to all the courts of Europe, there to beg mediation by offering the barter of the Republic for a king. Four months after the commencement of the siege, when they thought the opportune moment come for breaking the first word of capitulation, Trochu, in the presence of Jules Favre and others of his colleagues, addressed the assembled mayors of Paris in these terms:

"The first question put to me by my colleagues on the very evening of the 4th of September was this: Paris, can it with any chance of success stand a siege by the Prussian army? I did not hesitate to answer in the negative. Some of my colleagues here present will warrant the truth of my words and the persistence of my opinion. I told them, in these very terms, that, under the existing state of things, the attempt of Paris to hold out a siege by the Prussian army would be a folly. Without doubt, I added, it would be an heroic folly; but that would be all. . . . The events (managed by himself) have not given the lie to my prevision."

This nice little speech of Trochu was afterwards published by M. Corbon, one of the mayors present.

Thus, on the very evening of the proclamation of the republic, Trochu's "plan" was known to his colleagues to be the capitulation of Paris. If national defence had been more than a pretext for the personal government of Thiers, Favre, and Co., the upstarts of the 4th of September would have abdicated on the 5th—would have initiated the Paris people into Trochu's "plan," and called upon them to surrender at once, or to take their own fate into their own hands. Instead of this, the infamous impostors resolved upon curing the heroic folly of Paris by a regimen of famine and broken heads, and to dupe her in the meanwhile by ranting manifestoes, holding forth that Trochu, "the governor of Paris, will never capitulate," and Jules Favre, the foreign minister, will "not cede an inch of our territory, nor a stone of our fortresses." In a letter to Gambetta, that very same Jules Favre avows that what they were "defending" against were not the Prussian soldiers, but the working men of Paris. During the whole continuance of the siege the Bonapartist cut-throats, whom Trochu had wisely intrusted with the command of the Paris army, exchanged, in their intimate correspondence, ribald jokes at the well-understood mockery of defence. (See, for instance, the correspondence of Alphonse Simon Guiod, supreme

commander of the artillery of the Army of Defence of Paris and Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour, to Susane, general of division of artillery, a correspondence published by the *Journal Officiel*¹ of the Commune.) The mask of imposture was at last dropped on the 28th of January, 1871. With the true heroism of utter self-debasement, the Government of National Defence, in their capitulation, came out as the government of France by Bismarck's prisoners—a part so base that Louis Bonaparte himself had, at Sedan, shrunk from accepting it. After the events of the 18th of March, on their wild flight to Versailles, the *capitulards* left in the hands of Paris the documentary evidence of their treason, to destroy which, as the Commune says in its manifesto to the provinces, "those men would not recoil from battering Paris into a heap of ruins washed by a sea of blood."

To be eagerly bent upon such a consummation, some of the leading members of the Government of Defence had, besides, most peculiar reasons of their own.

Shortly after the conclusion of the armistice, M. Millière, one of the representatives of Paris to the National Assembly, now shot by express order of Jules Favre, published a series of authentic legal documents in proof that Jules Favre, living in concubinage with the wife of a drunkard resident at Algiers, had, by a most daring concoction of forgeries, spread over many years, contrived to grasp, in the name of the children of his adultery, a large succession, which made him a rich man, and that, in a lawsuit undertaken by the legitimate heirs, he only escaped exposure by the connivance of the Bonapartist tribunals. As these dry legal documents were not to be got rid of by any amount of rhetorical horse-power, Jules Favre, for the first time in his life, held his tongue, quietly awaiting the outbreak of the civil war, in order, then, frantically to denounce the people of Paris as a band of escaped convicts in utter revolt against family, religion, order and property. This same forger had hardly got into power, after the 4th of September, when he sympathetically let loose upon society Pic and Taillefer, convicted, even under the empire, of forgery, in the scandalous affair of the "Étendard." One of these men, Taillefer, having dared to return to Paris

¹ *Journal Officiel de la République Française*: Organ of the government of the Paris Commune; appeared in Paris from March 19 to May 24, 1871.—Ed.

under the Commune, was at once reinstated in prison; and then Jules Favre exclaimed, from the tribune of the National Assembly, that Paris was setting free all her jailbirds!

Ernest Picard, the Joe Miller¹ of the Government of National Defence, who appointed himself Finance Minister of the Republic after having in vain striven to become the Home Minister of the Empire, is the brother of one Arthur Picard, an individual expelled from the Paris *Bourse* as a blackleg (see report of the Prefecture of Police, dated the 13th of July, 1867), and convicted, on his own confession, of a theft of 300,000 francs, while manager of one of the branches of the *Société Générale*, rue Palestro, No. 5 (see report of the Prefecture of Police, 11th December, 1868). This Arthur Picard was made by Ernest Picard the editor of his paper, *l'Electeur Libre*. While the common run of stockjobbers were led astray by the official lies of this Finance Office paper, Arthur was running backwards and forwards between the Finance Office and the *Bourse*, there to discount the disasters of the French army. The whole financial correspondence of that worthy pair of brothers fell into the hands of the Commune.

Jules Ferry, a penniless barrister before the 4th of September, contrived, as Mayor of Paris during the siege, to job a fortune out of famine. The day on which he would have to give an account of his maladministration would be the day of his conviction.

These men, then, could find, in the ruins of Paris only, their tickets-of-leave: they were the very men Bismarck wanted. With the help of some shuffling of cards, Thiers, hitherto the secret prompter of the Government, now appeared at its head, with the ticket-of-leave-men² for his Ministers.

Thiers, that monstrous gnome, has charmed the French bourgeoisie for almost half a century, because he is the most con-

¹ The German edition has Karl Vogt; the French, Falstaff.

Joe Miller: Celebrated English actor of the eighteenth century. *Karl Vogt*: German bourgeois democrat who became an agent of Napoleon III. *Falstaff*: Character in Shakespeare's plays portraying the typical rogue and braggart.—*Ed.*

² In England common criminals are often discharged on parole after serving the greater part of their term, and are placed under police surveillance. On such discharge they receive a certificate called ticket-of-leave, their possessors being referred to as ticket-of-leave-men. [*Note by Engels to the German edition of 1871.*]

summate intellectual expression of their own class-corruption. Before he became a statesman he had already proved his lying powers as an historian. The chronicle of his public life is the record of the misfortunes of France. Banded, before 1830, with the republicans, he slipped into office under Louis Philippe by betraying his protector Laffitte, ingratiating himself with the king by exciting mob-riots against the clergy, during which the church of Saint Germain l'Auxerrois and the Archbishop's palace were plundered, and by acting the minister-spy upon, and the jail-*accoucheur* of, the Duchess de Berry. The massacre of the republicans in the rue Transnonain, and the subsequent infamous laws of September against the press and the right of association, were his work. Reappearing as the chief of the Cabinet in March, 1840, he astonished France with his plan of fortifying Paris. To the Republicans, who denounced this plan as a sinister plot against the liberty of Paris, he replied from the tribune of the Chamber of Deputies:

"What! to fancy that any works of fortification could ever endanger liberty! And first of all you calumniate any possible Government in supposing that it could some day attempt to maintain itself by bombarding the capital; . . . but that government would be a hundred times more impossible after its victory than before." Indeed, no Government would ever have dared to bombard Paris from the forts, but that Government which had previously surrendered these forts to the Prussians.

When King Bomba¹ tried his hand at Palermo, in January, 1848, Thiers, then long since out of office, again rose in the Chamber of Deputies: "You know, gentlemen, what is happening at Palermo. You, all of you, shake with horror (in the parliamentary sense) on hearing that during forty-eight hours a large town has been bombarded—by whom? Was it by a foreign enemy exercising the rights of war? No, gentlemen, it was by its own Government. And why? Because that unfortunate town demanded its rights. Well, then, for the demand of its rights it has got forty-eight hours of bombardment. . . . Allow me to appeal to the opinion of Europe. It is doing a service to mankind to arise, and to make reverberate, from what is perhaps the greatest tribune in Europe, some words (indeed words) of indignation against such acts. . . . When the Regent Espartero, who

¹ *King Bomba*: Sobriquet of King Ferdinand II of the Two Sicilies.—*Ed.*

had rendered services to his country (which M. Thiers never did), intended bombarding Barcelona, in order to suppress its insurrection, there arose from all parts of the world a general outcry of indignation."

Eighteen months afterwards, M. Thiers was amongst the fiercest defenders of the bombardment of Rome by a French army.¹ In fact, the fault of King Bomba seems to have consisted in this only, that he limited his bombardment to forty-eight hours.

A few days before the Revolution of February, fretting at the long exile from place and pelf to which Guizot had condemned him, and sniffing in the air the scent of an approaching popular commotion, Thiers, in that pseudo-heroic style which won him the nickname of *Mirabeau-mouche*,² declared to the Chamber of Deputies: "I am of the party of Revolution, not only in France, but in Europe. I wish the Government of the Revolution to remain in the hands of moderate men . . . but if that Government should fall into the hands of ardent minds, even into those of Radicals, I shall, for all that, not desert my cause. I shall always be of the party of the Revolution." The Revolution of February came. Instead of displacing the Guizot Cabinet by the Thiers Cabinet, as the little man had dreamt, it superseded Louis Philippe by the Republic. On the first day of the popular victory he carefully hid himself, forgetting that the contempt of the working men screened him from their hatred. Still, with his legendary courage, he continued to shy the public stage, until the June massacres³ had cleared it for his sort of action. Then he became the leading mind of the "Party of Order" and its Parliamentary Republic, that anonymous interregnum, in which all the rival factions of the ruling class conspired together to crush the people, and conspired against each other to restore each of them its own monarchy. Then, as now, Thiers denounced the Republicans as the only obstacle to the consolidation of the Republic; then, as now, he spoke to the Republic as the hang-

¹ In April 1849 French troops were sent to Italy to suppress the Italian Revolution. They bombarded revolutionary Rome, in glaring violation of the French constitution, which provided that the republic would never employ its forces to suppress the liberty of any people.—*Ed.*

² Mirabeau the fly.—*Ed.*

³ This refers to the suppression of the June insurrection of the Paris proletariat in 1848.—*Ed.*

man spoke to Don Carlos:—"I shall assassinate thee, but for thy own good." Now, as then, he will have to exclaim on the day after his victory: "*L'Empire est fait*"—the Empire is consummated. Despite his hypocritical homilies about necessary liberties and his personal grudge against Louis Bonaparte, who had made a dupe of him, and kicked out parliamentarism—and outside of its factitious atmosphere the little man is conscious of withering into nothingness—he had a hand in all the infamies of the Second Empire, from the occupation of Rome by French troops to the war with Prussia, which he incited by his fierce invective against German unity—not as a cloak of Prussian despotism, but as an encroachment upon the vested right of France in German disunion. Fond of brandishing, with his dwarfish arms, in the face of Europe the sword of the first Napoleon, whose historical shoe-black he had become, his foreign policy always culminated in the utter humiliation of France, from the London convention of 1841 to the Paris capitulation of 1871, and the present civil war, where he hounds on the prisoners of Sedan and Metz against Paris by special permission of Bismarck. Despite his versatility of talent and shiftiness of purpose, this man has his whole lifetime been wedded to the most fossil routine. It is self-evident that to him the deeper under-currents of modern society remained forever hidden; but even the most palpable changes on its surface were abhorrent to a brain all the vitality of which had fled to the tongue. Thus he never tired of denouncing as a sacrilege any deviation from the old French protective system. When a minister of Louis Philippe, he railed at railways as a wild chimera; and when in opposition under Louis Bonaparte, he branded as a profanation every attempt to reform the rotten French army system. Never in his long political career has he been guilty of a single—even the smallest—measure of any practical use. Thiers was consistent only in his greed for wealth and his hatred of the men that produce it. Having entered his first ministry under Louis Philippe poor as Job, he left it a millionaire. His last ministry under the same king (of the 1st of March, 1840) exposed him to public taunts of peculation in the Chamber of Deputies, to which he was content to reply by tears—a commodity he deals in as freely as Jules Favre, or any other crocodile. At Bordeaux his first measure for saving France from impending financial ruin was to endow himself with three millions a year, the first and the last word

of the "Economical Republic," the vista of which he had opened to his Paris electors in 1869. One of his former colleagues of the Chamber of Deputies of 1830, himself a capitalist and, nevertheless, a devoted member of the Paris Commune, M. Beslay, lately addressed Thiers thus in a public placard: "The enslavement of labour by capital has always been the corner-stone of your policy, and from the very day you saw the Republic of Labour installed at the Hôtel de Ville, you have never ceased to cry out to France: 'These are criminals!'" A master in small state roguery, a virtuoso in perjury and treason, a craftsman in all the petty stratagems, cunning devices, and base perfidies of parliamentary party-warfare; never scrupling, when out of office, to fan a revolution, and to stifle it in blood when at the helm of the state; with class prejudices standing him in the place of ideas, and vanity in the place of a heart; his private life as infamous as his public life is odious—even now, when playing the part of a French Sulla, he cannot help setting off the abomination of his deeds by the ridicule of his ostentation.

The capitulation of Paris, by surrendering to Prussia not only Paris, but all France, closed the long-continued intrigues of treason with the enemy, which the usurpers of the 4th of September had begun, as Trochu himself said, on that very same day. On the other hand, it initiated the civil war they were now to wage, with the assistance of Prussia, against the Republic and Paris. The trap was laid in the very terms of the capitulation. At that time above one-third of the territory was in the hands of the enemy, the capital was cut off from the provinces, all communications were disorganized. To elect under such circumstances a real representation of France was impossible, unless ample time were given for preparation. In view of this, the capitulation stipulated that a National Assembly must be elected within eight days; so that in many parts of France the news of the impending election arrived on its eve only. This assembly, moreover, was, by an express clause of the capitulation, to be elected for the sole purpose of deciding on peace or war, and, eventually, to conclude a treaty of peace. The population could not but feel that the terms of the armistice rendered the continuation of the war impossible, and that for sanctioning the peace imposed by Bismarck, the worst men in France were the best. But not content with these precautions, Thiers, even before the secret of the armistice had been broached to Paris, set out for

an electioneering tour through the provinces, there to galvanize back into life the Legitimist party, which now, along with the Orleanists, had to take the place of the then impossible Bonapartists. He was not afraid of them. Impossible as a government of modern France, and, therefore, contemptible as rivals, what party were more eligible as tools of counter-revolution than the party whose action, in the words of Thiers himself (Chamber of Deputies, 5th January, 1833), "had always been confined to the three resources of foreign invasion, civil war, and anarchy"? They verily believed in the advent of their long-expected retrospective millennium. There were the heels of foreign invasion trampling upon France; there was the downfall of an empire, and the captivity of a Bonaparte; and there they were themselves. The wheel of history had evidently rolled back to stop at the "Chambre introuvable" of 1816. In the assemblies of the republic, 1848 to 51, they had been represented by their educated and trained parliamentary champions; it was the rank-and-file of the party which now rushed in—all the Pourceaugnacs¹ of France.

As soon as this Assembly of "Rurals"² had met at Bordeaux, Thiers made it clear to them that the peace preliminaries must be assented to at once, without even the honours of a Parliamentary debate, as the only condition on which Prussia would permit them to open the war against the Republic and Paris, its stronghold. The counter-revolution had, in fact, no time to lose. The Second Empire had more than doubled the national debt, and plunged all the large towns into heavy municipal debts. The war had fearfully swelled the liabilities, and mercilessly ravaged the resources of the nation. To complete the ruin, the Prussian Shylock was there with his bond for the keep of half a million of his soldiers on French soil, his indemnity of five milliards, and interest at 5 per cent on the unpaid instalments thereof. Who was to pay the bill? It was only by the violent overthrow of the Republic that the appropriators of wealth could hope to shift on the shoulders of its producers the cost of a war which

¹ *Pourceaugnac*: A character in one of Molière's comedies, typifying the dull-witted, narrow-minded petty landed gentry.—*Ed.*

² *Assembly of Rurals*: The National Assembly, which opened in Bordeaux on February 12, 1871, had a vast majority of royalists (450 out of 750 deputies)—representatives of the landlords and reactionary elements of town and country. Hence its name of "Assembly of Rurals" or Landlord Chamber.—*Ed.*

they, the appropriators, had themselves originated. Thus, the immense ruin of France spurred on these patriotic representatives of land and capital, under the very eyes and patronage of the invader, to graft upon the foreign war a civil war—a slaveholders' rebellion.

There stood in the way of this conspiracy one great obstacle—Paris. To disarm Paris was the first condition of success. Paris was therefore summoned by Thiers to surrender its arms. Then Paris was exasperated by the frantic anti-republican demonstrations of the "Rural" Assembly and by Thiers' own equivocations about the legal status of the Republic; by the threat to decapitate and decapitalize Paris; the appointment of Orleanist ambassadors; Dufaure's laws on over-due commercial bills and house-rents, inflicting ruin on the commerce and industry of Paris; Pouyer-Quertier's tax of two centimes upon every copy of every imaginable publication; the sentences of death against Blanqui and Flourens; the suppression of the Republican journals; the transfer of the National Assembly to Versailles; the renewal of the state of siege declared by Palikao, and expired on the 4th of September; the appointment of Vinoy, the *Décembriseur*, as governor of Paris—of Valentin, the imperialist *gendarme*, as its prefect of police—and of D'Aurelle de Paladines, the Jesuit general, as the commander-in-chief of its National Guard.

And now we have to address a question to M. Thiers and the men of national defence, his under-strappers. It is known that, through the agency of M. Pouyer-Quertier, his finance minister, Thiers had contracted a loan of two milliards. Now, is it true, or not,—

1. That the business was so managed that a consideration of several hundred millions was secured for the private benefit of Thiers, Jules Favre, Ernest Picard, Pouyer-Quertier, and Jules Simon? and—

2. That no money was to be paid down until after the "pacification" of Paris?

At all events, there must have been something very pressing in the matter, for Thiers and Jules Favre, in the name of the majority of the Bordeaux Assembly, unblushingly solicited the immediate occupation of Paris by Prussian troops. Such, however, was not the game of Bismarck, as he sneeringly, and in public, told the admiring Frankfort philistines on his return to Germany.

II

Armed Paris was the only serious obstacle in the way of the counter-revolutionary conspiracy. Paris was, therefore, to be disarmed. On this point the Bordeaux Assembly was sincerity itself. If the roaring rant of its Rurals had not been audible enough, the surrender of Paris by Thiers to the tender mercies of the triumvirate of Vinoy the *Décembriseur*, Valentin the Bonapartist *gendarme*, and Aurelle de Paladines the Jesuit general, would have cut off even the last subterfuge of doubt. But while insultingly exhibiting the true purpose of the disarmament of Paris, the conspirators asked her to lay down her arms on a pretext which was the most glaring, the most barefaced of lies. The artillery of the Paris National Guard, said Thiers, belonged to the State, and to the State it must be returned. The fact was this:—From the very day of the capitulation, by which Bismarck's prisoners had signed the surrender of France, but reserved to themselves a numerous body-guard for the express purpose of cowing Paris, Paris stood on the watch. The National Guard reorganized themselves and intrusted their supreme control to a Central Committee elected by their whole body, save some fragments of the old Bonapartist formations. On the eve of the entrance of the Prussians into Paris, the Central Committee took measures for the removal to Montmartre, Belleville, and La Villette of the cannon and *mitrailleuses* treacherously abandoned by the *capitulards* in and about the very quarters the Prussians were to occupy. That artillery had been furnished by the subscriptions of the National Guard. As their private property, it was officially recognized in the capitulation of the 28th of January, and on that very title exempted from the general surrender, into the hands of the conqueror, of arms belonging to the government. And Thiers was so utterly destitute of even the flimsiest pretext for initiating the war against Paris, that he had to resort to the flagrant lie of the artillery of the National Guard being State property!

The seizure of her artillery was evidently but to serve as the preliminary to the general disarmament of Paris, and, therefore, of the Revolution of the 4th of September. But that Revolution had become the legal status of France. The republic, its work, was recognized by the conqueror in the terms of the capitulation. After the capitulation, it was acknowledged by all the

foreign Powers, and in its name the National Assembly had been summoned. The Paris working men's revolution of the 4th of September was the only legal title of the National Assembly seated at Bordeaux, and of its executive. Without it, the National Assembly would at once have to give way to the *Corps Législatif*, elected in 1869 by universal suffrage under French, not under Prussian, rule, and forcibly dispersed by the arm of the Revolution. Thiers and his ticket-of-leave-men would have had to capitulate for safe conducts signed by Louis Bonaparte, to save them from a voyage to Cayenne.¹ The National Assembly, with its power of attorney to settle the terms of peace with Prussia, was but an incident of that Revolution, the true embodiment of which was still armed Paris, which had initiated it, undergone for it a five months' siege, with its horrors of famine, and made her prolonged resistance, despite Trochu's plan, the basis of an obstinate war of defence in the provinces. And Paris was now either to lay down her arms at the insulting behest of the rebellious slaveholders of Bordeaux, and acknowledge that her Revolution of the 4th of September meant nothing but a simple transfer of power from Louis Bonaparte to his Royal rivals; or she had to stand forward as the self-sacrificing champion of France, whose salvation from ruin, and whose regeneration were impossible, without the revolutionary overthrow of the political and social conditions that had engendered the Second Empire, and, under its fostering care, matured into utter rotteness. Paris, emaciated by a five months' famine, did not hesitate one moment. She heroically resolved to run all the hazards of a resistance against the French conspirators, even with Prussian cannon frowning upon her from her own forts. Still, in its abhorrence of the civil war into which Paris was to be goaded, the Central Committee continued to persist in a merely defensive attitude, despite the provocations of the Assembly, the usurpations of the Executive, and the menacing concentration of troops in and around Paris.

Thiers opened the civil war by sending Vinoy, at the head of a multitude of *sergents-de-ville* and some regiments of the line, upon a nocturnal expedition against Montmartre, there to seize, by surprise, the artillery of the National Guard. It is well

¹ *Cayenne*: Capital of French Guiana in South America: penal settlement and place of exile.—*Ed.*

known how this attempt broke down before the resistance of the National Guard and the fraternization of the line with the people. Aurelle de Paladines had printed beforehand his bulletin of victory, and Thiers held ready the placards announcing his measures of *coup d'état*. Now these had to be replaced by Thiers' appeals, imparting his magnanimous resolve to leave the National Guard in the possession of their arms, with which, he said, he felt sure they would rally round the Government against the rebels. Out of 300,000 National Guards only 300 responded to this summons to rally round little Thiers against themselves. The glorious working men's Revolution of the 18th March took undisputed sway of Paris. The Central Committee was its provisional government. Europe seemed, for a moment, to doubt whether its recent sensational performances of state and war had any reality in them, or whether they were the dreams of a long bygone past.

From the 18th of March to the entrance of the Versailles troops into Paris, the proletarian revolution remained so free from the acts of violence in which the revolutions, and still more the counter-revolutions, of the "better classes" abound, that no facts were left to its opponents to cry out about but the execution of Generals Lecomte and Clément Thomas, and the affair of the Place Vendôme.

One of the Bonapartist officers engaged in the nocturnal attempt against Montmartre, General Lecomte, had four times ordered the 81st line regiment to fire at an unarmed gathering in the Place Pigalle, and on their refusal fiercely insulted them. Instead of shooting women and children, his own men shot him. The inveterate habits acquired by the soldiery under the training of the enemies of the working class are, of course, not likely to change the very moment these soldiers changed sides. The same men executed Clément Thomas.

"General" Clément Thomas, a malcontent exquartermaster-sergeant, had, in the latter times of Louis Philippe's reign, enlisted at the office of the Republican newspaper *Le National*, there to serve in the double capacity of responsible man-of-straw (*gérant responsable*) and of duelling bully to that very combative journal. After the revolution of February, the men of the *National* having got into power, they metamorphosed this old quartermaster-sergeant into a general on the eve of the butchery of June, of which he, like Jules Favre, was one of the sinister

plotters, and became one of the most dastardly executioners. Then he and his generalship disappeared for a long time, to again rise to the surface on the 1st November, 1870. The day before the Government of Defence, caught at the Hôtel de Ville, had solemnly pledged their parole to Blanqui, Flourens, and other representatives of the working class, to abdicate their usurped power into the hands of a commune to be freely elected by Paris. Instead of keeping their word, they let loose on Paris the Bretons of Trochu, who now replaced the Corsicans of Bonaparte. General Taxisier alone, refusing to sully his name by such a breach of faith, resigned the commandership-in-chief of the National Guard, and in his place Clément Thomas for once became again a general. During the whole of his tenure of command, he made war, not upon the Prussians, but upon the Paris National Guard. He prevented their general armament, pitted the bourgeois battalions against the working men's battalions, weeded out the officers hostile to Trochu's "plan," and disbanded, under the stigma of cowardice, the very same proletarian battalions whose heroism has now astonished their most inveterate enemies. Clément Thomas felt quite proud of having reconquered his June pre-eminence as the personal enemy of the working class of Paris. Only a few days before the 18th of March, he laid before the War Minister, Le Flô, a plan of his own for "finishing off *la fine fleur* [the cream] of the Paris *canaille*." After Vinoy's rout, he must needs appear upon the scene of action in the quality of an amateur spy. The Central Committee and the Paris working men were as much responsible for the killing of Clément Thomas and Lecomte as the Princess of Wales was for the fate of the people crushed to death on the day of her entrance into London.

The massacre of unarmed citizens in the Place Vendôme is a myth which M. Thiers and the Rurals persistently ignored in the Assembly, intrusting its propagation exclusively to the servants' hall of European journalism. "The men of order," the reactionists of Paris, trembled at the victory of the 18th of March. To them it was the signal of popular retribution at last arriving. The ghosts of the victims assassinated at their hands from the days of June, 1848, down to the 22nd of January, 1871, arose before their faces. Their panic was their only punishment. Even the *sergents-de-ville*, instead of being disarmed and locked up, as ought to have been done, had the gates of Paris flung wide open for their safe retreat to Versailles. The men of order were

left not only unharmed, but allowed to rally and quietly to seize more than one stronghold in the very centre of Paris. This indulgence of the Central Committee—this magnanimity of the armed working men—so strangely at variance with the habits of the "Party of Order," the latter misinterpreted as mere symptoms of conscious weakness. Hence their silly plan to try, under the cloak of an unarmed demonstration, what Vinoy had failed to perform with his cannon and *mitrailleuses*. On the 22nd of March a riotous mob of swells started from the quarters of luxury, all the *petits crevés* in their ranks, and at their head the notorious familiars of the Empire—the Heeckeren, Coëtlogon, Henri de Pène, etc. Under the cowardly pretence of a pacific demonstration, this rabble, secretly armed with the weapons of the bravo, fell into marching order, ill-treated and disarmed the detached patrols and sentries of the National Guards they met with on their progress, and, on debouching from the Rue de la Paix, with the cry of "Down with the Central Committee! Down with the assassins! The National Assembly for ever!" attempted to break through the line drawn up there, and thus to carry by a surprise the head-quarters of the National Guard in the Place Vendôme. In reply to their pistol-shots, the regular *sommations* (the French equivalent of the English Riot Act) were made, and, proving ineffective, fire was commanded by the general of the National Guard. One volley dispersed into wild flight the silly coxcombs, who expected that the mere exhibition of their "respectability" would have the same effect upon the Revolution of Paris as Joshua's trumpets upon the wall of Jericho. The runaways left behind them two National Guards killed, nine severely wounded (among them a member of the Central Committee), and the whole scene of their exploit strewn with revolvers, daggers, and sword-canes, in evidence of the "unarmed" character of their "pacific" demonstration. When, on the 13th of June, 1849, the National Guard made a really pacific demonstration in protest against the felonious assault of French troops upon Rome, Changarnier, then general of the Party of Order, was acclaimed by the National Assembly, and especially by M. Thiers, as the saviour of society, for having launched his troops from all sides upon these unarmed men, to shoot and sabre them down, and to trample them under their horses' feet. Paris, then, was placed under a state of siege. Dufaure hurried through the Assembly new laws of repression. New arrests, new

proscriptions—a new reign of terror set in. But the lower orders manage these things otherwise. The Central Committee of 1871 simply ignored the heroes of the “pacific demonstration”; so much so that only two days later they were enabled to muster under Admiral Saisset for that *armed* demonstration, crowned by the famous stampede to Versailles. In their reluctance to continue the civil war opened by Thiers’ burglarious attempt on Montmartre, the Central Committee made itself, this time, guilty of a decisive mistake in not at once marching upon Versailles, then completely helpless, and thus putting an end to the conspiracies of Thiers and his Rurals. Instead of this, the Party of Order was again allowed to try its strength at the ballot box, on the 26th of March, the day of the election of the Commune. Then, in the *mairies* of Paris, they exchanged bland words of conciliation with their too generous conquerors, muttering in their hearts solemn vows to exterminate them in due time.

Now look at the reverse of the medal. Thiers opened his second campaign against Paris in the beginning of April. The first batch of Parisian prisoners brought into Versailles was subjected to revolting atrocities, while Ernest Picard, with his hands in his trousers’ pockets, strolled about jeering them, and while Mesdames Thiers and Favre, in the midst of their ladies of honour (?) applauded, from the balcony, the outrages of the Versailles mob. The captured soldiers of the line were massacred in cold blood; our brave friend, General Duval, the iron-founder, was shot without any form of trial. Galliffet, the kept man of his wife, so notorious for her shameless exhibitions at the orgies of the Second Empire, boasted in a proclamation of having commanded the murder of a small troop of National Guards, with their captain and lieutenant, surprised and disarmed by his Chasseurs. Vinoy, the runaway, was appointed by Thiers Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour, for his general order to shoot down every soldier of the line taken in the ranks of the Federals. Desmarêt, the gendarme, was decorated for the treacherous butcher-like chopping in pieces of the high-souled and chivalrous Flourens, who had saved the heads of the Government of Defence on the 31st of October, 1870. “The encouraging particulars” of his assassination were triumphantly expatiated upon by Thiers in the National Assembly. With the elated vanity of a parliamentary Tom Thumb, permitted to play the part of a Tamerlane, he denied the rebels against his littleness every

right of civilized warfare, up to the right of neutrality for ambulances. Nothing more horrid than that monkey, allowed for a time to give full fling to his tigerish instincts, as foreseen by Voltaire. (See note, p. 35.)¹

After the decree of the Commune of the 7th April, ordering reprisals and declaring it to be its duty "to protect Paris against the cannibal exploits of the Versailles banditti, and to demand an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth," Thiers did not stop the barbarous treatment of prisoners, moreover insulting them in his bulletins as follows:—"Never have more degraded countenances of a degraded democracy met the afflicted gazes of honest men,"—honest like Thiers himself and his ministerial ticket-of-leave-men. Still the shooting of prisoners was suspended for a time. Hardly, however, had Thiers and his Decembrist generals become aware that the Communal decree of reprisals was but an empty threat, that even their gendarme spies caught in Paris under the disguise of National Guards, that even *sergents-de-ville*, taken with incendiary shells upon them, were spared,—when the wholesale shooting of prisoners was resumed and carried on uninterruptedly to the end. Houses to which National Guards had fled were surrounded by gendarmes, inundated with petroleum (which here occurs for the first time in this war), and then set fire to, the charred corpses being afterwards brought out by the ambulance of the Press at the Ternes. Four National Guards having surrendered to a troop of mounted Chasseurs at Belle Epine, on the 25th of April, were afterwards shot down, one after another, by the captain, a worthy man of Galliffet's. One of his four victims, left for dead, Scheffer, crawled back to the Parisian outposts, and deposed to this fact before a commission of the Commune. When Tolain interpellated the War Minister upon the report of this commission, the Rurals drowned his voice and forbade Le Flô to answer. It would be an insult to their "glorious" army to speak of its deeds. The flippant tone in which Thiers' bulletins announced the bayoneting of the Federals surprised asleep at Moulin Saquet, and the wholesale fusillades at Clamart shocked the nerves even of the not oversensitive London *Times*. But it would be ludicrous today to attempt recounting the merely preliminary atrocities committed by the bombardiers of Paris and the fomenters of a slavehold-

¹ See p. 542 of this volume.—*Ed.*

ers' rebellion protected by foreign invasion. Amidst all these horrors, Thiers, forgetful of his parliamentary laments on the terrible responsibility weighing down his dwarfish shoulders, boasts in his bulletin that *l'Assemblée siège paisiblement* (the Assembly continues meeting in peace), and proves by his constant carousals, now with Decembrist generals, now with German princes, that his digestion is not troubled in the least, not even by the ghosts of Lecomte and Clément Thomas.

III

On the dawn of the 18th of March, Paris arose to the thunderburst of "Vive la Commune!" What is the Commune, that sphinx so tantalizing to the bourgeois mind?

"The proletarians of Paris," said the Central Committee in its manifesto of the 18th March, "amidst the failures and treasons of the ruling classes, have understood that the hour has struck for them to save the situation by taking into their own hands the direction of public affairs. . . . They have understood that it is their imperious duty and their absolute right to render themselves masters of their own destinies, by seizing upon the governmental power." But the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.

The centralized State power, with its ubiquitous organs of standing army, police, bureaucracy, clergy, and judicature—organs wrought after the plan of a systematic and hierarchic division of labour,—originates from the days of absolute monarchy, serving nascent middle-class society as a mighty weapon in its struggles against feudalism. Still, its development remained clogged by all manner of mediaeval rubbish, seignorial rights, local privileges, municipal and guild monopolies and provincial constitutions. The gigantic broom of the French Revolution of the eighteenth century swept away all these relics of bygone times, thus clearing simultaneously the social soil of its last hindrances to the superstructure of the modern State edifice raised under the First Empire, itself the offspring of the coalition wars of old semi-feudal Europe against modern France. During the subsequent *régimes* the Government, placed under parliamentary control—that is, under the direct control of the propertied classes—became not only a hotbed of huge national debts and crush-

ing taxes; with its irresistible allurements of place, pelf, and patronage, it became not only the bone of contention between the rival factions and adventurers of the ruling classes; but its political character changed simultaneously with the economic changes of society. At the same pace at which the progress of modern industry developed, widened, intensified the class antagonism between capital and labour, the State power assumed more and more the character of the national power of capital over labour, of a public force organized for social enslavement, of an engine of class despotism.¹ After every revolution marking a progressive phase in the class struggle, the purely repressive character of the State power stands out in bolder and bolder relief. The Revolution of 1830, resulting in the transfer of Government from the landlords to the capitalists, transferred it from the more remote to the more direct antagonists of the working men. The bourgeois Republicans, who, in the name of the Revolution of February, took the State power, used it for the June massacres, in order to convince the working class that "social" republic meant the Republic ensuring their social subjection, and in order to convince the royalist bulk of the bourgeois and landlord class that they might safely leave the cares and emoluments of Government to the bourgeois "Republicans." However, after their one heroic exploit of June, the bourgeois Republicans had, from the front, to fall back to the rear of the "Party of Order"—a combination formed by all the rival fractions and factions of the appropriating class in their now openly declared antagonism to the producing classes. The proper form of their joint-stock Government was the *Parliamentary Republic*, with Louis Bonaparte for its President. There was a *régime* of avowed class terrorism and deliberate insult toward the "vile multitude." If the Parliamentary Republic, as M. Thiers said, "divided them (the different fractions of the ruling class) least," it opened an abyss between that class and the whole body of society outside their spare ranks. The restraints by which their own divisions had under former *régimes* still checked the State power, were removed by their union; and in view of the threatening upheaval of the proletariat, they now used that State power mercilessly and ostentatiously as the national war-engine of capital against

¹ In the German translation made by Engels in 1871 the end of this sentence reads as follows: "the character of a public force for oppressing labour, of an engine of class despotism."—*Ed.*

labour. In their uninterrupted crusade against the producing masses they were, however, bound not only to invest the executive with continually increased powers of repression, but at the same time to divest their own parliamentary stronghold—the National Assembly—one by one, of all its own means of defence against the Executive. The Executive, in the person of Louis Bonaparte, turned them out. The natural offspring of the “Party-of-Order” Republic was the Second Empire.

The empire, with the *coup d'état* for its certificate of birth, universal suffrage for its sanction, and the sword for its sceptre, professed to rest upon the peasantry, the large mass of producers not directly involved in the struggle of capital and labour. It professed to save the working class by breaking down Parliamentarism, and, with it, the undisguised subserviency of Government to the propertied classes. It professed to save the propertied classes by upholding their economic supremacy over the working class; and, finally, it professed to unite all classes by reviving for all the chimera of national glory. In reality, it was the only form of government possible at a time when the bourgeoisie had already lost, and the working class had not yet acquired, the faculty of ruling the nation. It was acclaimed throughout the world as the saviour of society. Under its sway, bourgeois society, freed from political cares, attained a development unexpected even by itself. Its industry and commerce expanded to colossal dimensions; financial swindling celebrated cosmopolitan orgies; the misery of the masses was set off by a shameless display of gorgeous, meretricious and debased luxury. The State power, apparently soaring high above society, was at the same time itself the greatest scandal of that society and the very hotbed of all its corruptions. Its own rottenness, and the rottenness of the society it had saved, were laid bare by the bayonet of Prussia, herself eagerly bent upon transferring the supreme seat of that *régime* from Paris to Berlin. Imperialism is, at the same time, the most prostitute and the ultimate form of the State power which nascent middle-class society had commenced to elaborate as a means of its own emancipation from feudalism, and which full-grown bourgeois society had finally transformed into a means for the enslavement of labour by capital.

The direct antithesis to the empire was the Commune. The cry of “social republic,” with which the revolution of February

was ushered in by the Paris proletariat, did but express a vague aspiration after a Republic that was not only to supersede the monarchical form of class-rule, but class-rule itself. The Commune was the positive form of that Republic.

Paris, the central seat of the old governmental power, and, at the same time, the social stronghold of the French working class, had risen in arms against the attempt of Thiers and the Rurals to restore and perpetuate that old governmental power bequeathed to them by the empire. Paris could resist only because, in consequence of the siege, it had got rid of the army, and replaced it by a National Guard, the bulk of which consisted of working men. This fact was now to be transformed into an institution. The first decree of the Commune, therefore, was the suppression of the standing army, and the substitution for it of the armed people.

The Commune was formed of the municipal councillors, chosen by universal suffrage in the various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at short terms. The majority of its members were naturally working men, or acknowledged representatives of the working class. The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time. Instead of continuing to be the agent of the Central Government, the police was at once stripped of its political attributes, and turned into the responsible and at all times revocable agent of the Commune. So were the officials of all other branches of the Administration. From the members of the Commune downwards, the public service had to be done at *workmen's wages*. The vested interests and the representation allowances of the high dignitaries of State disappeared along with the high dignitaries themselves. Public functions ceased to be the private property of the tools of the Central Government. Not only municipal administration, but the whole initiative hitherto exercised by the State was laid into the hands of the Commune.

Having once got rid of the standing army and the police, the physical force elements of the old Government, the Commune was anxious to break the spiritual force of repression, the "parson-power," by the disestablishment and disendowment of all churches as proprietary bodies. The priests were sent back to the recesses of private life, there to feed upon the alms of the faithful in imitation of their predecessors, the Apostles. The whole of the educational institutions were opened to the people

gratuitously, and at the same time cleared of all interference of Church and State. Thus, not only was education made accessible to all, but science itself freed from the fetters which class prejudice and governmental force had imposed upon it.

The judicial functionaries were to be divested of that sham independence which had but served to mask their abject subserviency to all succeeding governments to which, in turn, they had taken, and broken, the oaths of allegiance. Like the rest of public servants, magistrates and judges were to be elective, responsible, and revocable.

The Paris Commune was, of course, to serve as a model to all the great industrial centres of France. The communal *régime* once established in Paris and the secondary centres, the old centralized Government would in the provinces, too, have to give way to the self-government of the producers. In a rough sketch of national organization which the Commune had no time to develop, it states clearly that the Commune was to be the political form of even the smallest country hamlet, and that in the rural districts the standing army was to be replaced by a national militia, with an extremely short term of service. The rural communes of every district were to administer their common affairs by an assembly of delegates in the central town, and these district assemblies were again to send deputies to the National Delegation in Paris, each delegate to be at any time revocable and bound by the *mandat impératif* (formal instructions) of his constituents. The few but important functions which still would remain for a central government were not to be suppressed, as has been intentionally mis-stated, but were to be discharged by Communal, and therefore strictly responsible agents. The unity of the nation was not to be broken, but, on the contrary, to be organized by the Communal Constitution and to become a reality by the destruction of the State power which claimed to be the embodiment of that unity independent of, and superior to, the nation itself, from which it was but a parasitic excrescence. While the merely repressive organs of the old governmental power were to be amputated, its legitimate functions were to be wrested from an authority usurping pre-eminence over society itself, and restored to the responsible agents of society. Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes, as individual

suffrage serves every other employer in the search for the workmen and managers in his business. And it is well known that companies, like individuals, in matters of real business generally know how to put the right man in the right place, and, if they for once make a mistake, to redress it promptly. On the other hand, nothing could be more foreign to the spirit of the Commune than to supersede universal suffrage by hierarchic investiture.

It is generally the fate of completely new historical creations to be mistaken for the counterpart of older and even defunct forms of social life, to which they may bear a certain likeness. Thus, this new Commune, which breaks the modern State power, has been mistaken for a reproduction of the mediaeval Communes, which first preceded, and afterwards became the substratum of, that very State power. The Communal Constitution has been mistaken for an attempt to break up into a federation of small States, as dreamt of by Montesquieu and the Girondins, that unity of great nations which, if originally brought about by political force, has now become a powerful coefficient of social production. The antagonism of the Commune against the State power has been mistaken for an exaggerated form of the ancient struggle against over-centralization. Peculiar historical circumstances may have prevented the classical development, as in France, of the bourgeois form of government, and may have allowed, as in England, to complete the great central State organs by corrupt vestries, jobbing councillors, and ferocious poor-law guardians in the towns, and virtually hereditary magistrates in the counties. The Communal Constitution would have restored to the social body all the forces hitherto absorbed by the State parasite feeding upon, and clogging the free movement of, society. By this one act it would have initiated the regeneration of France. The provincial French middle class saw in the Commune an attempt to restore the sway their order had held over the country under Louis Philippe, and which, under Louis Napoleon, was supplanted by the pretended rule of the country over the towns. In reality, the Communal Constitution brought the rural producers under the intellectual lead of the central towns of their districts, and these secured to them, in the working men, the natural trustees of their interests. The very existence of the Commune involved, as a matter of course, local municipal liberty, but no longer as a check upon the, now superseded, State power. It could only enter into the head of a Bismarck, who, when not engaged

on his intrigues of blood and iron, always likes to resume his old trade, so befitting his mental calibre, of contributor to *Kladderadatsch*¹ (the Berlin *Punch*), it could only enter into such a head, to ascribe to the Paris Commune aspirations after that caricature of the old French municipal organization of 1791, the Prussian municipal constitution which degrades the town governments to mere secondary wheels in the police-machinery of the Prussian State. The Commune made that catchword of bourgeois revolutions, cheap government, a reality, by destroying the two greatest sources of expenditure—the standing army and State functionarism. Its very existence presupposed the non-existence of monarchy, which, in Europe at least, is the normal incumbrance and indispensable cloak of class-rule. It supplied the Republic with the basis of really democratic institutions. But neither cheap Government nor the “true Republic” was its ultimate aim; they were its mere concomitants.

The multiplicity of interpretations to which the Commune has been subjected, and the multiplicity of interests which construed it in their favour, show that it was a thoroughly expansive political form, while all previous forms of government had been emphatically repressive. Its true secret was this. It was essentially a working-class government, the produce of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labour.

Except on this last condition, the Communal Constitution would have been an impossibility and a delusion. The political rule of the producer cannot coexist with the perpetuation of his social slavery. The Commune was therefore to serve as a lever for uprooting the economical foundations upon which rests the existence of classes, and therefore of class-rule. With labour emancipated, every man becomes a working man, and productive labour ceases to be a class attribute.

It is a strange fact. In spite of all the tall talk and all the immense literature, for the last sixty years, about Emancipation of Labour, no sooner do the working men anywhere take the subject into their own hands with a will, than uprises at once all the apologetic phraseology of the mouth pieces of present

¹ *Kladderadatsch*: German satirical journal which began to appear in Berlin in 1848.—Ed.

society with its two poles of Capital and Wages-slavery (the landlord now is but the sleeping partner of the capitalist), as if capitalist society was still in its purest state of virgin innocence, with its antagonisms still undeveloped, with its delusions still unexploded, with its prostitute realities not yet laid bare. The Commune, they exclaim, intends to abolish property, the basis of all civilization! Yes, gentlemen, the Commune intended to abolish that class-property which makes the labour of the many the wealth of the few. It aimed at the expropriation of the expropriators. It wanted to make individual property a truth by transforming the means of production, land and capital, now chiefly the means of enslaving and exploiting labour, into mere instruments of free and associated labour.—But this is Communism, “impossible” Communism! Why, those members of the ruling classes who are intelligent enough to perceive the impossibility of continuing the present system—and they are many—have become the obtrusive and full-mouthed apostles of co-operative production. If co-operative production is not to remain a sham and a snare; if it is to supersede the Capitalist system; if united co-operative societies are to regulate national production upon a common plan, thus taking it under their own control, and putting an end to the constant anarchy and periodical convulsions which are the fatality of Capitalist production—what else, gentlemen, would it be but Communism, “possible” Communism?

The working class did not expect miracles from the Commune. They have no ready-made utopias to introduce *par décret du peuple*. They know that in order to work out their own emancipation, and along with it that higher form to which present society is irresistibly tending by its own economical agencies, they will have to pass through long struggles, through a series of historic processes, transforming circumstances and men. They have no ideals to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant. In the full consciousness of their historic mission, and with the heroic resolve to act up to it, the working class can afford to smile at the coarse invective of the gentlemen's gentlemen with the pen and inkhorn, and at the didactic patronage of well-wishing bourgeois-doctrinaires, pouring forth their ignorant platitudes and sectarian crotchets in the oracular tone of scientific infallibility.

When the Paris Commune took the management of the revolution in its own hands; when plain working men for the first

time dared to infringe upon the Governmental privilege of their "natural superiors," and, under circumstances of unexampled difficulty, performed their work modestly, conscientiously, and efficiently,—performed it at salaries the highest of which barely amounted to one-fifth of what, according to high scientific authority,¹ is the minimum required for a secretary to a certain metropolitan school board,—the old world writhed in convulsions of rage at the sight of the Red Flag, the symbol of the Republic of Labour, floating over the Hôtel de Ville.

And yet, this was the first revolution in which the working class was openly acknowledged as the only class capable of social initiative, even by the great bulk of the Paris middle class—shopkeepers, tradesmen, merchants—the wealthy capitalists alone excepted. The Commune had saved them by a sagacious settlement of that ever-recurring cause of dispute among the middle classes themselves—the debtor and creditor accounts.² The same portion of the middle class, after they had assisted in putting down the working men's insurrection of June, 1848, had been at once unceremoniously sacrificed to their creditors by the then Constituent Assembly. But this was not their only motive for now rallying round the working class. They felt that there was but one alternative—the Commune, or the Empire—under whatever name it might reappear. The Empire had ruined them economically by the havoc it made of public wealth, by the wholesale financial swindling it fostered, by the props it lent to the artificially accelerated centralization of capital, and the concomitant expropriation of their own ranks. It had suppressed them politically, it had shocked them morally by its orgies, it had insulted their Voltairianism by handing over the education of their children to the *frères Ignorantins*, it had revolted their national feeling as Frenchmen by precipitating them headlong into a war which left only one equivalent for the ruins it made—the disappearance of the Empire. In fact, after the exodus from Paris of the high Bonapartist and capitalist *bohème*, the true middle-class Party of Order came out in the shape of the "Union Républicaine," enrolling themselves under the colours of the Commune and defending it against the wilful misconstruc-

¹ Professor Huxley. [*Note to the German edition of 1871.*]

² On April 18, the Commune promulgated a decree postponing payments on debt obligations for three years.—*Ed.*

tion of Thiers. Whether the gratitude of this great body of the middle class will stand the present severe trial, time must show.

The Commune was perfectly right in telling the peasants that "its victory was their only hope." Of all the lies hatched at Versailles and re-echoed by the glorious European penny-a-liner, one of the most tremendous was that the Rurals represented the French peasantry. Think only of the love of the French peasant for the men to whom, after 1815, he had to pay the milliard of indemnity. In the eyes of the French peasant, the very existence of a great landed proprietor is in itself an encroachment on his conquests of 1789. The bourgeois, in 1848, had burdened his plot of land with the additional tax of forty-five cents in the franc; but then he did so in the name of the revolution; while now he had fomented a civil war against the revolution, to shift on to the peasant's shoulders the chief load of the five milliards of indemnity to be paid to the Prussian. The Commune, on the other hand, in one of its first proclamations, declared that the true originators of the war would be made to pay its cost. The Commune would have delivered the peasant of the blood tax,—would have given him a cheap government,—transformed his present blood-suckers, the notary, advocate, executor, and other judicial vampires, into salaried communal agents, elected by, and responsible to, himself. It would have freed him of the tyranny of the *garde champêtre*, the gendarme, and the prefect; would have put enlightenment by the schoolmaster in the place of stultification by the priest. And the French peasant is, above all, a man of reckoning. He would find it extremely reasonable that the pay of the priest, instead of being extorted by the taxgatherer, should only depend upon the spontaneous action of the parishioners' religious instincts. Such were the great immediate boons which the rule of the Commune—and that rule alone—held out to the French peasantry. It is, therefore, quite superfluous here to expatiate upon the more complicated but vital problems which the Commune alone was able, and at the same time compelled, to solve in favour of the peasant, *viz.*, the hypothecary debt, lying like an incubus upon his parcel of soil, the *prolétariat foncier* (the rural proletariat), daily growing upon it, and his expropriation from it enforced, at a more and more rapid rate, by the very development of modern agriculture and the competition of capitalist farming.

The French peasant had elected Louis Bonaparte president of the Republic; but the Party of Order created the Empire. What the French peasant really wants he commenced to show in 1849 and 1850, by opposing his *maire* to the Government's prefect, his schoolmaster to the Government's priest, and himself to the Government's gendarme. All the laws made by the Party of Order in January and February, 1850, were avowed measures of repression against the peasant. The peasant was a Bonapartist, because the great Revolution, with all its benefits to him, was, in his eyes, personified in Napoleon. This delusion, rapidly breaking down under the Second Empire (and in its very nature hostile to the Rurals), this prejudice of the past, how could it have withstood the appeal of the Commune to the living interests and urgent wants of the peasantry?

The Rurals—this was, in fact, their chief apprehension—knew that three months' free communication of Communal Paris with the provinces would bring about a general rising of the peasants, and hence their anxiety to establish a police blockade around Paris, so as to stop the spread of the rinderpest.

If the Commune was thus the true representative of all the healthy elements of French society, and therefore the truly national Government, it was, at the same time, as a working men's Government, as the bold champion of the emancipation of labour, emphatically international. Within sight of the Prussian army, that had annexed to Germany two French provinces, the Commune annexed to France the working people all over the world.

The Second Empire had been the jubilee of cosmopolitan black-legism, the rakes of all countries rushing in at its call for a share in its orgies and in the plunder of the French people. Even at this moment the right hand of Thiers is Ganesco, the foul Wallachian, and his left hand is Markovsky, the Russian spy. The Commune admitted all foreigners to the honour of dying for an immortal cause. Between the foreign war lost by their treason, and the civil war fomented by their conspiracy with the foreign invader, the bourgeoisie had found the time to display their patriotism by organizing police-hunts upon the Germans in France. The Commune made a German working man its Minister of Labour. Thiers, the bourgeoisie, the Second Empire, had continually deluded Poland by loud professions of sympathy, while in reality betraying her to, and doing the dirty work of, Russia. The Commune honoured the heroic sons of Poland by placing

them at the head of the defenders of Paris. And, to broadly mark the new era of history it was conscious of initiating, under the eyes of the conquering Prussians, on the one side, and of the Bonapartist army, led by Bonapartist generals, on the other, the Commune pulled down that colossal symbol of martial glory, the Vendôme column.

The great social measure of the Commune was its own working existence. Its special measures could but betoken the tendency of a government of the people by the people. Such were the abolition of the nightwork of journeymen bakers; the prohibition, under penalty, of the employers' practice to reduce wages by levying upon their work-people fines under manifold pretexts, — a process in which the employer combines in his own person the parts of legislator, judge, and executor, and filches the money to boot. Another measure of this class was the surrender, to associations of workmen, under reserve of compensation, of all closed workshops and factories, no matter whether the respective capitalists had absconded or preferred to strike work.

The financial measures of the Commune, remarkable for their sagacity and moderation, could only be such as were compatible with the state of a besieged town. Considering the colossal robberies committed upon the city of Paris by the great financial companies and contractors, under the protection of Haussmann,¹ the Commune would have had an incomparably better title to confiscate their property than Louis Napoleon had against the Orleans family. The Hohenzollern and the English oligarchs, who both have derived a good deal of their estates from Church plunder, were, of course, greatly shocked at the Commune clearing but 8,000 *fr.* out of secularization.

While the Versailles Government, as soon as it had recovered some spirit and strength, used the most violent means against the Commune; while it put down the free expression of opinion all over France, even to the forbidding of meetings of delegates from the large towns; while it subjected Versailles and the rest of France to an espionage far surpassing that of the Second Empire; while it burned by its gendarme inquisitors all papers

¹ During the Second Empire, Baron Haussmann was Prefect of the Department of the Seine, that is, of the City of Paris. He introduced a number of changes in the layout of the city for the purpose of facilitating the crushing of workers' insurrections. (*Note to the Russian translation edited by V. I. Lenin.*)—Ed.

printed at Paris, and sifted all correspondence from and to Paris; while in the National Assembly the most timid attempts to put in a word for Paris were howled down in a manner unknown even to the *Chambre introuvable* of 1816; with the savage warfare of Versailles outside, and its attempts at corruption and conspiracy inside Paris—would the Commune not have shamefully betrayed its trust by affecting to keep up all the decencies and appearances of liberalism as in a time of profound peace? Had the Government of the Commune been akin to that of M. Thiers, there would have been no more occasion to suppress Party-of-Order papers at Paris than there was to suppress Communal papers at Versailles.

It was irritating indeed to the Rurals that at the very same time they declared the return to the church to be the only means of salvation for France, the infidel Commune unearthed the peculiar mysteries of the Picpus nunnery, and of the Church of Saint Laurent. It was a satire upon M. Thiers that, while he showered grand crosses upon the Bonapartist generals in acknowledgement of their mastery in losing battles, signing capitulations, and turning cigarettes at Wilhelmshöhe, the Commune dismissed and arrested its generals whenever they were suspected of neglecting their duties. The expulsion from, and arrest by, the Commune of one of its members who had slipped in under a false name, and had undergone at Lyons six days' imprisonment for simple bankruptcy, was it not a deliberate insult hurled at the forger, Jules Favre, then still the foreign minister of France, still selling France to Bismarck, and still dictating his orders to that paragon Government of Belgium? But indeed the Commune did not pretend to infallibility, the invariable attribute of all governments of the old stamp. It published its doings and sayings, it initiated the public into all its shortcomings.

In every revolution there intrude, at the side of its true agents, men of a different stamp; some of them survivors of and devotees to past revolutions, without insight into the present movement, but preserving popular influence by their known honesty and courage, or by the sheer force of tradition; others mere bawlers, who, by dint of repeating year after year the same set of stereotyped declamations against the Government of the day, have sneaked into the reputation of revolutionists of the first water. After the 18th of March, some such men did also turn up, and in some cases contrived to play pre-eminent parts. As far as their power

went, they hampered the real action of the working class, exactly as men of that sort have hampered the full development of every previous revolution. They are an unavoidable evil: with time they are shaken off; but time was not allowed to the Commune.

Wonderful, indeed, was the change the Commune had wrought in Paris! No longer any trace of the meretricious Paris of the Second Empire. No longer was Paris the rendezvous of British landlords, Irish absentees,¹ American ex-slaveholders and shoddy men, Russian ex-serfowners, and Wallachian boyards. No more corpses at the morgue, no nocturnal burglaries, scarcely any robberies; in fact, for the first time since the days of February, 1848, the streets of Paris were safe, and that without any police of any kind. "We," said a member of the Commune, "hear no longer of assassination, theft and personal assault; it seems indeed as if the police had dragged along with it to Versailles all its Conservative friends." The *cocottes* had refound the scent of their protectors—the absconding men of family, religion, and, above all, of property. In their stead, the real women of Paris showed again at the surface—heroic, noble, and devoted, like the women of antiquity. Working, thinking, fighting, bleeding Paris—almost forgetful, in its incubation of a new society, of the cannibals at its gates—radiant in the enthusiasm of its historic initiative!

Opposed to this new world at Paris, behold the old world at Versailles—that assembly of the ghouls of all defunct *régimes*, Legitimists and Orleanists, eager to feed upon the carcass of the nation,—with a tail of antediluvian Republicans, sanctioning, by their presence in the Assembly, the slaveholders' rebellion, relying for the maintenance of their Parliamentary Republic upon the vanity of the senile mountebank at its head, and caricaturing 1789 by holding their ghastly meetings in the *Jeu de Paume*.² There it was, this Assembly, the representative of everything dead in France, propped up to the semblance of life by nothing but the swords of the generals of Louis Bonaparte. Paris all truth, Versailles all lie; and that lie vented through the mouth of Thiers.

Thiers tells a deputation of the mayors of the Seine-et-Oise,—“You may rely upon my word, which I have *never* broken!” He

¹ *Absentees*: Big landlords who hardly ever visited their estates.—*Ed.*

² *Jeu de Paume*: The tennis court where the National Assembly of 1789 adopted its famous decisions. [*Note to the German edition of 1871.*]

tells the Assembly itself that "it was the most freely elected and most Liberal Assembly France ever possessed"; he tells his motley soldiery that it was "the admiration of the world, and the finest army France ever possessed"; he tells the provinces that the bombardment of Paris by him was a myth: "If some cannon-shots have been fired, it is not the deed of the army of Versailles, but of some insurgents trying to make believe that they are fighting, while they dare not show their faces." He again tells the provinces that "the artillery of Versailles does not bombard Paris, but only cannonades it." He tells the Archbishop of Paris that the pretended executions and reprisals (!) attributed to the Versailles troops were all moonshine. He tells Paris that he was only anxious "to free it from the hideous tyrants who oppress it," and that, in fact, the Paris of the Commune was "but a handful of criminals."

The Paris of M. Thiers was not the real Paris of the "vile multitude," but a phantom Paris, the Paris of the *francs-fileurs*,¹ the Paris of the Boulevards, male and female—the rich, the capitalist, the gilded, the idle Paris, now thronging with its lackeys, its black-legs, its literary *bohème*, and its *cocottes* at Versailles, Saint-Denis, Rueil, and Saint-Germain; considering the civil war but an agreeable diversion, eyeing the battle going on through telescopes, counting the rounds of cannon, and swearing by their own honour and that of their prostitutes, that the performance was far better got up than it used to be at the Porte St. Martin. The men who fell were really dead; the cries of the wounded were cries in good earnest; and, besides, the whole thing was so intensely historical.

This is the Paris of M. Thiers, as the emigration of Coblenz was the France of M. de Calonne.

IV

The first attempt of the slaveholders' conspiracy to put down Paris by getting the Prussians to occupy it, was frustrated by Bismarck's refusal. The second attempt, that of the 18th of March, ended in the rout of the army and the flight to Versailles of the Government, which ordered the whole administration to break up and follow in its track. By the semblance of peace-negotiations

¹ *Francs-fileurs* Absconders.—Ed.

with Paris, Thiers found the time to prepare for war against it. But where to find an army? The remnants of the line regiments were weak in number and unsafe in character. His urgent appeal to the provinces to succour Versailles, by their National Guards and volunteers, met with a flat refusal. Brittany alone furnished a handful of *Chouans* fighting under a white flag, every one of them wearing on his breast the heart of Jesus in white cloth, and shouting "*Vive le Roi!*" (Long live the King!) Thiers was, therefore, compelled to collect, in hot haste, a motley crew, composed of sailors, marines, Pontifical Zouaves, Valentin's gendarmes, and Pietri's *sergents-de-ville* and *mouchards*. This army, however, would have been ridiculously ineffective without the instalments of imperialist war-prisoners, which Bismarck granted in numbers just sufficient to keep the civil war a-going, and keep the Versailles Government in abject dependence on Prussia. During the war itself, the Versailles police had to look after the Versailles army, while the gendarmes had to drag it on by exposing themselves at all posts of danger. The forts which fell were not taken, but bought. The heroism of the Federals convinced Thiers that the resistance of Paris was not to be broken by his own strategic genius and the bayonets at his disposal.

Meanwhile, his relations with the provinces became more and more difficult. Not one single address of approval came in to gladden Thiers and his Rurals. Quite the contrary. Deputations and addresses demanding, in a tone anything but respectful, conciliation with Paris on the basis of the unequivocal recognition of the Republic, the acknowledgement of the Communal liberties, and the dissolution of the National Assembly, whose mandate was extinct, poured in from all sides, and in such numbers that Dufaure, Thiers' Minister of Justice, in his circular of April 23 to the public prosecutors, commanded them to treat "the cry of conciliation" as a crime! In regard, however, of the hopeless prospect held out by his campaign, Thiers resolved to shift his tactics by ordering, all over the country, municipal elections to take place on the 30th of April, on the basis of the new municipal law dictated by himself to the National Assembly. What with the intrigues of his prefects, what with police intimidation, he felt quite sanguine of imparting, by the verdict of the provinces, to the National Assembly that moral power it had never possessed, and of getting at last from the provinces the physical force required for the conquest of Paris.

His banditti-warfare against Paris, exalted in his own bulletins, and the attempts of his ministers at the establishment, throughout France, of a reign of terror, Thiers was from the beginning anxious to accompany with a little byplay of conciliation, which had to serve more than one purpose. It was to dupe the provinces, to inveigle the middle-class element in Paris, and, above all, to afford the professed Republicans in the National Assembly the opportunity of hiding their treason against Paris behind their faith in Thiers. On the 21st of March, when still without an army, he had declared to the Assembly: "Come what may, I will not send an army to Paris." On the 27th March he rose again: "I have found the Republic an accomplished fact, and I am firmly resolved to maintain it." In reality, he put down the revolution at Lyons and Marseilles¹ in the name of the Republic, while the roars of his Rurals drowned the very mention of its name at Versailles. After this exploit, he toned down the "accomplished fact" into an hypothetical fact. The Orleans princes, whom he had cautiously warned off Bordeaux, were now, in flagrant breach of the law, permitted to intrigue at Dreux. The concessions held out by Thiers in his interminable interviews with the delegates from Paris and the provinces, although constantly varied in tone and colour, according to time and circumstances, did in fact never come to more than the prospective restriction of revenge to the "handful of criminals implicated in the murder of Lecomte and Clément Thomas," on the well-understood premiss that Paris and France were unreservedly to accept M. Thiers himself as the best of possible Republics, as he, in 1830, had done with Louis Philippe. Even these concessions he not only took care to render doubtful by the official comments put upon them in the Assembly through his Ministers. He had his Dufaure to act. Dufaure, this old Orleanist lawyer, had always been the justiciary of the state of siege, as now in 1871, under Thiers, so in 1839 under Louis Philippe, and in 1849 under Louis Bonaparte's presidency. While out of office he made a fortune by pleading for the Paris capitalists, and made political capital by pleading against the laws he had himself originated. He now hurried through the National Assembly not only a set of repressive laws which were, after the

¹ A few days after March 18, 1871, revolutionary outbreaks occurred in Lyons and Marseilles aimed at the proclamation of Communes. The movement was crushed by the Thiers government.—Ed

fall of Paris, to extirpate the last remnants of Republican liberty in France; he foreshadowed the fate of Paris by abridging the, for him, too slow procedure of courts-martial, and by a new-fangled, Draconic code of deportation. The Revolution of 1848, abolishing the penalty of death for political crimes, has replaced it by deportation. Louis Bonaparte did not dare, at least not in theory, to re-establish the *régime* of the guillotine. The Rural Assembly, not yet bold enough even to hint that the Parisians were not rebels, but assassins, had therefore to confine its prospective vengeance against Paris to Dufaure's new code of deportation. Under all these circumstances Thiers himself could not have gone on with his comedy of conciliation, had it not, as he intended it to do, drawn forth shrieks of rage from the Rurals, whose ruminating mind did neither understand the play, nor its necessities of hypocrisy, tergiversation, and procrastination.

In sight of the impending municipal elections of the 30th April, Thiers enacted one of his great conciliation scenes on the 27th April. Amidst a flood of sentimental rhetoric, he exclaimed from the tribune of the Assembly: "There exists no conspiracy against the Republic but that of Paris, which compels us to shed French blood. I repeat it again and again. Let those impious arms fall from the hands which hold them, and chastisement will be arrested at once by an act of peace excluding only the small number of criminals." To the violent interruption of the Rurals he replied: "Gentlemen, tell me, I implore you, am I wrong? Do you really regret that I could have stated the truth that the criminals are only a handful? Is it not fortunate in the midst of our misfortunes that those who have been capable to shed the blood of Clément Thomas and General Lecomte are but rare exceptions?"

France, however, turned a deaf ear to what Thiers flattered himself to be a parliamentary siren's song. Out of 700,000 municipal councillors returned by the 35,000 communes still left to France, the united Legitimists, Orleanists and Bonapartists did not carry 8,000. The supplementary elections which followed were still more decidedly hostile. Thus, instead of getting from the provinces the badly-needed physical force, the National Assembly lost even its last claim to moral force, that of being the expression of the universal suffrage of the country. To complete the discomfiture, the newly-chosen municipal councils of all the cities of

France openly threatened the usurping Assembly at Versailles with a counter Assembly at Bordeaux.

Then the long-expected moment of decisive action had at last come for Bismarck. He peremptorily summoned Thiers to send to Frankfort plenipotentiaries for the definitive settlement of peace. In humble obedience to the call of his master, Thiers hastened to despatch his trusty Jules Favre, backed by Pouyer-Quertier. Pouyer-Quertier, an "eminent" Rouen cotton-spinner, a fervent and even servile partisan of the Second Empire, had never found any fault with it save its commercial treaty with England, prejudicial to his own shop-interest. Hardly installed at Bordeaux as Thiers' Minister of Finance, he denounced that "unholy" treaty, hinted at its near abrogation, and had even the effrontery to try, although in vain (having counted without Bismarck), the immediate enforcement of the old protective duties against Alsace, where, he said, no previous international treaties stood in the way. This man, who considered counter-revolution as a means to put down wages at Rouen, and the surrender of French provinces as a means to bring up the price of his wares in France, was he not *the one* predestined to be picked out by Thiers as the helpmate of Jules Favre in his last and crowning treason?

On the arrival at Frankfort of this exquisite pair of plenipotentiaries, bully Bismarck at once met them with the imperious alternative: Either the restoration of the Empire, or the unconditional acceptance of my own peace terms! These terms included a shortening of the intervals in which the war indemnity was to be paid and the continued occupation of the Paris forts by Prussian troops until Bismarck should feel satisfied with the state of things in France; Prussia thus being recognized as the supreme arbiter in internal French politics! In return for this he offered to let loose, for the extermination of Paris, the captive Bonapartist army, and to lend them the direct assistance of Emperor William's troops. He pledged his good faith by making payment of the first instalment of the indemnity dependent on the "pacification" of Paris. Such a bait was, of course, eagerly swallowed by Thiers and his plenipotentiaries. They signed the treaty of peace on the 10th of May, and had it endorsed by the Versailles Assembly on the 18th.

In the interval between the conclusion of peace and the arrival of the Bonapartist prisoners, Thiers felt the more bound to

resume his comedy of conciliation, as his Republican tools stood in sore need of a pretext for blinking their eyes at the preparations for the carnage of Paris. As late as the 8th of May he replied to a deputation of middle-class conciliators: "Whenever the insurgents will make up their minds for capitulation, the gates of Paris shall be flung wide open during a week for all except the murderers of Generals Clément Thomas and Lecomte."

A few days afterwards, when violently interpellated on these promises by the Rurals, he refused to enter into any explanations; not, however, without giving them this significant hint: "I tell you there are impatient men amongst you, men who are in too great a hurry. They must have another eight days; at the end of these eight days there will be no more danger, and the task will be proportionate to their courage and to their capacities." As soon as MacMahon was able to assure him that he could shortly enter Paris, Thiers declared to the Assembly that "he would enter Paris with the *laws* in his hands, and demand a full expiation from the wretches who had sacrificed the lives of soldiers and destroyed public monuments." As the moment of decision drew near he said—to the Assembly, "I shall be pitiless!"—to Paris, that it was doomed; and to his Bonapartist banditti, that they had State licence to wreak vengeance upon Paris to their hearts' content. At last, when treachery had opened the gates of Paris to General Douay, on the 21st of May, Thiers, on the 22nd, revealed to the Rurals the "goal" of his conciliation comedy, which they had so obstinately persisted in not understanding. "I told you a few days ago that we were approaching *our goal*; today I come to tell you *the goal* is reached. The victory of order, justice and civilization is at last won!"

So it was. The civilization and justice of bourgeois order comes out in its lurid light whenever the slaves and drudges of that order rise against their masters. Then this civilization and justice stand forth as undisguised savagery and lawless revenge. Each new crisis in the class struggle between the appropriator and the producer brings out this fact more glaringly. Even the atrocities of the bourgeois in June, 1848, vanish before the ineffable infamy of 1871. The self-sacrificing heroism with which the population of Paris—men, women and children—fought for eight days after the entrance of the Versailles, reflects as much the grandeur of their cause, as the infernal deeds of the soldiery reflect the innate spirit of that civilization of which they are the

mercenary vindicators. A glorious civilization, indeed, the great problem of which is how to get rid of the heaps of corpses it made after the battle was over!

To find a parallel for the conduct of Thiers and his bloodhounds we must go back to the times of Sulla and the two Triumvirates of Rome. The same wholesale slaughter in cold blood; the same disregard, in massacre, of age and sex; the same system of torturing prisoners; the same proscriptions, but this time of a whole class; the same savage hunt after concealed leaders, lest one might escape; the same denunciations of political and private enemies; the same indifference for the butchery of entire strangers to the feud. There is but this difference, that the Romans had no *mitrailleuses* for the despatch, in the lump, of the proscribed, and that they had not "the law in their hands," nor on their lips the cry of "civilization."

And after those horrors, look upon the other, still more hideous, face of that bourgeois civilization as described by its own press!

"With stray shots," writes the Paris correspondent of a London Tory paper, "still ringing in the distance, and untended wounded wretches dying amid the tombstones of Père la Chaise—with 6,000 terror-stricken insurgents wandering in an agony of despair in the labyrinth of the catacombs, and wretches hurried through the streets to be shot down in scores by the *mitrailleuse*—it is revolting to see the *cafés* filled with the votaries of absinthe, billiards, and dominoes; female profligacy perambulating the boulevards, and the sound of revelry disturbing the night from the *cabinets particuliers* of fashionable restaurants." M. Edouard Hervé writes in the *Journal de Paris*, a Versaillist journal suppressed by the Commune: "The way in which the population of Paris (!) manifested its satisfaction yesterday was rather more than frivolous, and we fear it will grow worse as time progresses. Paris has now a *fête* day appearance, which is sadly out of place; and, unless we are to be called the *Parisiens de la décadence*, this sort of thing must come to an end." And then he quotes the passage from Tacitus: "Yet, on the morrow of that horrible struggle, even before it was completely over, Rome—degraded and corrupt—began once more to wallow in the voluptuous slough which was destroying its body and polluting its soul—*alibi proelia et vulnere; alibi balnea popinaeque* (here fights and wounds, there baths and restaurants)." M. Hervé only forgets

to say that the "population of Paris" he speaks of is but the population of the Paris of M. Thiers—the *francs-fleurs* returning in throngs from Versailles, Saint-Denis, Rueil and Saint-Germain—the Paris of the "Decline."

In all its bloody triumphs over the self-sacrificing champions of a new and better society, that nefarious civilization, based upon the enslavement of labour, drowns the moans of its victims in a hue-and-cry of calumny, reverberated by a world-wide echo. The serene working men's Paris of the Commune is suddenly changed into a pandemonium by the bloodhounds of "order." And what does this tremendous change prove to the bourgeois mind of all countries? Why, that the Commune has conspired against civilization! The Paris people die enthusiastically for the Commune in numbers unequalled in any battle known to history. What does that prove? Why, that the Commune was not the people's own government but the usurpation of a handful of criminals! The women of Paris joyfully give up their lives at the barricades and on the place of execution. What does this prove? Why, that the demon of the Commune has changed them into Megaeras and Hecates! The moderation of the Commune during two months of undisputed sway is equalled only by the heroism of its defence. What does that prove? Why, that for months the Commune carefully hid, under a mask of moderation and humanity, the blood-thirstiness of its fiendish instincts, to be let loose in the hour of its agony!

The working men's Paris, in the act of its heroic self-holocaust, involved in its flames buildings and monuments. While tearing to pieces the living body of the proletariat, its rulers must no longer expect to return triumphantly into the intact architecture of their abodes. The Government of Versailles cries, "Incendiarism!" and whispers this cue to all its agents, down to the remotest hamlet, to hunt up its enemies everywhere as suspect of professional incendiarism. The bourgeoisie of the whole world, which looks complacently upon the wholesale massacre after the battle, is convulsed by horror at the desecration of brick and mortar!

When governments give state-licences to their navies to "kill, burn and destroy," is that a licence for incendiarism? When the British troops wantonly set fire to the Capitol at Washington and to the summer palace of the Chinese Emperor, was that incendiarism? When the Prussians, not for military reasons, but out

of the mere spite of revenge, burned down, by the help of petroleum, towns like Châteaudun and innumerable villages, was that incendiarism? When Thiers, during six weeks, bombarded Paris, under the pretext that he wanted to set fire to those houses only in which there were people, was that incendiarism?—In war, fire is an arm as legitimate as any. Buildings held by the enemy are shelled to set them on fire. If their defenders have to retire, they themselves light the flames to prevent the attack from making use of the buildings. To be burnt down has always been the inevitable fate of all buildings situated in the front of battle of all the regular armies of the world. But in the war of the enslaved against their enslavers, the only justifiable war in history, this is by no means to hold good! The Commune used fire strictly as a means of defence. They used it to stop up to the Versailles troops those long, straight avenues which Haussmann had expressly opened to artillery-fire; they used it to cover their retreat, in the same way as the Versaillaise, in their advance, used their shells which destroyed at least as many buildings as the fire of the Commune. It is a matter of dispute, even now, which buildings were set fire to by the defence, and which by the attack. And the defence resorted to fire only then, when the Versaillaise troops had already commenced their wholesale murdering of prisoners.—Besides, the Commune had, long before, given full public notice that, if driven to extremities, they would bury themselves under the ruins of Paris, and make Paris a second Moscow, as the Government of Defence, but only as a cloak for its treason, had promised to do. For this purpose Trochu had found them the petroleum. The Commune knew that its opponents cared nothing for the lives of the Paris people, but cared much for their own Paris buildings. And Thiers, on the other hand, had given them notice that he would be implacable in his vengeance. No sooner had he got his army ready on one side, and the Prussians shutting up the trap on the other, than he proclaimed: "I shall be pitiless! The expiation will be complete, and justice will be stern!" If the acts of the Paris working men were vandalism, it was the vandalism of defence in despair, not the vandalism of triumph, like that which the Christians perpetrated upon the really priceless art treasures of heathen antiquity; and even that vandalism has been justified by the historian as an unavoidable and comparatively trifling concomitant to the titanic struggle between a new

society arising and an old one breaking down. It was still less the vandalism of Haussmann, razing historic Paris to make place for the Paris of the sightseer!

But the execution by the Commune of the sixty-four hostages, with the Archbishop of Paris at their head! The bourgeoisie and its army in June, 1848, re-established a custom which had long disappeared from the practice of war—the shooting of their defenceless prisoners. This brutal custom has since been more or less strictly adhered to by the suppressors of all popular commotions in Europe and India; thus proving that it constitutes a real “progress of civilization!” On the other hand, the Prussians, in France, had re-established the practice of taking hostages—innocent men, who, with their lives, were to answer to them for the acts of others. When Thiers, as we have seen, from the very beginning of the conflict, enforced the humane practice of shooting down the Communal prisoners, the Commune, to protect their lives, was obliged to resort to the Prussian practice of securing hostages. The lives of the hostages had been forfeited over and over again by the continued shooting of prisoners on the part of the Versailles. How could they be spared any longer after the carnage with which MacMahon’s praetorians¹ celebrated their entrance into Paris? Was even the last check upon the unscrupulous ferocity of bourgeois governments—the taking of hostages—to be made a mere sham of? The real murderer of Archbishop Darboy is Thiers. The Commune again and again had offered to exchange the archbishop, and ever so many priests in the bargain, against the single Blanqui, then in the hands of Thiers. Thiers obstinately refused. He knew that with Blanqui he would give to the Commune a head; while the archbishop would serve his purpose best in the shape of a corpse. Thiers acted upon the precedent of Cavaignac. How, in June 1848, did not Cavaignac and his men of order raise shouts of horror by stigmatizing the insurgents as the assassins of Archbishop Affre! They knew perfectly well that the archbishop had been shot by the soldiers of order. M. Jacquemet, the archbishop’s vicar-general, present on the spot, had immediately afterwards handed them in his evidence to that effect.

All this chorus of calumny, which the Party of Order never fail, in their orgies of blood, to raise against their victims, only

¹ Here “praetorians” has reference to the Versailles army.—*Ed.*

proves that the bourgeois of our days considers himself the legitimate successor to the baron of old, who thought every weapon in his own hand fair against the plebeian, while in the hands of the plebeian a weapon of any kind constituted in itself a crime.

The conspiracy of the ruling class to break down the Revolution by a civil war carried on under the patronage of the foreign invader—a conspiracy which we have traced from the very 4th of September down to the entrance of MacMahon's praetorians through the gate of St. Cloud—culminated in the carnage of Paris. Bismarck gloats over the ruins of Paris, in which he saw perhaps the first instalment of that general destruction of great cities he had prayed for when still a simple Rural in the Prussian *Chambre introuvable* of 1849. He gloats over the cadavres of the Paris proletariat. For him this is not only the extermination of revolution, but the extinction of France, now decapitated in reality, and by the French Government itself. With the shallowness characteristic of all successful statesmen, he sees but the surface of this tremendous historic event. Whenever before has history exhibited the spectacle of a conqueror crowning his victory by turning into, not only the gendarme, but the hired bravo of the conquered Government? There existed no war between Prussia and the Commune of Paris. On the contrary, the Commune had accepted the peace preliminaries, and Prussia had announced her neutrality. Prussia was, therefore, no belligerent. She acted the part of a bravo, a cowardly bravo, because incurring no danger; a hired bravo, because stipulating beforehand the payment of her blood-money of 500 millions on the fall of Paris. And thus, at last, came out the true character of the war, ordained by Providence as a chastisement of godless and debauched France by pious and moral Germany! And this unparalleled breach of the law of nations, even as understood by the old-world lawyers, instead of arousing the "civilized" Governments of Europe to declare the felonious Prussian Government, the mere tool of the St. Petersburg Cabinet, an outlaw amongst nations, only incites them to consider whether the few victims who escape the double cordon around Paris are not to be given up to the hangman at Versailles!

That after the most tremendous war of modern times, the conquering and the conquered hosts should fraternize for the common massacre of the proletariat—this unparalleled event does

indicate, not, as Bismarck thinks, the final repression of a new society upheaving, but the crumbling into dust of bourgeois society. The highest heroic effort of which old society is still capable is national war; and this is now proved to be a mere governmental humbug, intended to defer the struggle of classes, and to be thrown aside as soon as that class struggle bursts out into civil war. Class-rule is no longer able to disguise itself in a national uniform; the national Governments are *one* as against the proletariat!

After Whit-Sunday, 1871, there can be neither peace nor truce possible between the working men of France and the appropriators of their produce. The iron hand of a mercenary soldiery may keep for a time both classes tied down in common oppression. But the battle must break out again and again in ever-growing dimensions, and there can be no doubt as to who will be the victor in the end,—the appropriating few, or the immense working majority. And the French working class is only the advanced guard of the modern proletariat.

While the European governments thus testify, before Paris, to the international character of class-rule, they cry down the International Working Men's Association—the international counter-organization of labour against the cosmopolitan conspiracy of capital—as the head fountain of all these disasters. Thiers denounced it as the despot of labour, pretending to be its liberator. Picard ordered that all communications between the French Internationals and those abroad should be cut off; Count Jaubert, Thiers' mummified accomplice of 1835, declares it the great problem of all civilized governments to weed it out. The Rurals roar against it, and the whole European press joins the chorus. An honourable French writer, completely foreign to our Association, speaks as follows:—"The members of the Central Committee of the National Guard, as well as the greater part of the members of the Commune, are the most active, intelligent, and energetic minds of the International Working Men's Association; . . . men who are thoroughly honest, sincere, intelligent, devoted, pure, and fanatical in the *good* sense of the word." The police-tinged bourgeois mind naturally figures to itself the International Working Men's Association as acting in the manner of a secret conspiracy, its central body ordering, from time to time, explosions in different countries. Our Association is, in fact, nothing but the international bond between the most advanced working men in

the various countries of the civilized world. Wherever, in whatever shape, and under whatever conditions the class struggle obtains any consistency, it is but natural that members of our Association should stand in the foreground. The soil out of which it grows is modern society itself. It cannot be stamped out by any amount of carnage. To stamp it out, the Governments would have to stamp out the despotism of capital over labour—the condition of their own parasitical existence.

Working men's Paris, with its Commune, will be for ever celebrated as the glorious harbinger of a new society. Its martyrs are enshrined in the great heart of the working class. Its exterminators history has already nailed to that eternal pillory from which all the prayers of their priests will not avail to redeem them.

London, *May 30, 1871*

N O T E S

I

"The column of prisoners halted in the Avenue Uhrich, and was drawn up, four or five deep, on the footway facing to the road. General Marquis de Galliffet and his staff dismounted and commenced an inspection from the left of the line. Walking down slowly and eyeing the ranks, the General stopped here and there, tapping a man on the shoulder or beckoning him out of the rear ranks. In most cases, without further parley, the individual thus selected was marched out into the centre of the road, where a small supplementary column was, thus, soon formed. . . . It was evident that there was considerable room for error. A mounted officer pointed out to General Galliffet a man and woman for some particular offence. The woman, rushing out of the ranks, threw herself on her knees, and, with outstretched arms, protested her innocence in passionate terms. The General waited for a pause, and then with most impassible face and unmoved demeanour, said, 'Madame, I have visited every theatre in Paris, your acting will have no effect on me' (*'ce n'est pas la peine de jouer la comédie'*) It was not a good thing on that day to be noticeably taller, dirtier, cleaner, older, or uglier than one's neigh-

bours. One individual in particular struck me as probably owing his speedy release from the ills of this world to his having a broken nose. . . . Over a hundred being thus chosen, a firing party told off, and the column resumed its march, leaving them behind. A few minutes afterwards a dropping fire in our rear commenced, and continued for over a quarter of an hour. It was the execution of these summarily-convicted wretches.”—*Paris Correspondent Daily News*, June 8th.—This Gallifet, “the kept man of his wife, so notorious for her shameless exhibitions at the orgies of the Second Empire,” went, during the war, by the name of the French “Ensign Pistol.”

“The *Temps*¹ which is a careful journal, and not given to sensation, tells a dreadful story of people imperfectly shot and buried before life was extinct. A great number were buried in the square round St. Jacques-la Bouchière; some of them very superficially. In the daytime the roar of the busy streets prevented any notice being taken; but in the stillness of the night the inhabitants of the houses in the neighbourhood were roused by distant moans, and in the morning a clenched hand was seen protruding through the soil. In consequence of this, exhumations were ordered to take place. . . . That many wounded have been buried alive I have not the slightest doubt. One case I can vouch for. When Brunel was shot with his mistress on the 24th ult. in the courtyard of a house in the Place Vendôme, the bodies lay there until the afternoon of the 27th. When the burial party came to remove the corpses, they found the woman living still and took her to an ambulance. Though she had received four bullets she is now out of danger.”—*Paris Correspondent Evening Standard*, June 8th.

II

The following letter appeared in the [London] *Times*² of June 13th:

“To the Editor of the *Times*:

“Sir,—On June 6, 1871, M. Jules Favre issued a circular to all the European Powers, calling upon them to hunt down the

¹ *Le Temps* [*Time*]: Influential bourgeois daily newspaper; published in Paris from 1861 to 1943.—*Ed.*

² *Times*: Big influential English newspaper established in 1788. During the seventies of the nineteenth century its views were liberal.—*Ed.*

International Working Men's Association. A few remarks will suffice to characterize that document.

"In the very preamble of our statutes it is stated that the International was founded 'September 28, 1864, at a public meeting held at St. Martin's Hall, Long Acre, London.' For purposes of his own Jules Favre puts back the date of its origin behind 1862.

"In order to explain our principles, he professes to quote 'their (the International's) sheet of the 25th of March, 1869.' And then what does he quote? The sheet of a society which is not the International. This sort of manoeuvre he already recurred to when, still a comparatively young lawyer, he had to defend the *National* newspaper, prosecuted for libel by Cabet. Then he pretended to read extracts from Cabet's pamphlets while reading interpolations of his own—a trick exposed while the Court was sitting, and which, but for the indulgence of Cabet, would have been punished by Jules Favre's expulsion from the Paris bar. Of all the documents quoted by him as documents of the International, not one belongs to the International. He says, for instance, 'The Alliance declares itself Atheist, says the General Council, constituted in London in July 1869.' The General Council never issued such a document. On the contrary, it issued a document which quashed the original statutes of the 'Alliance'—L'Alliance de la Démocratie Socialiste at Geneva—quoted by Jules Favre.

"Throughout his circular, which pretends in part also to be directed against the Empire, Jules Favre repeats against the International but the police inventions of the public prosecutors of the Empire, which broke down miserably even before the law courts of that Empire.

"It is known that in its two addresses (of July and September last) on the late war, the General Council of the International denounced the Prussian plans of conquest against France. Later on, Mr. Reitlinger, Jules Favre's private secretary, applied, though of course in vain, to some members of the General Council for getting up by the Council a demonstration against Bismarck, in favour of the Government of National Defence; they were particularly requested not to mention the republic. The preparations for a demonstration with regard to the expected arrival of Jules Favre in London were made—certainly with the best of intentions—in spite of the General Council, which, in its address of the 9th of September, had distinctly forewarned the Paris workmen against Jules Favre and his colleagues.

"What would Jules Favre say if, in its turn, the International were to send a circular on Jules Favre to all the Cabinets of Europe, drawing their particular attention to the documents published at Paris by the late M. Millière?"

"I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

"John Hales,

"Secretary to the General Council of the International Working Men's Association.

"London, June 12th, 1871."

In an article on "The International Society and its aims," that pious informer, the *London Spectator* (June 24th), amongst other similar tricks, quotes, even more fully than Jules Favre has done, the above document of the "Alliance" as the work of the International, and that eleven days after the refutation had been published in the *Times*. We do not wonder at this. Frederick the Great used to say that of all Jesuits the worst are the Protestant ones.

Written by Marx in April-May 1871 and endorsed at a session of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association held on May 30, 1871

Printed according to the text of the English pamphlet of 1871

Originally published as a separate English pamphlet in London in 1871

German and French editions appeared at the same time

The German text edited by Engels and containing his introduction came out as a separate edition in Berlin in 1891

Frederick Engels

THE HOUSING QUESTION

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

The following work is a reprint of three articles which I wrote in 1872 for the Leipzig *Volksstaat*.¹ Just at that time the French milliards came pouring down on Germany: public debts were paid off, fortresses and barracks built, stocks of weapons and war material renewed; the available capital no less than the volume of money in circulation was suddenly enormously increased, and all this just at a time when Germany was entering the world arena not only as a "united empire," but also as a great industrial country. These milliards gave its young large-scale industry a powerful impetus, and it was they above all that were responsible for the short period of prosperity, so rich in illusions, which followed on the war, and for the great crash which came immediately afterwards, in 1873-74, by which Germany proved itself to be an industrial country capable of holding its own on the world market.

The period in which a country with an old culture makes such a transition from manufacture and small-scale production to large-scale industry, a transition which is, moreover, accelerated by such favourable circumstances, is at the same time predominantly a period of "housing shortage." On the one hand, masses of rural workers are suddenly drawn into the big towns, which develop into industrial centres; on the other hand, the building arrangement of these old towns does not any longer conform to the conditions of the new large-scale industry and the corresponding traffic; streets are widened and new ones cut through, and railways are run right across them. At the very time when workers

¹ *Volksstaat (People's State)*: Central organ of the German social-democratic party (Eisenachers) published in Leipzig in 1869-76.—Ed.

are streaming into the towns in masses, workers' dwellings are pulled down on a large scale. Hence the sudden housing shortage for the workers and for the small traders and small manufacturing businesses, which depend for their custom on the workers. In towns which grew up from the very beginning as industrial centres this housing shortage is as good as unknown; for instance, Manchester, Leeds, Bradford, Barmen-Elberfeld. On the other hand, in London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, the shortage took on acute forms at the time, and has, for the most part, continued to exist in a chronic form.

It was therefore just this acute housing shortage, this symptom of the industrial revolution taking place in Germany, which filled the press of the day with tractates on the "housing question" and gave rise to all sorts of social quackery. A series of such articles found their way also into the *Volksstaat*. The anonymous author, who revealed himself later on as A. Mülberger M. D. of Württemberg, considered the opportunity a favourable one for enlightening the German workers, by means of this question, on the miraculous effects of Proudhon's social panacea. When I expressed my astonishment to the editors at the acceptance of these peculiar articles, I was challenged to answer them, and this I did. (See Part One: How Proudhon Solves the Housing Question.) This series of articles was soon followed by a second series, in which I examined the philanthropic bourgeois view of the question, on the basis of a work by Dr. Emil Sax. (See Part Two: How the Bourgeoisie Solves the Housing Question.) After a rather long pause Dr. Mülberger did me the honour of replying to my articles, and this compelled me to make a rejoinder (see Part Three: Supplement on Proudhon and the Housing Question), whereby both the polemic and also my special occupation with this question came to an end. That is the history of the origin of these three series of articles, which have also appeared as a separate reprint in pamphlet form. The fact that a new reprint has now become necessary I owe undoubtedly to the benevolent solicitude of the German government which, by prohibiting the work, tremendously increased its sale, as usual, and I hereby take this opportunity of expressing my respectful thanks to it.

I have revised the text for this new edition, inserted a few additions and notes, and have corrected a small economic error in the first part, as my opponent, Dr. Mülberger, unfortunately failed to discover it. During this revision it was borne in on me

what gigantic progress the international working-class movement has made during the past fourteen years. At that time it was still a fact that "for twenty years the workers speaking Romance languages have had no other mental pabulum than the works of Proudhon," and, in a pinch, the still more one-sided version of Proudhonism presented by the father of "anarchism," Bakunin, who regarded Proudhon as "the schoolmaster of us all," *notre maître à nous tous*. Although the Proudhonists in France were only a small sect among the workers, they were still the only ones who had a definitely formulated programme and who were able in the Commune to take over the leadership in the economic field. In Belgium, Proudhonism reigned unchallenged among the Walloon workers, and in Spain and Italy, with a few isolated exceptions, everything in the working-class movement which was not anarchist was decidedly Proudhonist. And today? In France, Proudhon has been completely disposed of among the workers and retains supporters only among the radical bourgeois and petty bourgeois, who as Proudhonists also call themselves "Socialists," but against whom the most energetic fight is carried on by the socialist workers. In Belgium, the Flemish have ousted the Walloons from the leadership of the movement, deposed Proudhonism and greatly raised the level of the movement. In Spain, as in Italy, the anarchist high tide of the seventies has receded and swept away with it the remnants of Proudhonism. While in Italy the new party is still in process of clarification and formation, in Spain the small nucleus, which as the *Nueva Federación Madrileña* remained loyal to the General Council of the International, has developed into a strong party, which—as can be seen from the republican press itself—is destroying the influence of the bourgeois republicans on the workers far more effectively than its noisy anarchist predecessors were ever able to do. Among Latin workers the forgotten works of Proudhon have been replaced by *Capital*, the *Communist Manifesto* and a number of other works of the Marxist school, and the main demand of Marx—the seizure of all the means of production in the name of society by a proletariat risen to sole political power—is now the demand of the whole revolutionary working class in the Latin countries also.

If therefore Proudhonism has been finally supplanted among the workers of the Latin countries also, if it—in accordance with its real destination—only serves French, Spanish, Italian and

Belgian bourgeois radicals as an expression of their bourgeois and petty-bourgeois desires, why revert to it today? Why combat anew a dead opponent by reprinting these articles?

First of all, because these articles do not confine themselves to a mere polemic against Proudhon and his German representative. As a consequence of the division of labour that existed between Marx and myself, it fell to me to present our opinions in the periodical press, and, therefore, particularly in the fight against opposing views, in order that Marx should have time for the elaboration of his great basic work. This made it necessary for me to present our views for the most part in a polemical form, in opposition to other kinds of views. So also here. Parts One and Three contain not only a criticism of the Proudhonist conception of the question, but also a presentation of our own conception.

Secondly, Proudhon played much too significant a role in the history of the European working-class movement for him to fall into oblivion without more ado. Refuted theoretically and discarded practically, he still retains his historical interest. Whoever occupies himself in any detail with modern socialism must also acquaint himself with the "surmounted standpoints" of the movement. Marx's *Poverty of Philosophy* appeared several years before Proudhon put forward his practical proposals for social reform. Here Marx could only discover in embryo and criticize Proudhon's exchange bank. From this angle, therefore, this work of mine supplements, unfortunately imperfectly enough, Marx's work. Marx would have accomplished all this much better and more convincingly.

And finally, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois socialism is strongly represented in Germany down to this very hour. On the one hand, by Katheder-Socialists¹ and philanthropists of all sorts, with whom the wish to turn the workers into owners of their dwellings still plays a great role and against whom, therefore, my work is still appropriate. On the other hand, a certain petty-bourgeois socialism finds representation in the Social-Democratic Party itself, and even in the ranks of the Reichstag group. This is done in the following way: while the fundamental

¹ *Katheder-Socialism*: One of the trends in bourgeois political economy which arose in the seventies-eighties of the nineteenth century. Under the guise of socialism representatives of this trend preached from university chairs bourgeois-liberal reformism.—*Ed.*

views of modern socialism and the demand for the transformation of all the means of production into social property are recognized as justified, the realization of this is declared possible only in the distant future, a future which for all practical purposes is quite out of sight. Thus, for the present one has to have recourse to mere social patchwork, and sympathy can be shown, according to circumstances, even with the most reactionary efforts for so-called "uplifting of the labouring class." The existence of such a tendency is quite inevitable in Germany, the land of philistinism *par excellence*, particularly at a time when industrial development is violently and on a mass scale uprooting this old and deeply-rooted philistinism. The tendency is quite harmless to the movement, in view of the wonderful common sense of our workers, which has been demonstrated so magnificently precisely during the last eight years of the struggle against the Anti-Socialist Law, the police and the courts. But it is necessary clearly to realize that such a tendency exists. And if later on this tendency takes on a firmer shape and more clearly defined contours, as is necessary and even desirable, it will have to go back to its predecessors for the formulation of its programme, and in doing so it will hardly be able to avoid Proudhon.

The essence of both the big bourgeois and petty-bourgeois solutions of the "housing question" is that the worker should own his own dwelling. However, this is a point which has been shown in a very peculiar light by the industrial development of Germany during the past twenty years. In no other country do there exist so many wage-workers who own not only their own dwellings but also a garden or field as well. Besides these workers there are numerous others who hold house and garden or field as tenants, with in fact fairly secure possession. Rural domestic industry carried on in conjunction with kitchen-gardening or small-scale agriculture forms the broad basis of Germany's new large-scale industry. In the West the workers are for the most part the owners of their dwellings, and in the East they are chiefly tenants. We find this combination of domestic industry with kitchen-gardening and agriculture, and therefore with a secure dwelling, not only wherever hand weaving still fights against the mechanical loom: in the Lower Rhineland and in Westphalia, in the Saxon Erzgebirge and in Silesia, but also wherever domestic industry of any sort has established itself as a rural occupation; as, for instance, in the Thuringian Forest and in the Rhön area. At the

time of the discussion of the tobacco monopoly, it was revealed to what great extent cigar making was already being carried on as a rural domestic industry. Wherever distress spreads among the small peasants, as for instance a few years ago in the Eifel area, the bourgeois press immediately raises an outcry for the introduction of a suitable domestic industry as the only remedy. And in fact both the growing state of want of the German small-allotment peasants and the general situation of German industry urge a continual extension of rural domestic industry. This is a phenomenon peculiar to Germany. Only very exceptionally do we find anything similar in France; for instance, in the regions of silk cultivation. In England, where there are no small peasants, rural domestic industry depends on the work of the wives and children of the agricultural day-labourers. Only in Ireland can we observe the rural domestic industry of garment making being carried on, as in Germany, by real peasant families. Naturally we do not speak here of Russia and other countries not represented on the industrial world market.

Thus, as regards industry there exists today a state of affairs over wide-spread areas in Germany which appears at first glance to resemble that which prevailed generally before the introduction of machinery. However, this is so only at first glance. The rural domestic industry of earlier times, combined with kitchen-gardening and agriculture, was, at least in the countries in which industry was developing, the basis of a tolerable and, here and there, even comfortable material situation for the working class, but at the same time the basis of its intellectual and political nullity. The hand-made product and its cost determined the market price, and owing to the insignificantly small productivity of labour, compared with the present day, the market as a rule grew faster than the supply. This held good at about the middle of the last century for England, and partly for France, particularly in the textile industry. In Germany, however, which was at that time only just recovering from the devastation of the Thirty Years' War and working its way up under most unfavourable circumstances, the situation was of course quite different. The only domestic industry in Germany producing for the world market, linen weaving, was so burdened by taxes and feudal exactions that it did not raise the peasant weavers above the very low level of the rest of the peasantry. Nevertheless, at that time the rural industrial worker enjoyed a certain security of existence.

With the introduction of machinery all this was altered. Prices were now determined by the machine-made product, and the wage of the domestic industrial worker fell with this price. However, the worker had to accept it or look for other work, and he could not do that without becoming a proletarian, that is, without giving up his little house, garden and field, whether his own or rented. Only in the rarest cases was he ready to do this. And thus the kitchen-gardening and agriculture of the old rural hand weavers became the cause by virtue of which the struggle of the hand loom against the mechanical loom was everywhere so protracted and has not yet been fought to a conclusion in Germany. In this struggle it appeared for the first time, especially in England, that the same circumstance which formerly served as a basis of comparative prosperity for the worker—the fact that he owned his means of production—had now become a hindrance and a misfortune for him. In industry the mechanical loom defeated his hand loom, and in agriculture large-scale cultivation drove his small-scale cultivation from the lists. However, while the collective labour of many and the application of machinery and science became the social rule in both fields of production, the worker was chained to the antiquated method of individual production and hand labour by his little house, garden, field and hand loom. The possession of house and garden was now of much less advantage than the possession of complete freedom of movement (*vogelfreie Beweglichkeit*). No factory worker would have changed places with the slowly but surely starving rural hand weaver.

Germany appeared late on the world market. Our large-scale industry dates from the forties; it received its first impetus from the Revolution of 1848, and was able to develop fully only after the revolutions of 1866 and 1870 had cleared at least the worst political obstacles out of its way. But to a large extent it found the world market already occupied. The articles of mass consumption were supplied by England and the elegant luxury articles by France. Germany could not beat the former in price or the latter in quality. For the moment, therefore, nothing else remained but, following the beaten path of German production up to that time, to edge into the world market with articles which were too petty for the English and too shoddy for the French. Of course the favourite German custom of cheating, by first sending good samples and afterwards inferior articles, soon met with sufficiently severe punishment on the world market and was pretty well

abandoned. On the other hand, the competition of over-production has gradually forced even the respectable English along the downward path of quality deterioration and so given an advantage to the Germans, who are unbeatable in this sphere. And thus we finally came to possess a large-scale industry and to play a role on the world market. But our *large-scale* industry works almost exclusively for the home market (with the exception of the iron industry, which produces far beyond the limits of home demand), and our mass export consists of a tremendous number of small articles, for which large-scale industry provides at most the necessary half-finished products, while the small articles themselves are supplied chiefly by rural domestic industry.

And here is seen in all its glory the "blessing" of house- and landownership for the modern worker. Nowhere, hardly excepting even the Irish domestic industries, are such infamously low wages paid as in the German domestic industries. Competition permits the capitalist to deduct from the price of labour power that which the family earns from its own little garden or field. The workers are compelled to accept any piece wages offered them, because otherwise they would get nothing at all and they could not live from the products of their agriculture alone, and because, on the other hand, it is just this agriculture and landownership which chains them to the spot and prevents them from looking around for other employment. This is the basis which maintains Germany's capacity to compete on the world market in a whole series of small articles. *The whole profit is derived from a deduction from normal wages and the whole surplus value can be presented to the purchaser.* That is the secret of the extraordinary cheapness of most of the German export articles.

It is this circumstance more than any other which keeps the wages and the living conditions of the German workers also in other industrial fields below the level of the West European countries. The dead weight of such prices for labour, kept traditionally far below the value of labour power, depresses also the wages of the urban workers, and even of the workers in the big cities, below the value of labour power; and this is all the more the case because poorly-paid domestic industry has taken the place of the old handicrafts in the towns as well, and here too depresses the general level of wages.

Here we see clearly that what at an earlier historical stage was the basis of relative well-being for the workers, namely, the

combination of agriculture and industry, the ownership of house, garden and field, and certainty of a dwelling place, is becoming today, under the rule of large-scale industry, not only the worst hindrance to the worker, but the greatest misfortune for the whole working class, the basis for an unexampled depression of wages below their normal level, and that not only for separate districts and branches of enterprise but for the whole country. No wonder that the big and petty bourgeoisie, who live and grow rich from these abnormal deductions from wages, are enthusiastic over rural industry and the workers owning their own houses, and that they regard the introduction of new domestic industries as the sole remedy for all rural distress!

That is one side of the matter, but it also has its reverse side. Domestic industry has become the broad basis of the German export trade and therefore of the whole of large-scale industry. Due to this it spread over wide areas of Germany and is extending still further daily. The ruin of the small peasant, inevitable ever since his industrial domestic production for his own use was destroyed by cheap confection and machine products, as was his animal husbandry, and hence his manure production also, by the dissolution of the mark system, the abolition of the common mark and of compulsory crop rotation—this ruin forcibly drives the small peasant, fallen victim to the usurer, into the arms of modern domestic industry. Like the ground rent of the landlord in Ireland, the interest of the mortgage usurer in Germany cannot be paid from the yield of the soil but only from the wages of the industrial peasant. However, with the expansion of domestic industry one peasant area after another is being dragged into the present-day industrial movement. It is this revolutionizing of the rural areas by domestic industry which spreads the industrial revolution in Germany over a far wider territory than was the case in England and France. It is the comparatively low level of our industry which makes its extension in area all the more necessary. This explains why in Germany, in contrast to England and France, the revolutionary working-class movement has spread so tremendously over the greater part of the country instead of being confined exclusively to the urban centres. And this in turn explains the tranquil, certain and irresistible progress of the movement. It is perfectly clear that in Germany a victorious rising in the capital and in the other big cities will be possible only when the majority of the smaller towns and a great part

of the rural districts have become ripe for the revolutionary change. Given anything like normal development, we shall never be in a position to win working-class victories like those of the Parisians in 1848 and 1871, but for just that reason we shall also not suffer defeats of the revolutionary capital by the reactionary provinces, such as Paris suffered in both cases. In France the movement always originated in the capital; in Germany it originated in the areas of big industry, of manufacture and of domestic industry; the capital was conquered only later. Therefore, perhaps in the future also, the initiative will continue to rest with the French, but the decision can be fought out only in Germany.

Now, this rural domestic industry and manufacture, which due to its expansion has become the decisive branch of German production and thus revolutionizes the German peasantry more and more, is however itself only the preliminary stage of a further revolutionary change. As Marx has already proved (*Kapital*, Vol. I, 3rd edition, pp. 484-95¹), at a certain stage of development the hour of its downfall owing to machinery and factory production will sound for it also. And this hour would appear to be at hand. But in Germany the destruction of rural domestic industry and manufacture by machinery and factory production means the destruction of the livelihood of millions of rural producers, the expropriation of almost half the German small peasantry; the transformation, not only of domestic industry into factory production, but also of peasant farming into large-scale capitalist agriculture, and of small landed property into big estates—an industrial and agricultural revolution in favour of capital and big land-ownership at the cost of the peasants. Should it be Germany's fate to undergo also this transformation while still under the old social conditions it will unquestionably be the turning point. If the working class of no other country has taken the initiative by that time, Germany will certainly strike first, and the peasant sons of the "glorious army" will bravely lend assistance.

And with this the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois utopia, which would give each worker the ownership of his own little house and thus chain him in semi-feudal fashion to his particular capitalist, takes on a very different complexion. In lieu of its realization there appears the transformation of all the small rural house-owners

¹ Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 470-80.—*Ed.*

into industrial domestic workers; the destruction of the old isolation and with it the destruction of the political nullity of the small peasants who are dragged into the "social whirlpool"; the extension of the industrial revolution over the rural areas and thus the transformation of the most stable and conservative class of the population into a revolutionary hotbed; and, as the culmination of it all, the expropriation of the peasants engaged in home industry by machinery, which drives them forcibly into insurrection.

We can readily allow the bourgeois-socialist philanthropists the private enjoyment of their ideal so long as they continue in their public function as capitalists to realize it in this inverted fashion, to the benefit and advancement of the social revolution.

Frederick Engels

London, January 10, 1887

Written by Engels for the second edition of his *The Housing Question*, Zurich 1887

Printed according to the text of the book
Translated from the German

THE HOUSING QUESTION

PART ONE

HOW PROUDHON SOLVES THE HOUSING QUESTION

In No. 10 and the following issues of the *Volksstaat* may be found a series of six articles on the housing question. These articles are worthy of attention only because, apart from some long-forgotten would-be literary writings of the forties, they are the first attempt to transplant the Proudhonist school to Germany. This represents such an enormous step backward in comparison with the whole course of development of German socialism, which delivered a decisive blow precisely to the Proudhonist ideas as far back as twenty-five years ago,¹ that it is worth while answering this attempt immediately.

The so-called housing shortage, which plays such a great role in the press nowadays, does not consist in the fact that the working class generally lives in bad, overcrowded and unhealthy dwellings. *This* shortage is not something peculiar to the present; it is not even one of the sufferings peculiar to the modern proletariat in contradistinction to all earlier oppressed classes. On the contrary, all oppressed classes in all periods suffered rather uniformly from it. In order to put an end to *this* housing shortage there is only *one* means: to abolish altogether the exploitation and oppression of the working class by the ruling class. What is meant today by housing shortage is the peculiar intensification of the bad housing conditions of the workers as a result of the sudden rush of population to the big cities; a colossal increase in rents, still greater congestion in the separate houses, and, for

¹ In Marx: *Misère de la Philosophie*. Bruxelles et Paris, 1847 [*The Poverty of Philosophy*].—[Note by Engels.]

some, the impossibility of finding a place to live in at all. And *this* housing shortage gets talked of so much only because it is not confined to the working class but has affected the petty bourgeoisie as well.

The housing shortage from which the workers and part of the petty bourgeoisie suffer in our modern big cities is one of the innumerable *smaller*, secondary evils which result from the present-day capitalist mode of production. It is not at all a direct result of the exploitation of the worker *as* worker by the capitalist. This exploitation is the basic evil which the social revolution wants to abolish by abolishing the capitalist mode of production. The cornerstone of the capitalist mode of production is, however, the fact that our present social order enables the capitalist to buy the labour power of the worker at its value, but to extract from it much more than its value by making the worker work longer than is necessary to reproduce the price paid for the labour power. The surplus value produced in this fashion is divided among the whole class of capitalists and landowners, together with their paid servants, from the Pope and the Kaiser down to the night watchman and below. We are not concerned here with how this distribution comes about, but this much is certain: that all those who do not work can live only on the pickings from this surplus value, which reach them in one way or another. (Compare Marx's *Capital*, where this was propounded for the first time.)

The distribution of this surplus value, produced by the working class and taken from it without payment, among the non-working classes proceeds amid extremely edifying squabbings and mutual swindling. In so far as this distribution takes place by means of buying and selling, one of its chief methods is the cheating of the buyer by the seller; and in retail trade, particularly in the big cities, this has become an absolute condition of existence for the seller. When, however, the worker is cheated by his grocer or his baker, either in regard to the price or the quality of the merchandise, this does not happen to him in his specific capacity as a worker. On the contrary, as soon as a certain average measure of cheating has become the social rule in any place, it must in the long run be adjusted by a corresponding increase in wages. The worker appears before the shopkeeper as a buyer, that is, as the owner of money or credit, and hence not at all in his capacity as a worker, that is, as a seller of labour power. The cheating may hit him, and the poorer class as a whole, harder than

it hits the richer social classes, but it is not an evil which hits him exclusively, which is peculiar to his class.

And it is just the same with the housing shortage. The expansion of the big modern cities gives the land in certain sections of them, particularly in those which are centrally situated, an artificial and often enormously increasing value; the buildings erected in these areas depress this value, instead of increasing it, because they no longer correspond to the changed circumstances. They are pulled down and replaced by others. This takes place above all with centrally located workers' houses, whose rents, even with the greatest overcrowding, can never, or only very slowly, increase above a certain maximum. They are pulled down and in their stead shops, warehouses and public buildings are erected. Through its Haussmann in Paris, Bonapartism exploited this tendency tremendously for swindling and private enrichment. But the spirit of Haussmann has also been abroad in London, Manchester and Liverpool, and seems to feel itself just as much at home in Berlin and Vienna. The result is that the workers are forced out of the centre of the towns towards the outskirts; that workers' dwellings, and small dwellings in general, become rare and expensive and often altogether unobtainable, for under these circumstances the building industry, which is offered a much better field for speculation by more expensive dwelling houses, builds workers' dwellings only by way of exception.

This housing shortage, therefore, certainly hits the worker harder than it hits any more prosperous class, but it is just as little an evil which burdens the working class exclusively as is the cheating of the shopkeeper, and, as far as the working class is concerned, when this evil reaches a certain level and attains a certain permanency, it must similarly find a certain economic adjustment.

It is largely with just such sufferings as these, which the working class endures in common with other classes, and particularly the petty bourgeoisie, that petty-bourgeois socialism, to which Proudhon belongs, prefers to occupy itself. And thus it is not at all accidental that our German Proudhonist seizes chiefly upon the housing question, which, as we have seen, is by no means exclusively a working-class question; and that he declares it to be, on the contrary, a true, exclusively working-class question.

"The *tenant* is in the same position in relation to the *house-owner* as the *wage-worker* in relation to the *capitalist*."

This is totally untrue.

In the housing question we have two parties confronting each other: the tenant and the landlord, or house-owner. The former wishes to purchase from the latter the temporary use of a dwelling; he has money or credit, even if he has to buy this credit from the house-owner himself at a usurious price in the shape of an addition to the rent. It is a simple commodity sale; it is not a transaction between proletarian and bourgeois, between worker and capitalist. The tenant—even if he is a worker—appears as *a man with money*; he must already have sold his commodity, a commodity peculiarly his own, his labour power, to be able to appear with the proceeds as the buyer of the use of a dwelling or he must be in a position to give a guarantee of the impending sale of this labour power. The peculiar results which attend the sale of labour power to the capitalist are completely absent here. The capitalist causes the purchased labour power first to produce its own value but secondly to produce a surplus value, which remains in his hands for the time being, subject to distribution among the capitalist class. In this case, therefore, an excess value is produced, the sum total of the existing value is increased. In a renting transaction the situation is quite different. No matter how much the landlord may overreach the tenant it is still only a transfer of already *existing*, previously *produced* value, and the total sum of values possessed by the landlord and the tenant *together* remains the same after as it was before. The worker is always cheated of a part of the product of his labour, whether that labour is paid for by the capitalist below, above or at its value; the tenant only when he is compelled to pay for the dwelling above its value. It is therefore a complete misrepresentation of the relation between landlord and tenant to attempt to make it equivalent to the relation between worker and capitalist. On the contrary, we are dealing here with a quite ordinary commodity transaction between two citizens, and this transaction proceeds according to the economic laws which govern the sale of commodities in general, and in particular the sale of the commodity “landed property.” The building and maintenance costs of the house or of the part of the house in question enter first into the calculation; the value of the land, determined by the more or less favourable situation of the house, comes next; the relation between supply and demand existing at the moment decides in the end. This simple economic relation expresses itself in the mind of our Proudhonist as follows:

"The house, once it has been built, serves as a *perpetual legal title* to a definite fraction of social labour although the real value of the house has been paid to the owner long ago more than adequately in the form of rent. Thus it comes about that a house which, for instance, was built fifty years ago, during this period covers the original cost price two, three, five, ten and more times over in its rent yield."

Here we have at once Proudhon in his entirety. First, it is forgotten that the rent must not only pay the interest on the building costs, but must also cover repairs and the average amount of bad debts and unpaid rents as well as the occasional periods when the house is untenanted, and finally must pay off in annual instalments the building capital which has been invested in a house, which is perishable and which in time becomes uninhabitable and worthless. Secondly, it is forgotten that the rent must also pay interest on the increased value of the land upon which the building is erected and that, therefore, a part of it consists of ground rent. Our Proudhonist immediately declares, it is true, that since this increment is brought about without the landowner having contributed anything, it does not equitably belong to him but to society as a whole. However, he overlooks the fact that he is thereby in reality demanding the abolition of landed property, a point which would lead us too far if we went into it here. And finally he overlooks the fact that the whole transaction is not at all one of buying the house from its owner, but of buying only its use for a certain time. Proudhon, who never bothered himself about the real, the actual conditions under which any economic phenomenon occurs, is naturally also unable to explain how the original cost price of a house is under certain circumstances paid back ten times over in the course of fifty years in the form of rent. Instead of examining this not at all difficult question economically and establishing whether it is really in contradiction to economic laws, and if so how, Proudhon resorts to a bold leap from economics into jurisprudence: "The house, once it has been built, serves as a *perpetual legal title*" to a certain annual payment. How this comes about, *how* the house *becomes* a legal title, on this Proudhon is silent. And yet that is just what he should have explained. Had he examined this question he would have found that not all the legal titles in the world, no matter how perpetual, could give a house the power of obtaining its cost price back ten times, over the course of fifty years, in the form of rent, but that only economic conditions (which may have obtained social recognition in

the form of legal titles) can accomplish this. And with this he would again be where he started from.

The whole Proudhonist teaching rests on this saving leap from economic reality into legal phraseology. Every time our good Proudhon loses the economic hang of things—and this happens to him with every serious problem—he takes refuge in the sphere of law and appeals to *eternal justice*.

“Proudhon begins by taking his ideal of justice, of ‘*justice éternelle*,’ from the juridical relations that correspond to the production of commodities; thereby, it may be noted, he proves, to the consolation of all good citizens, that the production of commodities is a form of production as everlasting as justice. Then he turns round and seeks to reform the actual production of commodities, and the actual legal system corresponding thereto, in accordance with this ideal. What opinion should we have of a chemist, who, instead of studying the actual laws of the molecular changes in the composition and decomposition of matter, and on that foundation solving definite problems, claimed to regulate the composition and decomposition of matter by means of the ‘eternal ideas,’ of ‘*naturalité and affinité*’? Do we really know any more about ‘usury,’ when we say it contradicts ‘*justice éternelle*,’ ‘*équité éternelle*,’ ‘*mutualité éternelle*,’ and other ‘*vérités éternelles*’ than the fathers of the church did when they said it was incompatible with ‘*grâce éternelle*,’ ‘*foi éternelle*,’ and ‘*la volonté éternelle de Dieu*’?” (Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 45.)¹

Our Proudhonist does not fare any better than his lord and master:

“The rent agreement is one of the thousand exchanges which are as necessary in the life of modern society as the circulation of the blood in the bodies of animals. Naturally, it would be in the interest of this society if all these exchanges were pervaded by a *conception of right*, that is to say, if they were carried out everywhere according to the strict demands of justice. In a word, the economic life of society must, as Proudhon says, raise itself to the heights of *economic right*. In reality, as we know, exactly the opposite takes place.”

Is it credible that five years after Marx had characterized Proudhonism so summarily and convincingly precisely from this decisive angle, one can still print such confused stuff in the German language? What does this rigmarole mean? Nothing more

¹ Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 84-85.—Ed.

than that the practical effects of the economic laws which govern present-day society run contrary to the author's sense of justice and that he cherishes the pious wish that the matter might be so arranged as to remedy this situation. Yes, if toads had tails they would no longer be toads! And is then the capitalist mode of production not "pervaded by a conception of right," namely, that of its own right to exploit the workers? And if the author tells us that that is not *his* conception of right, are we one step further?

But let us go back to the housing question. Our Proudhonist now gives his "conception of right" free rein and treats us to the following moving declamation:

"We do not hesitate to assert that there is no more terrible mockery of the whole culture of our lauded century than the fact that in the big cities 90 per cent and more of the population have no place that they can call their own. The real nodal point of moral and family existence, hearth and home, is being swept away by the social whirlpool. . . . In this respect we are far below the savages. The troglodyte has his cave, the Australian his clay hut, the Indian his own hearth, but the modern proletarian is practically suspended in mid-air," etc.

In this jeremiad we have Proudhonism in its whole reactionary form. In order to create the modern revolutionary class of the proletariat it was absolutely necessary to cut the umbilical cord which still bound the worker of the past to the land. The hand weaver who had his little house, garden and field along with his loom was a quiet, contented man, "godly and honourable" despite all misery and despite all political pressure; he doffed his cap to the rich, to the priest and to the officials of the state and inwardly was altogether a slave. It is precisely modern large-scale industry which has turned the worker, formerly chained to the land, into a completely propertyless proletarian, liberated from all traditional fetters, a *free outlaw*; it is precisely this economic revolution which has created the sole conditions under which the exploitation of the working class in its final form, in capitalist production, can be overthrown. And now comes this tearful Proudhonist and bewails the driving of the workers from hearth and home as though it were a great retrogression instead of being the very first condition of their intellectual emancipation.

Twenty-seven years ago I described, in *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, the main features of just this process of driving the workers from hearth and home, as it took place in the eighteenth century in England. The infamies of which the land

and factory owners were guilty in so doing, and the deleterious effects, material and moral, which this expulsion inevitably had on the workers concerned in the first place, are there also described as they deserve. But could it enter my head to regard this, which was in the circumstances an absolutely necessary historical process of development, as a retrogression "below the savages"? Impossible! The English proletarian of 1872 is on an infinitely higher level than the rural weaver of 1772 with his "hearth and home." And will the troglodyte with his cave, the Australian with his clay hut or the Indian with his own hearth ever accomplish a June insurrection or a Paris Commune?

That the situation of the workers has on the whole become materially worse since the introduction of capitalist production on a large scale is doubted only by the bourgeois. But should we therefore look backward longingly to the (likewise very meagre) fleshpots of Egypt, to rural small-scale industry, which produced only servile souls, or to "the savages"? On the contrary. Only the proletariat created by modern large-scale industry, liberated from all inherited fetters including those which chained it to the land, and herded together in the big cities, is in a position to accomplish the great social transformation which will put an end to all class exploitation and all class rule. The old rural hand weavers with hearth and home would never have been able to do it; they would never have been able to conceive such an idea, not to speak of desiring to carry it out.

For Proudhon, on the other hand, the whole industrial revolution of the last hundred years, the introduction of steam power and large-scale factory production which substitutes machinery for hand labour and increases the productivity of labour a thousandfold, is a highly repugnant occurrence, something which really ought never to have taken place. The petty-bourgeois Proudhon aspires to a world in which each person turns out a separate and independent product that is immediately consumable and exchangeable in the market. Then, as long as each person receives back the full value of his labour in the form of another product, "eternal justice" is satisfied and the best possible world created. But this best possible world of Proudhon has already been nipped in the bud and trodden underfoot by the advance of industrial development, which long ago destroyed individual labour in all the big branches of industry and which is destroying it daily more and more in the smaller and even smallest branches, which is setting

social labour supported by machinery and the harnessed forces of nature in its place, and whose finished product, immediately exchangeable or consumable, is the joint work of the many individuals through whose hands it has had to pass. And it is precisely this industrial revolution which has raised the productive power of human labour to such a high level that—for the first time in the history of mankind—the possibility exists, given a rational division of labour among all, of producing not only enough for the plentiful consumption of all members of society and for an abundant reserve fund, but also of leaving each individual sufficient leisure so that what is really worth preserving in historically inherited culture—science, art, forms of intercourse—may not only be preserved but converted from a monopoly of the ruling class into the common property of the whole of society, and may be further developed. And here is the decisive point: as soon as the productive power of human labour has risen to this height, every excuse disappears for the existence of a ruling class. After all, the ultimate basis on which class differences were defended was always: there must be a class which need not plague itself with the production of its daily subsistence, in order that it may have time to look after the intellectual work of society. This talk, which up to now had its great historical justification, has been cut off at the root once and for all by the industrial revolution of the last hundred years. The existence of a ruling class is becoming daily more and more a hindrance to the development of industrial productive power, and equally so to that of science, art and especially of forms of cultural intercourse. There never were greater boons than our modern bourgeois.

All this is nothing to friend Proudhon. He wants "eternal justice" and nothing else. Each shall receive in exchange for his product the full proceeds of his labour, the full value of his labour. But to calculate this in a product of modern industry is a complicated matter. For modern industry obscures the particular share of the individual in the total product, which in the old individual handicraft was obviously represented by the finished product. Further, modern industry eliminates more and more individual exchange, on which Proudhon's whole system is built up, namely, direct exchange between two producers each of whom takes the product of the other in order to consume it. Consequently a reactionary streak runs through the whole of Proudhonism; an aversion to the industrial revolution and the desire, sometimes overtly,

sometimes covertly expressed, to drive the whole of modern industry out of the temple—steam engines, mechanical looms and the rest of the business—and to return to old, respectable hand labour. That we would then lose nine hundred and ninety-nine thousandths of our productive power, that the whole of humanity would be condemned to the worst possible labour slavery, that starvation would become the general rule—what does all that matter if only we succeed in organizing exchange in such a fashion that each receives “the full proceeds of his labour,” and that “eternal justice” is realized?

Fiat justitia, pereat mundus!

Let justice be done though the whole world perish!

And the world would perish in this Proudhonist counter-revolution if it were at all possible to carry it out.

It is, however, self-evident that, even with social production conditioned by modern large-scale industry, it is possible to assure each person “the full proceeds of his labour,” so far as this phrase has any meaning at all. And it has a meaning only if it is extended to purport not that each individual worker becomes the possessor of “the full proceeds of his labour,” but that the whole of society, consisting entirely of workers, becomes the possessor of the total product of their labour, which product it partly distributes among its members for consumption, partly uses for replacing and increasing its means of production, and partly stores up as a reserve fund for production and consumption.

* * *

After what has been said above, we already know in advance how our Proudhonist will solve the great housing question. On the one hand, we have the demand that each worker have and own his own home in order that we may no longer be *below the savages*. On the other hand, we have the assurance that the two, three, five or tenfold repayment of the original cost price of a house in the form of rent, as it actually takes place, is based on a *legal title*, and that this legal title is in contradiction to “*eternal justice*.” The solution is simple: we abolish the legal title and by virtue of eternal justice declare the rent paid to be a payment on account of the cost of the dwelling itself. If one has so arranged one’s premises that they already contain the conclusion, then of course it requires no greater skill than any charlatan possesses

to produce the result, prepared beforehand, from the bag and proudly point to unshakeable logic whose result it is.

And so it happens here. The abolition of rented dwellings is proclaimed a necessity, and couched in the form of a demand that every tenant be turned into the owner of his dwelling. How are we to do that? Very simply:

"Rented dwellings will be redeemed. . . . The previous house-owner will be paid the value of his house to the last farthing. Whereas rent represents, as previously, the tribute which the tenant pays to the perpetual title of capital, from the day when the redemption of rented dwellings is proclaimed the exactly fixed sum paid by the tenant will become the annual instalment paid for the dwelling which has passed into his possession. . . . Society . . . transforms itself in this way into a totality of free and independent owners of dwellings."

The Proudhonist finds it a crime against eternal justice that the house-owner can without working obtain ground rent and interest out of the capital he has invested in the house. He decrees that this must cease, that capital invested in houses shall no longer yield interest; nor ground rent either, so far as it represents purchased landed property. Now we have seen that the capitalist mode of production, the basis of present-day society, is in no way affected hereby. The pivot on which the exploitation of the worker turns is the sale of his labour power to the capitalist and the use which the capitalist makes of this transaction, the fact that he compels the worker to produce far more than the paid value of his labour power amounts to. It is this transaction between capitalist and worker which produces all the surplus value afterwards divided in the form of ground rent, commercial profit, interest on capital, taxes, etc., among the diverse varieties of capitalists and their servitors. And now our Proudhonist comes along and believes that if we were to prohibit *one single variety* of capitalists, and at that of capitalists who purchase no labour power directly and therefore also cause no surplus value to be produced, from making profit or receiving interest, it would be a step forward! The mass of unpaid labour taken from the working class would remain exactly the same even if house-owners were to be deprived tomorrow of the possibility of receiving ground rent and interest. However, this does not prevent our Proudhonist from declaring:

"The abolition of rented dwellings is thus one of the *most fruitful and magnificent aspirations* which has ever sprung from the womb of the revolutionary idea and it must become one of the *primary demands* of the Social Democracy."

This is exactly the type of market cry of the master Proudhon himself, whose cackling was always in inverse ratio to the size of the eggs laid.

And now imagine the fine state of things if each worker, petty bourgeois and bourgeois, were compelled by paying annual instalments to become first part owner and then full owner of his dwelling! In the industrial districts in England, where there is large-scale industry but small workers' houses and each married worker occupies a little house of his own, there might possibly be some sense in it. But the small-scale industry in Paris and in most of the big cities on the continent is supplemented by large houses in each of which ten, twenty or thirty families live together. Supposing that on the day of the world-delivering decree, when the redemption of rent dwellings is proclaimed, Peter is working in an engineering works in Berlin. A year later he is owner of, if you like, the fifteenth part of his flat consisting of a little room on the fifth floor of a house somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Hamburger Tor. He then loses his job and soon afterwards finds himself in a similar flat on the third floor of a house in the Pothof in Hanover with a wonderful view of the courtyard. After five months' stay there he has just acquired $\frac{1}{36}$ part of this property when a strike sends him to Munich and compels him by a stay of eleven months to assume ownership of exactly $\frac{11}{150}$ of a rather gloomy abode on the street level behind the Ober-Angergasse. Subsequent removals, such as nowadays are so frequent with workers, saddle him further with $\frac{7}{360}$ of a no less desirable residence in St. Gallen, $\frac{23}{180}$ of another one in Leeds, and $\frac{347}{56223}$, figured out exactly in order that "eternal justice" may have nothing to complain about, of a third flat in Seraing. And now, of what use are all these shares in flats to our Peter? Who is to give him the real value of these shares? Where is he to find the owner or owners of the remaining shares in his various one-time flats? And what exactly are the property relations regarding any big house whose floors hold, let us say, twenty flats and which, when the redemption period has elapsed and rented flats are abolished, belongs to perhaps three hundred part owners who are scattered all over the world? Our Proudhonist will answer that by that time the Proudhonist exchange bank will exist, which will pay to anyone at any time the full labour proceeds for any labour product, and will therefore pay out also the full value of a share in a flat. But in the first place we are not at all concerned here

with the Proudhonist exchange bank since it is nowhere mentioned in the articles on the housing question, and secondly it rests on the peculiar error that if someone wants to sell a commodity he will necessarily always find a buyer for its full value, and thirdly it went bankrupt in England more than once under the name of Labour Exchange Bazaar,¹ before Proudhon invented it.

The whole conception that the worker should *buy* his dwelling rests again on the reactionary basic outlook, already emphasized, of Proudhonism, according to which the conditions created by modern large-scale industry are morbid excrescences, and society must be brought forcibly, that is, against the trend which it has been following for a hundred years, to a condition in which the old stable handicraft of the individual is the rule, and which, generally speaking, is nothing but an idealized restoration of small-scale enterprise, which has gone and is still going to rack and ruin. Once the workers are flung back into these stable conditions and the "social whirlpool" has been happily removed, the worker can naturally again make use of property in "hearth and home," and the above redemption theory appears less absurd. Proudhon only forgets that in order to accomplish all this he must first of all put back the clock of world history a hundred years, and that if he did he would turn the present-day workers into just such narrow-minded, crawling, sneaking servile souls as their great-great-grandfathers were.

As far, however, as this Proudhonist solution of the housing question contains any rational and practically applicable content it is already being carried out today, but this realization does not spring from "the womb of the revolutionary idea," but from—the big bourgeois themselves. Let us listen to an excellent Spanish newspaper, *La Emancipación*,² of Madrid, of March 16, 1872:

"There is still another means of solving the housing question, the way proposed by Proudhon, which dazzles at first glance, but on closer examination reveals its utter impotence. Proudhon proposed that tenants should be converted into buyers on the instalment plan, that the rent paid annually be booked as an instalment on the redemption payment of the value of the particular dwelling, so that after a certain time the tenant would become its

¹ Engels refers to Robert Owen's attempted establishment of labour bazaars for the exchange of products through the medium of labour notes, whose unit of value was a single hour of work.—*Ed.*

² *La Emancipación*: A weekly newspaper, organ of the Marxist sections of the First International in Spain; appeared in Madrid from June 1871 to 1873.—*Ed.*

owner. This method, which Proudhon considered very revolutionary, is being put into operation in all countries by companies of speculators who thus secure double and treble the value of the houses by raising the rents. M. Dollfus and other big manufacturers in North-eastern France have carried out this system not only in order to make money but, in addition, with a political idea at the back of their minds.

"The cleverest leaders of the ruling class have always directed their efforts towards increasing the number of small property owners in order to build an army for themselves against the proletariat. The bourgeois revolutions of the last century divided up the big estates of the nobility and the church into small allotments, just as the Spanish republicans propose to do today with the still existing large estates, and created thereby a class of small landowners which has since become the most reactionary element in society and a permanent hindrance to the revolutionary movement of the urban proletariat. Napoleon III aimed at creating a similar class in the towns by reducing the denominations of the individual bonds of the public debt, and M. Dollfus and his colleagues sought to stifle all revolutionary spirit in their workers by selling them small dwellings to be paid for in annual instalments, and at the same time to chain the workers by this property to the factory once they worked in it. Thus the Proudhon plan, far from bringing the working class any relief, even turned directly against it."¹

How is the housing question to be solved, then? In present-day society just as any other social question is solved: by the gradual economic adjustment of supply and demand, a solution which ever reproduces the question itself anew and therefore is no solution. How a social revolution would solve this question not only depends on the particular circumstances in each case, but is also connected with much more far-reaching questions, one of the most fundamental of which is the abolition of the antithesis between town and country. As it is not our task to create utopian systems for the arrangement of the future society, it would be more than idle to go into the question here. But one thing is certain: there are already in existence sufficient buildings for dwellings in the

¹ How this solution of the housing question by means of chaining the worker to his own "home" is arising spontaneously in the neighbourhood of big or rapidly rising American towns can be seen from the following passage of a letter by Eleanor Marx-Aveling, Indianapolis, November 28, 1886: "In, or rather near, Kansas City we saw some miserable little wooden shacks, containing about three rooms each, still in the wilds; the land cost 600 dollars and was just big enough to put the little house on it; the latter cost a further 600 dollars, that is, together, 4,800 marks, for a miserable little thing, an hour away from the town, in a muddy desert." In this way the workers must shoulder heavy mortgage debts in order to obtain even these dwellings, and now become the slaves of their employers for fair. They are tied to their houses, they cannot go away, and must put up with whatever working conditions are offered them. [*Note by Engels to the 1887 edition.*]

big towns to remedy immediately any real "housing shortage," given rational utilization of them. This can naturally only take place by the expropriation of the present owners, that is, by quartering in their houses homeless workers or workers excessively overcrowded in their present homes. Immediately the proletariat has conquered political power such a measure dictated in the public interest will be just as easy to carry out as are other expropriations and billetings by the existing state.

* * *

However, our Proudhonist is not satisfied with his previous achievements in the housing question. He must raise the question from the level ground into the sphere of higher socialism in order that it may prove there also an essential "fractional part of the social question":

"Let us now assume that the productivity of capital is really taken by the horns, as it must be sooner or later, for instance, by a transitional law which fixes *the interest on all capitals at one per cent*, but mark you, with the tendency to make even this rate of interest approximate more and more to the zero point, so that finally nothing more will be paid than *the labour necessary to turn over the capital*. Like all other products, houses and dwellings are naturally also included within the purview of this law. . . . The owner himself will be the first one to agree to a sale because otherwise his house would be unused and the capital invested in it simply useless."

This passage contains one of the chief articles of faith of the Proudhonist catechism and offers a striking example of the confusion prevailing in it.

The "productivity of capital" is an absurdity that Proudhon takes over uncritically from the bourgeois economists. The bourgeois economists, it is true, also begin with the proposition that labour is the source of all wealth and the measure of value of all commodities; but they likewise have to explain how it comes about that the capitalist who advances capital for an industrial or handicraft business receives back at the end of it not only the capital which he advanced but also a profit over and above it. In consequence they are compelled to entangle themselves in all sorts of contradictions and to ascribe also to capital a certain productivity. Nothing proves more clearly how completely Proudhon remains enmeshed in the bourgeois ideology than the fact that he has taken over this phrase about the productivity of capital. We have seen at the very beginning that the so-called "productivity of

capital" is nothing but the quality attached to it (under present-day social relations, without which it would not be capital at all) of being able to appropriate the unpaid labour of wage-workers.

However, Proudhon differs from the bourgeois economists in that he does not approve of this "productivity of capital," but, on the contrary, discovers in it a violation of "eternal justice." It is this productivity which prevents the worker from receiving the full proceeds of his labour. It must therefore be abolished. But how? By lowering the *rate of interest* by compulsory legislation and finally reducing it to zero. Then, according to our Proudhonist, capital will cease to be productive.

The interest on loaned *money* capital is only a part of profit; profit, whether on industrial or commercial capital, is only a part of the surplus value taken by the capitalist class from the working class in the form of unpaid labour. The economic laws which govern the rate of interest are as independent of those which govern the rate of surplus value as could possibly be the case with laws of one and the same form of society. But as far as the distribution of this surplus value among the individual capitalists is concerned, it is clear that for industrialists and merchants who have in their businesses large amounts of capital advanced by other capitalists the rate of profit must rise—all other things being equal—to the same extent as the rate of interest falls. The reduction and final abolition of interest would, therefore, by no means really take the so-called "productivity of capital" "by the horns." It would do no more than re-arrange the distribution among the individual capitalists of the unpaid surplus value taken from the working class. It would not give an advantage to the worker as against the industrial capitalist, but to the industrial capitalist as against the rentier.

Proudhon, from his legal standpoint, explains the rate of interest, as he does all economic facts, not by the conditions of social production, but by the state laws in which these conditions receive their general expression. From this point of view, which lacks any inkling of the interconnection between the state laws and the conditions of production in society, these state laws necessarily appear as purely arbitrary orders which at any moment could be replaced just as well by their exact opposites. Nothing is, therefore, easier for Proudhon than to issue a decree—as soon as he has the power to do so—reducing the rate of interest to one per cent. And if all the other social conditions remain as

they were, this Proudhonist decree will simply exist on paper only. The rate of interest will continue to be governed by the economic laws to which it is subject today, all decrees notwithstanding. Persons possessing credit will continue to borrow money at two, three, four and more per cent, according to circumstances, just as before, and the only difference will be that *rentiers* will be very careful to advance money only to persons with whom no litigation is to be expected. Moreover, this great plan to deprive capital of its "productivity" is as old as the hills; it is as old as—the *usury laws* which aim at nothing else but limiting the rate of interest, and which have since been abolished everywhere because in practice they were continually broken or circumvented, and the state was compelled to admit its impotence against the laws of social production. And the reintroduction of these medieval and unworkable laws is "to take the productivity of capital by the horns"? One sees that the closer Proudhonism is examined the more reactionary it appears.

And when thereupon the rate of interest has been reduced to zero in this fashion, and interest on capital therefore abolished, then "nothing more would be paid than the labour necessary to turn over the capital." This is supposed to mean that the abolition of interest is equivalent to the abolition of profit and even of surplus value. But if it were possible *really* to abolish interest by decree, what would be the consequence? The class of *rentiers* would no longer have any inducement to loan out their capital in the form of advances, but would invest it for their own account in their own industrial enterprises or in joint-stock companies. The mass of surplus value extracted from the working class by the capitalist class would remain the same; only its distribution would be altered, and even that not much.

In fact, our Proudhonist fails to see that already now, in commodity purchase in bourgeois society, no more is paid on the average than "the labour necessary to turn over the capital" (it should read, necessary for the production of the commodity in question). Labour is the measure of value of all commodities, and in present-day society—apart from fluctuations of the market—it is absolutely impossible that in the aggregate more should be paid on the average for commodities than the labour necessary for their production. No, no, my dear Proudhonist, the difficulty lies elsewhere. It is contained in the fact that "the labour necessary to turn over the capital" (to use your confused terminology) is

simply *not fully paid for!* How this comes about you can look up in Marx (*Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 128-60!).

But that is not enough. If interest on capital [*Kapitalzins*] is abolished, *house* rent [*Mietzins*]² is abolished with it; for, "like all other products, houses and dwellings are naturally also included within the purview of this law." This is quite in the spirit of the old Major who summoned his one-year volunteer recruit and declared:

"I say, I hear you are a doctor; you might report from time to time at my quarters; when one has a wife and seven children there is always something to patch up."

Recruit: "Excuse me, Major, but I am a doctor of philosophy."

Major: "That's all the same to me; one sawbones is the same as another."

Our Proudhonist behaves the same way: house rent [*Mietzins*] or interest on capital [*Kapitalzins*], it is all the same to him. Interest is interest; sawbones is sawbones. We have seen above that the rent price [*Mietpreis*], commonly called house rent [*Mietzins*], is composed as follows: 1) a part which is ground rent; 2) a part which is interest on the building capital, including the profit of the builder; 3) a part which goes for repairs and insurance; 4) a part which has to amortize the building capital inclusive of profit in annual deductions according to the rate at which the house gradually depreciates.

And now it must have become clear even to the blindest that "the owner himself would be the first to agree to a sale because otherwise his house would remain unused and the capital invested in it would be simply useless." Of course. If the interest on loaned capital is abolished no house-owner can thereafter obtain a penny piece in rent for his house, simply because house rent [*Miete*] may be spoken of as rent *interest* [*Mietzins*] and because such "rent interest" contains a part which is really interest on capital. Sawbones is sawbones. Whereas the usury laws relating to ordinary interest on capital could be made ineffective only by circumventing them, yet they never touched the rate of house rent even remotely. It was reserved for Proudhon to imagine that his new usury law would without more ado regulate and gradually abolish not only simple interest on capital but also the complicated house rent [*Mietzins*] for dwellings. Why then the "simply useless" house should be purchased for good money from the house-owner,

¹ See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 164-94.—Ed.

² *Mietzins*: Literally—rent interest.—Ed.

and how it is that under such circumstances the house-owner would not pay money himself to get rid of this "simply useless" house in order to save himself the cost of repairs—about this we are left in the dark.

After this triumphant achievement in the sphere of higher socialism (Master Proudhon called it suprasocialism) our Proudhonist considers himself justified in flying still higher:

"All that still has to be done now is to draw some conclusions in order to cast complete light from all sides on our so important subject."

And what are these conclusions? Things which follow as little from what has been said before as the worthlessness of dwelling houses from the abolition of interest. Stripped of the pompous and solemn phraseology of our author, they mean nothing more than that, in order to facilitate the business of redemption of rented dwellings, the following is desirable: 1) exact statistics on the subject; 2) a good sanitary inspection force; and 3) co-operatives of building workers to undertake the building of new houses. All these things are certainly very fine and good, but, despite all the vociferous phrases in which they are enveloped, they by no means cast "complete light" into the obscurity of Proudhonist mental confusion.

One who has achieved such great things has the right to address a serious exhortation to the German workers:

"Such and similar questions, it would seem to us, are well worth the attention of the Social Democracy. . . . Let it seek to clarify its mind, as here on the housing question, so also on other and equally important questions, such as *credit, state debts, private debts, taxes,*" etc.

Thus, our Proudhonist here confronts us with the prospect of a whole series of articles on "similar questions," and if he deals with them all as thoroughly as with the present "so important subject," the *Volksstaat* will have copy enough for a year. But we are in a position to anticipate—it all amounts to what has already been said: interest on capital is to be abolished and with that the interest on public and private debts disappears, credit will be gratis, etc. The same magic formula is applied to any and every subject and in each particular case the same astonishing result is obtained with inexorable logic, namely, that when interest on capital has been abolished no more interest will have to be paid on borrowed money.

They are fine questions, by the way, with which our Proudhonist threatens us: *credit!* What credit does the worker need besides

that from week to week, or the credit he obtains at the pawnshop? Whether he gets this credit free or at interest, even at the usurious interest charged by the pawnshop, how much difference does that make to him? And if he did, generally speaking, obtain some advantage from it, that is to say, if the cost of production of labour power were reduced, would not the price of labour power be bound to fall? But to the bourgeois, and in particular to the petty bourgeois, credit is an important matter, and it would be a very fine thing for the petty bourgeois in particular if credit could be obtained at any time, and besides without payment of interest. "State debts!" The working class knows that it did not make them, and when it comes to power it will leave the payment of them to those who contracted them. "Private debts!"—see credit. "Taxes!" A matter that interests the bourgeoisie very much but the worker only very little. What the worker pays in taxes goes in the long run into the cost of production of labour power and must therefore be compensated for by the capitalist. All these things which are held up to us here as highly important questions for the working class are in reality of essential interest only to the bourgeois, and still more so to the petty bourgeois; and, despite Proudhon, we maintain that the working class is not called upon to safeguard the interests of these classes.

Our Proudhonist has not a word to say about the great question which really concerns the workers, that of the relation between capitalist and wage-worker, the question of how it comes about that the capitalist can enrich himself by the labour of his workers. True enough, his lord and master did occupy himself with it, but introduced absolutely no clearness into the matter. Even in his latest writings he has got essentially no farther than he was in his *Philosophy of Poverty*, which Marx so strikingly reduced to nothingness in 1847.

It was bad enough that for twenty-five years the workers of the Latin countries had almost no other socialist mental nourishment than the writings of this "Socialist of the Second Empire," and it would be a double misfortune if the Proudhonist theory were now to inundate Germany too. However, there need be no fear of this. The theoretical standpoint of the German workers is fifty years ahead of that of Proudhonism, and it will be sufficient to make an example of this one question, the housing question, to save further trouble in this respect.

P A R T T W O

**HOW THE BOURGEOISIE SOLVES
THE HOUSING QUESTION**

I

In the section on the *Proudhonist* solution of the housing question it was shown how greatly the petty bourgeoisie is directly interested in this question. However, the big bourgeoisie is also very much interested in it, even if indirectly. Modern natural science has proved that the so-called "poor districts," in which the workers are crowded together, are the breeding places of all those epidemics which from time to time afflict our towns. Cholera, typhus, typhoid fever, small-pox and other navaging diseases spread their germs in the pestilential air and the poisoned water of these working-class quarters. Here the germs hardly ever die out completely, and as soon as circumstances permit they develop into epidemics and then spread beyond their breeding places into the more airy and healthy parts of the town inhabited by the capitalists. Capitalist rule cannot allow itself the pleasure of generating epidemic diseases among the working class with impunity; the consequences fall back on it and the angel of death rages in its ranks as ruthlessly as in the ranks of the workers.

As soon as this fact had been scientifically established the philanthropic bourgeois became inflamed with a noble spirit of competition in their solicitude for the health of their workers. Societies were founded, books were written, proposals drawn up, laws debated and passed, in order to stop up the sources of the ever-recurring epidemics. The housing conditions of the workers were investigated and attempts made to remedy the most crying evils. In England particularly, where the largest number of big towns existed and where the bourgeoisie itself was, therefore, running the greatest risk, extensive activity

began. Government commissions were appointed to inquire into the hygienic conditions of the working classes. Their reports, honourably distinguished from all continental sources by their accuracy, completeness and impartiality, provided the basis for new, more or less thoroughgoing laws. Imperfect as these laws are, they are still infinitely superior to everything that has been done in this direction up to the present on the Continent. Nevertheless, the capitalist order of society reproduces again and again the evils to be remedied, and does so with such inevitable necessity that even in England the remedying of them has hardly advanced a single step.

Germany, as usual, needed a much longer time before the chronic sources of infection existing there also reached the acute stage necessary to arouse the somnolent big bourgeoisie. But he who goes slowly goes surely, and so among us too there finally has arisen a bourgeois literature on public health and the housing question, a watery extract of its foreign, and in particular its English, predecessors, to which it is sought fraudulently to impart a semblance of higher conception by means of fine-sounding and unctuous phrases. *The Housing Conditions of the Working Classes and Their Reform*, by Dr. Emil Sax, Vienna, 1869,¹ belongs to this literature.

I have selected this book for a presentation of the bourgeois treatment of the housing question only because it makes the attempt to summarize as far as possible the bourgeois literature on the subject. And a fine literature it is which serves our author as his "sources"! Of the English parliamentary reports, the real main sources, only three, the very oldest, are mentioned by name; the whole book proves that its author has *never glanced at even a single one of them*. On the other hand, a whole series of banal bourgeois, well-meaning philistine and hypocritical philanthropic writings are enumerated: Ducpétiaux, Roberts, Hole, Huber, the proceedings of the English congresses on social science (or rather social bosh), the journal of the Association for the Welfare of the Labouring Classes in Prussia, the official Austrian report on the World Exhibition in Paris, the official Bonapartist reports on the same subject, the *Illustrated London*

¹ E. Sax, *Die Wohnungszustände der arbeitenden Klassen und ihre Reform*. Wien, 1869.—Ed.

News,¹ *Über Land und Meer*,² and finally "a recognized authority," a man of "acute practical perception," of "convincing impressiveness of speech," namely—*Julius Faucher*! All that is missing in this list of sources is the *Gartenlaube*,³ *Kladderadatsch* and the *Fusilier Kutschke*.⁴

In order that no misunderstanding may arise concerning the standpoint of Herr Sax, he declares on page 22:

"By social economy we mean the doctrine of national economy in its application to social questions; or, to put it more precisely, the totality of the ways and means which this science offers us *for raising the so-called (!) propertyless classes to the level of the propertied classes, on the basis of its 'iron' laws within the framework of the order of society at present prevailing.*"

We shall not go into the confused idea that generally speaking "the doctrine of national economy," or political economy, deals with other than "social" questions. We shall get down to the main point immediately. Dr. Sax demands that the "iron laws" of bourgeois economics, the "framework of the order of society at present prevailing," in other words, that the capitalist mode of production must continue to exist unchanged, but nevertheless the "so-called propertyless classes" are to be raised "to the level of the propertied classes." Now, it is an unavoidable preliminary condition of the capitalist mode of production that a really, and not a so-called, propertyless class, should exist, a class which has nothing to sell but its labour power and which is therefore compelled to sell its labour power to the industrial capitalists. The task of the new science of social economy invented by Herr Sax is, therefore, to find ways and means—in a state of society founded on the antagonism of capitalists, owners of all raw materials, instruments of production and means of subsistence, on the one hand, and of propertyless wage-workers, who call only their labour power and nothing else their own, on the other hand—by which, inside this social order, all wage-workers can be turned into capitalists without ceasing to be wage-workers. Herr Sax thinks he has solved this question.

¹ *Illustrated London News*: Bourgeois weekly of wide circulation founded in 1842.—Ed.

² *Über Land und Meer* [*On Land and Sea*]: Illustrated literary magazine which began to appear in Stuttgart in 1858.—Ed.

³ *Gartenlaube* [*Arbour*]: A philistine family magazine.—Ed.

⁴ *Fusilier August Kutschke*: The poet Gotthelf Hoffmann, who wrote a patriotic song popular during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.—Ed.

Perhaps he would be so good as to show us how all the soldiers of the French army, each of whom carries a marshal's baton in his knapsack since the days of the old Napoleon, can be turned into field marshals without at the same time ceasing to be privates. Or how it could be brought about that all the forty million subjects of the German Reich could be made German kaisers.

It is the essence of bourgeois socialism to want to maintain the basis of all the evils of present-day society and at the same time to want to abolish the evils themselves. As already pointed out in the *Communist Manifesto*, the bourgeois Socialists are desirous of "redressing social grievances, in order to secure the continued existence of bourgeois society;" they want "*a bourgeoisie without a proletariat.*" We have seen that Herr Sax formulates the problem in exactly the same fashion. Its solution he finds in the solution of the housing problem. He is of the opinion that "by improving the housing of the labouring classes it would be possible successfully to remedy the material and spiritual misery which has been described, and thereby—by a radical improvement of the housing conditions *alone*—to raise the greater part of these classes out of the morass of their often hardly human conditions of existence to the pure heights of material and spiritual well-being." (Page 14.) Incidentally, it is in the interest of the bourgeoisie to gloss over the fact of the existence of a proletariat created by the bourgeois relations of production and determining the continued existence of these relations. Therefore Herr Sax tells us (page 21) that the expression labouring classes is to be understood as including all "impecunious social classes," "and, in general, people in a small way, such as handicraftsmen, widows, pensioners (!), subordinate officials, etc.," as well as actual workers. Bourgeois socialism extends its hand to the petty-bourgeois variety.

Whence the housing shortage then? How did it arise? As a good bourgeois, Herr Sax is not supposed to know that it is a necessary product of the bourgeois social order; that it cannot fail to be present in a society in which the great labouring masses are exclusively dependent upon wages, that is to say, upon the quantity of means of subsistence necessary for their existence and for the propagation of their kind; in which improvements of the machinery, etc., continually throw masses of workers out of employment; in which violent and regularly recur-

ring industrial fluctuations determine on the one hand the existence of a large reserve army of unemployed workers, and on the other hand drive the mass of the workers from time to time on to the streets unemployed; in which the workers are crowded together in masses in the big towns, at a quicker rate than dwellings come into existence for them under the prevailing conditions; in which, therefore, there must always be tenants even for the most infamous pigsties; and in which finally the house-owner in his capacity as capitalist has not only the right but, by reason of competition, to a certain extent also the duty of ruthlessly making as much out of his property in house rent as he possibly can. In such a society the housing shortage is no accident; it is a necessary institution and can be abolished together with all its effects on health, etc., only if the whole social order from which it springs is fundamentally refashioned. That, however, bourgeois socialism dare not know. It *dare* not explain the housing shortage as arising from the existing conditions. And therefore it has no other way but to explain the housing shortage by moralizing that it is the result of the wickedness of man, the result of original sin, so to speak.

"And here we cannot fail to recognize—and in consequence we cannot deny" (daring conclusion!)—"that the blame . . . rests partly *with the workers themselves*, those who want dwellings, and partly, the much greater part, it is true, with those who undertake to supply the need or those who, although they have sufficient means at their command, make no attempt to supply the need, namely, *the propertied, higher social classes*. The latter are to be blamed . . . because they do not make it their business to provide for a sufficient supply of good dwellings."

Just as Proudhon takes us from the sphere of economics into the sphere of legal phrases, so our bourgeois Socialist takes us here from the economic sphere into the moral sphere. And nothing is more natural. Whoever declares that the capitalist mode of production, the "iron laws" of present-day bourgeois society, are inviolable, and yet at the same time would like to abolish their unpleasant but necessary consequences, has no other recourse but to deliver moral sermons to the capitalists, moral sermons whose emotional effects immediately evaporate under the influence of private interest and, if necessary, of competition. These moral sermons are in effect exactly the same as those of the hen at the edge of the pond in which she sees the brood of ducklings she has hatched out gaily swimming. Ducklings take

to the water although it has no beams, and capitalists pounce on profit although it is heartless. "There is no room for sentiment in money matters," was already said by old Hansemann, who knew more about it than Herr Sax.

"Good dwellings are so expensive that *it is absolutely impossible* for the greater part of the workers to make use of them. Big capital... is shy of investing in houses for the working classes... and as a result these classes and their housing needs fall mostly a prey to the speculators."

Disgusting speculation—big capital naturally never speculates! But it is not ill will, it is only ignorance which prevents big capital from speculating in workers' houses:

"House-owners do not *know* at all what a great and important role... is played by a normal satisfaction or housing needs; *they do not know what they are doing to the people* when they offer them, as a general rule so irresponsibly, bad and harmful dwellings, and, finally, they do not *know* how they damage themselves thereby." (Page 27.)

However, the ignorance of the capitalists must be supplemented by the ignorance of the workers before a housing shortage can be created. After Herr Sax has admitted that "the very lowest sections" of the workers "are obliged (!) to seek a night's lodging wherever and however they can find it in order not to remain altogether without shelter and in this connection are absolutely defenceless and helpless." he tells us:

"For it is a well-known fact that many among them (the workers) from carelessness, but chiefly from ignorance, deprive their bodies, one is almost inclined to say, with virtuosity, of the conditions of natural development and healthy existence, in that they *have not the faintest idea* of rational hygiene and, in particular, of the enormous importance that attaches to the dwelling in this hygiene." (Page 27.)

Here however the bourgeois donkey's ears protrude. Where the capitalists are concerned "blame" evaporates into ignorance, but where the workers are concerned ignorance is made the cause of their guilt. Listen:

"Thus it comes (namely, through ignorance) that if they can only save something on the rent they will move into dark, damp and inadequate dwellings, which are in short a mockery of all the demands of hygiene... that often several families together rent a single dwelling, and even a single room—all this in order to spend as little as possible on rent, while on the other hand they *squander* their income *in truly sinful fashion on drink and all sorts of idle pleasures.*"

The money which the workers "waste on spirits and tobacco" (page 28), the "life in the pubs with all its regrettable consequences, which drags the workers again and again like a dead weight back into the mire" lies indeed like a dead weight in Herr Sax's stomach. The fact that under the existing circumstances drunkenness among the workers is a necessary product of their living conditions, just as necessary as typhus, crime, vermin, bailiff and other social ills, so necessary in fact that the average figures of those who succumb to inebriety can be calculated in advance, is again something that Herr Sax cannot allow himself to know. My old primary school teacher used to say, by the way: "The common people go to the pubs and the people of quality go to the clubs," and as I have been in both I am in a position to confirm it.

The whole talk about the "ignorance" of both parties amounts to nothing but the old phrases about the harmony of interests of labour and capital. If the capitalists knew their true interests, they would give the workers good houses and improve their position in general; and if the workers understood their true interests they would not go on strike, they would not go in for Social Democracy, they would not play politics, but would be nice and follow their betters, the capitalists. Unfortunately, both sides find their interests altogether elsewhere than in the sermons of Herr Sax and his countless predecessors. The gospel of harmony between capital and labour has been preached for almost fifty years now, and bourgeois philanthropy has expended large sums of money to prove this harmony by building model institutions; yet, as we shall see later, we are today exactly where we were fifty years ago.

Our author now proceeds to the practical solution of the problem. How little revolutionary Proudhon's proposal to make the workers *owners* of their dwellings was can be seen from the fact that bourgeois socialism even before him tried to carry it out in practice and is still trying to do so. Herr Sax also declares that the housing problem can be completely solved only by transferring property in dwellings to the workers. (Pages 58 and 59.) More than that, he goes into poetic raptures at the idea, giving vent to his feelings in the following outburst of enthusiasm:

"There is something peculiar about the longing inherent in man to own land; it is an urge which not even the *feverishly pulsating business life* of the

present day has been able to abate. It is the unconscious appreciation of the significance of the economic achievement represented by landownership. With it the individual obtains a secure hold; he is rooted firmly in the earth, as it were, and every enterprise (!) has its most permanent basis in it. However, the blessings of landownership extend far beyond these material advantages. Whoever is fortunate enough to call a piece of land his own has *reached the highest conceivable stage of economic independence*; he has a territory on which he can rule with *sovereign* power; he is *his own master*; he has a certain power and a *sure support* in time of need; his self-confidence develops and with this his moral strength. Hence the deep significance of property in the question before us. . . . The worker, today helplessly exposed to all the vicissitudes of economic life and in constant dependence on his employer, would thereby be saved to a certain extent from this precarious situation; *he would become a capitalist* and be safeguarded against the dangers of unemployment or incapacitation as a result of the credit which his real estate would open to him. *He would thus be raised from the ranks of the propertyless into the propertied class.*" (Page 63.)

Herr Sax seems to assume that man is essentially a peasant, otherwise he would not falsely impute to the workers of our big cities a longing to own land, a longing which no one else has discovered in them. For our workers in the big cities freedom of movement is the prime condition of existence, and landownership can only be a fetter to them. Give them their own houses, chain them once again to the soil and you break their power of resistance to the wage cutting of the factory owners. The individual worker might be able to sell his house on occasion, but during a big strike or a general industrial crisis all the houses belonging to the workers affected would have to be put up for sale and would therefore find no purchasers or be sold off far below their cost price. And even if they all found purchasers, Herr Sax's whole grand housing reform would have come to nothing and he would have to start from the beginning again. However, poets live in a world of fantasy, and so does Herr Sax, who imagines that a landowner has "reached the highest stage of economic independence," that he has "a sure support," that "he would *become a capitalist* and be safeguarded against the dangers of unemployment or incapacitation as a result of the credit which his real estate would open to him," etc. Herr Sax should take a look at the French and our own Rhenish small peasants. Their houses and fields are loaded down with mortgages, their harvests belong to their creditors before they are reaped, and it is not they who rule with sovereign power on their "territory" but the usurer, the lawyer and the bailiff. That certainly represents the

highest conceivable stage of economic independence—for the usurer! And in order that the workers may bring their little houses as quickly as possible under the same sovereignty of the usurer, our well-meaning Herr Sax carefully points to the *credit* which their *real estate* can secure them in times of unemployment or incapacitation instead of their becoming a burden on the poor rate.

In any case, Herr Sax has solved the question raised in the beginning: the worker "*becomes a capitalist*" by acquiring his own little house.

Capital is the command over the unpaid labour of others. The little house of the worker can therefore become capital only if he rents it to a third person and appropriates a part of the labour product of this third person in the form of rent. But the house is prevented from becoming capital precisely by the fact that the worker lives in it himself, just as a coat ceases to be capital the moment I buy it from the tailor and put it on. The worker who owns a little house to the value of a thousand talers is, true enough, no longer a proletarian, but it takes Herr Sax to call him a capitalist.

However, this capitalist streak of our worker has still another side. Let us assume that in a given industrial area it has become the rule that each worker owns his own little house. In that case *the working class of that area lives rent-free*; housing expenses no longer enter into the value of its labour power. Every reduction in the cost of production of labour power, that is to say, every permanent price reduction in the worker's necessities of life is equivalent "on the basis of the iron laws of the doctrine of national economy" to a depression of the value of labour power and will therefore finally result in a corresponding drop in wages. Wages would thus fall on an average as much as the average sum saved on rent, that is, the worker would pay rent for his own house, but not, as formerly, in money to the house-owner, but in unpaid labour to the factory owner for whom he works. In this way the savings of the worker invested in his little house would in a certain sense become capital, however not capital for him but for the capitalist employing him.

Herr Sax thus lacks the ability to turn his worker into a capitalist even on paper.

Incidentally, what has been said above applies to all so-called social reforms which can be reduced to saving schemes or to

cheapening the means of subsistence of the worker. Either they become general and then they are followed by a corresponding reduction of wages or they remain quite isolated experiments and then their very existence as isolated exceptions proves that their realization on an extensive scale is incompatible with the existing capitalist mode of production. Let us assume that in a certain area a general introduction of consumers' co-operatives succeeds in reducing the cost of the means of subsistence for the workers by 20 per cent. Hence in the long run wages would fall in that area by approximately 20 per cent, that is to say, in the same proportion as the means of subsistence in question enter into the budget of the workers. If the worker, for example, spends three-quarters of his weekly wage on these means of subsistence, wages would in the end fall by $\frac{3}{4} \times 20 = 15$ per cent. In short, as soon as any such saving reform has become general, the worker's wages diminish by as much as his savings permit him to live cheaper. Give *every* worker an independent income of 52 talers, achieved by saving, and his weekly wage must finally fall one taler. Therefore: the more he saves the less he will receive in wages. He saves, therefore, not in his own interest but in the interest of the capitalist. What else is needed "to stimulate" in him . . . "in the most powerful fashion . . . the primary economic virtue, thrift"? (Page 64.)

Moreover, Herr Sax tells us immediately afterwards that the workers are to become house-owners not so much in their own interest as in the interest of the capitalists:

"However, not only the working class but society as a whole has the greatest interest in seeing as many of its members as possible bound (!) to the land" (I should like to see Herr Sax himself even for once in this posture). . . . All the secret forces which set on fire the volcano called the social question which glows under our feet, the proletarian bitterness, the hatred . . . the dangerous confusion of ideas, . . . must all disappear like mist before the morning sun when . . . the workers themselves enter in this fashion into the ranks of the propertied class." (Page 65.)

In other words, Herr Sax hopes that by a shift in their proletarian status, such as would be brought about by the acquisition of a house, the workers would also lose their proletarian character and become once again obedient toadies like their forefathers, who were also house-owners. The Proudhonists should lay this thing to heart.

Herr Sax believes he has thereby solved the social question:

"A juster distribution of goods, the riddle of the Sphinx which so many have already tried in vain to solve, does it not now lie before us as a tangible fact, has it not thereby been taken from the regions of ideals and brought into the realm of reality? And if it is carried out, does this not mean the achievement of one of the highest aims, one which even the Socialists of the most extreme tendency present as the culminating point of their theories?" (Page 66.)

It is really lucky that we have worked our way through as far as this, because this shout of triumph is the "summit" of the Saxon book. From now on we once more gently descend from "the regions of ideals" to flat reality, and when we get down we shall find that nothing, nothing at all, has changed in our absence.

Our guide takes us the first step down by informing us that there are two systems of workers' dwellings: the cottage system, in which each working-class family has its own little house and if possible a little garden as well, as in England; and the barrack system of the large tenement houses containing numerous workers' dwellings, as in Paris, Vienna, etc. Between the two is the system prevailing in Northern Germany. Now it is true, he tells us, that the cottage system is the only correct one, and the *only one* whereby the worker can acquire the ownership of his own house; besides, he argues, the barrack system has very great disadvantages with regard to hygiene, morality and domestic peace. But, alas and alack! says he, the cottage system is not realizable in the centres of the housing shortage, in the big cities, on account of the high cost of land, and one should, therefore, be glad if houses were built containing from four to six flats instead of big barracks, or if the main disadvantages of the barrack system were alleviated by various ingenious building devices. (Pages 71-92.)

We have come down quite a bit already, haven't we? The transformation of the workers into capitalists, the solution of the social question, a house of his own for each worker—all these things have been left behind, up above in "the regions of ideals." All that remains for us to do is to introduce the cottage system into the countryside and to make the workers' barracks in the cities as tolerable as possible.

On its own admission, therefore, the bourgeois solution of the housing question has come to grief—it has come to grief owing to the *contrast between town and country*. And with this we have arrived at the kernel of the problem. The housing question

can be solved only when society has been sufficiently transformed for a start to be made towards abolishing the contrast between town and country, which has been brought to its extreme point by present-day capitalist society. Far from being able to abolish this antithesis, capitalist society on the contrary is compelled to intensify it day by day. On the other hand, already the first modern utopian Socialists, Owen and Fourier, correctly recognized this. In their model structures the contrast between town and country no longer exists. Consequently there takes place exactly the opposite of what Herr Sax contends: it is not that the solution of the housing question simultaneously solves the social question, but that only by the solution of the social question, that is, by the abolition of the capitalist mode of production, is the solution of the housing question made possible. To want to solve the housing question while at the same time desiring to maintain the modern big cities is an absurdity. The modern big cities, however, will be abolished only by the abolition of the capitalist mode of production, and when this is once set going there will be quite other issues than supplying each worker with a little house of his own.

In the beginning, however, each social revolution will have to take things as it finds them and do its best to get rid of the most crying evils with the means at its disposal. And we have already seen that the housing *shortage* can be remedied immediately by expropriating a part of the luxury dwellings belonging to the propertied classes and by compulsory quartering in the remaining part.

If now Herr Sax, continuing, once more leaves the big cities and delivers a verbose discourse on working-class colonies to be established *near* the towns, if he describes all the beauties of such colonies with their common "water supply, gas lighting, air or hot-water heating, laundries, drying-rooms, bath-rooms, etc.," each with its "nursery, school, prayer hall (!), reading-room, library . . . wine and beer hall, dancing and concert hall in all respectability," with steam power fitted to all the houses so that "to a certain extent production can be transferred back from the factory to the domestic workshop"—this does not alter the situation at all. The colony he describes has been directly borrowed by Mr. Huber from the Socialists Owen and Fourier and merely made entirely bourgeois by discarding everything socialist about it. Thereby, however, it has become really utopian. No capitalist

has any interest in establishing such colonies, and in fact none such exists anywhere in the world, except in Guise in France, and that was built by a follower of Fourier, not as profitable speculation but as a socialist experiment.¹ Herr Sax might just as well have quoted in support of his bourgeois project-spinning the example of the communist colony "Harmony Hall" founded by Owen in Hampshire at the beginning of the forties and long since defunct.

In any case, all this talk about building colonies is nothing more than a lame attempt to soar again into "the regions of ideals" and it is immediately afterwards again abandoned. We descend rapidly again. The simplest solution now is "that the employers, the factory owners, should assist the workers to obtain suitable dwellings, whether they do so by building such themselves or by encouraging and assisting the workers to do their own building, providing them with land, advancing them building capital, etc." (Page 106.)

With this we are once again out of the big towns, where there can be no question of anything of the sort, and back in the country. Herr Sax now proves that here it is in the interest of the factory owners themselves that they should assist their workers to obtain tolerable dwellings, on the one hand because it is a good investment, and on the other hand because the inevitably "resulting uplift of the workers . . . must entail an increase of their mental and physical working capacity, which naturally is of . . . no less . . . advantage to the employers. With this, however, the right point of view for the participation of the latter in the solution of the housing question is given. It appears as the outcome of a *latent association*, as the outcome of the care of the employers for the physical and economic, mental and moral well-being of their workers, which is concealed for the most part under the cloak of humanitarian endeavours and which is its own pecuniary reward because of its successful results: the producing and maintaining of a diligent, skilled, willing, contented and *devoted* working class." (Page 108.)

The phrase "latent association" with which Huber attempts to endow this bourgeois philanthropic drivel with a "loftier

¹ And this one also has finally become a mere site of working-class exploitation. (See the Paris *Socialists* of 1886.) [Note by Engels to the 1887 edition.]

significance." does not alter the situation at all. Even without this phrase the big rural factory owners, particularly in England, have long ago realized that the building of workers' dwellings is not only a necessity, a part of the factory equipment itself, but also that it pays very well. In England whole villages have grown up in this way, and some of them have later developed into towns. The workers, however, instead of being thankful to the philanthropic capitalists, have always raised very considerable objections to this "cottage system." Not only are they compelled to pay monopoly prices for these houses because the factory owner has no competitors, but immediately a strike breaks out they are homeless because the factory owner throws them out of his houses without any more ado and thus renders any resistance very difficult. Details can be studied in my *Condition of the Working Class in England*, pp. 224 and 228.¹ Herr Sax, however, thinks that these objections "hardly deserve refutation." (Page 111.) But does he not want to make the worker the owner of his little house? Certainly, but as "the employers must always be in a position to dispose of the dwelling in order that when they dismiss a worker they may have room for the one who replaces him," well then, there is nothing for it but "to make provision for such cases *by stipulating that the ownership shall be revocable.*" (Page 113.)²

This time we have stepped down with unexpected suddenness. First it was said the worker must own his own little house. Then we were informed that this was impossible in the towns and could be carried out only in the country. And now we are told that ownership even in the country is to be "*revocable by agreement*"! With this new sort of property for the workers discov-

¹ See K. Marx and F. Engels, *On Britain*, pp. 287, 291-92.—*Ed.*

² In this respect too the English capitalists have long ago not only fulfilled but far exceeded all the cherished wishes of Herr Sax. On Monday, October 14, 1872, the court in Morpeth for the establishment of the lists of parliamentary electors had to adjudicate a petition on behalf of 2,000 miners to have their names enrolled on the list of parliamentary voters. It transpired that the greater number of these miners, according to the regulations of the mine at which they were employed, were *not* to be regarded as *lessees* of the dwellings in which they lived but as occupying these dwellings on *sufferance*, and could be thrown out of them at any moment without notice. (The mine-owner and house-owner were naturally one and the same person.) The judge decided that these men were not *lessees* but *servants*, and as such not entitled to be included in the list of voters. (*Daily News*, October 15, 1872) [*Note by Engels.*]

ered by Herr Sax, with this transformation of the workers into capitalists "revocable by agreement," we have safely arrived again on level ground, and have here to examine what the capitalists and other philanthropists have *actually* done to solve the housing question.

II

If we are to believe our Dr. Sax, much has already been done by these gentlemen, the capitalists, to remedy the housing shortage, and the proof has been provided that the housing problem can be solved on the basis of the capitalist mode of production.

First of all, Herr Sax cites to us the example of—Bonapartist France! As is known, Louis Bonaparte appointed a commission at the time of the Paris World Exhibition ostensibly to report upon the situation of the working classes in France, but in reality to describe their situation as blissful in the extreme, to the greater glory of the Empire. And it is to the report of *this* commission, composed of the corruptest tools of Bonapartism, that Herr Sax refers, particularly because the results of its work are, "according to the authorized committee's *own statement*, fairly complete for France." And what are these results? Of eighty-nine big industrialists or joint-stock companies which gave information, thirty-one had built *no* workers' dwellings at all. According to Sax's own estimate the dwellings that were built house at the most from 50,000 to 60,000 people and consist almost exclusively of no more than two rooms for each family!

It is obvious that every capitalist who is tied down to a particular rural locality by the conditions of his industry—water power, the location of coal mines, iron-ore deposits and other mines, etc.—must build dwellings for his workers if none are available. To see in this a proof of "latent association," "an eloquent testimony to a growing understanding of the question and its wide import," a "very promising beginning" (page 115), requires a highly developed habit of self-deception. For the rest, the industrialists of the various countries differ from each other in this respect also, according to their national character. For instance, Herr Sax informs us (page 117):

"In *England only quite recently* has increased activity on the part of employers in this direction been observable. This refers in particular to the out-of-the-way hamlets in the rural areas. . . . The circumstance that otherwise the workers often have to walk a long way from the nearest village to

the factory and arrive there so exhausted that they do not perform enough work is the employers' main *motive for building* dwellings for their workers. However, the number of those who have a *deeper understanding* of conditions and who combine with the cause of housing *reform* more or less all the other elements of latent association is also increasing, and it is these people to whom credit is due for the establishment of those flourishing colonies. . . . The names of Ashton in Hyde, Ashworth in Turton, Grant in Bury, Greg in Bollington, Marshall in Leeds, Strutt in Belper, Salt in Saltaire, Ackroyd in Copley, and others are well known on this account throughout the United Kingdom."

Blessed simplicity, and still more blessed ignorance! The English rural factory owners have only "quite recently" been building workers' dwellings! No, my dear Herr Sax, the English capitalists are really big industrialists, not only as regards their purses but also as regards their brains. Long before Germany possessed a really large-scale industry they had realized that for factory production in the rural districts expenditure on workers' dwellings was a necessary part of the total investment of capital, and a very profitable one, both directly and indirectly. Long before the struggle between Bismarck and the German bourgeois had given the German workers freedom of association, the English factory, mine and foundry owners had had practical experience of the pressure they can exert on striking workers if they are at the same time the landlords of those workers. The "flourishing colonies" of a Greg, an Ashton and an Ashworth are so "recent" that even forty years ago they were hailed by the bourgeoisie as models, as I myself wrote twenty-eight years ago. (*The Condition of the Working Class in England*. Note on pp. 228-30.¹) The colonies of Marshall and Akroyd (that is how the man spells his name) are about as old, and the colony of Strutt is even much older, its beginnings reaching back into the last century. Since in England the average duration of a worker's dwelling is reckoned as forty years, Herr Sax can calculate on his fingers the dilapidated condition in which these "flourishing colonies" are today. In addition, the majority of these colonies are now no longer in the countryside. The colossal expansion of industry has surrounded most of them with factories and houses to such an extent that they are now situated in the middle of dirty, smoky towns with 20,000, 30,000 and more inhabitants. But all this does not prevent German bourgeois science, as represented by Herr Sax, from devoutly

¹ See K. Marx and F. Engels, *On Britain*, pp. 221-222.—Ed.

repeating today the old English paeans of praise of 1840, which no longer have any application.

And to give us old Akroyd as an example! This worthy was certainly a philanthropist of the first water. He loved his workers, and in particular his female employees, to such an extent that his less philanthropic competitors in Yorkshire used to say of him that he ran his factories exclusively with his own children! True, Herr Sax contends that "illegitimate children are becoming more and more rare" in these flourishing colonies. (Page 118.) Yes, illegitimate children *born out of wedlock*, for in the English industrial districts the pretty girls marry very young.

In England the establishment of workers' dwellings close to each big rural factory and simultaneously *with* the factory has been the rule for sixty years and more. As already mentioned, many of these factory villages have become the nucleus around which later on a whole factory town has grown up with all the evils which a factory town brings with it. These colonies have therefore not solved the housing question; on the contrary, they *first really created it* in their localities.

On the other hand, in countries which in the sphere of large-scale industry have only limped along behind England, and which really got to know what large-scale industry is only after 1848, in France and particularly in Germany, the situation is quite different. Here it was only colossal foundries and factories which decided after much hesitation to build a certain number of workers' dwellings—for instance, the Schneider works in Creusot and the Krupp works in Essen. The great majority of the rural industrialists let their workers trudge miles through the heat, snow and rain every morning to the factories, and back again every evening to their homes. This is particularly the case in mountainous districts, in the French and Alsatian Vosges districts, in the valleys of the Wupper, Sieg, Agger, Lenne and other Rhineland-Westphalian rivers. In the Erzgebirge the situation is probably no better. The same petty niggardliness occurs among both Germans and French.

Herr Sax knows very well that the very promising beginning as well as the flourishing colonies means less than nothing. Therefore, he tries now to prove to the capitalists that they can obtain magnificent rents by building workers' dwellings. In other words, he seeks to show them a new way of cheating the workers.

First of all, he holds up to them the example of a number of

London building societies, partly philanthropic and partly speculative, which have shown a net profit of from four to six per cent and more. It is not at all necessary for Herr Sax to prove to us that capital invested in workers' houses yields a good profit. The reason why the capitalists do not invest still more than they do in workers' dwellings is that more expensive dwellings bring in still greater profits for their owners. Herr Sax's exhortation to the capitalists, therefore, amounts once again to nothing but a moral sermon.

Now, as far as these London building societies are concerned, whose brilliant successes Herr Sax so loudly trumpets forth, they have, according to his own figures—and every sort of building speculation is included here—provided housing for a total of 2,132 families and 706 single men, that is, for less than 15,000 persons! And is it presumed seriously to present in Germany this sort of childishness as a great success, although in the East End of London alone a million workers live under the most miserable housing conditions? The whole of these philanthropic efforts are in fact so miserably futile that the English parliamentary reports dealing with the condition of the workers never even mention them.

We will not speak here of the ludicrous ignorance of London displayed throughout this whole section. Just one point, however. Herr Sax is of the opinion that the Lodging House for Single Men in Soho went out of business because there "was no hope of obtaining a large clientele" in this neighbourhood. Herr Sax imagines that the whole of the West End of London is one big luxury town, and does not know that right behind the most elegant streets the dirtiest workers' quarters are to be found, of which, for example, Soho is one. The model lodging house in Soho, which he mentions and which I already knew twenty-three years ago, was much frequented in the beginning, but closed down because no one could stand it there, and yet it was one of the best.

But the workers' town of Mülhausen in Alsace—that is surely a success, is it not?

The Workers' City in Mülhausen is the great show-piece of the continental bourgeois, just as the one-time flourishing colonies of Ashton, Ashworth, Greg and Co. are of the English bourgeois. Unfortunately, the Mülhausen example is not a product of "latent" association but of the open association between the Second French Empire and the capitalists of Alsace. It was one of Louis Bona-

parte's socialist experiments, for which the state advanced one-third of the capital. In fourteen years (up to 1867) it built 800 small houses, according to a defective system, an impossible one in England where they understand these things better, and these houses are handed over to the workers to become their own property after thirteen to fifteen years of monthly payments of an increased rental. It was not necessary for the Bonapartists of Alsace to invent this mode of acquiring property; as we shall see, it had been introduced by the English co-operative building societies long before. Compared with that in England, the extra rent paid for the purchase of these houses is rather high. For instance, after having paid 4,500 francs in instalments during fifteen years, the worker receives a house which was worth 3,300 francs fifteen years before. If the worker wants to go away or if he is in arrears with only a single monthly instalment (in which case he can be evicted), six and two-thirds per cent of the original value of the house is charged as the annual rent (for instance, 17 francs a month for a house worth 3,000 francs) and the rest is paid out to him, but *without a penny of interest*. It is quite clear that under such circumstances the society is able to grow fat, quite apart from "state assistance." It is just as clear that the houses provided under these circumstances are better than the old tenement houses in the town itself, if only because they are built outside the town in a semi-rural neighbourhood.

We need not say a word about the few miserable experiments which have been made in Germany; even Herr Sax, on page 157, admits their woefulness.

What, then, exactly do all these examples prove? Simply that the building of workers' dwellings is profitable from the capitalist point of view, even when not all the laws of hygiene are trodden under foot. But that has never been denied; we all knew that long ago. *Any* investment of capital which satisfies an existing need is profitable if conducted rationally. The question, however, is precisely, why the housing shortage continues to exist *all the same*, why the capitalists all the same do not provide sufficient healthy dwellings for the workers. And here Herr Sax has again nothing but exhortations to make to capital and fails to provide us with an answer. The real answer to this question we have already given above.

Capital does not *want* to abolish the housing shortage even if it could; this has now been finally established. There remain,

therefore, only two other expedients: self-help on the part of the workers, and state assistance.

Herr Sax, an enthusiastic worshipper of self-help, is able to report miraculous things about it also in regard to the housing question. Unfortunately he is compelled to admit right at the beginning that self-help can only effect anything where the cottage system either already exists or where it is feasible, that is, once again only in the rural areas. In the big cities, even in England, it can be effective only in a very limited measure. Herr Sax then sighs: "Reform in this way (by self-help) can be effected only in a *roundabout way* and therefore *always* only imperfectly, namely, only in so far as the principle of private ownership is so strengthened as to react on the quality of the dwelling." This too could be doubted; in any case, the "principle of private ownership" has not exercised any reforming influence on the "quality" of the author's style. Despite all this, self-help in England has achieved such wonders "that thereby everything done there along other lines to solve the housing problem has been *far exceeded*." Herr Sax is referring to the English "building societies" and he deals with them at great length particularly because "very inadequate or erroneous ideas are current about their character and activities in general. The English building societies are by no means . . . associations for building houses or building co-operatives; they can be described . . . in German rather as something like '*Hauserwerbvereine*' [associations for the acquisition of houses]. They are associations whose object it is to accumulate funds from the periodical contributions of their members in order then, out of these funds and according to their size, to grant loans to their members for the purchase of a house. . . . The building society is thus a savings bank for one section of its members, and a loan bank for the other section. The building societies are, therefore, mortgage credit institutions designed to meet the requirements of the workers which, in the main, . . . use the savings of the workers . . . to assist persons of the same social standing as the depositors to purchase or build a house. As may be supposed, such loans are granted by mortgaging the real estate in question, and on condition that they must be paid back at short intervals in instalments which combine both interest and amortization. . . . The interest is not paid out to the depositors but always *placed to their credit and compounded*. . . . The members can demand the return of the sums they have paid in, plus interest. . . , at any time by giving a

month's notice." (Pages 170 to 172.) "There are over 2,000 such societies in England; . . . the total capital they have accumulated amounts to about £15,000,000. In this way about 100,000 *working-class* families have already obtained possession of their own hearth and home—a social achievement which it would certainly be difficult to parallel." (Page 174.)

Unfortunately here too the "but" comes limping along immediately after:

"But a perfect solution of the problem has *by no means been achieved* in this way, for the reason, if for no other, that the acquisition of a house is something only the *better situated* workers . . . can afford. . . . In particular, sanitary conditions are often not sufficiently taken into consideration." (Page 176.) On the continent "such associations . . . find only little scope for development." They presuppose the existence of the cottage system, which here exists only in the countryside; and in the countryside the workers are not yet sufficiently developed for self-help. On the other hand, in the towns where real building co-operatives could be formed they are faced with "very considerable and serious difficulties of all sorts." (Page 179.) They could build only cottages and that will not do in the big cities. In short, "this form of co-operative self-help" cannot "in the present circumstances—and hardly in the near future either—play the chief role in the solution of the problem before us." These building societies, you see, are still "in their initial, undeveloped stage." "This is true even of England." (Page 181.)

Hence, the capitalists *will* not and the workers *cannot*. And with this we could close this section if it were not absolutely necessary to provide a little information about the English building societies, which the bourgeois of the Schulze-Delitzsch type always hold up to our workers as models.

These building societies are not workers' societies, nor is it their main aim to provide workers with their own houses. On the contrary, we shall see that this happens only very exceptionally. The building societies are essentially of a speculative nature, the small ones, which were the original societies, not less so than their big imitators. In a public house, usually at the instigation of the proprietor, on whose premises the weekly meetings then take place, a number of regular customers and their friends, shopkeepers, office clerks, commercial travellers, master artisans and other petty bourgeois—with here and there perhaps a

mechanic or some other worker belonging to the aristocracy of his class—get together and found a building co-operative. The immediate occasion is usually that the proprietor has discovered a comparatively cheap plot of land in the neighbourhood or somewhere else. Most of the members are not bound by their occupations to any particular locality. Even many of the shopkeepers and craftsmen have only business premises in the town but no living quarters. Everyone in a position to do so prefers to live in the suburbs rather than in the centre of the smoky town. The building plot is purchased and as many cottages as possible erected on it. The credit of the more substantial members makes the purchase possible, and the weekly contributions together with a few small loans cover the weekly costs of building. Those members who aim at getting a house of their own receive cottages by lot as they are completed, and the appropriate extra rent serves for the amortization of the purchase price. The remaining cottages are then either let or sold. The building society, however, if it does good business, accumulates a more or less considerable sum. This remains the property of the members, provided they keep up their contributions, and is distributed among them from time to time, or when the society is dissolved. Such is the life history of nine out of ten of the English building societies. The others are bigger associations, sometimes formed under political or philanthropic pretexts, but in the end their chief aim is always to provide a more profitable mortgage investment for the savings of the *petty bourgeoisie*, at a good rate of interest and the prospect of dividends from speculation in real estate.

The sort of clients these societies speculate on can be seen from the prospectus of one of the largest, if not the largest, of them. The Birkbeck Building Society, 29 and 30, Southampton Buildings, Chancery Lane, London, whose gross receipts since its foundation total over £10,500,000 (70,000,000 taler), which has over £416,000 in the bank or invested in government securities, and which at present has 21,441 members and depositors, introduces itself to the public in the following fashion:

“Most people are acquainted with the so-called three-year system of the piano manufacturers, under which anyone renting a piano for three years becomes the owner of the piano after the expiration of that period. Prior to the introduction of this system it was almost as difficult for people of limited income to acquire a good piano as it was for them to acquire their own house. Year after year such people had paid the rent for the piano and spent two or three times the money the piano was worth. What applies to a piano applies

also to a house. . . . However, as a house costs more than a piano, . . . it takes longer to pay off the purchase price in rent. In consequence the directors have entered into an arrangement with house-owners in various parts of London and its suburbs which enables them to offer the members of the Birkbeck Building Society and others a great selection of houses in the most diverse parts of the town. The system which the Board of Directors intends to put into operation is as follows: it will let these houses for twelve and a half years and at the end of this period, providing that the rent has been paid regularly, the tenant will become the absolute owner of the house without any further payment of any kind. . . . The tenant can also contract for a shorter space of time with a higher rental, or for a longer space of time with a lower rental. . . . *People of limited income, clerks, shop assistants* and others can make themselves independent of landlords immediately by becoming members of the Birkbeck Building Society."

That is clear enough. There is no mention of workers, but there is of people of limited income, clerks and shop assistants, etc., and in addition it is assumed that, as a rule, the applicants *already possess a piano*. In fact we do not have to do here with workers at all but with petty bourgeois and those who would like *and are able* to become such; people whose incomes gradually rise as a rule, even if within certain limits, such as clerks and similar employees. The income of the worker, on the contrary, at best remains the same in amount, and in reality falls in proportion to the increase of his family and its growing needs. In fact only a few workers can, by way of exception, belong to such societies. On the one hand their income is too low, and on the other hand it is of too uncertain a character for them to be able to undertake responsibilities for twelve and a half years in advance. The few exceptions where this is not valid are either the best-paid workers or foremen.¹

¹ We add here a little contribution on the way in which these building associations, and in particular the London building associations, are managed. As is known, almost the whole of the land on which London is built belongs to about a dozen aristocrats, including the most eminent, the Duke of Westminster, the Duke of Bedford, the Duke of Portland, etc. They originally leased out the separate building sites for a period of ninety-nine years, and at the end of that period took possession of the land with everything on it. They then let the houses on shorter leases, thirty-nine years for example, on a so-called repairing lease, according to which the leaseholder must put the house in good repair and maintain it in such condition. As soon as the contract has progressed thus far, the landlord sends his architect and the district surveyor to inspect the house and determine the repairs necessary. These repairs are often very considerable and may include the renewal of the whole frontage, or of the roof, etc. The leaseholder now deposits his lease as security with a building association and receives from this society a loan of the necessary money—up to £1,000 and more in the case of an annual rental of from £130

For the rest, it is clear to everyone that the Bonapartists of the workers' town of Mülhausen are nothing more than miserable apers of these petty-bourgeois English building societies. The sole difference is that the former, in spite of the state assistance granted to them, swindle their clients far more than the building societies do. On the whole their terms are less liberal than the average existing in England, and while in England interest and compound interest are calculated on each deposit and can be withdrawn at a month's notice, the factory owners of Mülhausen put both interest and compound interest into their own pockets and repay no more than the amount paid in by the workers in hard five-franc pieces. And no one will be more astonished at this difference than Herr Sax who has it all in his book without knowing it.

Thus, workers' self-help is also no good. There remains state assistance. What can Herr Sax offer us in this regard? Three things:

"First of all, the state must take care that in its legislation and administration all those things which in any way result in accentuating the housing shortage among the working classes are abolished or appropriately remedied." (Page 187.)

Consequently, revision of building legislation and freedom for the building trades in order that building shall be cheaper. But in England building legislation is reduced to a minimum, the building trades are as free as the birds in the air; nevertheless, the housing shortage exists. In addition building is now done so cheaply in England that the houses shake when a cart goes by and every day some of them collapse. Only yesterday (October 25, 1872) six of them collapsed simultaneously in Manchester and seriously injured six workers. Therefore, that is also no remedy.

"Secondly, the state power must prevent individuals in their narrow-minded individualism from spreading the evil or calling it forth anew."

Consequently, sanitary and building-police inspection of workers' dwellings; transference to the authorities of power to

to £150—for the building repairs to be made at *his* expense. These building associations have thus become an important intermediate link in a system which aims at securing the continual renewal and maintenance in habitable condition of London's houses belonging to the landed aristocracy without any trouble to the latter and at the cost of the public. And this is supposed to be a solution of the housing question for the workers! [Note by Engels to the 1887 edition.]

forbid the occupancy of dilapidated and unhygienic houses, as has been the case in England since 1857. But how did it come about there? The first law, that of 1855 (the Nuisances Removal Act), was "a dead letter," as Herr Sax admits himself, as was the second, the law of 1858 (the Local Government Act). (Page 197.) On the other hand Herr Sax believes that the third law (the Artisans' Dwellings Act), which applies only to towns with a population of over 10,000, "certainly offers favourable testimony of the great understanding of the British Parliament in social matters." (Page 199.) But as a matter of fact this assertion does no more than "offer favourable testimony" of the utter ignorance of Herr Sax in English "matters." That England in general is far in advance of the Continent "in social matters" is a matter of course. England is the motherland of modern large-scale industry; the capitalist mode of production has developed there most freely and extensively of all, its consequences show themselves there most glaringly of all and therefore it is likewise there that they first produced a reaction in the sphere of legislation. The best proof of this is factory legislation. If however Herr Sax thinks that an Act of Parliament only requires to become legally effective in order to be carried immediately into practice as well, he is grievously mistaken. And this is true of the Local Government Act more than of any other act (with the exception, of course, of the Workshops Act). The administration of this law was entrusted to the urban authorities, which almost everywhere in England are recognized centres of corruption of every kind, of nepotism and jobbery.¹ The agents of these urban authorities, who owe their positions to all sorts of family considerations, are either incapable of carrying into effect such social laws or disinclined to do so. On the other hand it is precisely in England that the state officials entrusted with the preparation and execution of social legislation are usually distinguished by a strict sense of duty—although in a lesser degree today than twenty or thirty years ago. In the town councils the owners of unsound and dilapidated

¹ Jobbery is the use of a public office to the private advantage of the official or his family. If, for instance, the director of the state telegraph of a country becomes a silent partner in a paper factory, provides this factory with timber from his forests and then gives the factory orders for supplying paper for the telegraph offices, that is, true, a fairly small but still quite a pretty "job," inasmuch as it demonstrates a complete understanding of the principles of jobbery; such as, by the way, in the days of Bismarck was a matter of course and to be expected. [*Note by Engels.*]

dwellings are almost everywhere strongly represented either directly or indirectly. The system of electing these town councils by small wards makes the elected members dependent on the pettiest local interests and influences; no town councillor who desires to be re-elected dare vote for the application of this law in his constituency. It is comprehensible, therefore, with what aversion this law was received almost everywhere by the local authorities, and that up to the present it has been applied only in the most scandalous cases—and even then, as a general rule, only as the result of the outbreak of some epidemic, such as in the case of the small-pox epidemic last year in Manchester and Salford. Appeals to the Home Secretary have up to the present been effective only in such cases, for it is the principle of every *Liberal* government in England to propose social reform laws only when compelled to do so and, if at all possible, to avoid carrying into effect those already existing. The law in question, like many others in England, is of importance only because in the hands of a government dominated by or under the pressure of the workers, a government which would at last really administer it, it will be a powerful weapon for making a breach in the existing social state of things.

“Thirdly,” the state power ought, according to Herr Sax, “to make the most extensive use possible of all the positive means at its disposal to allay the existing housing shortage.”

That is to say, it should build barracks, “truly model buildings,” for its “subordinate officials and servants” (but then these are not workers!), and “grant loans . . . to municipalities, societies and also to private persons for the purpose of improving the housing conditions of the working classes” (page 203), as is done in England under the Public Works Loan Act, and as Louis Bonaparte has done in Paris and Mülhausen. But the Public Works Loan Act also exists only on paper. The government places at the disposal of the commissioners a maximum sum of £50,000, that is, sufficient to build at the utmost 400 cottages, or in forty years a total of 16,000 cottages or dwellings for at the most 80,000 persons—a drop in the bucket! Even if we assume that after twenty years the funds at the disposal of the commission were to double as a result of repayments, that therefore during the past twenty years dwellings for a further 40,000 persons have been built, it still is only a drop in the bucket. And as the cottages last on the average only forty years, after forty years

the liquid assets of £50,000 or £100,000 must be used every year to replace the most dilapidated, the oldest of the cottages. This, Herr Sax declares on page 203, is carrying the principle into practice correctly "and to an unlimited extent!" And with this confession that even in England the state, to "an unlimited extent," has achieved next to nothing, Herr Sax concludes his book, but not without having first delivered another homily to all concerned.¹

It is perfectly clear that the state as it exists today is neither able nor willing to do anything to remedy the housing calamity. The state is nothing but the organized collective power of the possessing classes, the landowners and the capitalists, as against the exploited classes, the peasants and the workers. What the individual capitalists (and it is here only a question of these because in this matter the landowner, who is concerned, also acts primarily in his capacity as a capitalist) do not want, their state also does not want. If therefore the *individual* capitalists deplore the housing shortage, but can hardly be moved to palliate even superficially its most terrifying consequences, the *collective* capitalist, the state, will not do much more. At most it will see to it that that measure of superficial palliation which has become customary is carried into execution everywhere uniformly. And we have seen that this is the case.

But, one might object, in Germany the bourgeois do not rule as yet; in Germany the state is still to a certain extent a power hovering independently over society, which for that very reason represents the collective interests of society and not those of a single class. *Such* a state can certainly do much that a bourgeois state cannot do, and one ought to expect from it something quite different in the social field also.

¹ In recent English Acts of Parliament giving the London building authorities the right of expropriation for the purpose of new street construction, a certain amount of consideration is given to the workers thus turned out of their homes. A provision has been inserted that the new buildings to be erected must be suitable for housing those classes of the population previously living there. Big five or six storey tenement houses are therefore erected for the workers on the least valuable sites and in this way the letter of the law is complied with. It remains to be seen how this arrangement will work, for the workers are quite unaccustomed to it and in the midst of the old conditions in London these buildings represent a completely foreign development. At best, however, they will provide new dwellings for hardly a quarter of the workers actually evicted by the building operations. [*Note by Engels to the 1887 edition.*]

That is the language of reactionaries. In reality however the state as it exists in Germany is likewise the necessary product of the social basis out of which it has developed. In Prussia—and Prussia is now decisive—there exists side by side with a landowning aristocracy, which is still powerful, a comparatively young and extremely cowardly bourgeoisie, which up to the present has not won either direct political domination, as in France, or more or less indirect domination as in England. Side by side with these two classes, however, there exists a rapidly increasing proletariat which is intellectually highly developed and which is becoming more and more organized every day. We therefore find here, alongside of the basic condition of the old absolute monarchy—an equilibrium between the landed aristocracy and the bourgeoisie—the basic condition of modern Bonapartism—an equilibrium between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. But both in the old absolute monarchy and in the modern Bonapartist monarchy the real governmental authority lies in the hands of a special caste of army officers and state officials. In Prussia this caste is replenished partly from its own ranks, partly from the lesser primogenitary aristocracy, more rarely from the higher aristocracy, and least of all from the bourgeoisie. The independence of this caste, which appears to occupy a position outside and, so to speak, above society, gives the state the semblance of independence in relation to society.

The form of state which has developed with the necessary consistency in Prussia (and, following the Prussian example, in the new Reich constitution of Germany) out of these contradictory social conditions is pseudo-constitutionalism, a form which is at once both the present-day form of the dissolution of the old absolute monarchy and the form of existence of the Bonapartist monarchy. In Prussia pseudo-constitutionalism from 1848 to 1866 only concealed and facilitated the slow decay of the absolute monarchy. However, since 1866, and still more since 1870, the upheaval in social conditions, and with it the dissolution of the old state, has proceeded in the sight of all and on a tremendously increasing scale. The rapid development of industry, and in particular of stock-exchange swindling, has dragged all the ruling classes into the whirlpool of speculation. The wholesale corruption imported from France in 1870 is developing at an unprecedented rate. Strousberg and Pereire take off their hats to each other. Ministers, generals, princes and counts gamble in stocks in com-

petition with the most cunning stock-exchange wolves, and the state recognizes their equality by conferring baronetcies wholesale on these stock-exchange wolves. The rural nobility, who have been industrialists for a long time as manufacturers of beet sugar and distillers of brandy, have long left the old respectable days behind and their names now swell the lists of directors of all sorts of sound and unsound joint-stock companies. The bureaucracy is beginning more and more to despise embezzlement as the sole means of improving its income; it is turning its back on the state and beginning to hunt after the far more lucrative posts on the administration of industrial enterprises. Those who still remain in office follow the example of their superiors and speculate in stocks, or "acquire interests" in railways, etc. One is even justified in assuming that the lieutenants also have their hands in certain speculations. In short, the decomposition of all the elements of the old state and the transition from the absolute monarchy to the Bonapartist monarchy is in full swing. With the next big business and industrial crisis not only will the present swindle collapse, but the old Prussian state as well.¹

And this state, in which the non-bourgeois elements are becoming more bourgeois every day, is to solve "the social question," or even only the housing question? On the contrary. In all economic questions the Prussian state is falling more and more into the hands of the bourgeoisie. And if legislation in the economic field since 1866 has not been adapted even more to the interests of the bourgeoisie than has actually been the case, whose fault is that? The bourgeoisie itself is chiefly responsible, first because it is too cowardly to press its own demands energetically, and secondly because it resists every concession if the latter simultaneously provides the menacing proletariat with new weapons. And if the political power, that is, Bismarck, is attempting to organize its own bodyguard proletariat to keep the political activity of the bourgeoisie in check, what else is that if not a necessary and quite familiar Bonapartist recipe which pledges the state to nothing more, as far as the workers are concerned, than a

¹ Even today, in 1886, the only thing that holds together the old Prussian state and its basis, the alliance of big landownership and industrial capital sealed by the protective tariffs, is fear of the proletariat, which has grown tremendously in numbers and class-consciousness since 1872. [*Note by Engels to the 1887 edition.*]

few benevolent phrases and at the utmost to a minimum of state assistance for building societies *à la* Louis Bonaparte?

The best proof of what the workers have to expect from the Prussian state lies in the utilization of the French milliards which have given a new, short reprieve to the independence of the Prussian state machine in regard to society. Has even a single taler of all these milliards been used to provide shelter for those Berlin working-class families which have been thrown on to the streets? On the contrary. As autumn approached, the state caused to be pulled down even those few miserable hovels which had given them a temporary roof over their heads during the summer. The five milliards are going rapidly enough the way of all flesh: for fortresses, cannon and soldiers; and despite Wagner's asinities, and despite Stieber's conferences with Austria,¹ less will be allotted to the German workers out of those milliards than was allotted to the French workers out of the millions which Louis Bonaparte stole from France.

III

In reality the bourgeoisie has only one method of settling the housing question after *its* fashion—that is to say, of settling it in such a way that the solution continually poses the question anew. This method is called "*Hausmann*."

By the term "*Hausmann*" I do not mean merely the specifically Bonapartist manner of the Parisian Hausmann—breaking long, straight and broad streets right through the closely-built workers' quarters and lining them on both sides with big luxurious buildings, the intention having been, apart from the strategic aim of making barricade fighting more difficult, to develop a specifically Bonapartist building trades' proletariat dependent on the government and to turn the city into a luxury city pure and simple. By "*Hausmann*" I mean the practice, which has now become general, of making breaches in the working-class quarters of our big cities, particularly in those which are centrally situated, irrespective of whether this practice is occasioned by considerations of public health and beautification or by the demand for big

¹ The reference is to the conference of the Austrian and German emperors and their chancellors which took place at Gastein in August, 1871, to discuss police measures for combating the First International.—*Ed.*

centrally located business premises or by traffic requirements, such as the laying down of railways, streets, etc. No matter how different the reasons may be, the result is everywhere the same: the most scandalous alleys and lanes disappear to the accompaniment of lavish self-glorification by the bourgeoisie on account of this tremendous success, but—they appear again at once somewhere else, and often in the immediate neighbourhood.

In *The Condition of the Working Class in England* I gave a picture of Manchester as it looked in 1843 and 1844. Since then the construction of railways through the centre of the city, the laying out of new streets and the erection of great public and private buildings have broken through, laid bare and improved some of the worst districts described there, others have been abolished altogether; although, apart from the fact that sanitary-police inspection has since become stricter, many of them are still in the same state or in an even worse state of dilapidation than they were then. On the other hand, thanks to the enormous extension of the town, whose population has since increased by more than half, districts which were at that time still airy and clean are now just as overbuilt, just as dirty and congested as the most ill-famed parts of the town formerly were. Here is but one example: On page 80¹ *et seq.* of my book I described a group of houses situated in the valley bottom of the Medlock River, which under the name of Little Ireland was for years the disgrace of Manchester. Little Ireland has long ago disappeared and on its site there now stands a railway station built on a high foundation. The bourgeoisie pointed with pride to the happy and final abolition of Little Ireland as to a great triumph. Now last summer a great inundation took place, as in general the rivers embanked in our big cities cause more and more extensive floods year after year for reasons that can be easily explained. And it was then revealed that Little Ireland had not been abolished at all, but had simply been shifted from the south side of Oxford Road to the north side, and that it still continues to flourish. Let us hear what the *Manchester Weekly Times*, the organ of the radical bourgeoisie of Manchester, has to say in its issue of July 20, 1872:

“The misfortune which befell the inhabitants of the lower valley of the Medlock last Saturday will, it is to be hoped, have *one* good result, namely, that public attention will be directed to the obvious mockery of all the laws of

¹ See K. Marx and F. Engels, *On Britain*, p. 94.—*Ed.*

hygiene which has been tolerated there so long under the noses of our municipal officials and our municipal health committee. A trenchant article in our day edition yesterday revealed, though hardly forcibly enough, the scandalous condition of some of the cellar dwellings near Charles Street and Brook Street which were reached by the flood. A detailed examination of one of the courts mentioned in this article enables us to confirm all the statements made about them, and to declare that the cellar dwellings in this court should long ago have been closed down, or rather, they should never have been tolerated as human habitations. Squire's Court is made up of seven or eight dwelling houses on the corner of Charles Street and Brook Street. Even at the lowest part of Brook Street, under the railway viaduct, a pedestrian may pass daily and never dream that human beings are living far down, under his feet, in caves. The court itself is hidden from public view and is accessible only to those who are compelled by their impoverishment to seek a shelter in its sepulchral seclusion. Even if the usually stagnant waters of the Medlock, which are shut in between locks, do not exceed their usual level, the floors of those dwellings can hardly be more than a few inches above the surface of the river. A good shower of rain is capable of driving up foul, nauseous water through the drains and filling the rooms with pestilential gases such as every flood leaves behind it as a souvenir. . . . Squire's Court lies at a still lower level than the uninhabited cellars of the houses in Brook Street . . . twenty feet below street level, and the noxious water driven up on Saturday through the drains reached to the roofs. We knew this and therefore expected that we should find the place uninhabited or occupied only by the sanitary officials engaged in washing off the stinking walls and disinfecting the houses. Instead of this we saw a man in the cellar home of a barber . . . engaged in shovelling a heap of decomposing filth, which lay in a corner, on to a wheelbarrow. The barber, whose cellar was already more or less cleaned up, sent us still lower down to a number of dwellings about which he declared that, if he could write, he would have informed the press and demanded that they be closed down. And so finally we came to Squire's Court where we found a buxom and healthy-looking Irishwoman busy at the wash-tub. She and her husband, a night watchman, had lived for six years in the court and had a numerous family. . . . In the house which they had just left the water had risen almost to the roof, the windows were broken and the furniture was completely ruined. The man declared that the occupant of the house had been able to keep the smells from becoming intolerable only by whitewashing it every two months. . . . In the inner court into which our correspondent then went he found three houses whose rear walls abutted on the rear walls of the houses just described. Two of these three houses were inhabited. The stench there was so frightful that the healthiest man would have felt sick at the stomach in a very short space of time. . . . This disgusting hole was inhabited by a family of seven, all of whom had slept in the place on Thursday night (the first day the water rose). Or rather, not slept, as the woman immediately corrected herself, for she and her husband had vomited continually the greater part of the night owing to the terrible smell. On Saturday they had been compelled to wade through the water, chest high, to carry out their children. Besides, she was of the opinion that the place was not fit for pigs to live in, but on account of the low rent—one and sixpence a week—she had taken it, for her husband had been out of work a lot recently owing to

sickness. The impression made upon the observer by this court and the inhabitants huddled in it as though in a premature grave was one of utter helplessness. We must point out, by the way, that, according to our observations, Squire's Court is no more than typical—though perhaps an extreme case—of many other places in the neighbourhood whose continued existence our health committee cannot justify. Should these places be permitted to be tenanted in the future, the committee assumes a responsibility and the whole neighbourhood exposes itself to a danger of epidemic infection whose gravity we shall not further discuss."

This is a striking example of how the bourgeoisie settles the housing question in practice. The breeding places of disease, the infamous holes and cellars in which the capitalist mode of production confines our workers night after night, are not abolished; they are merely *shifted elsewhere!* The same economic necessity which produced them in the first place produces them in the next place also. As long as the capitalist mode of production continues to exist it is folly to hope for an isolated settlement of the housing question or of any other social question affecting the lot of the workers. The solution lies in the abolition of the capitalist mode of production and the appropriation of all the means of subsistence and instruments of labour by the working class itself.

PART THREE

SUPPLEMENT ON PROUDHON AND THE HOUSING QUESTION

I

In No. 86 of the *Volksstaat*, A. Mülberger reveals himself as the author of the articles criticized by me in No. 51 and subsequent numbers of the paper. In his answer he overwhelms me with such a series of reproaches, and at the same time confuses all the issues to such an extent that willy-nilly I am compelled to reply to him. I shall attempt to give my reply, which to my regret must be made to a large extent in the field of personal polemics enjoined upon me by Mülberger himself, a general interest by presenting the chief points once again and if possible more clearly than before, even at the risk of being told once more by Mülberger that all this "contains nothing essentially new either for him or for the other readers of the *Volksstaat*."

Mülberger complains of the form and content of my criticism. As far as the form is concerned it will be sufficient to reply that at the time I did not even know who had written the articles in question. There can, therefore, be no question of any personal "prejudice" against their author; against the solution of the housing problem put forward in the articles I was of course in so far "prejudiced" as I was long ago acquainted with it from Proudhon and my opinion on it was firmly fixed.

I am not going to quarrel with friend Mülberger about the "tone" of my criticism. When one has been so long in the movement as I have, one develops a fairly thick skin against attacks, and therefore one easily presumes the existence of the same in others. In order to compensate Mülberger I shall endeavour this time to bring my "tone" into the right relation to the sensitiveness of his epidermis.

Mülberger complains with particular bitterness that I said he was a Proudhonist, and he protests that he is not. Naturally I must believe him, but I shall adduce proof that the articles in question—and I had to do with them alone—contain nothing but undiluted Proudhonism.

But according to Mülberger I have also criticized Proudhon "frivolously" and have done him a serious injustice. "The doctrine of the petty bourgeois Proudhon has become an accepted dogma in Germany, which is even proclaimed by many who have never read a line of him." When I express regret that for twenty years the workers speaking Romance languages have had no other mental pabulum than the works of Proudhon, Mülberger answers that as far as the Latin workers are concerned, "the principles formulated by Proudhon are almost everywhere the driving spirit of the movement." This I must deny. First of all, the "driving spirit" of the working-class movement nowhere lies in "principles," but everywhere in the development of large-scale industry and its effects, the accumulation and concentration of capital, on the one hand, and of the proletariat, on the other. Secondly, it is not correct to say that in the Latin countries Proudhon's so-called "principles" play the decisive role ascribed to them by Mülberger; that "the principles of anarchism, of the organization of the *forces économiques*, of the *liquidation sociale*, etc., have there . . . become the true bearers of the revolutionary movement." Not to speak of Spain and Italy, where the Proudhonist panacea has gained some influence only in the still more botched form presented by Bakunin, it is a notorious fact for anyone who knows the international working-class movement that in France the Proudhonists form a numerically rather insignificant sect, while the mass of the French workers refuses to have anything to do with the social reform plan drawn up by Proudhon under the titles of *Liquidation sociale* and *Organisation des forces économiques*. This was shown, among other things, in the Commune. Although the Proudhonists were strongly represented in the Commune, not the slightest attempt was made to liquidate the old society or to organize the economic forces according to Proudhon's proposals. On the contrary, it does the Commune the greatest honour that in all its economic measures the "driving spirit" was not any set of "principles," but simple, practical needs. And therefore these measures—abolition of night work in the bakeries, prohibition of monetary fines in the factories, confiscation of shut-down factories and workshops and

handing them over to workers' associations—were not at all in accordance with the spirit of Proudhonism, but certainly in accordance with the spirit of German scientific socialism. The only social measure which the Proudhonists put through was the decision *not* to confiscate the Bank of France, and this was partly responsible for the downfall of the Commune. In the same way, when the so-called Blanquists made an attempt to transform themselves from mere political revolutionists into a socialist workers' faction with a definite programme—as was done by the Blanquist fugitives in London in their manifesto, *Internationale et Révolution*¹—they did not proclaim the “principles” of the Proudhonist plan for the salvation of society, but adopted, and almost literally at that, the views of German scientific socialism on the necessity of political action by the proletariat and of its dictatorship as the transition to the abolition of classes and with them of the state—views such as had already been expressed in the *Communist Manifesto* and since then on innumerable occasions. And if Mülberger even draws the conclusion from the Germans' disdain of Proudhon that there has been a lack of understanding of the movement in the Latin countries “down to the Paris Commune,” let him as proof of this lack tell us what work from the Latin side has understood and described the Commune even approximately as correctly as has the *Address of the General Council of the International on the Civil War in France*, written by the German Marx.

The only country where the working-class movement is directly under the influence of Proudhonist “principles” is Belgium, and precisely as a result of this the Belgian movement comes, as Hegel would say, “from nothing through nothing to nothing.”

When I consider it a misfortune that for twenty years the workers of the Latin countries fed intellectually, directly or indirectly, exclusively on Proudhon, I do not mean that thoroughly mythical dominance of Proudhon's reform recipe—termed by Mülberger the “principles”—but the fact that their economic criticism of existing society was contaminated with absolutely false Proudhonist phrases and that their political actions were bungled by Proudhonist influence. Whether thus the “Proudhonized work-

¹ Engels analyzed this manifesto in his article: *Programm der blanquistischen Kommune Flüchtlinge* [*Programme of the Blanquist Commune Fugitives*], *Internationales aus dem Volksstaat*, S. 40-46, Berlin 1894.—Ed.

ers of the Latin countries" "stand more in the revolution" than the German workers, who in any case understand the meaning of scientific German socialism infinitely better than the Latins understand their Proudhon, we shall be able to answer only after we have learnt what "to *stand* in the revolution" really means. We have heard talk of people who "stand in Christianity, in the true faith, in the grace of God," etc. But "standing" in the revolution, in the most violent of all movements? Is, then, "the revolution" a dogmatic religion in which one must believe?

Mülberger further reproaches me with having asserted, in defiance of the express wording of his articles, that he had declared the housing question to be an exclusively working-class question.

This time Mülberger is really right. I overlooked the passage in question. It was irresponsible of me to overlook it, for it is one most characteristic of the whole tendency of his disquisition. Mülberger actually writes in plain words:

"As we have been so frequently and largely exposed to the *absurd* charge of pursuing a *class policy*, of striving for *class domination*, and such like, we wish to stress first of all and expressly that the housing question is by no means a question which affects the proletariat exclusively, but that, *on the contrary*, it interests to a quite prominent extent the *middle classes proper*, the small tradesmen, the petty bourgeoisie, the whole bureaucracy.... The housing question is precisely that point of social reform which more than any other seems appropriate to reveal the *absolute inner identity of the interests of the proletariat*, on the one hand, and the interests of the *middle classes proper* of society, on the other. The middle classes suffer just as much as, and perhaps even more than, the proletariat under the oppressive fetters of the rented dwelling.... Today the middle classes proper of society are faced with the question of whether they... can summon sufficient strength... to participate in the process of the transformation of society in alliance with the youthful, vigorous and energetic workers' party, a transformation *whose blessings will be enjoyed above all by them.*"

Friend Mülberger thus makes the following points here:

1. "We" do not pursue any "class policy" and do not strive for "class domination." But the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party, just *because* it is a *workers' party*, necessarily pursues a "class policy," the policy of the working class. Since each political party sets out to establish its rule in the state, so the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party is necessarily striving to establish *its* rule, the rule of the working class, hence "class domination." Moreover, *every* real proletarian party, from the English

Chartists onward, has put forward a class policy, the organization of the proletariat as an independent political party, as the primary condition of its struggle, and the dictatorship of the proletariat as the immediate aim of the struggle. By declaring this to be "absurd," Mülberger puts himself outside the proletarian movement and inside the camp of petty-bourgeois socialism.

2. The housing question has the advantage that it is not an exclusively working-class question, but a question which "interests to a quite prominent extent" the petty bourgeoisie, in that "the middle classes proper" suffer from it "just as much as, and perhaps even more than," the proletariat. If anyone declares that the petty bourgeoisie suffers, even if in one respect only, "perhaps even more than the proletariat," he can hardly complain if one counts him among the petty-bourgeois Socialists. Has Mülberger therefore any grounds for complaint when I say:

"It is largely with just such sufferings as these, which the working class endures in common with other classes, and particularly the petty bourgeoisie, that petty-bourgeois socialism, to which Proudhon belongs, prefers to occupy itself. And thus it is not at all accidental that our German Proudhonist seizes chiefly upon the housing question, which, as we have seen, is by no means exclusively a working-class question."

3. There is an "absolute inner identity" between the interests of the "middle classes proper of society" and the interests of the proletariat, and it is not the proletariat, but these middle classes, proper which will "enjoy above all" the "blessings" of the coming process of transformation of society.

The workers, therefore, are going to make the coming social revolution "above all" in the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. And furthermore, there is an absolute inner identity of the interests of the petty bourgeoisie and those of the proletariat. If the interests of the petty bourgeoisie have an inner identity with those of the workers, then those of the workers have an inner identity with those of the petty bourgeoisie. The petty-bourgeois standpoint has thus as much right to exist in the movement as the proletarian standpoint, and it is precisely the assertion of this equality of right that is called petty-bourgeois socialism.

It is therefore perfectly consistent when, on page 25 of the separate reprint, Mülberger extols "petty industry" as the "actual buttress of society," "because in accordance with its very nature it combines within itself the three factors: labour—acquisition—

possession, and because in the combination of these three factors it places no bounds to the capacity for development of the individual;" and when he reproaches modern industry in particular with destroying this nursery for the production of normal human beings and "making out of a virile *class* continually reproducing itself an unconscious *heap* of humans who do not know wither to direct their anxious gaze." The petty bourgeois is thus Mülberger's model human being and petty industry is Mülberger's model mode of production. Did I defame him, therefore, when I classed him among the petty-bourgeois Socialists?

As Mülberger rejects all responsibility for Proudhon, it would be superfluous to discuss here any further how Proudhon's reform plans aim at transforming all members of society into petty bourgeois and small peasants. It will be just as unnecessary to deal with the alleged identity of interests of the petty bourgeoisie and the workers. What is necessary is to be found already in the *Communist Manifesto*. (Leipzig Edition, 1872, pp. 12 and 21.¹)

The result of our examination is, therefore, that side by side with the "myth of the petty bourgeois Proudhon" appears the reality of the petty bourgeois Mülberger.

II

We now come to one of the main points. I accused Mülberger's articles of falsifying economic relationships after the manner of Proudhon by translating them into legal terminology. As an example of this, I picked the following statement by Mülberger:

"The house, once it has been built, serves as a *perpetual legal title* to a definite fraction of social labour although the real value of the house has been paid to the owner long ago more than adequately in the form of rent. *Thus it comes about* that a house which, for instance, was built fifty years ago, during this period covers the original cost price two, three, five, ten and more times over in its rent yield."

Mülberger now complains as follows:

"This *simple sober statement of fact* causes Engels to enlighten me to the effect that I should have explained *how* the house became a 'legal title'—something which was quite beyond the scope of my task. . . . A *description* is one thing, an *explanation* another. When I say with Proudhon that the

¹ See pp. 43-44 and 56-57 of this volume.—*Ed.*

economic life of society should be pervaded by a *conception of right*, I am *describing* present-day society as one in which, true, not every conception of right is absent, but in which the *conception of right of the revolution* is absent, a fact which Engels himself will admit."

Let us keep for the moment to the house which has been built. The house, once it has been let, yields its builder ground rent, repairing costs, and interest on the building capital invested, including as well the profit made thereon in the form of rent; and, according to the circumstances, the rent, paid gradually, can amount to twice, thrice, five times or ten times as much as the original cost price. This, friend Mülberger, is the "simple, sober statement" of "fact," an *economic* fact; and if we want to know "how it comes" that it exists, we must conduct our examination in the economic field. Let us therefore look a little closer at this fact so that not even a child may misunderstand it any longer. As is known, the sale of a commodity consists in the fact that its owner relinquishes its use-value and pockets its exchange-value. The use-values of commodities differ from one another among other things in the different periods of time required for their consumption. A loaf of bread is consumed in a day, a pair of trousers will be worn out in a year, and a house, if you like, in a hundred years. Hence, in the case of durable commodities, the possibility arises of selling their use-value piecemeal and each time for a definite period, that is to say, to *let* it. The piecemeal sale therefore realizes the exchange-value only gradually. As a compensation for his renouncing the immediate repayment of the capital advanced and the profit accrued on it, the seller receives an increased price, interest, whose rate is determined by the laws of political economy and not by any means in an arbitrary fashion. At the end of the hundred years the house is used up, worn out and no longer habitable. If we then deduct from the total rent paid for the house the following: 1) the ground rent together with any increase it may have experienced during the period in question, and 2) the sums expended for current repairs, we shall find that the remainder is composed on an average as follows: 1) the building capital originally invested in the house, 2) the profit on this, and 3) the interest on the gradually maturing capital and profit. Now it is true that at the end of this period the tenant has no house, but neither has the house-owner. The latter has only the lot (provided that it belongs to him) and the building material on it, which, however, is no longer a house. And although in the meantime the

house may have brought in a sum "which covers five or ten times the original cost price," we shall see that this is solely due to an increase of the ground rent. This is no secret to anyone in such cities as London where the landowner and the house-owner are in most cases two different persons. Such tremendous rent increases occur in rapidly growing towns, but not in a farming village, where the ground rent for building sites remains practically unchanged. It is indeed a notorious fact that, apart from increases in the ground rent, house rents produce on an average no more than seven per cent per annum on the invested capital (including profit) for the house-owner, and out of this sum repair costs, etc., must be paid. In short, a rent agreement is quite an ordinary commodity transaction which theoretically is of no greater and no lesser interest to the worker than any other commodity transaction, with the exception of that which concerns the buying and selling of labour power, while practically the worker faces the rent agreement as one of the thousand forms of bourgeois cheating, which I dealt with on page 4¹ of the separate reprint. But, as I proved there, this form is also subject to economic regulation.

Mülberger, on the other hand, regards the rent agreement as nothing but pure "arbitrariness" (page 19 of the separate reprint) and when I prove the contrary to him he complains that I am telling him "solely things which to his regret he already knew himself."

But all the economic investigations into house rent will not enable us to turn the abolition of the rented dwelling into "one of the most fruitful and magnificent aspirations which has ever sprung from the womb of the revolutionary idea." In order to accomplish this we must translate the simple fact from sober economics into the really far more ideological sphere of jurisprudence. "The house serves as a perpetual legal title" to house rent, and "*thus it comes*" that the value of a house can be paid back in rent two, three, five or ten times. The "legal title" does not help us a jot to discover how it really "does come," and therefore I said that Mülberger would have been able to find out *how* it really "does come" only by inquiring how the house becomes a legal title. We discover this only after we have examined, as I did, the *economic* nature of house rent, instead of quarrelling

¹ See pp. 558-59 of this volume.—*Ed.*

with the legal expression under which the ruling class sanctions it. Anyone who proposes the taking of economic steps to abolish rent surely ought to know a little more about house rent than that it "represents the tribute which the tenant pays to the perpetual title of capital." To this Mülberger answers, "A description is one thing, an explanation another."

We have thus converted the house, although it is by no means everlasting, into a perpetual legal title to house rent. We find, no matter how "it comes," that by virtue of this legal title, the house brings in its original value several times over in the form of rent. By the translation into legal phraseology we are happily so far removed from economics that we now can see no more than the phenomenon that a house can gradually get paid for in gross rent several times over. As we are thinking and talking in legal terms, we apply to this phenomenon the measuring stick of right, of justice, and find that it is *unjust*, that it is not in accordance with the "conception of right of the revolution," whatever that may be, and that therefore the legal title is no good. We find further that the same holds good for interest-bearing capital and leased agricultural land, and we now have the excuse for separating these classes of property from the others and subjecting them to exceptional treatment. This consists in the demands: 1) to deprive the owner of the right to give notice to quit, the right to demand the return of his property; 2) to give the lessee, borrower or tenant the gratuitous use of the object transferred to him but not belonging to him; and 3) to pay off the owner in instalments over a long period without interest. And with this we have exhausted the Proudhonist "principles" from this angle. This is Proudhon's "social liquidation."

Incidentally, it is obvious that this whole reform plan is to benefit almost exclusively the petty bourgeois and the small peasants, in that it *consolidates* them in their position as petty bourgeois and small peasants. Thus "the petty bourgeois Proudhon," who, according to Mülberger, is a mythical figure, suddenly takes on here a very tangible historical existence.

Mülberger continues:

"When I say with Proudhon that the economic life of society should be pervaded by a *conception of right*, I am *describing* present-day society as one in which, true, not every conception of right is absent, but in which the conception of right of the revolution is absent, a fact which Engels himself will admit."

Unfortunately I am not in a position to do Mülberger this favour. Mülberger demands that society *should be* pervaded by a conception of right and calls that a description. If a court sends a bailiff to me with a summons demanding the payment of a debt, then, according to Mülberger, it does no more than *describe* me as a man who does not pay his debts! A description is one thing, and a presumptuous demand is another. And precisely herein lies the essential difference between German scientific socialism and Proudhon. We describe—and despite Mülberger every real description of a thing is at the same time an explanation of it—economic relationships as they are and as they are developing, and we provide the proof, strictly economically, that their development is at the same time the development of the elements of a social revolution: the development, on the one hand, of a class whose conditions of life necessarily drive it to social revolution, the proletariat, and, on the other hand, of productive forces which, having grown beyond the framework of capitalist society, must necessarily burst that framework, and which at the same time offer the means of abolishing class distinctions once and for all in the interest of social progress itself. Proudhon, on the contrary, demands of present-day society that it shall transform itself not according to the laws of its own economic development, but according to the precepts of justice (the “*conception of right*” does not belong to him, but to Mülberger). Where we prove, Proudhon, and with him Mülberger, *preaches* and laments.

What kind of thing “the conception of right of the revolution” is I am absolutely unable to guess. Proudhon, it is true, makes a sort of goddess out of “*the Revolution*,” the bearer and executrix of his “*Justice*,” in doing which he then falls into the peculiar error of mixing up the bourgeois revolution of 1789-94 with the coming proletarian revolution. He does this in almost all his works, particularly since 1848; I shall quote only one as an example, namely, the *General Idea of the Revolution*, pages 39 and 40 of the 1868 edition.¹ As, however, Mülberger rejects all and every responsibility for Proudhon I am not allowed to explain “the conception of right of the revolution” from Proudhon and remain therefore in Egyptian darkness.

Mülberger says further:

¹ P. J. Proudhon, *Idée Générale de la Révolution du XIX siècle*. Paris 1868.—*Ed.*

"But neither Proudhon nor I appeal to an 'eternal justice' in order thereby to *explain* the existing unjust conditions, or even expect, as Engels imputes to me, the improvement of these conditions from an appeal to this justice."

Mülberger must be banking on the idea that "in Germany Proudhon is, in general, as good as unknown." In all his works Proudhon measures all social, legal, political and religious propositions with the rod of "justice," and rejects or recognizes them according to whether they conform or do not conform to what he calls "justice." In his *Economic Contradictions*¹ this justice is still called "eternal justice," "*justice éternelle*." Later on, nothing more is said about eternity, but the idea remains in essence. For instance, in his *Justice in the Revolution and in the Church*,² 1858 edition, the following passage is the text of the whole three-volume sermon (Vol. I, page 42):

"What is the basic principle, the organic, regulating, sovereign principle of societies, the principle which subordinates all others to itself, which rules, protects, represses, punishes, and in case of need even suppresses all rebellious elements? Is it religion, the ideal or *interest*? . . . In my opinion this principle is *justice*. What is justice? *It is the very essence of humanity*. What has it been since the beginning of the world? Nothing. What ought it to be? Everything."

Justice which is the very essence of humanity, what is that if not *eternal* justice? Justice which is the organic, regulating, sovereign basic principle of societies, which has nevertheless been nothing up to the present, but which ought to be everything—what is that if not the stick with which to measure all human affairs, if not the final arbiter to be appealed to in all conflicts? And did I assert anything else but that Proudhon cloaks his economic ignorance and helplessness by judging all economic relations not according to economic laws, but according to whether they conform or do not conform to his conception of this eternal justice? And what is the difference between Mülberger and Proudhon if Mülberger demands that "all these changes in the life of modern society" should be "pervaded by a *conception of right*, that is to say," should "everywhere be carried out according to the *strict demands of justice*?" Is it that I can't read, or that Mülberger can't write?

¹ The reference is to Proudhon's *Système des Contradictions économiques ou Philosophie de la Misère*.—Ed.

² P. J. Proudhon, *De la justice dans la révolution et dans l'église*, T. 1-3. Paris 1858.—Ed.

Müberger says further:

"Proudhon knows as well as Marx and Engels that the actual driving spirit in human society is the economic and not the juridical relations; he also knows that the given conceptions of right among a people are only the expression, the imprint, the product of the economic relations—and in particular the relations of production. . . . In a word, for Proudhon right is a historically evolved economic product."

If Proudhon knows all this (I am prepared to let the unclear expressions used by Mülberger pass and take his good intentions for the deed), if Proudhon knows it all "as well as Marx and Engels," what is there left to quarrel about? The trouble is that the situation with regard to Proudhon's knowledge is somewhat different. The economic relations of a given society present themselves in the first place as *interests*. Now, in the passage which has just been quoted from his opus Proudhon says in so many words that the "regulating, organic, sovereign basic principle of societies, the principle which subordinates all others to itself," is not *interest* but *justice*. And he repeats the same thing in all the decisive passages of all his works, which does not prevent Mülberger from continuing:

"... the idea of economic right, as it was developed by Proudhon most profoundly of all in *War and Peace*,¹ completely coincides with that basic idea of Lassalle so excellently expressed by him in his foreword to the *System of Acquired Rights*."

War and Peace is perhaps the most schoolboyish of all the many schoolboyish works of Proudhon, but I could not have expected it to be put forward as proof of Proudhon's alleged understanding of the German materialist conception of history, which explains all historical events and ideas, all politics, philosophy and religion, from the material, economic conditions of life of the historical period in question. The book is so little materialistic that it cannot even construct its conception of war without calling in the help of the *creator*:

"However, the creator, who chose this form of life for us, had his own purposes." (Vol. II, page 100, 1869 edition.)

On what historical knowledge the book is based can be judged from the fact that it believes in the historical existence of the Golden Age:

¹ P. J. Proudhon, *La guerre et la paix*, T. 1-2, Paris 1869.—*Ed.*

"In the beginning, when the human race was still sparsely spread over the earth's surface, nature supplied its needs without difficulty. It was the Golden Age, the age of peace and plenty." (*Ibid.*, page 102.)

Its economic standpoint is that of the crassest Malthusianism:

"When production is doubled, the population will soon be doubled also." (Page 105.)

In what does the materialism of this book consist, then? In that it declares the cause of war to have always been and still to be: "pauperism" (for instance, page 143). Uncle Bräsigt¹ was just such an accomplished materialist when in his 1848 speech he placidly uttered these grand words: "the cause of the great poverty is the great *pauvreté*."

Lassalle's *System of Acquired Rights* bears the imprint of the illusions of not only the jurist, but also the Old-Hegelian. On page VII, Lassalle declares expressly that also "in *economics* the conception of acquired right is the driving force of all further development," and he seeks to prove that "right is a rational organism developing *out of itself*" (and not, therefore, out of economic prerequisites). (Page IX.) For Lassalle it is a question of deriving right not from economic relations, but from "the concept of the will itself, of which the philosophy of law is only the development and exposition." (Page X.) So, where does this book come in here? The only difference between Proudhon and Lassalle is that the latter was a real jurist and Hegelian, while in both jurisprudence and philosophy, as in all other matters, Proudhon was merely a dilettante.

I know perfectly well that this man Proudhon, who notoriously continually contradicts himself, occasionally makes an utterance which looks as though he explained ideas on the basis of facts. But such utterances are devoid of any significance when contrasted with the basic tendency of his thought, and where they do occur they are, besides, extremely confused and inherently inconsistent.

At a certain, very primitive stage of the development of society, the need arises to bring under a common rule the daily recurring acts of production, distribution and exchange of products, to see to it that the individual subordinates himself to the common conditions of production and exchange. This rule, which at

¹ *Uncle Bräsigt*: A comical character figuring in the works of the German bourgeois humourist and novelist Fritz Reuter.—*Ed.*

first is custom, soon becomes *law*. With law, organs necessarily arise which are entrusted with its maintenance—public authority, the state. With further social development, law develops into a more or less comprehensive legal system. The more intricate this legal system becomes, the more is its mode of expression removed from that in which the usual economic conditions of the life of society are expressed. It appears as an independent element which derives the justification for its existence and the substantiation of its further development not from the economic relations but from its own inner foundations or, if you like, from “the concept of the will.” People forget that their right derived from their economic conditions of life, just as they have forgotten that they themselves derive from the animal world. With the development of the legal system into an intricate, comprehensive whole a new social division of labour becomes necessary; an order of professional jurists develops and with these legal science comes into being. In its further development this science compares the legal systems of various peoples and various times not as a reflection of the given economic relationships, but as systems which find their substantiations in themselves. The comparison presupposes points in common, and these are found by the jurists compiling what is more or less common to all these legal systems and calling it *natural right*. And the stick used to measure what is natural right and what is not is the most abstract expression of right itself, namely, *justice*. Henceforth, therefore, the development of right for the jurists, and for those who take their word for everything, is nothing more than a striving to bring human conditions, so far as they are expressed in legal terms, ever closer to the ideal of justice, *eternal justice*. And always this justice is but the ideologized, glorified expression of the existing economic relations, now from their conservative, and now from their revolutionary angle. The justice of the Greeks and Romans held slavery to be just; the justice of the bourgeois of 1789 demanded the abolition of feudalism on the ground that it was unjust. For the Prussian Junker even the miserable District Ordinance¹ is a violation of eternal justice. The conception of eternal justice, therefore, varies not only with time and place, but also with the persons concerned, and belongs among those things of which Mülberger

¹ *Kreisordnung*: Engels has reference to the administrative reform of 1873 in Prussia, which authorized communities to elect elders that had previously been nominated by the landlords.—*Ed.*

correctly says, "everyone understands something different." While in everyday life, in view of the simplicity of the relations discussed, expressions like right, wrong, justice, and sense of right are accepted without misunderstanding even with reference to social matters, they create, as we have seen, the same hopeless confusion in any scientific investigation of economic relations as would be created, for instance, in modern chemistry if the terminology of the phlogiston theory were to be retained. The confusion becomes still worse if one, like Proudhon, believes in this social phlogiston, "justice," or if one, like Mülberger, avers that the phlogiston theory is as correct as the oxygen theory.¹

III

Mülberger further complains that I called his "emphatic" utterance, "that there is no more terrible mockery of the whole culture of our lauded century than the fact that in the big cities 90 per cent and more of the population have no place that they can call their own"—a reactionary jeremiad. To be sure. If Mülberger had confined himself, as he pretends, to describing "the horrors of the present time" I should certainly not have said one ill word about "him and his modest words." In fact, however, he does something quite different. He describes these "horrors" as the *result* of the fact that the workers "*have no place that they can call their own.*" Whether one laments "the horrors of the present time" for the reason that the ownership of houses by the workers has been abolished or, as the Junkers do, for the reason that feudalism and the guilds have been abolished, in either case nothing can come of it but a reactionary jeremiad, a song of sorrow at the coming of the inevitable, of the historically necessary. Its reactionary character lies precisely in the fact that Mülberger wishes to re-establish individual house ownership for the

¹ Before the discovery of oxygen chemists explained the burning of substances in atmospheric air by assuming the existence of a special igneous substance, phlogiston, which escaped during the process of combustion. Since they found that simple substances on combustion weighed more after having been burned than they did before, they declared that phlogiston had a negative weight so that a substance without its phlogiston weighed more than one with it. In this way all the main properties of oxygen were gradually ascribed to phlogiston, but all in an *inverted* form. The discovery that combustion consists in a combination of the burning substance with another substance, oxygen, and the discovery of this oxygen disposed of the original assumption, but only after long resistance on the part of the older chemists. [*Note by Engels.*]

workers—a matter which history has long ago put an end to; that he can conceive of the emancipation of the workers in no other way than by making everyone once again the owner of his own house.

And further:

"I declare most emphatically, the real struggle is to be waged against the capitalist mode of production; only *from its transformation* is an improvement of housing conditions to be hoped for. Engels sees nothing of all this. . . . I presuppose the complete settlement of the social question in order to be able to proceed to the abolition of the rented dwelling."

Unfortunately, I still see nothing of all this even now. It surely is impossible for me to know what someone whose name I never heard presupposes in the secret recesses of his mind. All I could do was to stick to the printed articles of Mülberger. And there I find even today (pages 15 and 16 of the reprint) that Mülberger, in order to be able to proceed to the abolition of the rented dwelling, presupposes nothing except—the rented dwelling. Only on page 17 he takes "the productivity of capital by the horns," to which we shall come back later. Even in his answer he confirms this when he says:

"It was rather a question of showing how, *from existing conditions*, a complete transformation in the housing question could be achieved."

From existing conditions, and from the transformation (read: abolition) of the capitalist mode of production, are surely diametrically opposite things.

No wonder Mülberger complains when I regard the philanthropic efforts of Herr Dollfus and other manufacturers to assist the workers to obtain houses of their own as the only possible practical realization of his Proudhonist projects. If he were to realize that Proudhon's plan for the salvation of society is a fantasy resting completely on the basis of *bourgeois* society, he would naturally not believe in it. I have never at any time called his good intentions in question. But why then does he praise Dr. Reschauer for proposing to the Vienna City Council that it should imitate Dollfus's projects?

Mülberger further declares:

"As far as the antithesis between town and country is particularly concerned, it is utopian to want to abolish it. This antithesis is a natural one, or more correctly, one that has arisen historically. . . . The question is not one of *abolishing* this antithesis, but of finding political and social forms in which

it would be *harmless*, indeed even *fruitful*. In this way it would be possible to expect a peaceful adjustment, a gradual balancing of interests."

So the abolition of the antithesis between town and country is utopian, *because* this antithesis is a natural one, or more correctly, one that has arisen historically. Let us apply this same logic to other contrasts in modern society and see where we land. For instance:

"As far, in particular, as the antithesis between 'the capitalists and the wage-workers' is concerned, it is utopian to want to abolish it. This antithesis is a natural one, or more correctly, one that has arisen historically. The question is not one of *abolishing* this antithesis, but of finding political and social forms in which it would be *harmless*, indeed even *fruitful*. In this way it would be possible to expect a peaceful adjustment, a gradual balancing of interests."

And with this we have once again arrived at Schulze-Delitzsch.

The abolition of the antithesis between town and country is no more and no less utopian than the abolition of the antithesis between capitalists and wage-workers. From day to day it is becoming more and more a practical demand of both industrial and agricultural production. No one has demanded this more energetically than Liebig in his writings on the chemistry of agriculture, in which his first demand has always been that man shall give back to the land what he receives from it, and in which he proves that only the existence of the towns, and in particular the big towns, prevents this. When one observes how here in London alone a greater quantity of manure than is produced by the whole kingdom of Saxony is poured away every day into the sea with an expenditure of enormous sums, and what colossal structures are necessary in order to prevent this manure from poisoning the whole of London, then the utopia of abolishing the distinction between town and country is given a remarkably practical basis. And even comparatively unimportant Berlin has been suffocating in the malodours of its own filth for at least thirty years. On the other hand, it is completely utopian to want, like Proudhon, to upheave present-day bourgeois society while maintaining the peasant as such. Only as uniform a distribution as possible of the population over the whole country, only an intimate connection between industrial and agricultural production together with

the extension of the means of communication made necessary thereby—granted the abolition of the capitalist mode of production—will be able to deliver the rural population from the isolation and stupor in which it has vegetated almost unchanged for thousands of years. To be utopian does not mean to maintain that the emancipation of humanity from the chains which its historic past has forged will be complete only when the antithesis between town and country has been abolished; the utopia begins only when one ventures, "from existing conditions," to prescribe the *form* in which this or any other antithesis of present-day society is to be resolved. And this is what Mülberger does by adopting the Proudhonist formula for the settlement of the housing question.

Mülberger then complains that I have made him to a certain extent co-responsible for "Proudhon's monstrous views on capital and interest," and declares:

"I *presuppose* the alteration of the relations of production as an *accomplished fact*, and the transitional law regulating the rate of interest does not deal with relations of production but with the social turnover, the relations of circulation. . . . The alteration of the relations of production, or, as the German school says more accurately, the abolition of the capitalist mode of production, certainly does not result, as Engels *tries to make me say*, from a transitional law abolishing interest, but from the *actual seizure of all the instruments of labour*, from the seizure of industry as a whole by the working people. Whether the working people will in that event worship (!) redemption sooner than immediate expropriation is not for either Engels or me to decide."

I rub my eyes in astonishment. I am reading Mülberger's disquisition through once again from beginning to end in order to find the passage where he says his redemption of the rented dwelling presupposes as an accomplished fact "the actual seizure of all the instruments of labour, the seizure of industry as a whole by the working people," but I am unable to find any such passage. It does not exist. There is nowhere mention of "actual seizure," etc., but there is the following on page 17:

"Let us now assume that the productivity of capital is *really taken by the horns*, as it must be sooner or later, for instance, *by a transitional law which fixes the interest on all capitals at one per cent*, but mark you, with the tendency to make even this rate of interest approximate more and more to the zero point. . . . Like all other products, houses and dwellings are naturally also included within the purview of this law. . . . We see, therefore, from this angle that the redemption of the rented dwelling is a *necessary consequence of the abolition of the productivity of capital in general*."

Thus it is said here in plain words, quite contrary to Mülberger's latest about-face, that the productivity of capital, by which confused phrase he admittedly means the capitalist mode of production, is really "taken by the horns" by a law abolishing interest, and that precisely as a result of such a law "the redemption of the rented dwelling is a necessary consequence of the abolition of the productivity of capital in general." Not at all, says Mülberger now. That transitional law "does not deal with relations of *production* but with relations of *circulation*." In view of this crass contradiction, "equally mysterious for wise men as for fools," as Goethe would say, all that is left for me to do is to assume that I am dealing with two separate and distinct Mülbergers, one of whom rightly complains that I "tried to make him say" what the other caused to be printed.

It is certainly true that the working people will ask neither me nor Mülberger whether in the actual seizure they will "worship redemption sooner than immediate expropriation." In all probability they will prefer not to "worship" at all. However, there never was any question of the actual seizure of all the instruments of labour by the working people, but only of Mülberger's assertion (page 17) that "the whole content of the solution of the housing question is comprised in the word *redemption*." If he now declares this redemption to be extremely doubtful, what was the sense in giving the two of us and our readers all this unnecessary trouble?

Moreover, it must be pointed out that the "actual seizure" of all the instruments of labour, the seizure of industry as a whole by the working people, is the exact opposite of the Proudhonist "redemption." Under the latter, the *individual worker* becomes the owner of the dwelling, the peasant farm, the instruments of labour; under the former, the "working people" remain the collective owners of the houses, factories and instruments of labour, and will hardly permit their use, at least during a transitional period, by individuals or associations without compensation for the cost. Just as the abolition of property in land is not the abolition of ground rent but its transfer, although in a modified form, to society. The actual seizure of all the instruments of labour by the working people, therefore, does not at all exclude the retention of the rent relation.

In general, the question is not whether the proletariat when it comes to power will simply seize by force the instruments of

production, the raw materials and means of subsistence, whether it will pay immediate compensation for them or whether it will redeem the property therein by small instalment payments. To attempt to answer such a question in advance and for all cases would be utopia-making, and that I leave to others.

IV

There was need to consume so much ink and paper in order to bore a way through Mülberger's diverse twists and turns to the real point at issue, a point which Mülberger carefully evades in his answer.

What were Mülberger's positive statements in his article?

First: that "the difference between the original cost price of a house, building site, etc., and its present value" belongs by right to society. In the language of economics, this difference is called ground rent. Proudhon too wants to appropriate this for society, as one may read in his *General Idea of the Revolution*, page 219 of the 1868 edition.

Secondly: that the solution of the housing problem consists in everyone becoming the owner instead of the tenant of his dwelling.

Thirdly: that this solution shall be put into effect by passing a law turning rent payments into instalment payments on the purchase price of the dwelling. Points 2 and 3 are both borrowed from Proudhon, as anyone can see in the *General Idea of the Revolution*, page 199 *et seq.*, where on page 203 a project of the law in question is to be found already drafted.

Fourthly: that the productivity of capital is taken by the horns by a transitional law reducing the rate of interest provisionally to one per cent, subject to further reduction later on. This point has also been taken from Proudhon, as may be read in detail on pages 182 to 186 of the *General Idea*.

With regard to each of these points I have cited the passage in Proudhon where the original of the Mülberger copy is to be found, and I ask now whether I was justified in calling the author of an article containing completely Proudhonist and nothing but Proudhonist views a Proudhonist or not? Nevertheless, Mülberger complains about nothing more bitterly than that I call him a Proudhonist because I "came upon a few *expressions* that are peculiar to Proudhon!" On the contrary. The "*expressions*" all

belong to Mülberger, their *content* belongs to Proudhon. And when I then supplement this Proudhonist disquisition with Proudhon, Mülberger complains that I am ascribing to him the "monstrous views" of Proudhon!

What did I reply to this Proudhonist plan?

First: that the transfer of ground rent to the state is tantamount to the abolition of individual property in land.

Secondly: that the redemption of the rented dwelling and the transfer of property in the dwelling to the party who was the tenant hitherto does not at all affect the capitalist mode of production.

Thirdly: that with the present development of large-scale industry and towns this proposal is as absurd as it is reactionary, and that the reintroduction of the individual ownership of his dwelling by each individual would be a step backward.

Fourthly: that the compulsory reduction of the rate of interest on capital would by no means attack the capitalist mode of production; and that, on the contrary, as the usury laws prove, it is as old as it is impossible.

Fifthly: that the abolition of interest on capital by no means abolishes the payment of rent for houses.

Mülberger has now admitted points 2 and 4. To the other points he makes no reply whatever. And yet these are just the points around which the whole debate centres. Mülberger's answer, however, is not a refutation: it carefully avoids dealing with all economic points, which after all are the decisive ones. It is a personal complaint, nothing more. For instance, he complains when I anticipate his announced solution of other questions, for example, state debts, private debts and credit, and say that his solution is everywhere the same, namely, that, as in the housing question, the abolition of interest, the conversion of interest payments into instalment payments on the capital sum, and free credit. Nevertheless, I am still ready to bet that if these articles of Mülberger see the light of day, their essential content will coincide with Proudhon's *General Idea*: credit, page 182; state debts, page 186; private debts, page 196, just as much as his articles on the housing question coincided with the passages I quoted from the same book.

Mülberger takes this opportunity to inform me that questions such as taxation, state debts, private debts and credit, to which is now added the question of municipal autonomy, are of the

greatest importance to the peasant and for propaganda in the countryside. To a great extent I agree, but, 1) up to the moment there has been no discussion of the peasant, and 2) the Proudhonian "solutions" of all these problems are just as absurd economically and just as essentially bourgeois as his solution of the housing problem. I need hardly defend myself against Mülberger's suggestion that I fail to appreciate the necessity of drawing the peasants into the movement. However, I certainly consider it folly to recommend the Proudhonian quackery to them for this purpose. There is still very much big landed property in Germany. According to Proudhon's theory all this ought to be divided up into small peasant farms, which, in the present state of scientific agriculture and after the experience with small land allotments in France and Western Germany, would be positively reactionary. The big landed estates which still exist will rather afford us a welcome basis for the carrying on of agriculture on a large scale—the only system of farming which can utilize all modern facilities, machinery, etc.—by associated workers, and thus demonstrating to the small peasants the advantages of large-scale operation by means of association. The Danish Socialists, who in this respect are ahead of all others, saw this long ago.

It is equally unnecessary for me to defend myself against the suggestion that I regard the existing infamous housing conditions of the workers as "an insignificant detail." As far as I know, I was the first to describe in German these conditions in their classical form as they exist in England; not, as Mülberger opines, because they "violated my *sense of justice*"—anyone who insisted on writing books about all the facts which violated his sense of justice would have a lot to do—but, as can be read in the Introduction to my book, in order to provide a factual basis, by describing the social conditions created by modern large-scale industry, for German socialism, which was then arising and expending itself in empty phrases. However, it never entered my head to try to settle the so-called housing *question* any more than to occupy myself with the details of the still more important *food question*. I am satisfied if I can prove that the production of our modern society is sufficient to provide all its members with enough to eat, and that there are houses enough in existence to provide the working masses for the time being with roomy and healthy living accommodation. To speculate on how a future society might organize the distribution of food and dwellings

leads directly to *utopia*. The utmost we can do is to state from our understanding of the basic conditions of all modes of production up to now that with the downfall of the capitalist mode of production certain forms of appropriation which existed in society hitherto will become impossible. Even the transitional measures will everywhere have to be in accordance with the relations existing at the moment. In countries of small landed property they will be substantially different from those in countries where big landed property prevails, etc. Mülberger himself shows us better than anyone else where one arrives at if one attempts to find separate solutions for so-called practical problems like the housing question. He first took 28 pages to explain that "the whole content of the solution of the housing question is comprised in the word *redemption*," and then, when hard pressed, begins to stammer in embarrassment that it is really very doubtful whether, on actually taking possession of the houses, "the working people will worship redemption" sooner than some other form of expropriation.

Mülberger demands that we should become *practical*, that we should not "come forward merely with dead and abstract formulas" when "faced with real practical relations," that we should "proceed beyond abstract socialism and *come close to the definite concrete relations of society*." If Mülberger had done this he might perhaps have rendered great service to the movement. The first step in coming close to the definite concrete relations of society is surely that one should learn what they are, that one should examine them according to their existing economic interconnections. But what do we find in Mülberger's articles? Two whole sentences, namely:

1. "The tenant is in the same position in relation to the house-owner as the wage-worker in relation to the capitalist."

I have proved on page 6¹ of the reprint that this is totally wrong, and Mülberger has not a word to say in reply.

2. "However, the bull which (in the social reform) must be taken by the horns is the *productivity of capital*, as the liberal school of political economy calls it, a thing which *in reality does not exist*, but which *in its apparent existence* serves as a cloak for all the inequality which burdens present-day society."

¹ See pp. 559-60 of this volume.—Ed.

Thus, the bull which has to be taken by the horns "*in reality does not exist*," and therefore also has no "horns." Not the bull itself is the evil, but his *seeming existence*. Despite this, "the so-called productivity (of capital) is able to conjure up houses and towns" whose existence is anything but "seeming." (Page 12.) And a man who, although Marx's *Capital* "is familiar also to him," jabbars in this hopelessly confused fashion about the relation of capital and labour, undertakes to show the German workers a new and better path, and presents himself as the "master builder" who is "clear about the architectural structure of the future society, at least in its main outlines"!

No one "has come" closer "to the definite and concrete relations of society" than Marx in *Capital*. He spent twenty-five years investigating them from all angles, and the results of his criticism contain throughout also the germs of so-called solutions, in so far as they are possible at all today. But that is not enough for friend Mülberger. That is all abstract socialism, dead and abstract formulas. Instead of studying the "definite concrete relations of society," friend Mülberger contents himself with reading through a few volumes of Proudhon which, although they offer him next to nothing concerning the definite concrete relations of society, offer him, on the contrary, very definite concrete miraculous remedies for all social evils. He then presents this ready-made plan for social salvation, this Proudhonian *system*, to the German workers under the pretext that *he* wants "to say good-bye to the *systems*," while I "choose the opposite path"! In order to grasp this I must assume that I am blind and Mülberger deaf so that any understanding between us is *utterly impossible*.

But enough. If this polemic serves for nothing else it has in any case the value of having given proof of what there really is to the practice of these self-styled "practical" Socialists. These practical proposals for the abolition of all social evils, these universal social panaceas, have always and everywhere been the work of founders of sects who appeared at a time when the proletarian movement was still in its infancy. Proudhon too belongs to them. The development of the proletariat soon casts aside these swaddling-clothes and engenders in the working class itself the realization that nothing is less practical than these "practical solutions," concocted in advance and universally applicable, and that practical socialism consists rather in a correct knowledge of the capitalist mode of production from

its various aspects. A working class which knows what's what in this regard will *never* be in doubt in any case as to which social institutions should be the objects of its main attacks, and in what manner these attacks should be executed.

Written by F. Engels in June
1872-February 1873

Originally printed in the newspaper
Volksstaat for 1872-73

Second edition, revised by Engels,
appeared in 1887

Printed according to the 1887
edition compared with the
newspaper text

Translated from the German

Frederick Engels

ON AUTHORITY

A number of Socialists have latterly launched a regular crusade against what they call the *principle of authority*. It suffices to tell them that this or that act is *authoritarian* for it to be condemned. This summary mode of procedure is being abused to such an extent that it has become necessary to look into the matter somewhat more closely. Authority, in the sense in which the word is used here, means: the imposition of the will of another upon ours; on the other hand, authority presupposes subordination. Now, since these two words sound bad and the relationship which they represent is disagreeable to the subordinated party, the question is to ascertain whether there is any way of dispensing with it, whether—given the conditions of present-day society—we could not create another social system, in which this authority would be given no scope any longer and would consequently have to disappear. On examining the economic, industrial and agricultural conditions which form the basis of present-day bourgeois society, we find that they tend more and more to replace isolated action by combined action of individuals. Modern industry with its big factories and mills, where hundreds of workers supervise complicated machines driven by steam, has superseded the small workshops of the separate producers; the carriages and wagons of the highways have been substituted by railway trains, just as the small schooners and sailing feluccas have been by steam-boats. Even agriculture falls increasingly under the dominion of the machine and of steam, which slowly but relentlessly put in the place of the small proprietors big capitalists, who with the aid of hired workers cultivate vast stretches of land. Everywhere combined action, the complication of processes dependent upon each other, displaces independent action by individuals. But whoever mentions combined action speaks of

organization; now, is it possible to have organization without authority?

Supposing a social revolution dethroned the capitalists, who now exercise their authority over the production and circulation of wealth. Supposing, to adopt entirely the point of view of the anti-authoritarians, that the land and the instruments of labour had become the collective property of the workers who use them. Will authority have disappeared or will it only have changed its form? Let us see.

Let us take by way of example a cotton spinning mill. The cotton must pass through at least six successive operations before it is reduced to the state of thread, and these operations take place for the most part in different rooms. Furthermore, keeping the machines going requires an engineer to look after the steam engine, mechanics to make the current repairs, and many other labourers whose business it is to transfer the products from one room to another, and so forth. All these workers, men, women and children, are obliged to begin and finish their work at the hours fixed by the authority of the steam, which cares nothing for individual autonomy. The workers must, therefore, first come to an understanding on the hours of work; and these hours, once they are fixed, must be observed by all, without any exception. Thereafter particular questions arise in each room and at every moment concerning the mode of production, distribution of materials, etc., which must be settled at once on pain of seeing all production immediately stopped; whether they are settled by decision of a delegate placed at the head of each branch of labour or, if possible, by a majority vote, the will of the single individual will always have to subordinate itself, which means that questions are settled in an authoritarian way. The automatic machinery of a big factory is much more despotic than the small capitalists who employ workers ever have been. At least with regard to the hours of work one may write upon the portals of these factories: *Lasciate ogni autonomia, voi che entrate!*¹ If man, by dint of his knowledge and inventive genius, has subdued the forces of nature, the latter avenge themselves upon him by subjecting him, in so far as he employs them, to a veritable despotism independent of all social organization. Wanting to abolish authority in large-scale industry is tantamount to wanting to abolish industry

¹ Leave, ye that enter in, all autonomy behind!—*Ed.*

itself, to destroy the power loom in order to return to the spinning wheel.

Let us take another example—the railway. Here too the co-operation of an infinite number of individuals is absolutely necessary, and this co-operation must be practised during precisely fixed hours so that no accidents may happen. Here, too, the first condition of the job is a dominant will that settles all subordinate questions, whether this will is represented by a single delegate or a committee charged with the execution of the resolutions of the majority of persons interested. In either case there is very pronounced authority. Moreover, what would happen to the first train dispatched if the authority of the railway employees over the Hon. passengers were abolished?

But the necessity of authority, and of imperious authority at that, will nowhere be found more evident than on board a ship on the high seas. There, in time of danger, the lives of all depend on the instantaneous and absolute obedience of all to the will of one.

When I submitted arguments like these to the most rabid anti-authoritarians the only answer they were able to give me was the following: Yes, that's true, but here it is not a case of authority which we confer on our delegates, *but of a commission entrusted!* These gentlemen think that when they have changed the names of things they have changed the things themselves. This is how these profound thinkers mock at the whole world.

We have thus seen that, on the one hand, a certain authority, no matter how delegated, and, on the other hand, a certain subordination, are things which, independently of all social organization, are imposed upon us together with the material conditions under which we produce and make products circulate.

We have seen, besides, that the material conditions of production and circulation inevitably develop with large-scale industry and large-scale agriculture, and increasingly tend to enlarge the scope of this authority. Hence it is absurd to speak of the principle of authority as being absolutely evil, and of the principle of autonomy as being absolutely good. Authority and autonomy are relative things whose spheres vary with the various phases of the development of society. If the autonomists confined themselves to saying that the social organization of the future would restrict authority solely to the limits within which the conditions of production render it inevitable, we could understand each other;

but they are blind to all facts that make the thing necessary and they passionately fight the word.

Why do the anti-authoritarians not confine themselves to crying out against political authority, the state? All Socialists are agreed that the political state, and with it political authority, will disappear as a result of the coming social revolution, that is, that public functions will lose their political character and be transformed into the simple administrative functions of watching over the true interests of society. But the anti-authoritarians demand that the authoritarian political state be abolished at one stroke, even before the social conditions that gave birth to it have been destroyed. They demand that the first act of the social revolution shall be the abolition of authority. Have these gentlemen ever seen a revolution? A revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of rifles, bayonets and cannon—authoritarian means, if such there be at all; and if the victorious party does not want to have fought in vain, it must maintain this rule by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionaries. Would the Paris Commune have lasted a single day if it had not made use of this authority of the armed people against the bourgeois? Should we not, on the contrary, reproach it for not having used it freely enough?

Therefore, either one of two things: either the anti-authoritarians don't know what they are talking about, in which case they are creating nothing but confusion; or they do know, and in that case they are betraying the movement of the proletariat. In either case they serve the reaction.

Federico Engels

Written by Engels in October 1872

Published in the miscellany
Almanacco Repubblicano for 1874

Printed according to the text of the
miscellany

Translated from the Italian

Frederick Engels

**PREFATORY NOTE TO THE PEASANT WAR
IN GERMANY**

The following work was written in London in the summer of 1850, while still under the immediate impression of the counter-revolution just then completed; it appeared in the fifth and sixth numbers of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung. Politico-Economic Review*, edited by Karl Marx, Hamburg 1850. My political friends in Germany desire it to be reprinted, and I accede to their desire, because, to my great regret, the work is still timely today.

It makes no claim to provide material derived from independent research. On the contrary, the entire subject-matter on the peasant risings and on Thomas Münzer is taken from Zimmermann. His book, despite gaps here and there, is still the best array of the factual material. Moreover, old Zimmermann enjoyed his subject. The same revolutionary instinct, which everywhere here makes him champion the oppressed classes, made him later one of the best of the extreme Left in Frankfort. It is true that since then he is said to have aged somewhat.

If, nevertheless, Zimmermann's presentation lacks the inner interconnections; if it does not succeed in showing the religious-political controversies of that epoch as the reflection of the contemporary class struggles; if it sees in these class struggles only oppressors and oppressed, evil folk and good folk, and the ultimate victory of the evil ones; if its insight into the social conditions which determined both the outbreak and the outcome of the struggle is extremely defective, it was the fault of the time in which the book came into existence.¹ On the contrary, for its

¹ The book referred to is W. Zimmermann, *Allgemeine Geschichte des grossen Bauernkrieges* [*General History of the Big Peasant War*], 3 vols., first published in 1841-43.—Ed.

time, it is written even very realistically, a laudable exception among the German idealist works on history.

My presentation, while sketching the historic course of the struggle only in its bare outlines, attempted to explain the origin of the Peasant War, the position of the various parties that played a part in it, the political and religious theories by which those parties sought to clarify their position in their own minds, and finally the result of the struggle itself as necessarily following from the historically established conditions of the social life of these classes; that is to say, to demonstrate the political constitution of the Germany of that time, the revolts against it and the contemporary political and religious theories not as causes but as results of the stage of development of agriculture, industry, land and waterways, commodity and money trade, then obtaining in Germany. This, the only materialist conception of history, originates not with myself but with Marx, and can also be found in his works on the French Revolution of 1848-49, in the same review, and in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*.

The parallel between the German Revolution of 1525 and that of 1848-49 was too obvious to be rejected altogether at that time. Nevertheless, despite the uniformity in the course of events, where various local revolts were crushed one after another by one and the same princely army, despite the often ludicrous similarity in the behaviour of the city burghers in both cases, the difference also stood out clear and distinct.

"Who profited by the Revolution of 1525? The *princes*. Who profited by the Revolution of 1848? The *big* princes, Austria and Prussia. Behind the minor princes of 1525, chaining them to themselves by the taxes, stood the petty burghers; behind the big princes of 1850, behind Austria and Prussia, there stand the modern big bourgeois, rapidly getting them under their yoke by means of the national debt. And behind the big bourgeois stand the proletarians."¹

I regret to have to say that in this paragraph much too much honour was done the German bourgeoisie. Both in Austria and Prussia, it has had the opportunity of "rapidly getting" the monarchy "under its yoke by means of the national debt"; nowhere did it ever make use of this opportunity.

¹ Frederick Engels, *The Peasant War in Germany*.—Ed.

By the War of 1866, Austria fell as a boon into the lap of the bourgeoisie. But it does not know how to rule, it is powerless and incapable of anything. It can do only one thing: savagely attack the workers as soon as they begin to stir. It remains at the helm solely because the *Hungarians* need it.

And in Prussia? True, the national debt has increased by leaps and bounds, the deficit has become a permanent feature, state expenditure grows from year to year, the bourgeois have a majority in the Chamber and without their consent taxes cannot be increased nor loans floated—but where is their power over the state? Only a few months ago, when there was again a deficit, they occupied a most favourable position. By holding out only just *a little*, they could have forced fine concessions. What do they do? They regard it as a sufficient concession that the government *allows them* to lay at its feet close on nine millions, not for *one* year, oh no, but for *every* year, and for all time to come.

I do not want to blame the poor “National-Liberals” in the Chamber more than they deserve. I know they have been left in the lurch by those who stand behind them, by the mass of the bourgeoisie. This mass does not *want* to rule. It has 1848 still in its bones.

Why the German bourgeoisie exhibits this remarkable cowardice will be discussed later.

In other respects the above statement has been fully confirmed. Beginning with 1850, the more and more definite recession into the background of the small states, serving now only as levers for Prussian or Austrian intrigues; the increasingly violent struggles for sole rule, waged between Austria and Prussia; finally the forcible settlement of 1866, in accordance with which Austria retains its own provinces, while Prussia subjugates directly or indirectly the whole of the North, and the three states of the South-west are left out in the cold for the time being.

In the whole of this grand performance of state the only thing of importance for the German working class is as follows:

First, universal suffrage has given the workers the power of being directly represented in the legislative assembly.

Secondly, Prussia has set a good example by swallowing three other crowns held by the grace of God. That *after* this operation it still possesses the same immaculate crown, held by the grace of God, that it formerly ascribed to itself, even the National-Liberals do not believe.

Thirdly, there is now only *one* serious adversary of the revolution in Germany—the Prussian government.

And fourthly, the German-Austrians will now at last have to ask themselves what they want to be, Germans or Austrians; whom they prefer to adhere to—Germany or their extra-German Transleithanian appendages. It has been obvious for a long time that they have to give up one or the other, but this has been continually glossed over by the petty-bourgeois democracy.

As regards the other important points of controversy relative to 1866, which since then have been thrashed out *ad nauseam* between the “National-Liberals” on the one side and the “People’s Party” on the other, the history of the next few years will probably prove that these two standpoints are so bitterly hostile to one another solely because they are the opposite poles of one and the same narrow-mindedness.

The year 1866 has changed almost nothing in the social conditions of Germany. The few bourgeois reforms—uniform weights and measures, freedom of movement, freedom of occupation, etc., all within limits acceptable to the bureaucracy—do not even come up to what the bourgeoisie of other West-European countries has long possessed, and leave the main abuse, the system of bureaucratic tutelage, untouched. For the proletariat all legislation concerning freedom of movement, the right of naturalization, the abolition of passports, *et cetera*, is anyhow made quite illusory by the common practice of the police.

What is much more important than the grand performance of state of 1866 is the growth of German industry and commerce, of railways, telegraphs and ocean steamship navigation since 1848. However much this progress lags behind that of England, or even of France, during the same period, it is unprecedented for Germany and has accomplished more in twenty years than a whole century did previously. Only now has Germany been drawn, seriously and irrevocably, into *world commerce*. The capitals of the industrialists have multiplied rapidly; the social position of the bourgeoisie has risen accordingly. The surest sign of industrial prosperity—*swindling*—has established itself abundantly and chained counts and dukes to its triumphal chariot. German capital is now constructing Russian and Rumanian railways—may it not come to grief!—whereas only fifteen years ago, German railways went a-begging to English *entrepreneurs*. How, then, is it possible that the bourgeoisie has not conquered polit-

ical power as well, that it behaves in so cowardly a manner towards the government?

It is the misfortune of the German bourgeoisie to have arrived too late, as is the favourite German manner. The period of its florescence occurs at a time when the bourgeoisie of the other West-European countries is already politically in decline. In England, the bourgeoisie could get its real representative, Bright, into the government only by an extension of the franchise, which in its consequences is bound to put an end to all bourgeois rule. In France, where the bourgeoisie as such, as a class in its entirety, held power for only two years, 1849 and 1850, under the republic, it was able to continue its social existence only by abdicating its political power to Louis Bonaparte and the army. And on account of the enormously increased interaction of the three most advanced European countries, it is today no longer possible for the bourgeoisie to settle down to a comfortable political rule in Germany when this rule has already outlived its usefulness in England and France.

It is a peculiarity of precisely the bourgeoisie, in contrast to all former ruling classes, that there is a turning point in its development after which every further increase in its agencies of power, hence primarily in its capitals, only tends to incapacitate it more and more for political rule. "*Behind the big bourgeois stand the proletarians.*" In proportion as the bourgeoisie develops its industry, its commerce and its means of communication, it produces proletariat. And at a certain point—which need not be reached everywhere at the same time or at the same stage of development—it begins to notice that this, its proletarian double, is outgrowing it. From that moment on, it loses the strength required for exclusive political rule; it looks around for allies, with whom it shares its rule, or to whom it cedes the whole of its rule, as circumstances may require.

In Germany this turning point came for the bourgeoisie as early as 1848. And, to be sure, the German bourgeoisie was frightened not so much by the German as by the French proletariat. The June battle in Paris, in 1848, showed the bourgeoisie what it had to expect; the German proletariat was just restless enough to prove to it that the seed that would yield the same crop had already been embedded in German soil, too; and from that day on the edge was taken off all bourgeois political action. The bourgeoisie looked round for allies, bargained itself away to

them regardless of price—and even today it has not advanced one step.

These allies are all of a reactionary nature. There is the monarchy with its army and its bureaucracy; there is the big feudal nobility; there are the little cabbage-*Junkers* and there are even the priests. With all of these the bourgeoisie made pacts and bargains if only to save its dear skin, until at last it had nothing left to barter away. And the more the proletariat developed, the more it began to feel as a class and to act as a class, the more faint-hearted did the bourgeois become. When the astonishingly bad strategy of the Prussians triumphed over the astonishingly still worse strategy of the Austrians at Sadowa, it was difficult to say who heaved a deeper sigh of relief—the Prussian bourgeois, who was also defeated at Sadowa, or the Austrian.

Our big bourgeois of 1870 still act exactly as the middle burghers of 1525 acted. As to the petty bourgeois, artisans and shopkeepers, they will always remain the same. They hope to climb, to swindle their way, into the big bourgeoisie; they are afraid of being plunged down into the proletariat. Between fear and hope, they will, during the struggle, save their precious skin, and join the victor when the struggle is over. Such is their nature.

The social and political activity of the proletariat has kept pace with the upsurge of industry since 1848. The role that the German workers play today in their trade unions, co-operative societies, political associations and meetings, at elections and in the so-called Reichstag, is by itself sufficient proof of the transformation Germany has imperceptibly undergone in the last twenty years. It greatly redounds to the credit of the German workers that *they alone* have succeeded in sending workers and workers' representatives into parliament—a feat which neither the French nor the English have so far accomplished.

But even the proletariat has not yet outgrown the parallel drawn with 1525. The class that is exclusively dependent on wages all its life is still far from forming the majority of the German people. This class is, therefore, also compelled to seek allies. The latter can only be found among the petty bourgeoisie, the *lumpenproletariat* of the cities, the small peasants and the agricultural labourers.

The *petty bourgeois* we have spoken of above. They are extremely unreliable except after a victory has been won, when their shouting in the beer houses knows no bounds. Nevertheless, there

are very good elements among them, who join the workers of their own accord.

The *lumpenproletariat*, this scum of the depraved elements of all classes, which establishes headquarters in the big cities, is the worst of all possible allies. This rabble is absolutely venal and absolutely brazen. If the French workers, in every revolution, inscribed on the houses: *Mort aux voleurs!* Death to thieves! and even shot some, they did it, not out of enthusiasm for property, but because they rightly considered it necessary above all to keep that gang at a distance. Every leader of the workers who uses these scoundrels as guards or relies on them for support proves himself by this action alone a traitor to the movement.

The *small peasants*—for the bigger peasants belong to the bourgeoisie—differ in kind.

Either they are *feudal peasants* and still have to perform *corvée* services for their gracious lord. Now that the bourgeoisie has failed to do its duty of freeing these people from serfdom, it will not be difficult to convince them that they can expect salvation only from the working class.

Or they are *tenant farmers*. In this case the situation is for the most part the same as in Ireland. Rents are pushed so high that in times of average crops the peasant and his family can just barely make ends meet; when the crops are bad he almost starves, is unable to pay his rent and consequently finds himself entirely at the mercy of the landlord. For such people the bourgeoisie does something only when it is compelled to. From whom then should they expect salvation if not from the workers?

There remain the peasants who cultivate their *own little patches of land*. In most cases they are so burdened with mortgages that they are as dependent on the usurer as the tenant on the landlord. For them also there remains only a meagre wage, which, moreover, since there are good years and bad years, is highly uncertain. These people least of all have anything to expect from the bourgeoisie, because it is precisely the bourgeoisie, the capitalist usurers, who suck the lifeblood out of them. Still, most of these peasants cling tightly to their property, though in reality it does not belong to them but to the usurer. Nevertheless, it will have to be brought home to them that they can be freed from the usurer only when a government dependent on the people has transformed all mortgages into debts to the state,

and thereby lowered the interest rates. And this can be brought about only by the working class.

Wherever medium-sized and large estates prevail, *agricultural labourers* form the most numerous class in the countryside. This is the case throughout the entire North and East of Germany and it is *here* that the industrial workers of the towns find their *most numerous and most natural allies*. In the same way as the capitalist confronts the industrial worker, the landowner or large tenant confronts the agricultural labourer. The same measures that help the one must also help the other. The industrial workers can free themselves only by transforming the capital of the bourgeois, that is, the raw materials, machines and tools, and the means of subsistence requisite for production, into the property of society, that is, into their own property, used by them in common. Similarly, the agricultural labourers can be rescued from their hideous misery only when, primarily, their chief object of labour, the land itself, is withdrawn from the private ownership of the big peasants and the still bigger feudal lords, transformed into social property and cultivated by co-operative associations of agricultural workers on their common account. And here we come to the famous decision of the International Working Men's Congress in Basle: that it is in the interest of society to transform landed property into common, national property. This resolution was adopted mainly for the countries where there is big landed property, and where, in connection with that, these big estates are being operated with one master and many labourers. This state of affairs, however, is still as a whole predominant in Germany, and therefore, next to England, the decision was *most timely precisely for Germany*. The agricultural proletariat, the farm labourers—that is the class from which the bulk of the armies of the princes is recruited. It is the class which, thanks to universal suffrage, sends into parliament the great mass of feudal lords and *Junkers*; but it is also the class nearest to the industrial workers of the towns, which shares their living conditions, which is steeped even still deeper in misery than they. To galvanize into life and to draw into the movement this class, impotent because split and scattered, but whose latent power is so well known to the government and nobility that they purposely allow the schools to fall into decay in order that it should remain ignorant, this is the immediate, most urgent task of the German workers' movement. From the day when the mass

of the agricultural labourers has learnt to understand its own interests, a reactionary, feudal, bureaucratic or bourgeois government will be impossible in Germany.

* * *

The preceding lines were written over four years ago. They are still valid today. What was true after Sadowa and the partition of Germany is being confirmed also after Sedan and the establishment of the Holy German Empire of the Prussian nation. So little can "world-shaking" grand performances of state in the realm of so-called high politics change the direction of the historical movement.

What, on the other hand, these grand performances of state are able to do is to accelerate this movement. And in this respect, the authors of the above-mentioned "world-shaking events" have had involuntary successes, which they themselves surely find most undesirable, but which, however, for better or for worse, they have to take into the bargain.

Already the War of 1866 shook the old Prussia to its foundations. After 1848 it had required much effort to bring the rebellious industrial element of the Western provinces, bourgeois as well as proletarian, under the old discipline again; still, this had been accomplished, and the interests of the *Junkers* of the Eastern provinces again became, next to those of the army, the dominant interests in the state. In 1866 almost all North-west Germany became Prussian. Apart from the irreparable moral injury suffered by the Prussian crown by the grace of God owing to its having swallowed three other crowns by the grace of God, the centre of gravity of the monarchy now shifted considerably westward. The five million Rhinelanders and Westphalians were reinforced, first, by the four million Germans annexed directly, and then by the six millions annexed indirectly, through the North German Alliance. And in 1870 there were further added the eight million South-west Germans, so that in the "New Reich," the fourteen and a half million old Prussians (from the six East Elbian provinces, including, besides, two million Poles) were confronted by some twenty-five millions who had long outgrown the old Prussian *Junker*-feudalism. In this way the very victories of the Prussian army shifted the entire basis of the Prussian state structure; the *Junker* domination became ever more intol-

erable even for the government. At the same time, however, the extremely rapid industrial development caused the struggle between bourgeois and workers to supersede the struggle between *junkers* and bourgeois, so that internally also the social foundations of the old state suffered a complete transformation. The basic precondition for the monarchy, which had been slowly rotting since 1840, was the struggle between nobility and bourgeoisie, in which the monarchy held the balance. From the moment when it was no longer a question of protecting the nobility against the onrush of the bourgeoisie, but of protecting all propertied classes against the onrush of the working class, the old, absolute monarchy had to go over completely to the form of state expressly devised for this purpose: *the Bonapartist monarchy*. This transition of Prussia to Bonapartism I have already discussed elsewhere (*The Housing Question*, Part 2, pp. 26 *et seq.*).¹ What I did not have to stress there, but what is very essential here, is that this transition was the *greatest progress* made by Prussia since 1848, so much had Prussia lagged behind in point of modern development. It was, to be sure, still a semi-feudal state, whereas Bonapartism is, at any rate, a modern form of state which presupposes the abolition of feudalism. Hence Prussia has to decide to get rid of its numerous remnants of feudalism, to sacrifice *Junkerdom* as such. This naturally is being done in the mildest possible form and to the favourite tune of: *Immer langsam voran!*² Thus, for example, the notorious District Ordinance. It abolishes the feudal privileges of the individual *Junker* on his estate, but only to restore them as privileges of the totality of the big landowners in relation to the entire district. The substance remains, being only translated from the feudal into the bourgeois dialect. The old Prussian *Junker* is being compulsorily transformed into something akin to an English squire, and he need not have offered so much resistance because the one is as stupid as the other.

Thus it has been the peculiar fate of Prussia to complete its bourgeois revolution—begun in 1808 to 1813 and advanced further to some extent in 1848—in the pleasant form of Bonapartism at the end of this century. And if all goes well, and the world remains nice and quiet, and we all become old enough, we may

¹ See pp. 604-05 of this volume.—*Ed.*

² Always slowly forward!—*Ed.*

live to see—perhaps in 1900—that the government of Prussia has actually abolished all feudal institutions, that Prussia has finally arrived at the point where France stood in 1792.

The abolition of feudalism, expressed positively, means the establishment of bourgeois conditions. As the privileges of the nobility fall, legislation becomes more and more bourgeois. And here we come to the crux of the relation of the German bourgeoisie to the government. We have seen that the government is *compelled* to introduce these slow and petty reforms. As against the bourgeoisie, however, it portrays each of these small concessions as a *sacrifice* made to the bourgeois, as a concession wrung from the crown with the greatest difficulty, and for which the bourgeois ought in return to concede something to the government. And the bourgeois, though the true state of affairs is fairly clear to them, allow themselves to be fooled. This is the origin of the tacit agreement which is the mute basis of all Reichstag and Chamber debates in Berlin: on the one hand, the government reforms the laws at a snail's pace in the interest of the bourgeoisie, removes the feudal obstacles to industry as well as those which arose from the multiplicity of small states, establishes uniform coinage, weights and measures, freedom of occupation, etc., puts Germany's labour power at the unrestricted disposal of capital by granting freedom of movement, and favours trade and swindling. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie leaves all actual political power in the hands of the government, votes taxes, loans and soldiers, and helps to frame all new reform laws in such a way that the old police power over undesirable characters remains in full force and effect. The bourgeoisie buys its gradual social emancipation at the price of immediate renunciation of its own political power. Naturally, the chief motive which makes such an agreement acceptable to the bourgeoisie is not fear of the government but fear of the proletariat.

However miserable a figure our bourgeoisie may cut in the political field, it cannot be denied that as far as industry and commerce are concerned, it is at last doing its duty. The impetuous growth of industry and commerce referred to in the introduction to the second edition has since then developed with still greater vigour. What has taken place in this respect since 1869 in the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial region is quite unprecedented for Germany, and recalls the upsurge in the English manufacturing districts at the beginning of this century. The same

thing no doubt holds good for Saxony and Upper Silesia, Berlin, Hanover and the sea cities. At last we have world trade, a really big industry, a really modern bourgeoisie. But in return we have also had a real crash, and have likewise got a real, powerful proletariat.

For the future historian, the roar of battle at Spichern, Mars-la-Tour and Sedan, and everything connected therewith, will be of much less importance in the history of Germany from 1869-74 than the unpretentious, quiet but constantly progressing development of the German proletariat. As early as 1870, the German workers were subjected to a severe test: the Bonapartist war provocation and its natural effect: the general national enthusiasm in Germany. The German socialist workers did not allow themselves to become confused for a single moment. Not a trace of national chauvinism showed among them. In the midst of the wildest intoxication of victory they remained cool, demanding "an equitable peace with the French republic and no annexations," and not even martial law was able to silence them. No battle glory, no talk of German "imperial magnificence" produced any effect on them; their sole aim remained the liberation of the entire European proletariat. We may say with assurance that in no other country have the workers hitherto been put to so hard a test and have acquitted themselves so splendidly.

Martial law during the war was followed by the trials for treason, for *lèse majesté* and for insulting officials, and the ever-increasing police chicanery of peace-time. The *Volksstaat* had usually three or four editors in prison at the same time and the other papers in proportion. Every party speaker at all well known had to stand trial at least once a year and was almost always convicted. Deportations, confiscations, and the breaking-up of meetings followed one another, thick as hail. All in vain. The place of every person arrested or deported was immediately filled by another; for every broken-up meeting two new ones were called, and thus the arbitrary power of the police was worn down in one place after the other by endurance and strict conformity to the law. All this persecution had the opposite effect to that intended. Far from breaking the workers' party or even bending it, it only brought ever new recruits to it and consolidated the organization. In their struggle with the authorities and also individual bourgeois, the workers showed themselves superior, intellectually and morally, and proved, particularly in

their conflicts with the so-called "providers of work," the employers, that they, the workers, were now the educated class and the capitalists the ignoramuses. And they conduct the fight for the most part with a sense of humour, which is the best proof of how sure they are of their cause and how conscious of their superiority. A struggle thus conducted, on historically prepared soil, must yield great results. The successes of the January elections stand out unique in the history of the modern workers' movement and the astonishment aroused by them throughout Europe was fully justified.

The German workers have two important advantages over those of the rest of Europe. First, they belong to the most theoretical people of Europe; and they have retained that sense of theory which the so-called "educated" classes of Germany have almost completely lost. Without German philosophy, which preceded it, particularly that of Hegel, German scientific socialism—the only scientific socialism that has ever existed—would never have come into being. Without a sense of theory among the workers, this scientific socialism would never have entered their flesh and blood as much as is the case. What an immeasurable advantage this is may be seen, on the one hand, from the indifference towards all theory which is one of the main reasons why the English working-class movement crawls along so slowly in spite of the splendid organization of the individual unions; on the other hand, from the mischief and confusion wrought by Proudhonism, in its original form, among the French and Belgians, and, in the form further caricatured by Bakunin, among the Spaniards and Italians.

The second advantage is that, chronologically speaking, the Germans were about the last to come into the workers' movement. Just as German theoretical socialism will never forget that it rests on the shoulders of Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen—three men who, in spite of all their fantastic notions and all their utopianism, have their place among the most eminent thinkers of all times, and whose genius anticipated innumerable things the correctness of which is now being scientifically proved by us—so the practical workers' movement in Germany ought never to forget that it has developed on the shoulders of the English and French movements, that it was able simply to utilize their dearly-bought experience, and could now avoid their mistakes, which in their time were mostly unavoidable. Without the prec-

edent of the English trade unions and French workers' political struggles, without the gigantic impulse given especially by the Paris Commune, where would we be now?

It must be said to the credit of the German workers that they have exploited the advantages of their situation with rare understanding. For the first time since a workers' movement has existed, the struggle is being conducted pursuant to its three sides—the theoretical, the political and the practical-economic (resistance to the capitalists)—in harmony and in its interconnections, and in a systematic way. It is precisely in this, as it were, concentric attack that the strength and invincibility of the German movement lies.

Due to this advantageous situation, on the one hand, and to the insular peculiarities of the English and the forcible suppression of the French movement, on the other, the German workers have for the moment been placed in the vanguard of the proletarian struggle. How long events will allow them to occupy this post of honour cannot be foretold. But let us hope that as long as they occupy it they will fill it fittingly. This demands redoubled efforts in every field of struggle and agitation. In particular, it will be the duty of the leaders to gain an ever clearer insight into all theoretical questions, to free themselves more and more from the influence of traditional phrases inherited from the old world outlook, and constantly to keep in mind that socialism, since it has become a science, demands that it be pursued as a science, that is, that it be studied. The task will be to spread with increased zeal among the masses of the workers the ever more clarified understanding thus acquired, to knit together ever more firmly the organization both of the party and of the trade unions. Even if the votes cast for the Socialists in January already make quite a decent army, they are still far from constituting the majority of the working class; and encouraging as are the successes of the propaganda among the rural population, infinitely more still remains to be done precisely in this field. Hence, we must make it a point not to slacken in the struggle, to wrest from the enemy one town, one constituency after the other; the main point, however, is to safeguard the true international spirit, which allows no patriotic chauvinism to arise, and which joyfully welcomes each new advance of the proletarian movement, no matter from which nation it comes. If the German workers progress in this way, they will not be march-

ing exactly at the head of the movement—it is not at all in the interest of this movement that the workers of any particular country should march at its head—but they will occupy an honourable place in the battle line; and they will stand armed for battle when either unexpectedly grave trials or momentous events demand of them increased courage, increased determination and energy.

Frederick Engels

London, July 1, 1874

Written by Engels: Part I in 1870;
Part II, July 1, 1874

Published in the second and third
editions of *The Peasant War in
Germany*,

Leipzig 1870 and 1875

Printed according to the text of the
third edition

Translated from the German

I N D E X E S

NAME INDEX

A

- Affre* (1793-1848): Archbishop of Paris; attempted to conciliate the soldiers and the barricade fighters during the June battles; killed at one of the barricades by a bullet fired by government troops—539.
- Ailly, Pierre* (1350-1420): French cardinal—341.
- Albert*—See Martin, Alexandre.
- Alexander II* (1818-1881): Tsar of Russia (1855-1881)—495.
- Alexander of Macedon* (the Great) (356-323 B.C.)—85, 240, 297.
- Aurette de Paladines, Louis* (1804-1877): French general, monarchist—509, 511.
- Aurang-Zebe* (*Aurangzeb*) (1619-1707): Emperor of India (1658-1707), of Great Mogul dynasty—345.

B

- Babeuf, François-Noel* (Gracchus) (1760-1797): French revolutionary, utopian Communist; organizer of "Conspiracy of Equals," upon discovery of which he was executed—61.
- Bailly, Jean-Sylvain* (1736-1793): political personage during French Bourgeois Revolution; Girondist—249.
- Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich* (1814-1876)—22, 31, 548, 611, 651.
- Balzac, Honoré de* (1799-1850)—344.
- Baraguey d'Hilliers, Achille* (1795-1878): French general, deputy to Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (1848-1851); Bonapartist—203, 305, 317.
- Barbès, Armand* (1809-1870): French revolutionary; petty-bourgeois democrat—182, 225, 359.
- Baroche, Pierre-Jules* (1802-1870): French political figure; during July monarchy belonged to moderate liberal monarchist opposition, then became Bonapartist—225, 290, 301, 306, 310.
- Barrot, Odilon* (1791-1873): leader of monarchist opposition under Louis Philippe; headed first ministry during Louis Bonaparte's presidency—136, 144, 166, 176-184, 188, 196, 197, 203, 206, 208, 266-267, 270, 316, 324.
- Barton, John*: English bourgeois economist; wrote at end of eighteenth century—445.
- Bastiat, Frédéric* (1801-1850): French vulgar economist—140, 395.
- Bastide, Jules* (1800-1879): French politician and publicist; participant in Revolution of 1830, one of editors of *National*, Foreign Minister (1848)—169.
- Baze, Jean* (1800-1881): French lawyer and politician; Orleanist—315, 328.
- Beaumarchais, Pierre-Augustin* (1732-1799)—183.
- Bebel, August* (1840-1913)—129.
- Bedeau, Marie-Alphonse* (1804-1863): French general and politi-

- cian, War Minister of Provisional Government (1848), Vice-President of Constituent Assembly—271, 306.
- Benois d'Azy, Denis* (1796-1880): French financier and political figure; monarchist—310, 314.
- Berry, Duchess of* (1798-1870): widow of second son of Charles X, mother of Count of Chambord, Legitimist pretender to French throne—503.
- Berruyer, Pierre-Antoine* (1790-1868): well-known French lawyer and political figure; Legitimist—207, 274, 290, 307, 314, 316, 318, 321.
- Beslay, Charles* (1795-1878): French engineer, prominent member of Paris Commune, Right Proudhonist—506.
- Billault, Auguste-Adolphe* (1805-1863): French lawyer and politician, member of Constituent Assembly (1848-1849), Minister of Interior under Second Empire—310.
- Bismarck, Otto* (1815-1898)—123, 126, 129, 136, 137, 473, 476, 488, 495, 501, 502, 505, 508, 522, 528, 530, 534, 540, 544, 592, 601, 605.
- Blanc, Louis* (1811-1882): French petty-bourgeois Socialist—64, 145, 147, 151, 156-159, 166, 179, 192, 224, 247.
- Blanqui, Louis-Auguste* (1805-1881): French revolutionary, utopian Communist—157, 158, 182, 223, 224, 225, 254, 359, 480, 508, 512, 539.
- Block, Maurice* (1816-1901): French bourgeois economist and statistician—453.
- Boguslawski, Albert* (1834-1905): Prussian general and military writer—135, 136.
- Boisguillebert, Pierre* (1646-1714): French economist, predecessor of physiocrats—213.
- Bonaparte*—See Napoleon III.
- Bourbons*: French royal dynasty reigning in France from end of 16th century till 1792, and during Restoration (1814-1830)—189, 207, 264, 272, 311, 312, 315, 334.
- Brandenburg, Friedrich Wilhelm* (1792-1850): Prussian general and reactionary statesman; headed cabinet since November 1848—66.
- Bréa, Jean-Baptiste-Fidèle* (1790-1848): French reactionary general; killed during the June insurrection of the Paris proletariat—192.
- Bright, John* (1811-1889): English Liberal, advocate of Free Trade; together with Cobden headed Anti-Corn-Law league—211, 643.
- Brissot, Jean Pierre* (1754-1793): political figure during period of French Bourgeois Revolution; leader of Girondists—392.
- Brogie, Achille-Charles* (1785-1870): French politician, Orleanist—290, 316.
- Brunel, Antoine-Magloire* (1830-1871): member of Paris Commune, Blanquist, member of Central Committee of National Guard—543.
- Brutus, Marcus Junius* (85-42 B. C.): Roman republican, headed conspiracy against Caesar—248.
- Büchner, Ludwig* (1824-1899): German physician, popularizer of natural science; in philosophy vulgar materialist—372.

C

- Cabet, Etienne* (1788-1856): French utopian Communist, author of *Travels in Icaria*—32, 63, 157, 158, 394, 544.
- Caesar, Gaius Julius* (c. 100-44 B. C.)—248.
- Caligula, Gaius* (12-41 A. D.): Roman emperor (37-41)—267.
- Calonne, Charles-Alexandre* (1734-1802): Finance Minister of Louis XVI (1783-1787)—530.

- Campbell, George* (1824-1892): British official in India, Member of Parliament, Liberal—356.
- Camphausen, Ludolf* (1803-1890): one of leaders of Rhenish liberal bourgeoisie; headed Prussian Council of Ministers after March Revolution (1848)—67.
- Capefigue, Jean-Baptiste* (1802-1872): French publicist and historian of monarchist tendencies—235.
- Carlier, Pierre* (1799-1858): Prefect of Paris police during presidency of Louis Bonaparte—219, 285, 298, 303, 325.
- Carnot, Lazare-Hippolyte* (1801-1888): French political figure, Minister of Education in Provisional Government (1848), member of Legislative Assembly; resolute opponent of *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851—224, 225.
- Caussidière, Marc* (1808-1861): French petty-bourgeois Socialist, participated in Lyons uprising (1834), Prefect of Paris police under Provisional Government (1848)—151, 166, 192, 247.
- Cavaignac, Louis-Eugène* (1802-1857): French general, put down the June uprising of the Paris proletariat (1848)—161, 162, 165, 169, 170, 171-176, 179, 181, 185, 186, 193, 199, 258, 262-264, 271, 308, 320, 328, 539.
- Chambord, Henry-Charles, Count of* (1820-1883): grandson of Charles X, Legitimist pretender to French throne under name of Henry V—205, 237-238, 274, 294, 313, 314, 318.
- Changarnier, Nicolas-Anne-Théodore* (1793-1877): French general, Orleanist; took part in quelling June uprising in Paris (1848)—177, 183, 194, 200, 204, 236, 240-241, 267, 268, 270, 276, 281, 297, 298, 301, 304-308, 311, 316, 319, 324, 327, 328, 513.
- Chapman, John* (1801-1854): English publicist and manufacturer—355.
- Charles X* (1757-1836): King of France (1824-1830)—225.
- Charles-Albert* (1798-1849): King of Piedmont (1831-1849)—187.
- Charras, Jean-Baptiste-Adolphe* (1810-1865): French colonel and military writer, moderate republican, anti-Bonapartist—244, 328.
- Cherbuliez, Antoine-Elisée* (1797-1869): Swiss economist, petty-bourgeois critic of capitalism—445.
- Clive, Robert* (1725-1774): one of conquerors of East India, British Governor of Bengal (1765-1767)—357.
- Cobden, Richard* (1804-1865): English bourgeois economist, Liberal, Free Trader, founder of Anti-Corn-Law league—211.
- Coetlogon, Louis-Charles* (1814-1886): French official, Prefect—513.
- Constant, Benjamin* (1767-1830): French writer and liberal publicist—248.
- Constantine I* (the Great) *Gaius Flavius Valerius* (c. 274-337): Roman emperor (306-337)—138.
- Corbon, Claude Anthime* (1808-1891): French compositor, later editor; after September 4, 1870, Mayor of Paris arrondissement; member of National Assembly (1871)—500.
- Cousin, Victor* (1792-1867): French liberal publicist, Minister of Public Education (1840)—248.
- Crémieux, Adolphe* (1796-1880): French lawyer and liberal politician, Minister of Justice (1848) in Provisional Government—145, 186.
- Creton, Nicolas* (1798-1864): French lawyer, member of Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (1848-1851); Orleanist—213, 313.

Cromwell, Oliver (1599-1658)—248, 328.

Cubières, Amédée-Louis (1786-1853): French general, participator in Napoleon's wars, Minister of War (1839-1840)—212.

D

Dante, Alighieri (1265-1321)—452.

Danton, Georges-Jacques (1759-1794)—248.

Darboy, Georges (1813-1871): Archbishop of Paris, executed by Communards—539.

Darwin, Charles Robert (1809-1882)—25.

Deflotte, Paul (Flotte, Paul, de) (1817-1860): disciple of Fourier, participant in movement of May 15 and insurrection of June 1848 in Paris; member of Legislative Assembly (1851)—224, 225, 289.

Demosthenes (c. 384-322 B. C.): ancient Greek orator—207.

Desmoulins, Camille (1760-1794): political personage during French Bourgeois Revolution, journalist: Right Jacobin—247.

Diocletian, Gaius Aurelius Valerius (c. 245-c. 313 A. D.): Roman emperor (284-305)—137.

Douay, Félix (1816-1879): French general; taken prisoner together with Napoleon III at Sedan in Franco-Prussian War—535.

Duchâtel, Charles (1803-1867): French political statesman, Orleanist, Minister of Interior before Revolution of 1848—315.

Duclerc, Charles-Théodore-Eugène (1812-1888): French journalist and politician, member of *National's* editorial board (1840-1846), Finance Minister from May to June 1848, subsequently director of *Crédit Mobilier* bank—185.

Ducpétiaux, Edouard (1804-1868): Belgian publicist, bourgeois economist, Inspector general of Belgian

prisons and charitable institutions—578.

Dufaure, Armand-Jules (1798-1881): French lawyer, minister under Louis Philippe and Second Republic, Minister of Justice in Thiers government (1871)—171, 175, 212, 508, 514, 531, 532.

Dunoyer, Charles (1786-1862): French economist, bourgeois liberal—394.

Dupin, André-Marie (1783-1865): French lawyer, Orleanist; after the February Revolution of 1848, President of Legislative Assembly—233, 297, 301, 302.

Dupont de l' Eure, Jacques-Charles (1767-1855): French political figure, one of leaders of banquet campaign before Revolution of 1848, and President of Provisional Government—145.

Duprat, Pierre-Pascal (1815-1885): Member of Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (1848-1851), proponent of resolution to invest Cavaignac with dictatorial authority on June 24, 1848; rabid opponent of Louis Bonaparte—303.

Duval, Emile (1841-1871): French worker, member of First International, a general of Paris Commune; shot by Versaillists during sortie on April 3-4—514.

E

Engels, Frederick (1820-1895)—22, 24, 25, 32, 78, 246, 364, 556, 616, 618-621, 625, 627.

Espartero, Baldomero (1793-1879): Spanish general, leader of Liberal Party, Regent of Spain (1840-1843) and Premier (1854-1856)—503.

Eudes, Emile (1843-1888): Blanquist, member of Paris Commune; until April 4 military delegate of Commune—479.

F

- Falloux, Frederic-Pierre* (1811-1886): French writer and politician, Legitimist and Clerical, initiated dissolution of National *ateliers* (1848), inspired sanguinary butchery of June insurgents—177, 186, 197, 207, 270, 283, 284, 316, 318.
- Faucher, Julius* (1820-1878): German vulgar economist, Free Trader; 1861 became member Prussian Chamber of Deputies; Progressive—579.
- Faucher, Léon* (1804-1854): French publicist, moderate republican, Minister of Interior during Louis Bonaparte's presidency—140, 177, 182, 185, 291, 310, 315.
- Faure, Jules* (1809-1880): French politician, bourgeois republican, member Government of National Defence (1870), took part in bloody suppression of Paris Commune—500-502, 507, 508, 512, 528, 534, 544-545.
- Ferdinand II* (1810-1859): King of the Two Sicilies; was given sobriquet "King Bomba" for suppressing revolution in Palermo and Messina by bombardment (1848)—462.
- Ferrier, François* (1777-1861): French economist and political figure—367.
- Ferry, Jules* (1832-1893): French lawyer and politician; one of hangmen of Paris Commune; Premier (1880-1881 and 1883-1885); organized several military colonial expeditions—502.
- Feuerbach, Ludwig* (1804-1872)—340, 371.
- Flocon, Ferdinand* (1800-1866): French petty-bourgeois publicist and politician—144.
- Flourens, Gustave* (1838-1871): French Blanquist revolutionary, member Military Commission of

- Paris Commune; killed in sortie of Commune troops on April 3, 1871—508, 512, 514.
- Fouché, Joseph* (1759-1820): Chief of Police under Napoleon I—219.
- Fould, Achille* (1800-1867): French banker, Orleanist, later Bonapartist, member Constituent Assembly (1848-1849), participant in *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851—154, 168, 180, 208-209, 212, 213, 285, 306, 310, 318.
- Fouquier-Tinville, Antoine-Quentin* (1746-1795): public prosecutor of Revolutionary Tribunal during French Bourgeois Revolution—188.
- Fourier, Charles* (1772-1837)—61, 63, 340, 462, 588, 651.
- Franklin, Benjamin* (1706-1790)—418.
- Frederick II* (the Great) (1712-1786): King of Prussia (1740-1786)—134, 545.

G

- Galliffet, Gaston* (1830-1909): French general, who drowned Paris Commune in blood—514, 515, 542-543.
- Gambetta, Léon* (1838-1882): French political figure; belonged to moderate wing of republican party; member of Government of National Defence (1870)—500.
- Ganesco, Grégory* (1830-1877): French publicist, native of Rumania—526.
- Girardin, Emile* (1806-1881): French publicist, editor of a number of big newspapers; bourgeois republican, later Bonapartist—233, 303.
- Giraud, Charles* (1802-1881): French jurist and political personage, Minister of Public Education (1851)—326.
- Gladstone, William Ewart* (1809-1898)—379.
- Goethe, Johann-Wolfgang* (1749-1832)—351, 628.

- Gorchakov, Alexander Mikhailovich* (1798-1883): Russian diplomatist and statesman, Foreign Minister (1856-1882)—495.
- Goudchaux, Michel* (1797-1862): French Finance Minister (1848)—166.
- Gracchi* (brothers). *Tiberius* (162-133 B. C.) and *Gaius* (153-121 B. C.): leaders of an agrarian revolutionary movement, reflecting interests of small peasantry in ancient Rome—136, 248.
- Grandin, Victor* (1797-1849): French manufacturer and political figure under Louis Philippe; conservative—140.
- Granier de Cassagnac, Bernard-Adolphe* (1806-1880): French journalist; before Revolution of 1848, an Orleanist; subsequently, active Bonapartist, member of Legislative Corps—234-235, 343.
- Grün, Karl Theodor* (1817-1887): German publicist, one of representatives of so-called "True Socialism"—60, 392.
- Guinard, Auguste-Joseph* (1799-1874): French petty-bourgeois democrat—225.
- Guizot, François-Pierre* (1787-1874): French bourgeois historian and statesman; monarchist—33, 140, 143, 144, 162, 169, 177, 184, 203, 208, 248, 260, 315, 316, 332, 343, 362, 504.
- H
- Hales, John*: English worker, trade unionist, member General Council, First International (1866-1872)—545.
- Hansemann, David-Justus* (1790-1864): one of leaders of Rhenish liberal bourgeoisie in 1848—66, 67, 582.
- Haussez, Charles* (1778-1854): Minister of Navy under Charles X in Polignac cabinet (1829)—225.
- Hausmann, Georges-Eugène* (1809-1891): Prefect of Paris under Second Empire; reconstructed the capital in interests of bourgeoisie—225.
- Hautpoul, Alphonse-Henri* (1789-1865): French general, War Minister during presidency of Louis Bonaparte—207, 218, 223-224, 233, 240, 241, 285, 290, 297-299.
- Haxthausen, August* (1792-1866): Prussian official and writer, travelled in Russia (1843-1844) and described vestiges of Russian communal system in land relations—34.
- Haynau, Julius-Jakob* (1786-1853): Austrian field marshal; cruelly suppressed revolutionary movement in Italy and Hungary (1848-1849)—204.
- Heckeren* (d'Anthès) *Georges-Charles* (1812-1895): French nobleman, murderer of Alexander Pushkin; subsequently became Bonapartist; one of active participants in *coup d'état* of December 1851—513.
- Hegel, Georg-Wilhelm-Friedrich* (1770-1831)—247, 340, 362, 370-372, 456, 612, 651.
- Helvétius, Glaude-Adrien* (1715-1771): eminent French materialist philosopher of the Enlightenment—194, 395.
- Henry V*—See Chambord.
- Henry VI*—(1421-1471): King of England (1422-1471)—313.
- Hervé, Edouard* (1835-1899): French monarchist publicist—536.
- Heydt, August* (1801-1874): Rhenish liberal, Prussian Minister of Commerce (1848); from 1862, Minister of Finance until he entered Bismarck government—66.
- Hobbes, Thomas* (1588-1679)—425.
- Hohenzollern*: dynasty reigning in Brandenburg-Prussia (1415-1918)

and in German Empire (1871-1918)—488, 527.

Hole, James: English publicist, bourgeois philanthropist—578.

Huber, Victor-Aimé (1800-1869): conservative publicist and professor; one of founders of German Christian Socialism—578, 588, 589.

Hugo, Victor (1802-1885)—207, 235, 283.

Huxley, Thomas Henry (1825-1895)—524.

J

Jaubert, François (1798-1874): French scientist and philologist, Minister of Public Works in Thiers cabinet (1840)—541.

Joinville, Prince (1818-1900): third son of Louis Philippe; after Revolution of 1848 emigrated to England—315, 324.

Jones, Richard (1790-1855): English economist—445.

K

Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804)—208, 371, 391, 392.

Khuli-Khan—See Nadir-Shah.

King Bomba—See Ferdinand II.

Köllner, Ernst Matthias (1841-1928): Prussian Conservative, Chief of Police in Frankfort (1887), Minister of Interior (1894-1895)—138.

L

Lacrosse, Bertrand-Theobald-Joseph (1796-1865): French politician, Minister of Public Works during presidency of Louis Bonaparte—198.

Laffitte, Jacques (1767-1844): French banker—139, 503.

La Hitte, Jean-Ernest (1789-1878): French general, Bonapartist, Foreign Minister (1849-1851)—224, 289.

Lamartine, Alphonse (1790-1869): French poet, liberal bourgeois; in 1848, when he practically headed the Provisional Government, he betrayed the interests of the democratic elements—145, 150, 158, 161, 310.

Lamoricière, Christophe-Léon (1806-1865): French general and politician, bourgeois republican; took part in quelling June uprising (1848)—271, 328.

La Rochejaquelein, Henri-Auguste-Georges (1805-1867): French Legitimist monarchist, member of Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (1848-1851); under Napoleon III, Senator—146, 316.

Lassalle, Ferdinand (1825-1864)—30, 129, 448, 621, 622.

Lavoisier, Antoine-Laurent (1743-1794)—471.

Leclerc, François (b. 1800): locksmith, member of Constituent Assembly (1848)—231.

Lecomte, Claude-Martin (1817-1871): French general, took part in nocturnal raid on Montmartre on March 18, 1871; killed by his own men, who had gone over to the side of the people—511, 512, 516, 532, 533, 535.

Ledru-Rollin, Alexandre-Auguste (1807-1874): French bourgeois republican, one of leaders of petty-bourgeois democracy—64, 144, 154, 157, 158, 164, 166, 175, 182, 185-187, 193-196, 200, 212, 225, 232, 271, 276, 279.

Le Flô, Adolphe-Emmanuel-Charles (1804-1887): French general, monarchist, member of Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (1848-1851), War Minister (1870-1871)—268, 328, 512, 515.

- Lemoine, John-Emile* (1815-1892): Correspondent of newspaper *Journal des Debats* in England—235.
- Lermnier, Jean-Louis-Eugène* (1803-1857): French publicist, professor of comparative law at *Collège de France*—184.
- Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim* (1729-1781)—456.
- Liebig, Justus* (1803-1873): German scientist, founder of agricultural chemistry—366.
- Linguet, Simon-Nicolas-Henri* (1736-1794): French publicist—394.
- List, Friedrich* (1789-1846): German bourgeois economist, advocate of protectionism—367.
- Locke, John* (1632-1704)—248.
- Louis Bonaparte*—See Napoleon III.
- Louis Napoleon*—See Napoleon III.
- Louis XIV* (1638-1715): King of France (1643-1715)—213, 335.
- Louis XV* (1710-1774): King of France (1715-1774)—344.
- Louis XVI* (1754-1793): King of France (1774-1792)—479.
- Louis XVIII* (1755-1824): King of France (1814-1824)—248.
- Louis Philippe* (1773-1850): King of France (1830-1848)—140-142, 144, 168, 171, 174, 176, 203, 206, 209-212, 237, 252, 254, 256, 257, 263, 265, 270, 281-283, 294, 314-318, 333, 380, 475, 476, 503, 504, 505, 511, 521, 532.
- Louis Philippe-Albert*, Count of Paris (1838-1894): grandson of Louis Philippe, Orleanist pretender to throne after Louis Philippe's abdication in 1848—237, 313, 314.
- Luther, Martin (1483-1546)—247.
- M**
- MacMahon, Marie-Edme-Patrice Maurice* (1808-1893): French marshal; in 1871 commanded Versailles troops against Commune; President of Republic (1873-1879)—127, 535, 539.
- Magnan, Bernard-Pierre* (1791-1865): French general, Bonapartist, took part in suppressing Lyons uprising (1849)—317, 325, 328.
- Maleville, Léon* (1803-1879): member of Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (1848-1851)—310.
- Matthus, Thomas Robert* (1766-1834)—391, 438.
- Marie Alexandre* (1795-1870): Minister of Public Works of Provisional Government of France in 1848, organizer of so-called national *ateliers*—156.
- Marrast, Armand* (1801-1852): French bourgeois publicist, Right Republican leader, member of Provisional Government (1848)—158, 165, 169, 170, 172, 185, 193, 194, 249, 258, 267.
- Martin, Alexandre (Albert)* (1815-1895): French worker, member of Provisional Government (1848)—145, 147, 159.
- Marx, Eleonor* (Tussie) (1855-1898): Marx's youngest daughter, wife of E. Aveling, prominent figure of British and international labour movement—570.
- Marx, Karl* (1818-1883)—22, 24, 30-32, 70-72, 75, 118-121, 124, 125, 128, 245, 246, 373-375, 397, 452, 453-455, 457, 463, 465-467, 468, 470-472, 473-474, 482, 548, 549, 555, 558, 562, 574, 576, 612, 621, 633, 639, 640.
- Masaniello, Tommaso Aniello* (1623-1647): fisherman, leader of plebeian revolt at Naples in 1647, against Spanish rule—327.
- Mathieu de Drôme, Philippe-Antoine* (1808-1865): member of Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (1848-1851); petty-bourgeois democrat—184.

- Mauguin, François* (1785-1854): French lawyer, member of Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (1848-1851)—300, 301.
- Maupas, Emile* (1818-1888): Bonapartist, active participant in *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851—325
- Maurer, Georg Ludwig* (1790-1872): German historian, investigator of social system of ancient and medieval Germany—34.
- Mendelssohn, Moses* (1729-1786): German petty-bourgeois idealist philosopher—456.
- Menenius, Agrippa* (d. 494 B.C.): Roman patrician—401.
- Metternich, Clemens Wenzel* (1773-1859): reactionary Austrian chancellor, one of organizers of Holy Alliance of European powers—33.
- Millière, Jean-Baptiste* (1817-1871): Left Proudhonist, journalist, participated in Paris Commune; shot by Versaillists on May 26, 1871—501, 545.
- Molé, Louis-Mathieu* (1781-1855): French politician at time of Napoleon I, Restoration and July Monarchy: was minister several times, member of Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (1848-1851)—203, 204, 290, 316.
- Moleschott, Jacob* (1822-1893): physiologist, native of Holland; vulgar materialist—371.
- Moll, Josef* (1812-1849): Cologne watchmaker, member of Communist League; killed in Baden insurrection—107.
- Monk, George* (1608-1669): English general and political figure; fought under Cromwell; after latter's death came out against republic and helped restore Stuart dynasty—183, 297.
- Montalembert, Charles* (1810-1870): French writer and political personage, leader of Catholic party—213, 233, 307, 316, 339.
- Montesquieu, Charles* (1689-1755)—521.
- Morgan, Lewis Henry* (1818-1881): American scientist, ethnographer and historian of primitive society—34.
- Morny, Charles-Auguste* (1811-1865): half-brother (maternal) of Louis Bonaparte; Bonapartist, actively participated in *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851—343.
- Morton, John* (1781-1864): English agronomist—407.
- Mülberger, Arthur* (1847-1907): German physician, Proudhonist—547, 559-562, 567, 571, 574-575, 610-621, 623-626, 627-633.
- Münzer, Thomas* (c. 1490-1525): German plebeian revolutionary, chief leader of peasant uprising of 1524-25 in Germany, propagator of equalitarian utopian communism—369.

N

- Nadir Shahi* (Khuli-Khan) (1688-1747): Shah of Persia; undertook campaign of conquest in India (1738-1739)—345.
- Napoleon I* (1769-1821)—141, 174, 175, 177, 178, 213, 218, 219, 239, 244, 248, 249, 296, 328, 332-335, 337-340, 342, 344, 397, 478, 483, 490, 494, 505, 526, 580.
- Napoleon III* (Louis Bonaparte) (1808-1873); Emperor of the French (1852-1870)—121, 126, 127, 168, 173-181, 183, 186-188, 191, 192, 195-197, 204-208, 212-215, 219, 220, 223-227, 235-241, 244, 247-249, 257, 263-268, 270, 274-276, 280-286, 289-291, 293-312, 315-321, 324-331, 333-344, 396, 397, 473, 476, 486, 488, 491, 492, 495-497, 499, 502, 505-507, 510-512, 517, 521, 524-527, 529, 532, 533, 570, 591, 594, 602, 605, 643.

Nero, Claudius (37-68 A. D.): Roman emperor (54-68)—380.

Neumayer, Maximilien-Georges-Joseph (1789-1866): French general—241, 298.

Newman, Francis William (1805-1897): English scientist and liberal publicist—406.

Newmarch, William (1820-1882): English economist and statistician—406.

Ney, Edgar (1812-1882): son of M. Ney, marshal of Napoleon I, adjutant of President Louis Bonaparte—206, 283.

Nicholas II. (1868-1918); Tsar of Russia (1894-1917)—135.

O

Orleans: French royal dynasty (1830-1848)—189, 208, 264, 272, 311, 314, 316, 334, 342, 343, 527.

Orleans, Duke of—See Louis Philippe.

Oudinot, Nicolas-Charles-Victor (1791-1863): French general, Orleanist; in 1849 commanded troops dispatched against republic of Rome—188, 196, 267, 280, 283.

Owen, Robert (1771-1858)—61, 63, 383, 406, 462, 588, 589, 651.

P

Pagnerre, Laurent-Antoine (1805-1854): French publisher, member of Constituent Assembly (1848-1849), bourgeois republican—185.

Palmerston, Henry John (1784-1865)—384.

Paris, Count of—See Louis-Philippe-Albert.

Passy, Hippolyte-Philibert (1793-1880): Finance Minister (1848-1849)—206, 212.

Pecqueur, Constantin (1801-1887): French utopian Socialist—459.

Pène, Henri (1830-1888): French journalist; at first Legitimist, then Bonapartist; founded newspapers *Gaulois* and *Paris Journal*—513.

Pereire, Isaac (1806-1880): French banker; together with his brother Emile founded *Crédit Mobilier* (1852)—604.

Persigny, Jean-Gilbert-Victor (1808-1872): French diplomatist, Bonapartist, active participant in *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851—311, 324.

Peter I (the Great) (1672-1725)—396.

Picard, Arthur (b. 1825): French political figure and journalist, member of Chamber of Deputies since 1876—502.

Picard, Ernest (1821-1877): Finance Minister in Government of National Defence, Minister of Interior in Thiers government—502, 508, 514, 541.

Pietri (1820-1902): active participant in *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851, Prefect of police under Second Empire—488, 531.

Plato (c. 427-c. 347 B. C.)—171.

Polignac, Jules-Auguste (1780-1847): French statesman, extreme Legitimist, Prime Minister under Charles X—316.

Pouyer-Quertier, August-Thomas (1820-1891): manufacturer from Rouen, Bonapartist, Finance Minister in Thiers government (1871)—508, 534.

Priestley, Joseph (1733-1804): English naturalist and materialist philosopher—470, 471.

Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph (1809-1865)—60, 229-230, 243, 364, 340-397, 481, 482, 548-550, 557, 559-562, 564, 565, 568-570, 571, 572, 574, 575, 576, 581, 583, 610-615, 618-622, 624, 626, 627, 629, 630-633.

R

- Raffles, Thomas Stamford** (1781-1826): British colonial figure, Governor of Java and Sumatra, author of 2-volume *History of Java*—346.
- Ramsay, George** (1800-1871): English economist—445.
- Raspail, François-Vincent** (1794-1878): French physician and naturalist, publicist, Left republican; took part in Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, subsequently Left radical—145, 157, 168, 175, 182, 359.
- Rateau, Jean-Pierre** (1800-1887): member Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (1848-1851), Bonapartist—180, 184, 266.
- Rau, Karl** (1792-1870): German vulgar economist—367.
- Raumer, Friedrich** (1781-1873): German bourgeois historian, member Frankfort Assembly (1848-1849)—396.
- Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angely** (1794-1870): French general, War Minister in 1851—306.
- Rémusat François-Marie-Charles** (1797-1875): French political leader and writer; Orleanist—307.
- Reschauer, Heinrich** (b. 1838): Austrian journalist, editor radical newspaper *Volksstimme* in Graz—625.
- Ricardo, David** (1772-1823)—72, 75, 393, 416, 445, 472.
- Richard III** (1452-1485): King of England (1483-1485)—313.
- Riehl, Wilhelm-Heinrich** (1823-1897): German reactionary publicist—367.
- Roberts, Henry** (d. 1876): English architect, philanthropist; studied housing conditions of working class in Britain, Belgium and Italy—578.
- Robespierre, Maximilien** (1758-1794)—170, 248, 405.

- Rodbertus, Johann-Karl** (Jagetzow) (1805-1875): Prussian landlord, economist, theoretician of Prussian-junker "state socialism"—470, 472.
- Roscoe, Henry Enfield** (1833-1915): English chemist; co-author, with K. Schorlemmer, of 9-volume textbook on chemistry—470.
- Rose, George** (1744-1818): British Conservative, Finance Minister (1782-1783 and 1784-1801)—443.
- Rössler, Konstantin** (1820-1896): Prussian publicist, supporter of Bismarck—136.
- Rouher, Eugène** (1814-1884): French political personage, Bonapartist—300, 310.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques** (1712-1778)—396-397.
- Royer-Collard, Pierre** (1763-1845): philosopher and political figure, one of leaders of Liberal Party during Restoration—248.

S

- Saint-Arnaud, Armand-Jacques** (1801-1854): French marshal—268.
- Saint-Jean d'Angely, Regnaud**—See Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angely.
- Saint-Just, Louis-Antoine Léon** (1767-1794): prominent leader in French Bourgeois Revolution of end of 18th century, friend and associate of Robespierre—248.
- Saint-Priest, Emmanuel-Louis-Marie** (1789-1887): French general and diplomatist; Legitimist—314.
- Saint-Simon, Henri** (1760-1825)—61, 340, 462, 651.
- Sainte-Beuve, Henri** (1819-1855): French manufacturer and big landowner, member Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (1848-1851)—319.
- Saisset, Jean-Marie Joseph-Théodore** (1810-1879): French vice-admiral, reactionary monarchist—514.

- Sallandrouze, Charles-Jean* (1808-1867): manufacturer, member of Constituent Assembly (1848-1849)—328.
- Saltykov, Alexei Dmitrievich*—See Soltykov, Alexei Dmitrievich.
- Salvandy, Narcisse-Achille* (1795-1856): French publicist; after Revolution of 1830 member Chamber of Deputies; held post Minister of Public Education under Louis Philippe—314.
- Sax, Emil* (1845-1927): Austrian bourgeois economist—547, 578-596, 600-603.
- Say, Jean-Baptiste* (1767-1832): French bourgeois economist—248.
- Scheele, Karl Wilhelm* (1742-1786): Swedish chemist—470, 471.
- Schorlemmer, Karl* (1834-1892): prominent chemist, native of Germany, Communist friend of Marx and Engels; lived and worked in Manchester—470.
- Schramm, Jean-Paul-Adam* (1789-1884): French general, participated in Napoleonic wars—298.
- Schulze-Delitzsch, Franz Hermann* (1808-1883): German bourgeois economist, progressive; attempted to direct German working-class movement into channel of handicraftsmen's producers' co-operatives—448, 626.
- Schweitzer, Johann Baptist* (1833-1875): German journalist, editor-in-chief of the Lassallean newspaper *Social-Demokrat*; from 1867, headed General German Workers' Union—340.
- Sebastiani, Horace-François-Bastien* (1772-1851): French marshal and diplomatist, Foreign Minister under July Monarchy—162.
- Ségur d'Aguesseau, Raymond-Paul* (1803-1889): French political figure—225.
- Senior, Nassau William* (1790-1864): English vulgar economist, apologist of capitalism—382, 406.
- Shakespeare, William* (1564-1616)—296.
- Sieber, Nicolai Ivanovich* (1844-1888): Russian economist, one of first popularizers of Marx's economic teachings in Russia—453.
- Simon, Jules* (1814-1896): French publicist, Minister of Public Education in Government of National Defence—508.
- Sismondi, Jean-Charles Simonde de* (1773-1842): Swiss economist, petty-bourgeois critic of capitalism—57, 244, 445, 459.
- Smith, Adam* (1723-1790)—375, 405, 416, 422.
- Smith, Edward* (c. 1818-1874): English physician, sanitary inspector of Medical Department of Privy Council for investigating feeding of working people (1864)—378.
- Solytkov [Saltykov], Alexei Dmitrievich*, Prince (1806-1859): Russian traveller; author of travel notes in French—356-357.
- Soulouque* (1782-1867); President Negro Republic of Haiti; in 1849 proclaimed himself emperor, assuming the name of Faustin I—177.
- Spinoza, Baruch* (Benedict) (1632-1677)—456.
- Stein, Lorenz* (1815-1890): German jurist and economist, advocate of "social monarchy"; known as author of *Socialism and Communism in Modern France*, published 1842—367.
- Stieber, Wilhelm* (1818-1882): director of Prussian political police, organizer of Cologne Communist trial in 1852; headed Prussian Intelligence Office during War of 1866 and 1870-1871—606.
- Strousberg, Bethel Henry* (1823-1884): big German financier and speculator—604.
- Sue, Eugène* (1804-1857)—220, 231, 234, 291.

- Sulla, Lucius Cornelius* (138-78 B.C.): Roman dictator—506, 536.
Susane, Louis (1810-1876): French general, War Minister beginning February 1871—501.

T

- Tacitus, Publius Cornelius* (c. 55-120 A. D.)—536.
Tamerlane (Timur) (1336-1405): Eastern conqueror, founder of powerful state in Central Asia—351, 515.
Tamisier, François Laurent Alphonse (b. 1809): French colonel and military inventor Left republican, Commander-in-Chief of National Guard—512.
Teste, Jean-Baptiste (1780-1852): French lawyer and politician, Liberal; Minister of Justice under Louis Philippe—212.
Thiers, Louis-Adolphe (1797-1877): French bourgeois historian and political figure, hangman of Paris Commune—127, 203, 206, 208, 220, 233, 235, 268, 274, 276, 280, 290, 307, 315-316, 319, 321, 324, 328, 395, 477, 480, 487, 500, 502-511, 512-516, 517, 519, 525, 526, 528, 529-539, 541.
Thomas, Clément (1809-1871): French general, head of National Guard (1848); killed during Paris Commune by troops that had gone over to side of people—511, 512, 516, 532, 533, 535.
Thorigny, Pierre-François Elizabeth (1798-1869): French lawyer; in 1834 conducted judicial investigation into Lyons uprising; Minister of Interior and Premier during Louis Bonaparte's presidency—325.
Thornton, William Thomas (1813-1880): English bourgeois economist, disciple of John Stuart Mill—443.
Tocqueville, Alexis-Charles (1805-1859): French historian and statesman, Liberal—316.
Tolain, Henri-Louis (1828-1897): French worker, one of founders of French section of First International, Proudhonist; during Paris Commune went over to side of Versaillists; later Senator—515.
Tooke, Thomas (1774-1858): English economist and statistician—406, 423.
Toussaint Louverture (Louverture dit Toussaint), *François Dominique* (1743-1803): leader of revolutionary movement of Haiti Negroes during period of French Revolution of end of 18th century—177.
Trélat, Ulysse (1795-1879): French political figure, vice-president Constituent Assembly (1848-1849), Minister of Public Works—159.
Tremenheere, Hugh Seymour (1804-1893): English official, government commissioner for investigation of working conditions at factories—380.
Trochu, Louis-Jules (1815-1896): French general, head of Government of National Defence (1870), hangman of Paris Commune—499, 500, 506, 510, 512, 538.

U

- Ure, Andrew* (1778-1857): English bourgeois economist—382, 406.
Urquhart, David (1805-1877): British diplomatist and publicist; contended against Palmerston's foreign policy—367.

V

- Vaillant, Eduard* (1840-1915): French engineer and physician, Blanquist, member of General

- Council of First International and of Paris Commune; subsequently leader of French Socialist Party—481.
- Vaisse, Claude* (1799-1864): French political figure, Bonapartist, Minister of Interior—309.
- Valentin, Marie-Edmond* (1823-1879): French general of gendarmes—508, 531.
- Vatimesnil, Antoine* (1789-1860): French statesman of Restoration period—310.
- Vauban, Sebastien* (1633-1707): French marshal, military engineer and publicist—213.
- Vidal, François* (1814-1872): French petty-bourgeois economist, Socialist, follower of Louis Blanc—224, 225, 231, 290.
- Villèle, Joseph* (1773-1854): French political leader during Restoration; extreme monarchist—316.
- Vinoy, Joseph* (1800-1880): French general, commanding Versailles army at time of Paris Commune—509, 510, 512, 514.
- Vivien, Alexandre-François* (1799-1854): French lawyer and politician, Minister of Justice under Louis Philippe—171.
- Vogt, Karl* (1817-1895). German vulgar materialist, rabid enemy of proletarian and communist movement; Bonapartist—371.
- Voltaire, François Marie (Arouet)* (1694-1778)—205, 397, 515.

W

- Wade, Benjamin Franklin* (1800-1878): Vice-President of United States—452.
- Wagner, Adolph* (1835-1917): German bourgeois economist, professorial Socialist, one of founders of reactionary Christian-Social Party—606.
- Weitting, Wilhelm* (1808-1871): German artisan; most pronounced representative of German utopian equalitarian communism; was influenced by Fourier—32.
- Weston, John*: English worker, disciple of Robert Owen, member General Council of First International—398-401, 404-405, 408-410, 412, 413, 414, 415, 445.
- Weydemeyer, Joseph* (1818-1866): German revolutionary, Communist, friend of Marx; in 1851 emigrated to America—243.
- William I* (1797-1888): King of Prussia (1861-1888) and German emperor (1871-1888)—126, 491, 492, 534.
- Wood, Charles, Viscount Halifax* (1800-1885): English statesman, Liberal, Minister for Indian Affairs (1859-1866)—345.

Z

- Zimmermann, Wilhelm* (1807-1878): German petty-bourgeois historian, author of *History of Peasant War in Germany*—639.

SUBJECT INDEX

A

Abstraction—373-374, 449.
Accident (chance). See *Necessity and accident*.
Agrarian question—114-115, 631, 645-646.
Alsace-Lorraine—127, 474, 492-493, 496.
America—23, 64, 255, 404-405, 408, 444, 450, 483-484, 570;—proletariat of—23.
Anarchism—548, 635, 637-638.
Anarchy of production—57, 87, 523.
Ancient society—90, 363;—in ancient Rome—34, 244.
Army—89, 127-128.
Austria—125, 134, 143, 186-188, 640-641.

B

Banks—152, 229-230, 318-319, 409.
Basis and superstructures—272, 363, 368, 623.
Being and consciousness—52, 363, 368-369.
Belgium—80, 134, 548-549, 612.
Blanquism, Blanquists—127, 223, 481-483, 612.
Bonapartism—173-175, 186-187, 191, 264, 294-296, 331-332, 333-337, 339, 341-344, 476, 489, 518, 559, 604-605, 648-649.
Bourgeois democracy—258-259, 485, 520-521.
Bourgeois-democratic parties, proletariat's attitude toward them—64-65, 113-114.

Bourgeoisie—25, 34, 35-44, 45, 55, 60-61, 67-68, 80-81, 92-93, 97-98, 124-125, 147-149, 190, 226-227, 259, 273, 287-288, 355-357, 461, 475-476, 577, 580, 643;
—origin of—34-36, 56;
—role of in abolition of feudalism and development of productive forces of society—147-149;
—and proletariat (their struggle)—See *Proletariat*.
Bourgeois-republican party in France (party of *National*)—145, 150, 159, 161-162, 165, 169, 172-173, 176, 177, 180, 182, 185-186, 189-190, 193-194, 199, 204, 257-258, 268-269.
Bourgeois society—34, 40, 48, 54, 56, 59, 76-77, 87, 90, 98-99, 142, 146, 147, 161, 164, 170, 185, 230-231, 246, 248, 255, 340-341, 361, 364, 366, 369, 373, 386, 449, 451-452, 457, 459, 490, 516-517, 518, 523, 535, 540-542, 567, 570, 573, 580, 581, 619, 626-627, 635.
Bourse—151-152.

C

Capital—45, 47-48, 89-94, 95-96, 97-98, 105, 217, 357, 395, 431-432, 459, 462-463, 467-468, 472, 585;
—as a social relation—90;
—original accumulation of—425, 458-459;
—organic composition of—445-446;
—constant and variable—433, 445, 472;

—accumulation of—101, 405, 467-468, 472, 611;
 —concentration of—3, 57, 101, 222, 420, 611;
 —and wage labour—46-47, 61, 80-81, 83-84, 91-94, 95-96, 97-98, 103, 105, 121, 195, 274, 360, 424-425, 427-428, 432, 442, 443-444, 447, 452, 462, 467, 517, 523, 572, 576, 580, 626.
Capital, by Marx—72, 75, 448-449, 451-452, 453-457, 462-469, 470-472, 548, 555, 558, 562, 574, 633.
Capitalism—34-35, 36-38, 338, 357-358, 364, 368, 446, 462, 468, 558, 578, 579;
 —origin of—35;
 —contradictions of—77-78, 359-360, 364, 368-369, 381, 449-450, 457, 460;
 —inevitability of its doom, and socialism—23, 45, 78, 364, 369, 461, 469.
Cause and effect—341.
Chance. See *Accident*.
Chartism—64, 612.
Child labour—41, 54.
Christianity—52, 56, 137-138.
Civil War in France, by Marx—22, 473-474, 481, 482, 484, 491, 499, 544, 567.
Classes and class struggle—25, 43, 46-47, 79-80, 119, 122, 132, 134, 211, 244, 245-246, 272, 287-288, 292, 334-335, 517, 535, 541;
 —class struggle as motive force in history—24-25, 34, 44-45, 52, 79;
 —origin of modern classes—34-35;
 —antagonistic class contradictions—34-35;
 —struggle of proletariat against bourgeoisie. See *Proletariat*.
 —abolition of classes under socialism 54, 78, 111, 223, 338, 386, 522, 564, 565.
Class Struggle in France, by Marx—118-122, 640.
Cologne Communist trial—30.
Commodity—72, 76-77, 84-85, 86-87, 90-91, 374, 417-418, 448, 472, 616.

Communism, scientific. See *Scientific Socialism*.
Communist League—21, 33, 106-107, 110-111, 113.
Communist Manifesto. See *Manifesto of the Communist Party*.
Communist society—48, 54, 78, 566.
Communists—2, 46-51, 64-65.
Community
 —village—34;
 —Indian village—349-351, 353, 355;
 —German village (mark)—554;
 —Russian village—23.
Competition—39, 42, 43, 56, 84-85, 88, 99-101, 248, 415, 466, 552-553.
Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844, by Engels—25, 364, 563, 590, 592, 607, 631.
Constitution, bourgeois—170-173, 185, 197, 226-227, 258-262.
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, by Marx—70, 72, 361, 368, 370, 375, 395, 448, 454.
Co-operative movement—383.
Cost of production—86-89, 97, 100-102, 211.
Credit—141, 151-154, 167-168, 229, 318, 395, 576.
Crises, capitalist—39-40, 42, 57, 104-105, 120, 144, 228, 230, 321-323, 381, 440-441, 457, 523.

D

Darwinism—25.
Dialectical materialism—373-374.
Dialectics—456;
 —materialist dialectics of Marx—opposite of idealist dialectics of Hegel—373, 455-457;
 —in life of society—38, 39, 43-44, 45, 46-47, 48-49, 359, 363, 368, 425, 454-455, 459-460, 468-469, 564, 565, 643.
Dictatorship of proletariat—46, 51, 53, 54, 162, 222-223, 485, 522, 571, 612, 613.
Division of labour—35, 40, 57, 99, 102, 104, 332, 418, 421, 565, 623.

E

- East*—347, 348, 354.
Economics—24, 79, 119-120, 246, 363, 368, 619, 621;
 See also *Basis and superstructure*.
Economists, bourgeois—60, 72-73, 75, 76, 87, 89, 92, 98, 103, 367, 370, 374-375, 382, 393, 405-406, 414-415, 463, 471-472, 572.
Education—50, 54.
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, by Marx—121, 243-246, 473, 640.
England (Great Britain)—36, 80, 144, 148, 209, 211, 228, 230, 322-323, 346-348, 352-353, 356, 366, 377, 379, 380-383, 395, 404-407, 409-411, 420, 438, 444-445, 449-451, 466-468, 521, 551-552, 554, 563, 568, 577-578, 590, 592-593, 601-602, 604, 643, 646;
 --proletariat of—360, 377-380, 382, 384, 410, 466-467, 490, 497, 563-564, 568;
 --bourgeoisie of—211, 354, 355-356, 592, 604, 642-643;
 --landed aristocracy of—56, 273;
 --colonial policy of—346, 348, 350-351, 352-358, 444;
 --industrial monopoly of—23, 80, 148, 366-367, 380-381, 405;
 --working-class movement in. See *Working-class (labour) movement*.
Exchange—374-376.
Exploitation, capitalist—36, 41, 47, 52, 103, 149, 217, 558, 562-563, 564, 567.
Expropriation
 --of small proprietors—425, 458-459, 461, 556, 563;
 --of expropriators—53, 460-461, 523, 571, 588.
- F
- Family and marriage*
 --under capitalism—36, 50-51.
Female labour—41.
Feudalism—34-35, 39, 90, 363, 458-459.

- Force*, its role in history—54.
Fourierism—31, 63, 64.
France—36, 64, 67, 79, 120, 121, 122, 125, 126-129, 134, 143-146, 148-149, 214-216, 228-231, 244-246, 248, 257, 260, 283-284, 321-323, 332, 333-337, 366, 408, 474-476, 486-488, 493, 495-497, 499, 505, 506-508, 510-511, 521, 540, 548, 551-552, 554-555, 591, 604, 611-612, 643;
 --proletariat of—211, 474-475, 486-488, 497, 509-510;
 --bourgeoisie of—69, 139-143, 195, 209, 211, 272, 274, 284, 312, 336, 507-508, 526, 604, 643;
 --petty bourgeoisie of—211, 524;
 --peasantry of—57, 114, 213-217, 230, 334-340, 497, 525-526;
 --July monarchy in—139-144, 146-147, 151-153, 158, 253, 256-258, 332, 476, 503;
 --Second Empire in—126, 476, 486-489, 491, 495, 505, 507, 518, 524, 526, 591;
 --proclamation of republic on September 4, 1870 and Government of National Defence—477, 491, 496-497, 507-510;
 --working-class movement in. See *Working-class (labour) movement*.
 See also *Revolution of 1848 in France, Paris Commune*.
 "Freedom," bourgeois—48, 259.
Free trade—36, 48, 51, 61, 211.

G

- General law of capitalist accumulation*—467-468.
German Ideology, by Marx and Engels—364.
Germany—56, 57, 59, 60, 65, 66, 80, 109, 110, 115, 125, 128, 129, 137, 366-367, 371, 450, 493-495, 546-547, 549-555, 578, 593, 603-606, 631, 640-644, 646-650;
 --Prussianism, reactionary role of—272, 492, 494-495, 541;
 --unification of—115, 647-648;

—proletariat of—107, 116, 495, 550, 553, 604-605, 641, 643, 650-651;
 —bourgeoisie of—59, 66-69, 107, 492, 604-605, 641-642, 649;
 —peasantry of—551, 554, 646;
 —junkers of—56, 604, 647-648;
 —petty bourgeoisie of—59, 644;
 —working-class (labour) movement
 in. See *Working-class (labour) movement*.
Ground rent—273, 431-433, 465, 567, 574, 616, 629-630.
Guild system—34, 35, 68.

H

Hegelianism—370-372, 456.
Historical materialism—25, 119, 246, 247, 272-273, 363, 368-369, 451, 621, 640.
History—34, 52, 364, 373.
House rent—557, 560, 566-567, 574-575, 585, 616.
Housing question—550, 560, 587-588, 612;
 —under capitalism—546-547, 557, 580-581, 595-596, 603;
 —Proudhonist settlement of—559-563, 567-571, 575, 577, 583, 624-625, 627-628;
 —bourgeois settlement of—555-556, 570, 577-580, 583-603, 606-609;
 —proletarian revolution and settlement of housing question—557, 570-571, 588, 609.
Housing Question, by Engels—547, 550, 648.

I

Ideas—role of in development of society—49, 52-53, 124.
Ideology—363;
 See also *Science, Religion*.
Inaugural Address and Rules of International Working Men's Association—30, 486, 544.
India—345-358.
Industrial revolution—35, 125, 359, 547, 554-555, 564-565.

Industry—22, 35-38, 41-43, 45, 55, 62, 84, 103, 125, 148, 356, 357, 440, 446, 461, 517, 563-565, 611, 630, 631, 635.
Instruments of labour. See *Instruments of production*.
Instruments of production—37, 38, 53, 101, 215, 386, 419-420, 425, 431, 460, 467.
Interest—104, 431-433, 567, 572;
 —rate of—572.
International, First, and its historical significance—31, 32, 127, 387-389, 398, 486-487, 489-490, 498, 541, 544;
 —foundation of—31, 32, 384, 387, 544;
 —General Council of—387-389, 544, 548;
 —Geneva Congress of—32;
 —Basle Congress of—646;
 —struggle against Proudhonism; See *Proudhonism*.
International Working Men's Association. See *International, First*.
Internationalism of working class—46, 125, 384-385, 386-387, 487-488, 489-490, 652-653.
Ireland—79, 377, 551, 554, 645.
Italy—79, 134, 143, 169, 186-188, 263, 345.

J

Joint-stock companies—228.

L

Labour movement. See *Working-class movement*.
Labour power—71, 75-77, 88, 91, 93-94, 424-426, 439, 464, 467-468, 472, 558, 560, 567, 580;
 —value of—75-77, 81, 425-429, 436, 442, 464-465, 567, 579.
Labour (work)—47, 72-73, 82-83, 88, 420-421, 430-431, 434-436, 441, 462, 472, 564-565, 572, 573;
 —social—418-420, 422-423, 460;

—necessary and surplus—428, 431, 438, 464, 465-466;
 —socially necessary—72, 75, 77, 420, 424-425;
 —wage labour—46, 48, 83, 93, 147, 383, 426, 429, 432, 442, 447.
Lassalleanism—30, 31.
Law. See *Right*.
Law of transformation of energy—246.
Legitimacy. See *Regularity*.
Legitimists—55, 146, 162, 164, 177, 183, 189-190, 195, 202-203, 209, 219-220, 238, 264, 270-273, 286, 294, 312, 314, 316, 318, 507.
Lumpenproletariat—44, 143, 155, 253, 295, 341, 645.

M

Machines—35, 41, 42, 57, 95, 97, 99-104, 359, 421, 445, 468, 555-556, 565, 635.
Malthusianism—391, 622.
Manifesto of the Communist Party, by Marx and Engels—21-32, 33, 106, 118, 121, 129, 364, 461, 548, 580, 612, 615.
Manufacture—35.
Market—35, 40, 100, 105, 573;
 —world market—35, 36, 37, 51, 97, 101, 105, 148, 323, 358, 460.
Material conditions of existence—58, 61, 272-273, 363.
Materialism
 —vulgar—371.
Materialist conception of history. See *Historical Materialism*.
Means of production—39, 40, 57, 73, 90, 99, 101, 104, 149, 421, 432, 450, 465;
 —their transformation into public property—52, 121, 171, 523, 548.
Means of subsistence—39, 40, 47, 73, 78, 82, 89, 90, 105, 334, 426, 436-437, 442-443, 464-465, 468.
Middle Ages—35.
Mode of production—37, 100, 363, 459-460;

—capitalist—38, 125, 363, 449, 458-460, 467-468, 558, 563, 567, 579, 581, 588, 601, 609, 630.
Monarchy—36, 158, 227, 482, 522;
 —absolute—36, 332, 516, 604, 605, 648;
 —constitutional—68, 146.
Money and Money circulation—375, 410-412, 472.
Morality, bourgeois—36.

N

National Question—38, 51, 163.
Nationalization
 —of land—53, 114, 630, 646;
 —of banks—53;
 —of transport—53, 116.
Nature
 —and man—89, 96, 99, 358.
Necessaries. See *Means of Subsistence*.
Necessity and Accident—72.
Neue Rheinische Zeitung—70, 118, 162, 174, 364.
Nobility—54-56.

O

Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, by Engels—34.
Orleanists—164, 177, 183, 189-190, 195, 203, 209, 220, 238, 264, 272, 286, 313, 314-315, 496, 507.
Overproduction—39, 57, 323, 440.
Owenism—31, 63, 64, 383, 406.

P

Paris Commune, its historical significance—22, 127-128, 474, 477-485, 501-502, 510-516, 518-529, 530-533, 535-540, 542-543, 548, 611, 612, 638, 652;
 —economic and political measures—478-479, 481-483, 519-520, 523-524, 527, 611-612;

- and peasantry—525;
- clash of trends within—127, 481-482, 611-612;
- a new type of state—479, 484-485, 519-524;
- mistakes and causes of defeat of—127, 481-482, 513-514, 611-612.
- Party of the proletariat*—21, 43, 46, 106-107, 109-110, 113-114, 121, 368, 384, 388, 612.
- Pauperization of proletariat*—45, 57, 377-381, 460, 462-463, 467-468.
- Peasantry*—41, 44, 47, 80, 334, 461, 518, 626;
- small—584, 645;
- agricultural proletariat—115, 646-647;
- and proletariat; See *Proletariat*;
- and proletarian revolution—217, 341, 556.
- Peasant War in Germany*, by Engels—639-640.
- Petty bourgeoisie*—42, 44, 56, 164, 222, 275, 278, 396, 461, 550, 577, 614.
- petty-bourgeois democracy—106, 108-112, 116, 123, 197, 200-201, 275, 278, 291.
- Poland*—64, 79, 125, 143, 384.
- Policy and political struggle of working class*—41-42, 130, 134, 384, 388-389, 443-444, 612, 613-614.
- Political economy*—71-72, 357, 366, 368, 370, 373-374, 391, 451, 471;
- classical—71-75, 393, 415-416, 422-423, 462-463, 471-472.
- Poor Laws*—443.
- Poverty of Philosophy*, by Marx—364, 392-393, 549, 557, 576.
- Price*—71, 81, 84-88, 91, 97, 100-102, 375, 402-404, 408, 410, 413-415, 422-423, 435-437, 442.
- Primitive communism*—34.
- Primitive society*—34.
- Production*—90, 101-102, 104;
- capitalist—73, 101-102, 357-358, 393, 428, 432, 440, 446-447, 450, 460, 469, 431-432, 524, 564;
- and distribution—121.
- Productive forces and relations of production*—37, 39, 40, 49-50, 53, 54, 57, 61, 78, 90, 110, 148, 223, 231, 356, 358, 360, 363-364, 368-369, 381, 391-393, 399, 458-459, 468-469, 581, 619.
- Profit*—86, 95-98, 423-424, 428-429, 431-435, 438, 443, 447, 571-572.
- rate of—403-405, 415, 433-434, 440-441, 443, 447, 572;
- average—431.
- Proletarian revolution*—45, 52-53, 54, 61, 65, 80, 120, 127, 147-148, 149, 151, 163-164, 211, 230-231, 250, 332, 341, 358, 360, 369, 388, 511, 523-524, 548, 557, 558, 564, 570-571, 619, 626, 636.
- Proletariat*—24, 34, 35, 40-46, 50, 51-53, 60, 67, 77, 91, 92, 104, 106, 111, 122, 125, 127, 148-149, 175, 222, 446, 451, 460, 461, 467, 548, 564, 580, 619, 633, 643;
- historical role of—24, 44-45, 338, 360, 461, 469, 524;
- origin of—563;
- condition under capitalism—41-42, 73, 98, 102-103, 380-381, 553-554, 557, 580-581; See also *Pauperization of proletariat*.
- its struggle against bourgeoisie—34-35, 40, 41-45, 46, 54, 62, 65, 79, 121-123, 124-125, 148-149, 162, 185, 194-195, 200, 246, 446, 475, 540-541, 648;
- and petty bourgeoisie—148-149, 163, 644;
- and peasantry—114-115, 134, 148-149, 163, 644-647.
- Property*—65, 272, 391;
- common—47, 114, 461, 646;
- communal—34, 115;
- feudal—47;
- bourgeois—23, 40, 47, 49, 68, 391, 459-460, 523;
- landed—23, 272, 337, 340, 646;
- private—47, 49, 114, 458-461;
- relations of—39, 46, 49-50, 53, 57, 114, 363, 368, 391-392, 451;
- abolition of private property under socialism—47, 48, 110.

Proudhonism, Proudhonists—31, 127, 229-230, 254, 390-391, 392-397, 481-482, 548, 557, 562-565, 563-569, 571-576, 611-613, 615, 618-622, 624, 629-633, 651.
Prussia, Prussianism. See Germany.

R

Regularity (legitimacy) in nature and history—246, 358, 450-451, 454, 460, 468, 562-563, 572.

Religion—186-187, 479.

Republic, bourgeois—80, 146-147, 158-160, 163, 170, 171, 179-180, 182, 188, 195, 200-201, 208-209, 217, 219, 227, 235, 253-259, 264, 268-269, 274, 280, 287-288, 308, 312-313, 320-321, 329-330, 333, 336, 483, 485, 517.

Revolution—123, 147, 217, 363, 368, 516, 638;

—bourgeois—60, 65, 67-68, 162, 250;
 —proletarian, socialist; See *Proletarian revolution.*

Revolution in Permanence—110, 117, 223.

Revolution of 1848-1849—120, 122, 124, 127, 359, 381.

Revolution of 1848-1849 in Germany—66-69, 79, 106-108, 131.

Revolution of 1848 in France—32, 79, 122, 124-125, 131, 139, 144-146, 161-162, 176, 247, 249-251, 258, 268-270, 331-332, 475, 504, 513, 517;

—stages of—252-253, 329-330;

—June insurrection of proletariat—30, 79, 122, 149, 161-167, 194-195, 254-256, 264, 281-282, 329, 475, 512, 517;

—proletariat in—125, 146-151, 157, 159-161, 163, 174-176, 181-182, 191, 193, 198, 223-224, 252-255, 292, 331, 518-519;

—bourgeoisie in—124-126, 158-159, 160-161, 162-167, 168, 172-174, 176-180, 181-182, 189-191, 221, 224, 227, 237-238, 252-254, 255-256, 262-264, 276, 282, 286-287, 292, 296,

300, 313-314, 317-321, 323-324, 327-328, 331, 475-476;

—petty bourgeoisie in—152, 156, 158, 167-168, 174-175, 190, 194, 200-201, 224, 233, 252-253, 276, 282, 292;

—peasantry in—146, 153-154, 158, 169-170, 173-174, 191-194, 216-219, 265, 286-287, 340-341, 526;

—Party of the *Montagne* (Mountain)—164, 175, 269;

—Social-Democratic Party (new *Montagne*)—182, 185-186, 188-189, 191-194, 225, 231-233, 235, 271-272, 274-280, 291, 330;

—Party of Order—189-191, 195, 201-202, 208, 210, 218, 221, 223, 226, 232-242, 255-256, 264-269, 270-273, 276, 279-284, 290-291, 293-295, 299, 302, 305-320, 327, 328-329, 504, 513, 517-518, 526;

—Provisional Government of February republic—144-145, 150-160, 166, 252, 258;

—Luxemburg Commission—147, 149, 156;

—Constituent Assembly—159-160, 164-171, 173, 175, 177-189, 192-197, 213, 252-253, 256-258, 264-267, 270, 274-276, 283, 293, 329, 524;

—Legislative Assembly—173, 189, 191, 194-198, 201-207, 213, 218-220, 223, 225, 232-233, 236-238, 241-242, 252, 260-261, 265-267, 268, 270, 282-283, 288-289, 293-294, 296-298, 300-305, 306-307, 310-312, 316, 324-330;

—right to work—121, 171.

Revolution, bourgeois, in France, in 1830 (July Revolution)—54, 131, 139, 146-147, 517.

Revolution, bourgeois, in France, in 18th century—47, 65, 67-68, 114, 115, 154, 161, 247-248, 250, 268, 332, 516.

Revolution, bourgeois, in England, in 17th century—65, 67-68, 124, 248, 328.

Rheinische Zeitung—361.

Right (Law), its economic roots—
49, 362, 622-623.
Russia—23, 125, 135, 195, 384, 408,
474, 490, 495, 551;
—tsarism of, its reactionary role—
23, 490, 495.

S

Science—365, 421.
Scientific socialism—24, 46, 48-49,
125, 365, 393, 548, 612, 619, 633-
634, 651;
—historical origin of—30-31, 362-364.
Sectarianism—633.
Serfdom—83, 428, 465.
Slave-holding society—34, 83.
Slavery—244, 429, 465.
Small-holding economy—215-217,
248, 334-341, 645.
Social-Democratic Party of Germany
—128, 135-136, 485, 549-550, 613;
—and Anti-Socialist law—128, 130,
473-474, 650.
*Social-Democratic Workers' Party of
Germany (Eisenachers)*—489, 496.
Socialism
—scientific. See *Scientific socialism*.
—feudal—54-55, 121;
—petty-bourgeois—56-57, 121, 222,
394, 550, 559, 614;
—“true”—57-58;
—conservative, or bourgeois—31,
60-61, 121, 222, 549, 580-583;
—critical-utopian—31, 61-64, 588,
651.
Socialist society—78, 490, 631-632,
636;
See also *Communist society*.
Society—90;
—socio-economic formations of—90,
248, 363-364, 451;
—civil—284, 362;
See also *Primitive society*, *Slave-
holding society*, *Feudalism*, *Bour-
geois society*, *Socialist society*,
Communist society.
State—483-485, 516, 572, 603-604,
623;

—class essence of—52, 485, 517,
603-604;
—origin of—483;
—bourgeois—36-37, 140, 146, 163,
209-210, 284-285, 332-334, 517-518,
520-522, 603-604;
—and proletarian revolution, neces-
sity of smashing bourgeois state
machine—22, 340, 483-485, 516,
520, 638;
—withering away of—638;
—proletarian; See *Dictatorship of
proletariat*.
See also *Monarchy*, *Republic*.
Supply and demand—84-87, 383,
402-403, 408, 413-414, 422, 441, 444.
Surplus value—427-428, 431-434,
463-466, 470-472, 553-554, 558, 560,
567, 572-573;
—rate of—428, 572.
Switzerland—64, 80, 116, 129, 134,
143.

T

*Tactics of class struggle of proletar-
iat*—46, 65.
Taxation—116, 127, 140-141, 171,
178-179, 211, 213, 217, 443, 465,
567, 575.
Theory and its importance—46-47,
370, 652;
—unity of theory and practice—368.
Town and country—35-36, 38, 54,
272, 527, 570, 587, 626.
Trade—35, 101, 358.
Trade Unions—31, 447, 651.

U

*Unemployment under capitalism
(reserve army)*—468, 581.
Uninterrupted revolution. See *Revo-
lution in Permanence*.
United States. See *America*.
Universal suffrage—129-130, 134,
146, 158, 170, 172, 227, 233, 252,
258, 467, 520-521, 641.
Uprising, armed—113, 130-134.

V

- Value*—72, 77, 413, 416-424, 430-431, 434-435, 441, 472;
 —form of—448;
 —use—375, 616;
 —exchange—82, 90-91, 96, 375, 404, 415, 416-418, 420, 616.

W

Wage labour. See Labour.

Wage Labour and Capital, by Marx
 —70-71, 364.

- Wages*—40, 42, 71, 72, 75, 81-84, 88, 93-98, 102, 104, 399-407, 409-416, 418, 426-427, 429-430, 432-438, 439, 442, 443-444, 447, 462-464, 472, 554, 580, 585-586;
 —struggle of workers for increase in—398, 400, 436-441, 446-447;
 —real and nominal—95-96, 97, 399;
 —minimum and maximum—47, 89, 103-104, 444;
 —and profit—95-98, 403, 414, 434-435, 443, 447.

War

- attitude of proletariat toward it—487-490, 495-496, 498, 650;
 —civil—161, 254, 504, 507-508, 510, 514, 525, 540, 541;
 —defensive—492;
 —of conquest—493-494;
 —Napoleonic wars—494;
 —Austro-Prussian of 1866—127, 476-477, 495, 641-642, 644, 647;
 —Franco-Prussian of 1870—127-128, 473, 476, 487-488, 491, 506-508, 518, 534, 541, 650.

Work. See Labour.

- Working-class (labour) movement*—23, 32, 447, 611, 651-652;
 —international character of—32, 125, 384-385, 386-387, 548, 611, 652-653;
 —in Britain—651;
 —in Germany—554-555, 650-652;
 —in France—497, 548, 555, 611.
Working day—428-429, 438-440, 442-444, 465-467;
 —struggle of workers to shorten—382, 439, 444, 466-467.

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

